Transnational Repression in the UK (JCHR Report)

Thursday 26th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Motion to Take Note

16:27

Moved by

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

That this House takes note of the Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights Transnational repression in the UK (7th Report, HL Paper 160).

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

My Lords, before the debate gets under way, I want to highlight the four-minute advisory time for Back-Bench contributions. This is designed to ensure that the debate can finish within two hours, in line with the usual timings for Thursday debates, and that the House can rise at a reasonable time. I therefore urge noble Lords to keep their remarks within four minutes to meet these ends—of course, with the exception of the mover, the noble Lord, Lord Alton.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, it is an honour to open today’s debate on the Joint Committee on Human Rights report Transnational Repression in the United Kingdom. As chair of the JCHR, I pay tribute to my committee colleagues from both Houses and thank the terrific JCHR team, headed by our clerks Rhiannon Hollis, Moriyo Aiyeola and Lauren Marchant. I also thank the Library for its briefing note, the Minister and the officials who have briefed him for the work that has been done by him and his colleagues in the department, but especially the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, who will make his maiden speech today. We greatly look forward to hearing that.

Our report highlights the absence of a universally accepted definition of transnational repression—TNR. We recommend that the Government adopt a formal definition, systematically collect data, and develop monitoring mechanisms. We agree with James Lynch, the co-director of Fair Square, who told our committee that we are missing a

“big opportunity to properly monitor and analyse the trends and then develop a coherent strategy”.

We query the way in which TNR is treated in diplomacy with hostile states, and contend that failure to incorporate it as part of the UK’s diplomatic engagement with perpetrator countries

“risks … emboldening authoritarian regimes to escalate TNR activities”.

The report calls for international co-operation with other democracies—we mention the example of Canada—in combating TNR, and we make some specific recommendations about the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation, or SLAPPs, and the misuse of Interpol red notices. Closer to home, we call for a national hotline for victims, and more systematic, specialised training for police officers to identify the early warning signs of TNR.

In paragraph 96 of the report, we say:

“The UK’s response to TNR would benefit significantly from more structured and consistent coordination across government departments”.


Andrew Scurry, the director of the homeland security group at the Home Office, told us that:

“We are looking still with the police … at how best to gather data and more information, and indeed intelligence”.


It would be good for the House to hear how that is going.

During a discussion this morning with academics from Bristol and Oxford Universities, facilitated by the international affairs parliamentary hub, I was struck by their finding that TNR is profoundly on the rise in the UK. This chimed entirely with our own committee’s view that TNR is not a peripheral or minor issue. MI5 says that, in 2024, the number of its state-threat investigations jumped by some 48%, with more than 20 threat-to-life cases relating to Iran alone, since the start of 2022. The true scale, though, is likely to be far greater still, given the significant underreporting and the often covert nature of TNR criminality.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights commends the National Security Act 2023, which created new offences relating to foreign interference in the UK, and did not identify any significant gaps in criminal law related to TNR. We do, however, want the existing laws to be better used and more effectively enforced. It is essential that the legal framework remains agile and responsive to evolving threats. We recognise the rapidly evolving nature of digital technologies, and the increasing sophistication of methods used to conduct TNR. We call for the Government to keep relevant legislation under regular review, and have asked for an annual update to the JCHR on the effectiveness of current legislation in addressing evolving digital forms of TNR.

Our country has a long history of giving protection to courageous dissidents being hunted down by dictatorships. During my early days as a young Member of Parliament in the 1980s, I met extraordinary heroes who had escaped the Soviet bloc and continued to work for the liberties that would ultimately come with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Back then, and today too, dictatorial regimes had a long reach.

Let me draw on the evidence given to our inquiry to illustrate the nature of the threats that people resident in the United Kingdom now face. A number of noble Lords have experienced a small dose of transnational repression themselves: in my case, collecting sanctions from Russia, North Korea, Iran and China. But this is small beer in comparison with some of the appalling intimidation experienced by others. Perhaps the Minister could tell us whether China has lifted sanctions on parliamentarians’ families, and on others, including Sir Geoffrey Nice KC, who chaired the Uyghur Tribunal, Dr Jo Smith Finley, Essex Court Chambers, and the Conservative Party Human Rights Commission.

Will the Minister also comment on the 1 million Hong Kong dollar bounty placed by the CCP on the head of Chloe Cheung, a 19 year-old young woman, and others in the United Kingdom? Read Chloe’s courageous testimony to our inquiry, waiving her anonymity, in which she described the profound effect that this CCP targeting has had on her. She spoke recently against the proposed CCP mega-embassy in London, fearful that, if it is built and she is snatched, she will, to use her words, “never come out”.

Read the evidence of the brave Uyghur activist Rahima Mahmut, whose relatives in China have been subjected to intimidation and coercion, forced to publicly condemn her in order to safeguard themselves from reprisals. She movingly described to the committee what she called the “human cost” of speaking out. Read the evidence of the disgraceful treatment of Professor Michelle Shipworth by University College London, and the shameful mistreatment of Sheffield Hallam’s Professor Laura Murphy following her brilliant work on Uyghur slave labour in Xinjiang.

Their treatment is an affront to British sovereignty, to academic freedom and to free speech. It is transnational repression driven by overreliance on Chinese money. Let us note too that, earlier this month, MI5’s Ken McCallum identified threats to universities, students and academics at a meeting he convened with 70 vice-chancellors. How will the Government implement a direct reporting route on foreign interference, implement the complaints scheme in the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act and strengthen overseas transparency regulatory powers?

Unsurprisingly, the JCHR received a large amount of evidence recommending the designation of China under the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme—FIRS. It was an issue raised by Caoilfhionn Gallagher KC the lawyer of British citizen Jimmy Lai, incarcerated in Hong Kong for five years and in solitary confinement. She told our inquiry that, as his lawyer, she had been subjected to threats and harassment. She criticised the feeble response to bounties and sanctions against parliamentarians and described how peaceful protestors in Manchester had been assaulted by CCP diplomats. She said:

“We send such a terrible message if we have a situation where a diplomat can drag an activist by the hair into the Manchester consulate … and the use of language such as calling individuals rats who need to be hunted down worldwide, and yet … China is not in the enhanced tier”.


The JCHR concluded:

“Decisions on which countries to specify under the enhanced tier of FIRS must be guided by objective assessments of threat, not influenced by broader foreign policy considerations. We recommend that the Government specify China under the enhanced tier of FIRS”;


and that

“The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 do not capture the full range of TNR tactics”;


and that China’s omission from the enhanced tier

“risks undermining the credibility and coherence of FIRS”.

The JCHR found:

“China conducts the most comprehensive TNR campaign of any foreign state operating in the UK”.


I would be grateful if the Minister would respond to my previously voiced proposal—which appears at paragraph 90 on page 37 as a JCHR recommendation—that the Intelligence and Security Committee, on which the noble Lord himself served with great distinction, should have confidential oversight of FIRS and sanctions and which, like appointments of high-level British ambassadors, or the expulsion of diplomats connected to TNR, should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

Such scrutiny should also extend to issues of proscriptions. Let us consider Iran and the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. We heard shocking evidence of the lethality of Iranian transnational repression. We heard about an Iranian journalist left seriously wounded on the streets of London and about intimidation of BBC Persian journalists and their families. One witness, Hossein Abedini, deputy director of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, almost lost his life in a vicious brutal attack by Iranian operatives. He told the JCHR that “cultural centres” in the UK are used as fronts for surveillance operations targeting members of the Iranian diaspora. Reporters without Borders told us:

“Iranian women journalists have been subjected to gendered and sexualised abuse, including explicit threats of rape or sexual violence towards them or their families (including children), the circulation of fake stories designed to ruin their reputations and photoshopped pornographic images”.


In this week marking the fourth anniversary of Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine, we should consider also how Putin’s regime has engaged in the most terrible war crimes and egregious forms of transnational repression. We can recall the Salisbury nerve agent attack on Sergei and Yulia Skripal. But Russian TNR comes in other form too. The JCHR received evidence relating to the misuse of SLAPPs to intimidate and silence journalists, activists, and other critics.

Although SLAPPs are typically initiated by private individuals rather than states, we heard that they are often used as a TNR tactic. Susan Coughtrie, the director of the Foreign Policy Centre, told us that individuals “closely aligned” with the state are utilised to carry out TNR through legal harassment. She cited the case of Catherine Belton, the journalist and author of the book Putin’s People:

“She was pursued originally by five oligarchs, including Roman Abramovich, but also Rosneft, which is the Russian state gas company, so there was a very direct link there … to the Russian state”.


The inquiry found that SLAPPs are increasingly used to silence and intimidate people who expose or criticise the actions of authoritarian regimes.

The committee would also like the Government to look at the cost and stress of lengthy legal action, provide a clear timeline for a review of the effectiveness of the SLAPPs provisions in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 and ensure that future legislation deals with SLAPPs that are not related to economic crime.

Our inquiry also found that Interpol red notices had been issued without the knowledge of those targeted, leaving people uncertain about whether they can travel without risk of detention. We concluded that red notices are being systematically exploited to pursue political opponents, human rights defenders and journalists beyond national borders.

Beyond Russia, Iran and China, the committee received credible evidence that a number of states had engaged in acts of transnational repression on UK soil. The evidence included allegations concerning Pakistan, India, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

I draw particular attention to the evidence and testimony given to our inquiry concerning Eritrea by Martin Plaut, the accomplished former BBC journalist, author and academic. The UN special rapporteur on Eritrea told the inquiry that those who refuse to contribute a tax that is levied on the diaspora are

“considered government opponents and face harassment, intimidation and ultimately social isolation”.

I welcome an update on what the Government are doing about this.

In the last few days, I have received additional disturbing depositions, one of which I know the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, will refer to in her remarks. I received evidence also about a Burmese artist who has been targeted, and I will send the depositions to the Minister, because they are outside the scope of the inquiry.

Let me end. With our national security interests and way of life threatened on a scale unparalleled since the 1930s and 1940s, democracies must act together in strong alliances to combat multipolar threats to our way of life. We are fools to take for granted our privileges and freedoms, including the right to think, to speak and to believe—even to live. All over the world, the 30 articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are under concerted attack. We have been far too complacent and dependent on the states which threaten us, and insufficiently focused on resilience. Transnational repression is a harbinger of far worse to come.

Our committee concluded that transnational repression risks undermining the UK’s ability to protect people who have sought safety within our borders, such as the witnesses to whom I have referred. But we also found that a failure to deal robustly with TNR and the malign activities of hostile states will also increasingly put the UK’s indigenous population at risk today. Debates such as this will bring the JCHR report to a wider audience and I hope that noble Lords who have participated—and I am grateful to them all—will circulate its findings far and wide. I beg to move.

16:43

[Lord Isaac (Lab) (Maiden Speech)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for his warm welcome and for introducing this important debate: one that is fundamental to protecting freedoms and human rights in this country, and one that I believe highlights the important work of his committee. I rise for my maiden speech with a real sense of responsibility and duty that comes from joining this august body.

I begin by thanking Black Rod, Garter, the Clerk, the doorkeepers and all the staff of this House for the kindness that they have shown me since joining. I thank noble Lords from every side for the very warm welcome without exception they have given to me. I especially thank my supporters, my noble friends Lady Royall and Lord Collins, for their encouragement, wisdom and support, as well as my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester, an alumnus of my college in Oxford and someone who has been a great supporter and friend of my work, in and beyond Oxford.

I grew up in a small village called Llanfoist, outside Abergavenny in South Wales, where many of my family for many generations had lived. I attended the village primary school and I went on to the local secondary school, where I was privileged to receive an excellent state education—something that we Welsh are rightly proud of and that should be the right of every child, not a privilege. That education enabled me to go to Cambridge, the first member of my family to go to university, and ultimately to establish a successful career as a lawyer in the City. Education transformed my life and life chances. It gave me important skills, it widened my horizons and it taught me about the importance of music, art and culture and how they enhance the world.

My commitment to education has led me to the most recent phase of my career as provost of Worcester College, Oxford, and chair of the University of the Arts in London. These roles have enabled me to give something back to current students, but they have also given me an opportunity to argue for a number of things, such as improved funding for students and universities, the need to continue to support initiatives to widen participation and, last but not least, the importance of creative education. Let us not forget that the creative industries contributed £125 billion to the UK economy in 2022. Improved support for students and educational institutions, including creative educational institutions, is, in my view, essential if this country and future generations are to flourish.

I am very conscious that this debate is about transnational repression of freedoms and human rights. Human rights have played a key role in my life. I grew up in the 1980s during the AIDS pandemic and later lived through the chilling effect of Section 28. Working with others, I realised that we could use our legal and advocacy skills to work to end discrimination against the gay community in this country. Progress in delivering legal and cultural change has succeeded in no small part because of our focus on human rights. Later, as the chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, it was a privilege not only to lead a national organisation committed to promoting equality and human rights, but to work with international organisations promoting greater understanding, particularly in countries where human rights are not yet as well embedded in law as they are in the UK.

At the same time as protecting the rights of our own citizens, and, dare I say, resisting culture-war attacks on the very notion of human rights, we must stop foreign state-directed crimes against individuals deemed by their Governments to be a security threat. The noble Lord has provided ample evidence of those threats. I am particularly grateful to the Minister, my noble friend Lord Hanson, for meeting me to discuss his department’s response to this important report. I thank him for his work, which I am confident is in line with the ambitions of the JCHR report. The freedoms and human rights of journalists, lawyers and political opponents in this country are, as we have heard, being undermined. I also know that anxieties about such threats can and do have a chilling effect in our universities. We must work hard to ensure that human rights and freedom of speech are protected in our universities more generally. It is for that reason that I am committed to support the work of the JCHR in this important area.

I should like to end by making it clear that it would have been beyond the imagination of my teenage self to think that today I would be a Member of this House. It is thanks to the support of my parents, and particularly to the confidence that my teachers had in me while I was growing up, that I hope to play a role in this Chamber in promoting not only human rights but the importance of education and culture.

16:50

[Lord Cryer (Lab)]

My Lords, it is my duty and pleasure to welcome the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, to his place and congratulate him on an outstanding maiden speech. The rest of us will have to look to our laurels in the next few years, I suspect. The noble Lord, Lord Isaac, CBE, is, as noble Lords have heard, provost of Worcester College, Oxford, and chair of the governors of the University of the Arts London and of the Henry Moore Foundation. Throughout his career, he has consistently been involved in the arts, education and human rights; we heard some of that a few minutes ago. He is also a former chair, as we have heard, of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission, of Stonewall and of Modern Art Oxford.

On a personal note, I thank the noble Lord for the delivery of the report on anti-Semitism in the Labour Party. He was not chair when the report was delivered but he oversaw and initiated it. That, for me, was a major turning point in Labour Party history and probably more widely in British political history. He was also a trustee of Cumberland Lodge, and a director of the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, of the Human Dignity Trust, of the Big Lottery Fund and of 14-18 NOW. He was also for many years, as noble Lords have heard, a partner at Pinsent Masons and made a CBE in the 2011 Queen’s Birthday Honours List. I do not know where he found the time for all that, but there we are.

I turn to the debate. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, who has an exemplary track record on issues of human rights around the world, and to the JCHR and the report that it has produced, which clearly demonstrates that a lot of regimes are using physical and digital means to target individuals across borders. The key passage from the report, from my point of view, states that testimonies point to a continuing gap between policy commitments and lived experience, including delayed police responses, subpar case management and persistent intimidation faced by diaspora communities. That is very clear about where we are. The report points to a number of countries but, in the short time I have, I will focus on two, China and Iran, which both use force against expats—we have heard a lot about that from the noble Lord, Lord Alton—and at times against British citizens.

The recent events in Iran should not need any repetition but, unfortunately, they do. We have seen, night after night, the persecution during the recent demonstrations by Iranian citizens. The recent crackdown probably involved the murder of 36,000 Iranian citizens. The figure is likely much higher than that, but that figure can be readily attributable to the Iranian regime. Agents of the Iranian state, as we have heard, have attacked peaceful demonstrators in central London on a number of occasions. I welcome the fact that the Government—I have engaged in Questions with my noble friend the Minister about this—have recently introduced new criminal charges that have been put on to the statute book, whereby if you have undeclared links to the Tehran regime, you can be prosecuted. That was not the case before and is to be welcomed.

However, as has been mentioned many times, the IRGC—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—remains unproscribed. Individuals may be prosecuted and they have been proscribed, but we have failed to proscribe it as a collective unit. We are talking about an enormous organisation that employs some 140,000 to 150,000 people globally and uses proxies in many countries, including in this country and across Europe. In the other place and here, I have seen Ministers—from both Governments—come to the Dispatch Box who are clearly sympathetic to proscribing the IRGC, then it does not happen. That points to a culture at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office that clearly militates against proscribing the IRGC.

That brings me on to China, which I also want to focus on. We all read regularly and see the reports about the persecution of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang province. That is well known. I remind your Lordships and those who may not have been aware of it at the time that, extraordinarily—it sounds like a work of fiction—three or four years ago, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office officials invited the governor of Xinjiang province, the butcher of Xinjiang, to a meeting in London. The reason why that the meeting did not happen is that my former parliamentary neighbour found out about it and tabled a UQ.

I see that I have run out of time, so I will quickly mention a couple of points. We need to stop the construction of the embassy; that permission has to be revoked. We need to see the proscription of the IRGC. Finally and more widely, we need to see greater capacity in Britain’s military abilities, because the best protection against war is preparing for it.

16:56

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, it was a delight to listen to the noble Lord, and a pleasure to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, give his maiden speech. Some of us may have been sceptical about the achievements of some new Peers in their past local government or party-political careers, but today we have a new Peer who has done things and achieved a tremendous lot, as a provost of Worcester College and as the chair of Stonewall and of the EHRC. I read that he was concerned a few years ago about interference in the work of the commission by Boris Johnson, so I hope he will express concern that the current Government are also messing around with the commission’s report on implementing the Supreme Court decision. However, he is a very able man and a great addition to this House, and we look forward to hearing from him. Having been so nice about his new noble friend, I hope that the Whip, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, will allow me an extra 30 seconds.

Once again, I congratulate my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, on yet another frightening masterpiece. The United Kingdom must confront a stark reality: transnational repression is not an abstract threat but a deliberate, systematic campaign by authoritarian states to silence dissent, intimidate communities, and export coercion into our streets and institutions. The main threat comes from China once again.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights concluded that transnational repression

“risks undermining the UK’s ability to protect the human rights of its citizens and those who have sought safety within its borders”.

We have seen the tactics these oppressive states use: surveillance, online harassment, threats to family members abroad, the operation of unofficial police outposts, bounties on activists, misuse of international law enforcement tools and even attempts to enforce foreign judgments in our own courts. Beijing has deliberately built an extraterritorial legal architecture—a long-arm jurisdiction that is being used to suppress free speech, coerce return, and weaponise ordinary legal and commercial processes against exiles and critics.

Let me be plain: this is an assault on the rule of law in our United Kingdom. When foreign states use bogus Interpol red notices as political instruments, seek to enforce civil judgments abroad to punish dissidents, or cultivate networks that monitor and intimidate diaspora communities on our soil, they are attacking the fundamental freedoms that it is our duty to protect.

The UK’s response under all Governments has been feeble. We have failed to use the National Security Act, the foreign influence registration scheme or sanctions regimes with the urgency, coherence and transparency that this threat demands. Worse still, we have put trade and access to cheap Chinese goods ahead of the defence of the freedoms of our people. China is a real threat to our fundamental freedoms and way of life, yet our Governments call it a strategic partner and we kowtow to it. That must change. I therefore propose five immediate, practical steps out of the 37 recommendations in the report that we should adopt without delay.

First, we should adopt a formal UK definition of transnational repression and mandate routine data collection across police forces and relevant agencies so that we can measure scale, patterns and perpetrators. Secondly, we should designate China under the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme where objective threat assessments support it, and publish clear guidance on how FIRS data will be used to investigate TNR. Thirdly, we should create a dedicated national TNR reporting and support hotline—one that is multilingual and staffed by trained specialists—and require anonymised data from that service to feed threat analysis. Fourthly, we should reform judicial comity and foreign judgment enforcement rules so that our courts do not blindly accept that Chinese courts have similar integrity to ours. They do not, as we have seen in the appalling case of Jimmy Lai. Fifthly, we should lead an international push to reform Interpol procedures, working with Five Eyes, the G7 and other like-minded partners to stop the abuse of red notices being used to punish political critics.

These are essential measures to defend our citizens, our institutions and the open society that we cherish. The United Kingdom is a refuge for those fleeing persecution. If we allow foreign states to turn our streets, campuses and courts into extensions of their coercive apparatus, we betray that duty. Let us act now—decisively, coherently and in concert with our allies—to protect those who look to Britain for safety and to defend the rule of law at home and abroad.

17:01

[Lord Dholakia (LD)]

My Lords, I am delighted to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, on his maiden contribution.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for securing this debate and highlighting the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on transnational repression. For the purpose of declaring my interest, I should mention that I was a member of that committee when this unanimous report was produced. It has been a great delight to work under the leadership of the noble Lord, Lord Alton. He has been responsible for highlighting human rights issues in your Lordships’ Chamber on frequent occasions, and this report is no exception. We all owe him a debt of gratitude for his contribution.

Today, we live in an uncertain world. A few years ago, we would not have heard the phrase “transnational repression”. It still requires a great deal of explanation in many parts of the world as to what meaning we attach to it. I am pleased that clarity on a common definition now exists. This leave us in doubt where the civilised world stands. But we need to ensure that the FCDO and other agencies are involved in educating the rest of the world about transnational repression. This will not happen unless a common definition is agreed. Can the Minister give some indication of when this is likely to happen? Regrettably, this recommendation has not been accepted by the Government.

I said earlier in my speech that we live in an uncertain world. Human rights are frequently in confrontation with authorities and Governments. Acts or threats against individual groups and communities across territorial borders are carried out by Governments or their proxies. This violates human rights. The examples that are cited include Hong Kong, China, Iran and some countries in the Horn of Africa. Many of these are anonymised in the report to protect their identities, for obvious reasons.

I shall ignore China and Hong Kong and instead concentrate on Iran, because my time is fairly limited. The principal Iranian actors are the Supreme Leader and senior regime leadership, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and diplomatic missions and proxies. Hundreds of people have been killed simply to protect regime survival, fragment the opposition, prevent unity and prevent any form of independent, organised resistance through intimidation, infiltration, smear campaigns and manipulations. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on Iran concluded that Iran poses a wide-ranging threat to UK national security which should not be underestimated, as it is

“persistent and—crucially—unpredictable”.

Since 2022, there has been a sharp rise in physical attacks, kidnappings and assassination attempts. The report further stressed that our security services and police have stopped at least 15 murder or kidnap arrests against British nationals.

In conclusion, we must introduce immediate legislation to proscribe the IRGC as a terror organisation and to constrain its transnational repression. We should expel identified diplomats linked to the IRGC where evidence of abusive and illegal activities exists. We should strengthen our investigatory and prosecution capacity, funding specialist policing and legal resources to identify, investigate and prosecute individuals and networks facilitating transnational repression. This is the best outcome of this report.

17:05

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I join others in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, on his maiden speech. I think we all remember what a daunting prospect that was, so many congratulations to him. I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, on securing this debate and introducing it, as he always does, with compelling evidence, incisive analysis, practical recommendations, and his typical passion and principle. I congratulate the JCHR, which the noble Lord chairs, on producing this powerful report on transnational repression in the United Kingdom, the subject we are talking about.

It is a very real threat. Hong Kong exiles who have quite rightly been welcomed into the United Kingdom now feel afraid that they are being watched by the Chinese Communist Party from which they fled. Several have received arrest warrants from the Hong Kong authorities, accompanied by bounties placed on their heads. Some, such as Carmen Lau, as reported in the media, have faced an appalling campaign of harassment, with anonymous letters sent to neighbours telling them to hand over Hong Kong activists to the Chinese embassy or report their whereabouts and activities to the Chinese embassy. In Carmen Lau’s case, it was even worse, involving sexually explicit images created by artificial intelligence, amounting to a campaign of sexual harassment. A young former Hong Kong district councillor who fled repression in Hong Kong in search of freedom in this country should not have to endure such obscene and grave abuse in the United Kingdom.

Of course, China is not the only perpetrator of transnational repression, though it is one of the most active and significant. Several Members of this House and the other place have been sanctioned by China and other regimes, and subject to various threats of harassment and espionage. Further, several British citizens, including the co-founder of Hong Kong Watch, Benedict Rogers, have faced sustained harassment as a result of their activism on human rights cases. In his case, for several years he received anonymous threatening letters at his home address. His neighbours in a London suburb received letters urging them to monitor him. Even his mother received letters, stamped and postmarked in Hong Kong, urging her to tell her son to shut up. He also received an official threat of a jail sentence from the Hong Kong Police Force if he did not cease his activism and advocacy for Hong Kong.

Transnational repression frequently targets dissidents living abroad, the family members of political prisoners and individuals who engage with the UN mechanism. Just last week, I was made aware of an example of a young Myanmar artist called Sai. He was trying to put on an exhibition in Bangkok of artists in exile from Hong Kong, Tibet, Iran, Russia and Syria, and Uyghur artists. The exhibition, which was scheduled to open for almost three months, was shut down by officials in Bangkok because of diplomatic pressure from the Chinese regime.

Finally, I want to talk about one of the most important aspects of the report: the foreign influence registration scheme, which was introduced under the National Security Act in 2023. The Joint Committee’s report welcomes the introduction of FIRS and the designation of Iran and Russia on the enhanced tier, and so do I. However, the report expresses concerns about the evidence it received regarding TNR by China, and therefore the absence of China from the enhanced tier. In concluding, can the Minister advise the House on whether TNR is a high priority consideration when deciding which countries should be specified under the enhanced tier of FIRS, and whether the Government will designate China on that enhanced tier in compliance with what the report has said?

Once again, I commend the noble Lord, his committee and this report, and look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.

17:10

[Baroness Blackstone (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to start by congratulating my noble friend Lord Isaac on his excellent maiden speech, and particularly on what he had to say about education, creative industries and the arts.

I also want to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and his committee members for their excellent report on this issue. It has had all too little attention. Indeed, many people probably have absolutely no idea what transnational repression actually means. In fact, the committee noted that there is no widely agreed definition, but that it amounts to

“certain foreign state-directed crimes against individuals”.

The best-known example is probably the Salisbury poisoning of the Skripals by agents of the Russian Government. Besides Russia, other countries which have been cited for intimidating and harassing—sometimes very violently—their subjects in the UK include Iran, China and Eritrea, all of which have been mentioned.

Also on the list, though less frequently cited, is Pakistan. I want to devote my speech largely to a current case concerning a Pakistani human rights lawyer who is living in exile in the UK. Shahzad Akbar was called to the Bar in the UK and subsequently had a distinguished career in Pakistan, working on human rights issues such as forced disappearances and the death penalty. He then became a Minister in Imran Khan’s Government and was responsible in particular for anti-corruption. When Khan was removed from office, Akbar fled to the UK in 2022, fearing what would happen to him if he stayed in Pakistan.

I am grateful to Reprieve for briefing me on the appalling attacks to which Akbar has been subjected since coming to this country. Unknown assailants have thrown acid at his face outside his home, assaulted him physically, and tried to set fire to his house, forcing him and his wife and children to go into hiding after gunshots were fired through the windows of his house. Counterterrorism police consider the attacks to be highly targeted and have arrested several people. It appears to be a recent example of a sophisticated plot to intimidate him and to assault him.

The response by the police is of course very welcome, but the committee report rightly contends that treating each case of this kind individually is not enough. Law enforcement can pursue the perpetrators, but what is needed is a commitment to address the behaviour of foreign Governments who are determined to destroy opposition to them by truly vicious means, and who are certainly denying those targeted their right to freedom of expression.

In the specific case of Shahzad Akbar, first, can the Minister tell the House what action the Government have taken to put pressure on the Pakistani Government? Does he agree that addressing the root causes in a political and diplomatic response is needed in cases of this kind? Secondly, what reassurance is Mr Akbar being given from a senior level in the Government that his safety is a matter of concern and that everything possible will be done to protect him and his family?

A number of dissident communities are at high risk of transnational repression, such as the critics of the Iranian regime, as has been mentioned by other speakers. They have escaped from the likelihood of imprisonment without trial in Iran, but can the Minister elaborate on what special measures have been taken to protect them?

When the Minister replies, I hope he will be able to give a positive response on a number of the issues the committee report identified, including better data collection, the co-ordination of interagency responses to TNR, and the possibility of specific sanctions against it. We need to address these questions to maintain our reputation as a country which does not tolerate the denial of free speech through violent intimidation.

17:15

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the Joint Committee for this excellent and important report. It refers to concern about transnational oppression by China and Russia, as have many noble Lords in this debate—and you do not get much more extreme than attempted and actual assassination by Iran and other states. Speaking as the founding, now former, co-chair of the All-Party Group on Hong Kong, and having often spoken about concern for Hong Kong and other Chinese students at UK universities, these are very grave concerns.

Today, I am going to talk about another state—a rising threat. At the moment, most of this is in the form not of physical threat, obviously, but intimidation. We know that intimidation and physical threats are often closely linked, and that intimidation can have very serious effects on people’s lives.

I start with what is really a quite mild case, involving the head of a British public relations company about whom that state’s embassy—the official representatives of its Government—complained to the companies for which his firm worked. They complained not about the quality of his work or his representations but about private social media posts, which were critical, in very mild terms, of the leader of the state that the embassy represents. The individual has now left the company. It is called Hanover, and one of its key clients is the American Pharmaceutical Group. Yes, the state is the United States of America.

The Financial Times reports that the embassy refused to continue to support the US pharma firms unless the executive was fired. These, of course, are the same pharmaceutical companies which, with embassy help, have considerably raised the costs of drugs for our NHS.

Some might say that that is just the rough and tumble of capitalism, the unequal and all too often subsidiary position the UK finds itself in in relation to the US—“it is only that individual’s economic rights that are affected”. But, of course, what about his successor, and what about his and others’ free speech rights?

Let us look at the other end of the scale: the top of society. The US Vice-President JD Vance last year shocked Europe at the Munich security conference by attacking democratically agreed laws, debated in this very Chamber, to protect women’s healthcare rights. JD Vance suggested that the US might not live up to treaty obligations unless we changed our laws. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, spoke about Chinese assault on the rule of law here; we are seeing an assault from the US on our rule of law.

This year, of course, the speech from Secretary of State Marco Rubio was much better received. The tone was much more conciliatory, but the content was no different. It attacked the obstructions of international law, the very human rights we are talking about, and suggested that this hamstrings future western colonialism. He asked—you might say demanded—that Europe join again with the US to expand with missionaries and soldiers to build vast empires extending across the globe, which is definitely not in line with human rights.

What does this mean practically? I spoke earlier today in the EU debate about the precautionary principle. Whether we are talking about Chinese technology or other forms of transnational repression, we might wish that we acted earlier. Perhaps we should apply the precautionary principle, particularly when it comes to US tech firms and their hold over our society and individuals, and to protecting not just British individuals or the US diaspora, but our whole rule of law and human rights, against a new threat of transnational repression.

17:19

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

I extend my congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, on an excellent and very informative maiden speech. I also congratulate my noble friend Lord Alton, as well as the members of the JCHR, on producing this excellent report and securing the debate. It will not come as a surprise to noble Lords that I support all the recommendations in this report.

The JCHR has articulated clearly the problems caused by TNR—a growing threat to democratic values, the rule of law and freedom of expression. Foreign policy decisions and international trade partnerships are often made without sufficient consideration of the TNR record of perpetrator states, which risks undermining the UK’s credibility as a leader on global human rights issues and emboldening these authoritarian regimes to escalate their TNR activities.

The JCHR has called for a definition of TNR, and we need it, but I think we recognise it—in state-directed cross-border actions to coerce, intimidate, conduct surveillance on, kidnap, prosecute or even assassinate critics, dissidents and diaspora opponents. All this, of course, is in the wider context of the torture, harassment, intimidation and even execution of diaspora family members who live in the country in question. Noble Lords have spoken of Russia and China. I want to speak briefly about Iran and the impact of its TNR activities in the UK.

The Supreme Leader, as he calls himself, Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security in Iran are very active. They utilise the resources of diplomatic missions and embassies across the world. I give the example of the conviction of Asadollah Assadi, an Iranian diplomat who was convicted in Belgium in 2021 and sentenced to 20 years in prison for attempting to bomb a gathering of the Iranian opposition coalition, the NCRI, in support of a free Iran, which was held in Paris in 2018 and attended by Members of your Lordships’ House and the other place. They use various criminal methods and work assiduously to undermine any protest against the regime; they arrest and prosecute dual nationals on fabricated charges so they can leverage releases of regime operatives and convicted diplomats; and they have developed extensive and co-ordinated transnational repression.

Last July, the ISC issued a report which said that Iran poses a wide-ranging threat to UK national security that should not be underestimated and is persistent and, crucially, unpredictable. Since 2022, the previous major rising in Iran, there has been a sharp rise in physical attacks and kidnapping or assassination attempts. Our security services and police have stopped at least 15 murders or kidnapping attempts against British nationals or UK-based individuals since 2022. The threat to us has increased sharply, and there is now an acute national security and human rights concern.

The designation of Iran and Russia as countries on the advanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme is evidence of the threat posed by TNR originating from these countries. Anyone working for or directed by the Iranian state is at peril if they carry out such activities without compliance. The JCHR has recognised the need to support efforts to elevate TNR as a priority on the UN agenda, to promote co-ordinated international action against its use by authoritarian regimes and to ensure information and data sharing on TNR with like-minded countries in fora such as the Council of Europe, Interpol, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, the OSCE and the UN.

In January, the people of Iran rose up. We know that tens of thousands of them have been killed, including women and children. We should use the powers which are available to us. We should close the Iranian embassy in London, where there is evidence of, for example, co-ordinated attempts to silence Iranian dissidents. We should work with allied states to condemn Iranian state threats. I do not know, as other noble Lords have said, why we are allowing China to build this embassy in our country. This should not happen. We should adopt a more positive approach to sanctions, perhaps particularly against Members of your Lordships’ House. We have heard, and I have read, the Government’s response to the report and I would be very grateful if the Minister could tell us how long it will be before the IRGC is proscribed.

17:24

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I too welcome the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, to your Lordships’ House and congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, on his comprehensive and informative opening speech and the excellent report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights under his chairmanship. It is fair to say that, on these sorts of issues, he stands head and shoulders above the rest of us, and I thoroughly congratulate him. The committee obviously knew what it was doing when it appointed him as chairman. I cannot think of anybody better, and that is no reflection on others.

As the noble Lord and the Joint Committee’s report have made clear, transnational repression is about many other state actors besides China, notably Russia, Iran and North Korea, but also Pakistan, India, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Some of these present recognised threats to our security and geopolitical challenges, while others are among the countries we may consider important trading partners and, at times, strategic allies. Nevertheless, as the JCHR states:

“China conducts the most comprehensive TNR campaign of any foreign state operating in the UK”.


This is consistent with the finding of the Intelligence and Security Committee report in 2023 that China had penetrated “every sector” of the United Kingdom and poses a “whole of state” challenge.

Given the findings of these two important reports, three years apart, can the Minister explain to your Lordships’ House how His Majesty’s Government’s new rapprochement with China addresses these concerns? What priority did the Prime Minister place on addressing China’s transnational repression, influence and espionage campaigns in the UK in his discussions during his recent visit to China? What steps are the Government taking to ensure that China’s new recently approved mega-embassy—if it goes ahead, as it is now subject to judicial review—will not serve as a hub for transnational repression and espionage as many of us fear it will?

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, referred to evidence provided by Hong Kong activist Chloe Cheung, examples of transnational repression faced by other Hong Kongers now in exile in the UK, such as Carmen Lau, and the effects this has had on their safety and mental and physical well-being, and the threats made to Caoilfhionn Gallagher KC, head of Jimmy Lai’s international legal team. I am also aware of threats made to British citizens such as Benedict Rogers, co-founder of Hong Kong Watch, who has faced numerous anonymous threatening letters to himself, his neighbours and his mother, been named more than 95 times in the trial of Jimmy Lai and received threats of a prison sentence. Similarly, Luke de Pulford, co-founder of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, has been the target of such threats.

When Hong Kongers who have fled Hong Kong to escape repression and sought refuge in the United Kingdom in the expectation of freedom and security are pursued by the long arms of the Chinese Communist Party, and when the tentacles of the Chinese Communist Party reach into the letterboxes and email inboxes of British citizens who happen to be its critics, what are His Majesty’s Government doing in response? What are the Government, who have a duty to protect their citizens and keep us safe, doing to ensure the safety of our citizens and those whom we have rightly welcomed into this country as a pathway towards citizenship? Is there a dedicated police hotline? What efforts are the police and our intelligence agencies making to brief and advise those who are being threatened? I look forward to the Minister’s response.

17:29

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the JCHR for this very important report, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for moving it.

The Government recognised in their response to the report that not only can transnational repression

“undermine an individual’s ability to exercise their freedoms and human rights”,

but that

“it is also a matter of national sovereignty and national security”.

But there seems to be an insufficient follow-through from these conclusions. Although the Government say they cannot publish their Defending Democracy review, they say that the review found that the UK had a

“hard operating environment for states wishing to conduct transnational repression”,

and that the UK had

“robust tools and system-wide safeguards”.

The JCHR begs to differ, finding that the UK currently lacks a clear strategy to address it, with no clear definition of transnational repression, as we have heard, and a failure to routinely collect data on the issue.

Hong Kong Watch advises:

“Hong Kong activists have highlighted concerns that UK police officers see harassment, disruptions and verbal abuses by Chinese individuals against the Hong Kong diaspora as internal conflicts between groups with differing political views. One activist stated he felt this framing helped the police depoliticise TNR, omitting the role of foreign Governments in pursuing activists and thus avoiding highly sensitive aspects of UK diplomacy and national security”.


We want the Government to show that that charge is not true.

It is a mystery to me why the Government resist a definition of TNR in favour of a description. The Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group, a coalition of 60 individuals and organisations, has produced what seems to me to be a good definition:

“Acts or threats against individuals, groups and communities across territorial borders carried out by Governments or their proxies, which violate human rights and/or intimidate, control, coerce or silence dissent”.


It seems to me that it is impossible to have an effective policy and operational response from the Government and police to something that is undefined. Therefore, it seems fair to claim that there is an unresolved protection gap between policy commitments and lived experience, and that the UK response is fragmented and difficult to access.

For instance, a dedicated reporting line is something the JCHR asked for. The Government consider this would be

“duplicative and potentially cause confusion”,

which I do not really understand. This seems to me to have slight echoes of the experience of and complaints from victims of domestic abuse and sexual crimes in this sector.

In particular, the committee—understandably—wants China to be specified on the enhanced tier of the scheme. The Government’s response was, “We will not rush this decision”. As has been widely referred to, there is also the lack of proscription of the IRGC. Lastly, I ask the Minister: what are the Government doing at Interpol to stop the abuse of Interpol red notices? This is of course a cause that Bill Browder—Sir William Browder—has long taken up, after the case of Sergei Magnitsky. The other tool of pressure and silencing that the committee mentions is SLAPPs, which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, also mentioned. What are the Government doing on all these matters?

17:34

[Lord Moore of Etchingham (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. In the short time we have, I will take up and apply what she has been saying in relation to one country and one subject. The country is China and the subject is our universities.

I know Chloe Cheung, for example, and these individual cases are appalling, of course. However, they are described as TNR “events”, and I think what is underrated by the Government is the systemic quality of all of this. It is not just one or two, or even several, horrible events: it is working right through the system. Above all, in this country, it is working right through our universities because of the whole-of-state approach that China has to its engagement with this country and other foreign countries.

The problem arises here partly because our universities are so incredibly dependent on Chinese money for their survival and are therefore uncritical of the terms on which they receive that money. Recent figures obtained by UK-China Transparency show that, in Russell group universities, Chinese postgraduate students in STEM subjects now outnumber British postgraduates. Our universities are a very rich ground for CCP intervention. Chinese and now Hong Kong students are incentivised to report dissident fellow students. Those who report the dissidents are rewarded with a leg-up in their educational careers. In the past five years, 260 Chinese students in this country have applied for asylum because of the problems they faced in this way. I would be very pleased to be corrected if I am wrong, but I have seen no admission of this problem by any vice-chancellor in this country, and that, it seems to me, amounts to complicity.

I will quote a recent article in Times Higher Education by Dr Michael Spence, the provost and president of UCL, where more than 10,000 China nationals are studying. He spoke of the idea that Chinese students might be persecuted in the way that I have described, but, in his view, it is only an idea rather than a reality. He went on to say:

“Ironically, the experience of many of our Chinese students is that anti-China sentiment in the UK has an impact on their ability to speak freely about the positives they see in their country and its culture”.


Well, I think that Dr Spence is setting up an utterly false moral equivalence. It may be true that people here criticise some Chinese attitudes, but they do not threaten them with arrest by national security police and imprisonment back home, or with financial penalties being inflicted on their families. That is what China does to the students that it disparages. I am sorry, I should have said earlier that I should like to join in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, particularly in this context, because he of course has great experience of universities.

In the article, Dr Spence said his university was

“stamping out a culture of fear”.

I am sorry to say that I think that is almost the reverse of what is going on, and this will continue unless it is, as people now say, “called out”. This is where I beg the Government to give a lead, particularly in light of this report. It is very important that the report’s recommendation of raising China to the enhanced tier happens. However, I am not very optimistic about this, because I have noticed that, with the Government’s mantra of “challenge, compete and co-operate”, the power of money constantly means that the idea of co-operating is always preferred to the idea of challenge.

17:38

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a director of the Free Speech Union. I praise the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the Joint Committee for producing this report and the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, for his brilliant maiden speech. As he knows, I am a big fan because of the work that he has done to promote free speech at the University of Oxford.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, mentioned the case of Laura Murphy at Sheffield Hallam University, so I will not dwell on that one. Instead, I will draw your Lordships’ attention to the case of Michelle Shipworth, an associate professor in social sciences at UCL. She was stopped from teaching her long-running data detectives module in 2024 after a Chinese student in her class complained about her use of data about China and its treatment of the Uyghurs from the Global Slavery Index in her module. She wrote in Times Higher Education recently:

“The department made a decision to protect what it saw as a risk to its income owing to potential reputational damage from the student complaint, and the core content teaching how to critically evaluate factual claims and secondary data was removed”.


There is an obvious remedy to these instances of what, on the face of it, looks like transnational repression in Britain’s universities: commence Sections 8 and 9 of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act. Section 9 would create a complaints scheme to enable academics and visiting speakers to complain to the Office for Students if they feel that their right to free speech and their academic freedom have been breached, including by repressive foreign states or at their behest.

The Government have said they want to amend the complaints scheme to exclude students and are waiting for a suitable legislative vehicle they can attach an amendment to containing a revised scheme. But, as I pointed out in this House earlier this week, there is no constitutional reason why this section cannot be partially commenced via a statutory instrument, excluding students from having access to the scheme, even if that is just a stopgap before a scheme meeting all of the Secretary of State’s concerns can be introduced via primary legislation.

We need to introduce a cost-free way for academics to defend themselves, other than by taking ruinously expensive legal action, if their speech rights are breached, including by university leaders worried about jeopardising their income from repressive foreign states. We owe it to Laura Murphy and Michelle Shipworth—and countless others—to introduce this scheme.

Section 8 of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act should also be commenced without delay. It would require the Office for Students to monitor higher education providers and students’ unions to assess the extent to which overseas funding presents a risk to free speech and would impose a mandatory reporting requirement for providers to disclose information on foreign funding above a certain amount. The Minister will say that the Government have now created an academic interference reporting route for senior university leaders to pass on concerns about foreign interference to the security services. But while this is a step in the right direction, it is insufficient—and, incidentally, it could be improved by allowing academics to use this route, not just senior university leaders.

As Michelle Shipworth pointed out in her Times Higher Education article, this route is reliant on self-reporting, and senior university leaders may not be aware of inappropriate foreign influence in their institutions. Michael Spence, the president and provost of UCL, is a case in point, as the noble Lord, Lord Moore, just pointed out. Even if they are aware of it, they may be conflicted about reporting it. Under Section 8, all significant foreign income would have to be declared and it would then be the Office for Students’ job to monitor whether that funding came with strings attached.

The Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act was voted for by a majority of both Houses of Parliament and received Royal Assent in 2023. For how much longer does the Education Secretary intend to delay activating these clauses? We know there is a problem with transnational repression in our universities, and the Government have the remedy at hand. When are they going to put it in place?

17:42

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, it was a privilege to be present to listen to my noble friend’s wonderful maiden speech.

This is a brilliant and long overdue report. The committee said it had received

“credible evidence that a number of states have engaged in acts of transnational repression on UK soil”.

The report also says that

“the UK currently lacks a clear strategy to address TNR. There is no formal definition … and the Government does not routinely collect data on TNR events … Police officers often lack the training necessary to respond effectively to TNR, resulting in inconsistent and ineffective support for TNR victims”.

The Government’s response is clear. They say that the Select Committee’s recommendations are “constructive”, they recognise

“TNR as a term to describe certain foreign state-directed crimes against individuals”,

and they note:

“Efforts are underway to … improve data”.


I will therefore use my short contribution to ask the Government to conduct a cold case review of a group of alleged TNR crimes against individuals. I raised this group in the debate on the Queen’s Speech in June 2017, which can be found in Hansard in cols. 399-401 and was reported on in the BuzzFeed.com Reports section in the same month.

It involves more than a dozen suspicious “non-suspicious” deaths in the UK. According to the reports, the then Government declined to comment on any of the deaths due to national security concerns. Nine of the deaths relate to one circle of people. Police declared them “non-suspicious”, but MI6 asked its US counterparts for information about each of them. Eleven of the deaths occurred after the murder of Mr Litvinenko, which we knew from Sir Robert Owen’s report 10 years after his death in 2016. Some were UK public sector employees, about one of whom I had correspondence with the Government after the debate.

These deaths were claimed to be out of scope of local police. One named senior counterterrorism officer claimed they were “brazen” Russian assassinations in Britain

“right out in the daylight”.

I regret that claims were made that the UK failed to get a grip, partly due to the desire to preserve the flow of Russian money into banks and properties in London. I do not propose to go into detail, but I will do as I did at col. 400 on 27 June 2017 and list the names of the people whose deaths were the focus of the reports and the year they occurred: Scot Young, 2014; Boris Berezovsky, 2013; Badri Patarkatsishvili, 2008; Yuri Golubev, 2007; Stephen Moss, 2003; Stephen Curtis, 2004; Paul Castle, 2010; Robert Curtis, 2012; Johnny Elichaoff, 2014; Alexander Litvinenko, 2006—although that was found to be murder; Matthew Puncher, May 2016; Igor Ponomarev, October 2006; Daniel McGrory, 2007; Gareth Williams, 2010; and Alexander Perepilichnyy, 2012.

I have not contacted anyone about this issue that I have raised in the past, so I apologise if there is any distress caused after so long a time. However, we now can have a cold case review of these deaths, especially in the light of the UK Government now taking transnational repression seriously. I think this is long overdue.

17:46

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as chair of human rights at Liberal International. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. His focus on querying suspicious non-suspicious deaths over the past nine years is very serious and, from these Benches, we echo his concern and call for a cold cases review.

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, on his maiden speech. It was imbued with his love of learning and of the creative arts and his passion for people in his role of chair of the EHRC as well. For our debate today, that passion in fighting for the rights of everyone was evident. From these Benches, we welcome him and look forward to his future contributions.

This report highlights in detail how this country responds to attacks on foreign nationals—and, indeed, some of our own nationals—on our soil by other Governments and repressive regimes. From these Benches, we thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and his committee for this excellent piece of work. I also echo my noble friend Lord Dholakia’s comments about the extensive work on human rights done by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, beyond this committee, over many years.

There is no doubt that transnational repression can be difficult to identify and manage; the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, shows exactly that. The report clearly sets out these difficulties, as we have heard in the debate: whether it is having a clear definition that makes it obvious when someone needs assistance; whether the existing law is sufficient to enable our police and intelligence agencies to assist them; and, very importantly, whether the current practical arrangements are actually working. The example given by the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, of TNR on a senior Pakistani lawyer was particularly apt here.

As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, highlighted, the report also covers the very difficult issue of strategic lawsuits against public participation—SLAPPs—and Interpol’s notice and diffusion mechanisms and how they can be exploited through the use of either lawfare or red notices, which were, the report says,

“the sniper rifle of autocrats … long-distance, targeted, and highly effective”.

The noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Cryer, emphasised the TNR on Iranian dissidents at home or abroad. The numbers are very worrying. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, reminded us that sometimes our friends, such as the USA, can also behave in a very unacceptable manner. I thank Amnesty International, the Stop Uyghur Genocide campaign and other organisations, as well as the individuals who have been targets of transnational oppression and who told me their personal accounts when I was at the UN Watch annual Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy last week.

The Government’s response to this report goes some way to accepting the issues raised by it. However, it is a shame that it does not go further, and I will use my time to query some of that in the light of the evidence taken by the committee, as well as of the contributions during this debate. Like others, I will not identify individuals. This matter is so serious that we should not put anyone at risk through this debate, and I know that the committee took equal care with people who felt they could not be named.

Although this report focuses on TNR in the UK, we know that it happens beyond our borders too, and that comparison may be helpful for us. In the Netherlands last year, Dutch society was shocked when a Dutch Uyghur was assaulted inside a city hall—a blatant attack in a democratic space. That is chilling. A correspondent noted:

“As a Uyghur activist based in the UK, I have personally experienced this pressure. Chinese police have contacted members of the Uyghur community and demanded that they report on my activities. I have had no contact with my family for nine years as a direct result of transnational repression. My relatives have been subjected to intimidation and coercion, and forced to publicly condemn me in order to safeguard themselves from reprisals. This is the human cost of speaking out”.


We know that this is true for other targets of the Chinese authorities. Hong Kong Watch reports concerns that people have moved home or, in the case of one family I heard of a couple of years ago, have had to change their names. The psychological effects of this were emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow.

The problem with TNR is that we too often think of appalling extreme events, such as the Salisbury poisoning that targeted the Skripal family but killed civilians as well. Much more is insidious and affects families back in the home country as well. I spoke recently to an Afghani who fled after the Taliban re-established their power. The TNR that this person experienced in the UK came from a number of asylum seekers who also fled Afghanistan. The individual said that they saw two types. There were those, mentioned by other speakers, who were blackmailed and pressured to bully and coerce individuals to protect their families who were still in Afghanistan, but, more worryingly, they noted that it was evident that some people clearly had sympathy with those in power, even though they claimed to have fled them. They said that this particular type of TNR is very worrying because those people had asylum-seeking status.

I also talked to Chloe Cheung in Geneva, who gave evidence to the committee last week; like with that evidence to the committee, I found her personal testimony moving. We need to ensure that China’s actions are condemned and it should be added to the enhanced tier list.

I talked last week to a victim of TNR who is currently living in Europe. The support they get from the police in their new country is impressive, including armed police supporting them when intelligence suggests that is necessary or when they may be in a vulnerable environment. But when they came to visit the UK they not only lost the support and intelligence of the experts in their country but found it very difficult to get support from day one because they were not based in the UK, even though they were still severely under threat. Will the Minister say what should happen when someone currently receiving support and protection in a country that we would regard as a friend is invited here, particularly for events, but is not entitled to the same level of support and protection in the UK as they get in their new base?

The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, reminded us that TNR changes as technology develops. The use of AI is a real threat. Will the Minister say whether those investigating TNR across agencies are supported by cyber security experts? The tackling TNR in the UK working group, co-ordinated by Amnesty, points out that we should work closely with our Five Eyes allies to tackle the misuse of red notices, but I also wonder whether we share our experiences with them and European colleagues so that we can all learn to manage TNR better.

In order to do that, we need to collect good data. The police are the obvious body for this. But it is also clear, from talking to those on the receiving end of TNR, that it is the other agencies involved—local government, the FCDO and so forth—from which broader data should be collected, certainly by the police. The noble Lord, Lord Moore of Etchingham, was right to highlight the problems of the reliance that our universities have on Chinese students. Our Australian colleagues have long battled with this subversive influence attempting to silence higher education institutions. The illustration made by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, regarding Chinese students in the UK trying to pressure HEIs not to criticise China, is also chilling.

Not much has been mentioned today about the Vietnam Government, but they have become habitual users of TNR for their opponents, both in-country and abroad. There are many familiar techniques: they have a particular habit of abducting their people when in other countries, whether in Berlin, or Bangkok, and getting them back into Vietnam. There is pressure on the diaspora and indirect discrimination, as we have heard about. There is certainly a risk of abuse of Interpol red notices. But there are other subtle mechanisms as well, such as using business techniques to try to scare these people out of country, and we need to be aware of that too. I am not sure that the police always pick this up.

As many others have said, will the Government reconsider the adoption of a definition of TNR? My noble friend Lady Ludford and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, have said that this is important, and they are right. Will the Government review that? Will the Government also undertake a review of the effectiveness of managing TNR cases in the UK? Will the Government include a comparison with some of the other nations managing TNR, as I mentioned earlier. Will they also undertake to set up a dedicated hotline within 12 months? Last week, I heard of one person who had need to call 999 in an emergency, and the call centre staff member said that they did not know what TNR was, and was therefore unwilling to pass them on to somebody with more knowledge. That was very frightening, as there was nowhere for them to turn to. As I end my contribution, I think of people in that sort of position.

17:57

[The Earl of Effingham (Con)]

My Lords, first I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, on his excellent maiden speech. I note that he was a partner at a top law firm that was established in 1769, so he will fit seamlessly into your Lordships’ House, which is another amazing place to work, having also been around for many centuries. As my noble friend Lord Blencathra so eloquently put it, the CV of the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, is so extensive that I could keep going for quite some time. I would like to focus, however, on just one further item. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, is the first provost of Worcester College to keep bees, and has been known to sell his honey in college, so perhaps he might consider selling a jar to His Majesty’s loyal Opposition.

Moving on to the report in front of us, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and those on the committee, such as the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, for their thorough and forensic work, which has resulted in the excellent report and debate today. His Majesty’s loyal Opposition would also like to pay tribute to all those who had the tenacity and strength of character to give evidence to the committee, despite the potential personal risk that they were taking in doing so. Through their voice, others will, hopefully, be spared the suffering of transnational repression here in the UK.

The security of our nation is clearly the first duty of government. It is a pivotal priority for any Administration that aim to foster a high-trust society where people are and, more importantly, feel free—that is, they are free to speak openly, free to debate and free to challenge constructively. Transnational repression has a chilling effect on those very freedoms. It is neither fair nor reasonable that individuals living in the UK are unable to speak out and bring to the fore perceived abuses perpetrated by foreign states, both internationally and here on our home soil.

The Government’s own National Security Strategy 2025 concluded:

“Hostile activity on British soil from countries like Russia and Iran is increasing, threatening our people, critical national infrastructure and prosperity”.


As the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said, the committee found that

“In the last year, the number of state-threat investigations run by MI5 jumped by 48%”,


with that agency dealing with more than 20 threat-to-life cases relating to just Iran since the start of 2022. This repression is not limited to just those countries. As we have heard, Egypt, Eritrea, Rwanda and others feature in the committee’s report.

In that same national security strategy, Ministers recognised the vital importance of diplomacy in approaching the threat posed by China, and they are entirely correct. So as a starting point, we would be most grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, would confirm that his Government will action at pace an appropriate diplomatic conversation with senior counterparts from every country on the committee’s list, and update your Lordships’ House on what is being done and when.

Many noble Lords have made specific reference to Iran. In the same vein, we would appreciate a blow-by-blow account of the steps Ministers are taking to address the committee’s finding that:

“Iran represents one of the highest kidnap and assassination state threats to the UK”.


Surely, that is a line that must never be crossed.

Regarding evidence calling for a formal definition of transnational repression, in line with the Council of Europe’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, is the noble Lord the Minister in a position to explain why Ministers have resisted calls to issue such a formal definition? What is the logic behind that decision? Does he not agree with all noble Lords, I am sure, on what my noble friend Lord Blencathra said: that a definition might improve our data on transnational repression? If he does not agree, perhaps he could provide colour on why the Government believe that data and monitoring of transnational repression can be improved without a further change to the way the Government describe the act. On the specific recommendation that new offences in respect of transnational repression may be required in future, is it not a sensible idea that Ministers keep existing offences under review and respond to emerging threats in the way the committee suggests?

Turning to China, the statistics do not lie, and I am afraid to say that the Government have failed to deliver the growth they promised 18 months ago. One just needs to look at the market-standard benchmark of GDP per capita, a measure often highlighted quite correctly by my noble friend Lord Hintze. The Prime Minister’s recent trip to China was a sensibly cautious yet tangible reset of UK-China economic ties. However, in line with the calls to action from my noble friend Lord Blencathra, the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and the noble Lords, Lord Morrow and Lord Moore of Etchingham, it would be wrong not to challenge the Minister on why China remains at a lower foreign influence registration scheme designation and not on the enhanced tier. Can he please explain what the threshold for China’s designation on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme would be?

My noble friend Lord Young of Acton rightly mentioned the Uyghurs, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. The evidence given by the Uyghur Muslims to the committee was both brave and insightful. The same applies to the Uyghur communities in the UK and around the world.

Only last week, the noble Lord, Lord Whitehead, was asked at that very Dispatch Box which UK-registered firms imported component parts for solar panels that include polycrystalline silicon from China, and how many of these components were sourced from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, to which he replied:

“The Government does not hold or publish data identifying which UK-registered firms imported component parts for solar panels containing polycrystalline silicon from China, nor data on how many of these components may have originated from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region”.


The Great British Energy Act is crystal-clear. It requires the Secretary of State legally to satisfy himself or herself that no schools are clad in solar panels made from slave labour. It is only fair and reasonable that the Minister and the department confirm to schools, parents and children that they have a cast-iron guarantee from this Government that no schools are clad in solar panels with any component parts made by slave labour.

Noble Lords are also all too familiar with the situation of Jimmy Lai, and Ministers have flagged that:

“We will continue to protect the Hong Kong community in the UK and others from transnational repression”. 


Is it the case that, if the Minister were to raise China to the enhanced tier, then Hong Kongers’ confidence in our national commitment to their safety and security would increase accordingly?

Finally, the committee’s report touched on strategic lawsuits against public participation. I assume the Government do not believe it is right to use a SLAPP to silence individuals who are exposing or criticising unacceptable conduct. Does the Minister agree with the committee that the current framework for tackling misuse of SLAPPs is too limited?

It would be wrong to end without touching on a critical element of the entire report, namely support for victims. The committee welcomed the Government’s guidance and improved training for the police, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, in her live example. But actions speak louder than words, and all victims of transnational repression will be watching the Government’s every move to improve communication with and support all those affected.

18:07

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for securing this important debate and for the work of his committee on understanding the issues of transnational repression. I note that he has been sanctioned by a number of regimes; I have been sanctioned by Russia, and I take that as a badge of honour on some occasions. He brings immense experience and moral clarity to the role of chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

It is clear from contributions across the House that this is a subject of utmost importance. I must start with my noble friend Lord Isaac, who made an excellent maiden speech, combining his championship of human rights, particularly LGBT rights, with his warmth and experience in education. It is clear that he will bring great experience to this House, and I welcome him on behalf of the Government—and, I hope, the whole House—to his new role.

The committee brought a very thorough and detailed report and its inquiry has presented a thoughtful contribution to the UK’s understanding of foreign states and how they operate on our soil. The Government have carefully considered the recommendations, as the noble Lord knows, and we responded formally on 30 October. That included welcoming much of the committee’s report, including on co-ordination, international co-operation, strengthening resilience and the issues that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, that I cannot share all her analysis of the United States, because it is part of international co-operation and strengthening resilience when we look at how we deal with some of the state bad actors in the world at large. But she has made her point in her usual way, and I note the point as a whole.

Let me say at the outset that this Government are unequivocal that any attempt by any foreign state to intimidate, harass and harm individuals in the UK will not be tolerated. The position that we have is very clear: transnational repression in the UK will not be tolerated. I reassure the House that it is targeted and specific. Perpetrating states focus on individuals they believe to be threats, vocal critics, dissidents and activists, as in the many examples given in the House today. Our message, therefore, is that people should be alert but not afraid. From the Government’s perspective, we must not inadvertently amplify the fear that perpetrating states actively seek to create. The UK is a safe, open and democratic society, and we will always defend those principles. While transnational repression does not affect large numbers of people, its impacts can be severe for those directly targeted and for wider communities.

We have had some discussion around the term transnational repression, what it means and the behaviour it captures or not. The noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, mentioned this in particular. The UK has a long, mature and well-established system across legislation, policing, intelligence, diplomacy and community engagement to counter state threats, including conduct that amounts to TNR. This issue demands positive, constant vigilance and proactivity to ensure our defences are strong, resilient and robust.

That is why, already, in the light of the committee’s report and of our own wish, we have conducted, through the Defending Democracy Taskforce, a review into the UK’s response, which has focused on building an understanding, through the collection of data, of the scale, nature and impact domestically, as well as making recommendations to strengthen that response. I want to share with the House some of the lessons that we have learned from our internal examination. These include, partly in response to the report, the continued implementation of the National Security Act 2023, which provides world-leading, modernised tools to counter state-linked threats, notably FIRS, which colleagues in the House today have referred to. I will talk a little more about that in a moment.

Another important issue that has been raised, including just a moment ago by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is training on foreign interference and call handling, delivered by counterterrorism policing across 45 territorial forces in the UK to strengthen front-line identification of state-directed activities. These are all issues that we have reviewed and are working to improve.

There is clear and practical guidance published on the GOV.UK website for those who believe they may be at risk. We have a dedicated TNR team within the Home Office, giving a central point of contact on co-ordination and analysis. We are deepening international co-operation, including with Five Eyes—I say this in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett—and looking at how we can work with like-minded partners to bring collective resilience.

FIRS, which has been noted, including by my noble friend Lord Cryer and the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, does feature Iran. Iran is included in the scheme and we keep under constant review whether we should expand it to other countries. I have had representations on other countries here today. However, it is not something we discuss in public, but we keep it under review at all times. The Government have accepted the thrust of the committee’s findings, and we must continue to strengthen resilience.

The question of proscription of the IRGC has been mentioned by a number of people, notably my noble friend Lord Cryer. I say to him and others who raised it that that is an issue that we cannot comment upon but keep under review at all times. We do so because the safety of individuals, the integrity of our national security and the actions of foreign states in the United Kingdom are our foremost priority. The UK is a safe and open democratic society, and we must defend those principles.

The question of definition was raised by the noble Earl, Lord Effingham, on the Opposition Front Bench, the noble Baronesses, Lady O’Loan and Lady Ludford, the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Dholakia, and my noble friends Lady Blackstone and Lord Rooker. The Government, in our review, considered the issue and the recommendations in depth and we recognise transnational repression in the following terms:

“certain foreign state-directed crimes against individuals, which may be carried out both physically and online”.

Any such activity will not be tolerated. There is no international universal agreement on a definition of TNR, but the definition we are using is deliberately broad so that we can capture the totality of the issue, provide maximum flexibility and ensure that we can address what is an evolving threat.

We have looked at the issue of data, mentioned by my noble friends Lord Rooker and Lady Blackstone, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, among others. We recognise the importance of robust data as evidence in shaping an effective response. We are taking steps to strengthen our understanding of the threat, to improve data collection and to ensure that our systems are responsive. To further support data collection, the police have now established a system for reporting crimes that include reference to foreign interference. I will be happy in due course to reflect on the comments that have been made today.

In his opening remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, raised the question of the foreign influence registration scheme and asked whether we will publish data on it. The Government plan to publish data on the operation of FIRS by 30 June 2026, which is the first anniversary of its operation. I hope that that will help to give some colour to the discussion that we had today.

The noble Lord also mentioned the ISC and asked whether it can have oversight of FIRS and the sanctions regime. The Government are trying proactively to update Parliament whenever we can on all these issues. The ISC has statutory powers to call in anything it wants to. I sat on it for five years. It can call in and examine any of those issues if it so wishes, and we will obviously co-operate: it has oversight of those matters should it so wish.

There was a lot of discussion, notably from the noble Lords, Lord Young of Acton and Lord Moore of Etchingham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, about academic issues. Our universities, because they are world-class, are a prime target for foreign states and hostile actors who seek to erode their reputation by promoting, shaping or censoring what universities can offer. I do not take those threats lightly. We are collaborating with universities, we are meeting vice-chancellors, we have looked at how we can develop a new academic interference reporting route and we have put in £3 million of investment to ensure that we give guidance and support on the very issues that the noble Lords mentioned today. Freedom of speech and other fundamental rights are protected under UK law. Section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986, passed by a previous Conservative Government, requires providers to ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for members, students, employees and visiting speakers, and I totally uphold that right.

A number of noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned Interpol, and SLAPPs in particular. Perpetrating states use a wide range of methodologies to conduct transnational repression, and the UK’s response in tackling state-directed threats is, I think, world-leading. We have appropriate tools and systems and we will certainly be examining those issues in detail.

A number of noble Lords raised individual issues. My noble friend Lady Blackstone mentioned issues in Pakistan and my noble friend Lord Rooker mentioned a number of specific deaths. I have to say to the House that, owing to the sensitive nature of these topics, the need to protect individuals who may be at threat and the need not to compromise cases, I cannot talk about individual cases, but I will reflect on what was said. However, I will say something on individual countries, if I may.

China was mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Moore, Lord Morrow, Lord Blencathra and Lord Young of Acton, and by the noble Earl, Lord Effingham, on the Front Bench. The Government recognise that China poses a series of threats to the UK from cyber attacks, foreign interference and espionage. We understand the transnational repression of Hong Kongers and China’s support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and we will challenge those issues robustly, but we are also alive to the fact that China presents the UK with opportunities. It is the second largest economy and it is currently the UK’s third largest trading partner, so we have to develop both challenge and pragmatism in relation to these issues. We are working with Five Eyes colleagues to build collective resistance to the threats China poses, but we also have to look at the business and economy of the United Kingdom in doing so. It is an issue that we will continue to return to.

There has been pressure, notably from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, to include China in the foreign influence registration scheme. We continually look at whether, how and why this should be examined. No decision has been made about China. Adding countries to the enhanced tier requires consideration of a broad range of issues, which will remain under consideration at all times. As I have mentioned, the same is true with Iran. We have already put Iran in the FIRS, and we will examine and continue to look at Iran in relation to other matters. The proscription issue is always under review.

The Chinese embassy was mentioned in passing and I will touch on that. The planning decision was independently taken, but national security is our first duty as a Government. Therefore, intelligence agencies have been involved throughout the process and an extensive range of measures has been developed to manage any risks. Those risks can come from any nation at any time. Following extensive negotiations, the Chinese Government have agreed to consolidate seven current sites in London into one site, which in my view will bring clear security advantages.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I do not seek to delay matters at this time on a Thursday night, but the Minister did say that China was our third-largest trading partner. I wanted to be sure, for the record, so I have just looked it up. We had a £60 billion deficit with China in 2025. Chinese exports to the UK were £77 billion, far exceeding British exports to China of £17 billion. So yes, it is a big trading partner, but we are the weak one and China is the one getting all the benefit.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We have to work with China. We will challenge it at all times and trade with it when we need to. It is important that we hold standards of democracy to account across the world.

I am conscious of time—

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I do not want to detain the House and I thank the Minister for giving way. He has just said, I think, that he will keep us informed about the proscription issue. This has been said for months and months. Can he please give us some idea of when there might be some actual news?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is not in the interests of the UK’s security or the security of the individuals we are trying to protect to give a running commentary on the issue of proscription. This House will be informed if any proscription decision is ever taken on any individual, country or organisation. That is the process we have followed recently and we will continue to do so, but, unfortunately, I cannot give a running commentary on whether, when and how we will consider these matters. We keep them under review and, in the event of a decision being taken, I will be held to account in this House for that decision, as will Ministers in the House of Commons.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

Can the Minister tell me this, then? Jonathan Hall produced a proposal for dealing with the issue. Is that being accepted by the Government?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We will respond to the Jonathan Hall review very shortly. Again, Members of this House will be able to hold me to account for the response the Government give, but I cannot give a running commentary at the Dispatch Box on issues of national security in the way in which the noble Baroness tempts me.

I am conscious of time. This has been a very fruitful and useful debate for us. I will look at Hansard in detail when it is produced and, if there are issues I wish to respond to further, I will write individually to Members. I thank the noble Lord for securing the debate today. I hope that we can continue our discussions on how we keep people in this country safe from transnational oppression and how we support the security of the United Kingdom.

18:23

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I start by saying how grateful I am to noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, for the way in which he has engaged with the JCHR on this issue, and indeed to his colleague, Dan Jarvis, Member of Parliament, another Minister in the Government, who gave evidence to the committee. It has been constructive and we have made progress.

The noble Lord has felt some of the frustration around some of the issues, such as FIRS and sanctions—things on which he cannot give running commentaries, including the proscription of the IRGC. However, that begs the question I raised earlier on about how we as a Parliament deal with such difficult, sensitive and often controversial questions. They cannot be dealt with on the Floor of the House, but they can be in places such as the Intelligence and Security Committee. I hope that he will talk to his colleagues about how some dedicated moment in the course of the year might be set aside to look at those things, because he knows as well as I do that if the avalanche of issues that come before a committee rumbles on, you never get round to doing some of the other things you might like to do. Perhaps he can take that away specifically so that some of these questions could be looked at in more detail in more confidential surroundings, in camera and safeguarding national interests. That is something constructive that could come out of this.

The Minister said that this is a safe, open and democratic society. There is unanimity across your Lordships’ House that we want to keep it that way. I do not agree with him about the numbers. In fact, he said we need to look again at the data. We have underestimated the scale of transnational repression. If anything, this report and the debate have helped us to see the scale.

This is an excellent report. I congratulate everyone involved in its compilation. I only regret that my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, who is such a hard-working member of the committee, has now rotated off it. We were grateful to him for the contribution that he made to the report’s compilation.

The noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, said that few people know what transnational repression is. She is quite correct. I hope that the report and today’s debate will help to put that right. A number of noble Lords, including the noble Earl, Lord Effingham, complimented the witnesses who came before the committee, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, emphasised the courage that many have shown, specifically those who wanted to waive their anonymity so that people would know what has happened to them.

Maiden speeches always give special definition to debates, and the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, certainly raised our debate. The noble Lord, Lord Cryer, said that we would all have to look to our laurels as a result of the noble Lord’s maiden speech; I agree. The noble Lord, Lord Isaac, brought together two things: his commitment to education and to human rights. Curiously, those two have conflated as we have heard about the threats to our universities. We heard that from the noble Lords, Lord Moore and Lord Young of Acton, and other noble Lords who contributed. This is something we have to return to. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Malvern, the Universities Minister, is looking at this. She could do no worse than go back to the report compiled several years ago by the then Universities Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Johnson of Marylebone. When I drew that report personally to the attention of his brother, who at the time was the Prime Minister, he said he was not even aware of it. Things have moved on and we need to be much more aware of the systemic subversion of our universities, which has been referred to today.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who is a long-standing friend, always emphasises the importance, as he did in his intervention a few moments ago, of resilience and getting rid of the dependency we have—billions of pounds of national debt every year. But it goes beyond the funding to the very heart and nature of our society. We have heard about FIRS, SLAPPs, red notices, Magnitsky sanctions, common definitions, the collection of data, how to reset diplomatic engagement, proscription of the IRGC and the rest. These are all important themes and I am glad that our committee was able to bring some of them out. I am grateful to all noble Lords who developed the arguments and delved deeper as we have proceeded.

I shall end on a personal reflection, which is that I always enjoy listening to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. We have talked today about maiden speeches. He may not remember but in 1979, a brash new young MP who had just been elected in a by-election and became the shortest-ever lived MP, for two and a half days flat, had to make his maiden speech within two hours of arriving because the House was being suspended so that people could go back and fight a general election. It fell to the noble Lord, then Jeff Rooker, to respond to the new youngest Member of the House of Commons and say nice things about him. He has always given me encouragement as the years have proceeded, and it is always a pleasure to hear him speak in debates such as our own today. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, will also feel encouraged by all the commendations that have been made to him from around your Lordships’ House. With those words, I conclude my remarks.

Motion agreed.

House adjourned at 6.29 pm.