Armed Forces Bill

Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, we on these Benches are very grateful to Sir Richard Henriques for his report and recommendations. We understand why, in the three months since they were published, they have received only light-touch consideration from the Government. Perhaps I can be forgiven for giving some historical context to the role of the chain of command in courts martial, because it appears in Amendment 43 and in the Bill.

In 1757, Admiral Byng was convicted not of personal cowardice but of failing to do his utmost to engage the enemy in an attack upon French forces besieging the British garrison in Menorca. The truth was that his fleet of ships had been hastily assembled by the Admiralty. They were in poor condition and he had to retire to have them repaired, but he was convicted by court martial under the Articles of War and, despite pleas for clemency, even by the Prime Minister William Pitt himself, George II refused to commute the sentence. Admiral Byng was shot on the quarterdeck of a British ship by a firing squad. Your Lordships will recall that Voltaire, in his book Candide, commented that in Britain, it is good to kill an admiral from time to time to encourage the others—“pour encourager les autres”.

Courts martial were seen then, and for 200 years afterwards, as an instrument of discipline rather than justice. It is undoubtedly the case that men were shot for cowardice in the First World War to encourage their comrades to go over the top. Discipline was seen to be a function of command, and the commander must achieve discipline to secure cohesive action and singleness of purpose.

It was the Labour Government of 1946 who appointed a commission to examine the administration of military justice. It advised the appoint of a civilian judge-marshal but made no change in the way the board and the prosecuting officer were appointed. So it was that in 1996, the structure of courts martial was still within the chain of command. The convening officer, who was the field officer in command of a body of the Regular Forces within which the person to be tried was serving, was the person who decided the charges against the defendant, appointed the board and the prosecuting officer and arranged the trial. He—the convening officer—could dissolve the court martial during the trial, in the interests of the administration of justice, and could comment on its findings publicly, in the interests of discipline. He confirmed the findings and could reject or change the sentence, so the board was still subject to command influence.

A fair and impartial trial is obviously difficult in an atmosphere of command control. All the personnel connected with the trial are dependent, or were at that time, on the commanding officer for assignments, leave and promotion. A member of the board could not deviate too far from his commander’s views of the case if it might affect his career. That is why, following the criticisms made by the European Court of Human Rights in Findlay, we brought about such significant changes in 2006. Justice is now the dominant element and in a volunteer army, this is vital to morale and to the retention of personnel, as Sir Richard Henriques himself comments.

Despite this history, the Government have rejected Sir Richard’s recommendation 14. In paragraph 5.4.1 of his review, he says:

“An investigating body, charged with the responsibility of investigating serious crime allegedly committed by members of the Armed Forces, must be hierarchically, institutionally and practically independent both of the chain of command and of those whom they are under a duty to investigate.”


The wording that he uses—“hierarchically, institutionally and practically”—comes from the judgment in Jordan v United Kingdom, 37 EHRR 2. Explicitly, the European court was following Lord Steyn in 2003 in the Appellate Committee of this House, where he said:

“Public perception of the possibility of unconscious bias is the key.”


That issue of public confidence was raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, at the last hearing of this Committee.

However, instead of following that wording and explicitly breaking away from the chain of command, the Government have put forward the existing wording taken from the 2011 Act, as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, pointed out. New Section 2A, proposed by the noble Baroness’s Amendment 42, would impose a duty on the provost marshal to ensure that all investigations are “free from improper interference”. That in no way matches the language of recommendation 14 of Sir Richard Henriques’s report, which makes an explicit break from the chain of command.

In recommending a strategic policing board for civilian governance and oversight of the provost marshal for serious crime, in paragraph 5.6.13 of his report, Sir Richard Henriques looked around the world. He looked to New Zealand, Australia and Canada. He also considered the function of the independent advisory group, which was formed for Operation Northmoor in this country. It appears that he agreed the composition of the strategic policing board with the Chief of Defence Staff and the Chief of Defence People.

Today, the noble Baroness told us that the Government have accepted the strategic policing board’s structure, but it is something to be put into the future. The strategic policing board is the person who stands behind and is the instrument of governance of the proposed provost marshal for serious crime. You cannot have one without the other, so perhaps the noble Baroness will explain how you could appoint a person to a position and give them responsibilities without first having the strategic policing board of civilian governance and oversight that Sir Richard Henriques called for.

Finally, I add my support to Amendment 66 and its requirement for a report to ensure that Sir Richard Henriques’s recommendations are carried out.

[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)]

My Lords, I support this amendment, but I have a number of questions for my noble friend the Minister.

The tri-service serious crime unit is definitely a good idea but, given that the Armed Forces Act brought together the three single-service Acts back in 2006, I have for some time questioned why we do not have a joint service police force, given their relative sizes. The Royal Air Force Police is commanded by a group captain; the Navy, by a commander; and, of course, the Army provost marshal is a one-star brigadier. Who will own this organisation? If it is not going to be linked to one of the other service police forces, how can we ensure that it will not wither on the vine in time? For example, what will happen to the SIB, which has a proud operational record over the past 40 years? What will its role be vis-à-vis this new organisation? Equally, as we create what will be a fourth provost marshal, who will sit on the National Police Chiefs’ Council? Currently, the three single service provost marshals do. Does this mean that now there will be four? How will that look? Will defence be speaking with a single voice?

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My noble friend Lord Lancaster also raised an issue about structures and who is accountable to whom. A lot of this work, obviously, is still under consideration. Will more information on the unit be provided? Yes, our officials continue to work on the detail, alongside specialist resource from across the tri-services, and we will provide more information as it emerges. A number of noble Lords sought further information about the unit itself and I thank them for their interest.

[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)]

I sense that my noble friend might be coming to the end of her remarks. Perhaps I might take her back to the question of independence and the need for the appointment to come from members of the service police. The answer that she gave to the Committee was, “Well, that’s what the Armed Forces Act says”. My response would be, “Well, so what?” Is it not the purpose of this Bill and this Committee to look again at these issues? I do not want to put my noble friend on the spot, but could we perhaps think again as to whether that is still the best thing to do, given the nature of the role, and whether, as we move forward, because there are other examples in defence where we recruit from civilians because they are best qualified and best placed, the time has come to look again at that requirement?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I cannot give my noble friend the certainty of the assurance that he seeks, but I indicated that the rank was decided based on the current rank range of the single service provost marshal. We are open to revisiting the rank of provost marshal for serious crime—that is one of the recommendations in Henriques—and we would intend to review the post three years after the unit is operational. That is a sensible review period to allow some time to elapse. We want to ensure that the post remains aligned with the level of responsibility that is implicit in the role and the relevant and recent skills and experience of the postholder, and that it remains open to all three services to compete for. I can say to my noble friend that there is continued thinking on this, but I cannot at this stage provide him with the certainty that he seeks.

I have tried to address the points that have arisen and I hope that I have covered them all. In these circumstances, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

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[Lord Robertson of Port Ellen (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 48 and will follow what the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, said. I will say why the amendment and more care for mental illness are required.

I live in a town in Scotland called Dunblane. In 1996, a gunman used a private armoury to kill schoolchildren and their teacher. At that time I was shadow Secretary of State for Scotland and lived in the town. The Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael Forsyth, was the local Member of Parliament. We came together that day. It was by any standard a traumatic day. We did everything together after that to handle the issues that came up in the media. The following day, the Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition came to the town.

Within days I was back at work, which you do: it is traumatic, but you get through these things. I thought, “Well, I’m tough enough”—I had been a politician in Scotland for long enough, after all. You think you can take it all. But gradually I came to realise that I was not coping with it at all. I remembered that the Secretary of State for Scotland had offered counselling to those who had been affected. We were also made the same offer as individuals. I went to see the counsellor because I found I could not mention the events of that day without breaking up, and this was not something that was convenient or natural when you were in the bearpit of Scottish politics. I took up the offer and went to the counsellor. I spent a morning with an experienced counsellor and I was fixed. It took only a morning, but that lady was quite remarkable in the way she treated me.

Fast forward two years and I am Secretary of State for Defence. The Omagh bomb exploded in that small town in Northern Ireland. I went across as Defence Secretary with the Chief of the General Staff, Sir Roger Wheeler, and spoke to the troops that day. The troops based there who had helped in the aftermath were pretty hardened infantry soldiers—as tough and as hard as you can get, and they had been in Northern Ireland for some time—but they were deeply affected by what they had seen that day. They could cope with most things, but the sight of a baby torn in pieces was something they were deeply traumatised by.

I told them my story that day to say that they had been injured by what they had seen and that they needed to take the counselling that was going to be on offer. Although they were tough and hard, if they had been told after being shot in the shoulder to put a sticking plaster on it and it would go away, it would not have seemed sufficient even for them, yet they had been injured in another way, and there were ways in which they could be treated. I hope that had an effect that day and persuaded some of them to take that treatment, which they probably felt was not something they would ever really need.

Since then, of course, the traumas of Afghanistan and Iraq have come along and many more of our Armed Forces have been severely affected. Therefore, this amendment, which, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, said, maybe does not go far enough, alerts the Ministry of Defence to the necessity that is there to make sure that more attention is paid to that aspect of medical welfare.

[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)]

My Lords, I do not think anybody can disagree with the intention of these amendments. Indeed, I agree entirely and am pleased to have heard about the progress made by the MoD in recent years when it comes to mental health—and, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, said, the differing approach that we have taken to mental health and physical health over many years. It begs the question as to whether there is anything about physical health in the Bill, if we are potentially about to put something in about mental health.

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[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 49 and 63, but I shall speak to Amendment 63 and concentrate on the plight of the few UK Armed Forces veterans of the Hong Kong Military Service Corps. For completeness, I also include veterans of the Royal Navy Hong Kong Squadron. They were all full members of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces throughout their service. They took the same lifetime oath of loyalty as all other British service members, and paid full UK taxes. Officially recognised as veterans by Her Majesty’s Government, they are not being treated fairly and reasonably, as the covenant requires. I have already explained the background to this issue to the Minister and raised it many times in this House, so I will not repeat myself now in this Committee.

The recent swift action by the Government to evacuate and grant right of abode to thousands of Afghanis shows that the Home Office can respond fast. Is there any reason why the Government have prevaricated for the past nine years and refused to come to a decision about granting the request of the Hong Kong veterans for British citizenship and right of abode? These veterans’ covenant rights should apply in Hong Kong as they do anywhere else.

The imposed national security law in Hong Kong has put the “one country, two systems” paradigm in a precarious state. These veterans find themselves living under Beijing rule. They, along with many other Hong Kongers, are worried, but they are small in number and believe their case is now a matter of humanity, not politics. They feel they are being treated as aliens, not veterans of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces.

They, as much as other past members of the Armed Forces, deserve a positive decision, not the endless excuse that their case is being “actively considered”. That euphemism has been the response of Home Office Ministers and a frequently repeated response to approaches from Members of both Houses on behalf of these veterans for the past nine years and more. Over 60 individual applications from this small group of veterans, which I forwarded to the Home Office on their behalf in March 2020, over 18 months ago, have gone unanswered. It all smacks of a Sir Humphrey-style reaction, unworthy of the Home Office, unless it aspires to remain a department unfit for business in this area. It is long past time for this request to be resolved finally and clearly.

Is this not an equally pertinent example, as was the case of Gulf War syndrome, highlighted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, in the earlier Committee debate, of the need to include the Secretary of State for Defence in the list of those who must have a duty of care under the covenant? These Hong Kong Armed Forces veterans’ concerns and requests are not ones that could be devolved or passed to a local authority. Including the Secretary of State in this Bill is necessary to fill this gap in the duty of care under the covenant. Will the Government acknowledge that this Hong Kong veterans’ claim is a long-standing and legitimate one that should be honoured by reaching a decision now?

[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to contribute on Amendment 49. In doing so, I declare my interest as Colonel Commandant of the Brigade of Gurkhas. I have had a long association with the brigade since, as an 18 year-old troop commander in the Queen’s Gurkha Engineers, I first visited Nepal in 1988. I have served with them ever since, in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere, so I am delighted to now be the Colonel Commandant.

This is an interesting day. Yesterday marked the 207th anniversary of the death of Major-General Rollo Gillespie at the Battle of Kalunga, where a tiny Gurkha or Nepali force of some 600 held off for nearly a month a much better-equipped and larger British Army force. That honourable draw effectively started the relationship between the British Army and Nepal, when the Prime Minister at the time, Bhim Thapa, allowed the East India Company, as it was then, to start recruiting Gurkhas.