Public Office (Accountability) Bill: Exclusion

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Thursday 26th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I too welcome the obtaining of this debate by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and want to return, as we often should, to the actual Question in the debate. We shall have plenty of time to look at the Bill when it gets here. We are not on the Bill but on this very narrow point. Narrow though it is, it is important. Although what the Government have proposed—excluding MPs and Peers—is probably right, because it is the Government and the Executive who are dealt with in the scope of the Bill, it is worth while considering the implications of this. We can take two things by way of some help in examining the question, because the acuteness of this issue will arise primarily when we get close to an election or when political tensions are high.

It is quite interesting to see what we did in the Representation of the People Act, or to go back to what was originally enacted in 1895, in distinguishing between untruths in relation to people’s personal characteristics and untruths in relation to all other matters. Looking at the debates in 1895, it seems remarkable to me that that distinction, which was carefully made, has stood us in good stead, because we addressed a particular problem in elections.

When you look at the debates, you can see what was worrying politicians in 1895. One was worried about the fact that, during an election, he had been on a Bench of magistrates and was said to have sent a man to prison for a month, with hard labour, for stealing three pennorth of oats; he had dissented from the decision of the others. Another was accused of his yacht being used to poach salmon with a net on a Sunday in Scotland. It was a concern that untruths were being told about people’s personal characteristics, for which there was no effective remedy because you could not bring an action for slander during an election. Therefore, in 1895 it was decided that one ought to focus on what the problem was, what the remedy was and whether it should be enacted. It was enacted then and has been re-enacted successively, as recently as the 1983 legislation.

Why has it been restricted in this way? Looking at the case law that has elucidated these provisions, it seems that Parliament then thought—it is, to my mind, a very tenable position—that whereas it is wrong to be allowed to tell lies about someone’s personal characteristics, because it is very difficult to disprove those, do you leave the good sense of lying about politics to the public? That has served us well for over 130 years, but the question is: should we continue that distinction?

It is useful to look at a second matter, which is the proceedings in Senedd Cymru where, in relation to elections in Wales, it is proposed that there be an offence, similar to what is envisaged in the Bill, applicable during elections: namely, telling untruths of any fact or matter completely. The report of the examination by the Senedd committee is useful reading because it had evidence from the Electoral Commission, the Bar in Wales, Transparency International, Professor Horder and others, in relation to the problems that you create by having a wide-ranging offence of this kind.

The way forward, it seems to me, is to look at what the problem is in this House and in the other place. Is there a remedy that should be brought, and in what circumstances? The one thing that would be very undesirable is to create a huge amount of potential for people to complain to the police, saying “X or Y is lying about this” and seeking to engage in political prosecutions of that kind. That is a real worry.

However, I go this far in supporting the noble Baroness, Lady Jones: we simply ought to look at the difficulties and see what the problem is—but it is a difficult problem on which there is an awful lot of experience, and we need a proper examination. On what I have read so far, I regret to say that I agree with leaving their Lordships—I should say “your Lordships”, including myself—and others out of the scope of this Bill, because there is a logic to confining the provision to the Executive and not opening the door to lengthy and politically inspired prosecutions. However, it is a question that should be examined, and that is why I am so grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for raising this very difficult point.