Lord Teverson
Main Page: Lord Teverson (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)My Lords, my understanding of both these amendments is that they are intended to have the same effect. One may be more elegant than the other, but I think that they probably have the same effect, and I support both.
I do not intend to rehearse the arguments that the noble Baroness who moved the amendment made comprehensively. However, there are some other points that are worth making, and points that we have debated already this afternoon which are worth drawing on.
First, the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, as we began our deliberations this afternoon, encapsulated the problem at the heart of the Bill in relation to penalties. He set out quite fairly the fine as a penalty and enforcement mechanism, and the choices that face the Committee and Parliament in relation to the Bill. Either we have a piece of legislation that includes financial penalties or we do not—or, because of the road that the Government have gone down, we have a piece of legislation that kind of includes financial penalties.
However, the decision on whether these financial penalties will ever become operative lies outwith the control of those who are being asked to legislate—other than that they will, by the interaction of Clause 9, Schedule 3 and, I think, Clause 23, get an opportunity, via a statutory instrument, to have a short debate which will probably be conducted with very few people in the room, in a comparatively short time and with no power to amend. If the Secretary of State comes to the view that the history of the adjudicator’s experience thus far reveals that the operative penalties—the recommendations and the naming and shaming—have proved to be insufficient, these financial penalties can be activated.
That means that, in terms of this Bill, we cannot have any debate on what level of penalty is appropriate, what sort of circumstances would trigger a penalty as opposed to one of the other enforcement mechanisms or whether we would like rules to be made so that violations of the code can be differentiated by their nature and attract different types of penalties. I do not think that that is constitutionally appropriate. Given the nature of the sort of penalty that we must expect, it is not appropriate for Parliament to be denied the opportunity to have such a debate if the penalty is to be meaningful. I say that because this code can be enforced only against the top 10 retailers in the country. These are enormous businesses. If financial penalties are to have any effect on them, they will have to be significant.
However, there is a much more concerning issue about this construction. I am sure that the noble Baroness—or those advising her—may say, or even be able to find, an example of where something similar was done in the past in order to support doing it again—although the example will probably turn out not to have been extraordinarily successful. I am sure that in responding the Minister will say that Parliament has supervision of this to the extent that it allows this mechanism and that it is entirely proportionate—and I am sure that the word “proportionate” will be used regularly in the response. Of course, the mechanism does not give Parliament any role if it disagrees with the Secretary of State’s persisting view that financial penalties are not appropriate.
The Secretary of State holds all the cards now. The Secretary of State is constrained by this to allow financial penalties only if he concludes that the other powers are inadequate. If the Secretary of State does not conclude that, how are they accountable to Parliament? How on earth can Parliament make the Secretary of State accountable in terms of these mechanisms for not triggering this power, other than the inadequate process of Questions or maybe a Question for Short Debate? There is no mechanism whereby Parliament can say, “This is not what we intended. There are egregious breaches of this going on and the Secretary of State is not willing to trigger this power”, and that is inappropriate. There is not even a continuing method for amending this legislation or a clause that can be resurrected in some fashion. There is just no method for making the Secretary of State accountable for a continuing failure to recognise what is going on and to leave a piece of legislation ineffective because a part of it has not been enacted.
My Lords, when first I was looking forward to reading the Bill, there were two areas that I felt were of key importance. One was that we managed to expand the number of people who could bring a case to the adjudicator for the adjudicator to judge from then on, and that was well satisfied by the Government and the Minister in our discussions on the previous Committee day. The other area is this one: is this an adjudicator that counts or one that is there merely for form? Yes, there may be a question of reputation, but not all retailers are that concerned about reputation in every sense. This is a powerful tool and we know that the restricted population of these retailers is going to be sensitive to it but, to show that Parliament and the Government are serious in this legislation, there has to be a direct ability on the part of the adjudicator to be able to make fines. It is a measure of whether this is a serious creation of an appointment. It is for that reason that the amendment put forward by my noble friends is important and goes to the heart of making the Bill something that the industry on both sides will pay attention to. On that basis, I hope that the Minister’s response will be positive.
My Lords, the issue of proceeds of fines has become prominent since last year, when the Office of Fair Trading fined certain supermarkets for raising their prices in 2003 in response to a concerted push-up on prices from dairy suppliers through their processors. Dairy farmers were responding to very low returns. The supply chain was being receptive and wished to respond without disturbing the competitive status quo. The supermarkets wanted a sustainable supply chain but the Office of Fair Trading, with its primary concern focused on prices to the consumer, fined the supermarkets, with the proceeds going to the Exchequer. That took further resources out of the supply chain, which brought it great alarm, and many in the dairy industry thought that this was unfair and counterproductive.
I will not comment further, as I understand that this case may yet be unresolved. However, the proceeds of fines levied on supermarkets for anti-competitive behaviour in a supply chain can be seen, in many regards, as different from those for most other wrong-doing. The Consolidated Fund helps taxpayers, not consumers. The complainants insist on anonymity. Rather than take money out of the grocery trade, surely we could be more imaginative.
We have doubts about whether the Government ever intend the adjudicator to levy a fine. If, on reflection, the Government find their nerve and agree that the adjudicator’s powers need to have teeth, the industry may be looking at significant sums of money if the level of fines is to have some meaning to supermarkets with multi-million pound turnovers. The proportionality of fines to the offence should also be taken into account. Have the Government done any thinking on this? Our amendment offers scope to undertake more positive action.
In early February, the House debated the report of Sub-Committee D of the European Union Committee, Innovation in EU Agriculture. The report’s main conclusion was that the UK must show leadership within the EU in order to develop a strategic approach to food production. The CAP budget should be rebalanced to increase allocation to research and innovation. All sides of the House, including the Government, welcomed the report. We have a wonderful opportunity to increase innovation in our groceries supply chain with proceeds from fines. “Innovation” includes all aspects of development in farming and the supply chain, technological development, product development, and marketing. The amendment at this stage does not seek to name a specific recipient, but rather to seek agreement to this idea.
Much of the innovation in farming originates in the supply industries that provide farming inputs: genetics of crops and animals, plant protection, animal health products and treatments, plant and machinery, and a range of expert services for financial, technical, environmental and marketing purposes. The BBSRC—Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council—and the Technology Strategy Board urgently need to reposition UK agriculture at the forefront of technological advance. As an alternative, we have the Agricultural and Horticultural Development Board, as well as sector centres of excellence such as the dairy innovation centre.
The noble Lord, Lord Knight, received only today a letter from the Minister, dated 29 May, following our debate at Second Reading. In the letter, which the noble Lord has shared with me, the Minister mentions where money should go. I quote:
“There is … a risk that if the funds were earmarked for funding groceries supply chain initiatives this could lead to lobbying or even litigation over who the most suitable recipient was”.
I am not sure whether we need at this stage to specify in the Bill where precisely the money should go—the area is surely sufficient. Could that not be included as an amendment to secondary legislation under Schedule 3? Other examples do not seem to have caused a problem. For example, the regional growth fund is quite able to make awards without challenge. We have mentioned this idea to stakeholders in the industry and have received encouragement to explore this option with the Minister.
The Groceries Supply Code of Practice was needed precisely because anti-competitive behaviour stifled innovation. What better way to promote innovation in the supply chain than by using the money raised in fines from such behaviour to undertake this work? It would be the best way to provide redress to suppliers, who must be assured of confidentiality if they are to come forward without fear of reprisal. It is a pro-growth measure; pro-supplier and pro-consumer: a win-win-win. I beg to move.
My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 49. There is an opportunity here, as the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester has said, to be a little more innovative. I have certainly put down one suggestion in my own amendment, though I am not saying that it is exactly the right way to go. At this stage, we are talking about the principle.
I know that the Government are often concerned about what they would see as creeping hypothecation, and that fines should generally go into the Consolidated Fund. However, I was interested to read the Statement today from my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the Barclays crisis, where he stated that fines paid to the FSA are used to reduce the annual levy on other financial institutions. We have an example there of where such fines do not go into the Consolidated Fund, as pointed out very conveniently by the Chancellor. If anyone knows about these Treasury issues, it is probably him—we hope, at least.
The Chancellor goes on to say that he wants to change that, and that proceeds of fines should go back into the Consolidated Fund. The reason that he is iffy about that system is that the money goes back to the financial sector. Here, we are not suggesting that it should go back to the rest of the retail sector; we are suggesting it should go to the people whom this Bill is trying to protect and promote—that is, the supply chain. There is an opportunity here for innovation, for goodwill and for common sense. I do not think that it will be the end of the Treasury trying to meet its targets in reducing the public debt. It will not be that significant, but it will be important to the industry.
My Lords, I need to leave fairly soon, so I want to add something about this particular suggestion. I want to address also a broader point, since this is tied into the whole issue of financial penalties.
I was grateful to the Minister for her comment about changing culture. This is another small way in which the culture might be changed. But the crucial issue we need to grasp is that changing any culture will require whether we like it or not—and it is not a pleasant word—coercion. That is at the heart of much of what we are saying here. I do not know enough about the latest statistics to be able to respond to what the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles said a few moments ago, but, certainly, in our part of the world dairy farms are still closing and, certainly, an analysis of the past 10 years would show that the capacity for milk production has reduced. I do not know what the figures are for importing milk, but I think they have gone up significantly over these years.
All these things lead us back to innovation, which seems to be a key word to use. It is a positive word. It goes back to changing cultures and is not about punishing people. It is about trying to find a proper balance within the market, so that suppliers and retailers are doing something which has a synthesising effect: they are working together. Therefore, I hope very much that some sort of response will come from the Government at this stage. If it does not, I fear that these same questions will be asked on Report. I would gently support this pair of amendments, but in the end they push us back to the same issues that we have been looking at. If we do not face those issues, we shall still end up in a situation where we do not alter the present culture.
It is certainly true that Tesco has a higher margin than the Co-op. Its net margin before tax is around 5%. It also just happens that its margin in the UK is slightly lower than its average margin because it achieves somewhat better margins abroad. The size of Tesco’s profits is, in my view, irrelevant. Tesco is running a business that needs to achieve a margin on which it pays taxes, and it needs to make a return on the capital employed, which of course is very large. The Tesco store around the corner from where I live has just been completely reconfigured, perhaps I may say, to the advantage of the consumer. There are now more goods in the store and there is not much room to move around. In fact, if you go there between 12 pm and 2 pm, you are mown down by members of the Civil Service buying sandwiches for lunch. Nevertheless, in its broadest sense, Tesco provides an extremely good service to the public. Quoting arbitrary sums of money does not recognise the reality of life. It is to take a mythological position to say that because people are making quite a lot of money, they can always afford to pay all the costs that are thrust upon them.
If Parliament wills that there should be an adjudicator, that he or she should sit in the Office of Fair Trading, conduct investigations, have a staff and cost money, then rather than having an endless argument about how it defends invoices it has sent for investigation costs, it would be much better if they were paid out of taxes—out of the combined OFT and adjudicator budget—and do not fall on the elderly ladies with their small shopping baskets whom I see in another supermarket, called Sainsbury’s, who cannot afford to pay more for what they are getting there. The taxpayer has broader shoulders than the consumer. I beg to move.
I congratulate the Government on this clause. It is balanced, it puts the costs where they should be and acts as a break on frivolous claims and complaints. I do not understand the argument about it putting up prices, because if that is the case it is because we have an oligopolistic market. The way that markets work is that the price is set not by the cost of fines but by competition in the market and the crossing of supply and demand. If we have competition in that market—that is a big “if” and I will come back to it in a minute—the individual firm takes a hit on the fine, but it cannot put up the price because there is competition in that market. That sector argues very strongly that there is strong competition in that market, so it does not affect price. That is fundamental capitalist economics. If there is a problem, it is because there is insufficient competition in the grocery market. Frankly, if that is the case, the remedy is not here, but is clearly somewhere else altogether—in the Competition Commission or whatever follows it following any legislation this year.
As I said at Second Reading, I am a great advocate of multiple retailers. They have brought a great deal of benefit to this country, although there may be downsides as well. It is clear that if people cause the costs of an investigation, it should take responsibility for them. That is absolutely the right way to do it, and the clause reflects that. If you believe that fines will put up costs, you have to go to something other than fines. What do you go to? I do not think you go back to taxpayers. That is impossible. You would have to go back to an FSA-type system where you have approved people and you disqualify them from being in the grocery trade, but there is no way that that would work. Otherwise, I suppose you put them in jail under the criminal code, and that is clearly utterly inappropriate. I congratulate the Government on the clause. It is absolutely balanced and correct.
I am pleased to follow the noble Lord, Lord Teverson. I think his answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, was exactly correct about the interaction of financial penalties and the truth of the noble Viscount’s arguments about the efficiency of competition. We cannot make a decision about these issues based on an entirely arbitrary judgment about what aspects of the finances of this business are relevant to this decision and ignoring the others. The noble Viscount is right about that, but he has to apply that logic to himself. He cannot say that it is all about margins and not about the scale and nature of these businesses and the amount of profit that they earn, because they are relevant to this.
That having been said, this is a very odd clause given other parts of this legislation because, however you dress this up, this is a financial penalty. I asked the noble Baroness a simple question: what scale of financial penalty are the Government prepared to countenance in relation to this legislation? The answer that I got was, “Without the experience of the adjudicator working, we have no idea”. The adjudicator has been given a blank cheque without any experience.
I do not know if I am grateful to the noble Viscount for asking me that question. If I were standing where the noble Baroness is, then I would feel I had to answer it. The only answer I can give the noble Viscount is that I will think about it. However, I suggest that for the purposes of the Committee, the fact that it is not easy to answer makes the point that he wishes to make.
There are all sorts of complexities about this legislation, many of which are necessary. I believe that anonymity at the heart of this process is necessary to build confidence in it and ensure that people come forward in this unequal bargaining position. The noble Viscount himself said that the consequences of people being exposed may be significant for them as suppliers to the retail industry. However, all of these complexities are going to keep the adjudicator awake at night in any event. This complex structure that we are creating—and we are all now willing participants in this if we do not speak out against it—is taking a reasonably good idea, which could be delivered simply, and complicating it beyond all belief. It is so complicated now, and I have taken such an interest in this over the last couple of weeks, that I might go back into practising in the legal profession, because I can see opportunities here that were not there when I practised before, and niche practices are places to make decent money now in the legal profession.
I do not support the argument that the noble Viscount puts forward, because I think costs should fall. The nature and scale of what we are dealing with here is such that if people cause this draconian step to have to be taken, then they deserve all they get in my view. They should then have to go out and compete in the market in order to make that money up in some other way.
There is another point about this clause that disturbs me, which is the part that the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, likes and is designed to avoid vexatious complaints. This is entirely the wrong way to go about this. We should be saying that the adjudicator should stop vexatious complaints and not pursue them. I cannot believe that we will be satisfied if we appoint somebody to be the adjudicator who has to resort, after an investigation, to imposing the costs of the investigation on to a vexatious complainer. I want an adjudicator who says, “I have looked at this, it is vexatious and I am not doing it”.
I am not going to present the Minister’s case, but it seems that the whole way that the early part of the legislation is written, which we dealt with in the previous sitting, was that the adjudicator is under no obligation to pursue anything that he or she feels is vexatious. That is inherent in the Bill, hence you then move on to this. I take the noble Lord’s point.
I am grateful to the noble Lord and I think he has got my point. It seems to me that we ought to front-load the assessment of vexatiousness and not leave this bit at the end, as if somehow it balances everything and makes it appear much better than it is. We should give the adjudicator the power to say to people who bring complaints that are vexatious or without merit—and that will be revealed very quickly—“I am not taking these any further and that’s it”. People have to have confidence in this. The decisions that we want the adjudicator to make in relation to this issue will be decisions of moment and will have to be serious and important points. We do not want an adjudicator running around doing lots of small investigations. We want one or two key investigations that go to the heart of the inequities in this market, which people want the Government and Parliament to address. The previous Government started to do that. I am uncomfortable with this particular clause for a number of reasons but am grateful to it because it exposes the false logic of a lot of the rest of the provisions of this Bill.
My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendments 95 and 123A. The issue we are raising is that, as the Bill is currently written, it would appear that when the workings of the adjudicator are reviewed—this is specifically in relation to the ability of third parties such as trade associations to make representations and complaints to the adjudicator—and if the review decides that the arrangement is not working well and wants to change it, all that the Bill currently allows the Secretary of State to do is to completely remove the ability of third parties to complain to the adjudicator. It is a very black and white position: either all third parties can complain or all third parties cannot complain.
These amendments seek to give the Secretary of State the ability by order to list specific third parties who would still be allowed to submit information to the adjudicator. Should irresponsible third parties abuse the right that the legislation gives them to submit information to the adjudicator, the Secretary of State could restrict the number of third parties to those that behave responsibly. This would be a pragmatic way for the Secretary of State to operate should the review disclose something that he is unhappy about.
Amendment 123A simply seeks that the affirmative resolution rather than the negative resolution is used in order to give Parliament extra scrutiny if the Secretary of State wants to limit the number of individuals permitted to submit information to the adjudicator. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendment 94 is quite straightforward: it seeks to insert a new paragraph in proposed new Section 4A(1) which allows for the adjudicator to consider,
“information provided by a trade association”.
Trade associations are important and should be involved in the structure of the Bill, and the amendment would involve them in this part of the work delineated by the Bill. It is as straightforward as that.
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have raised the important issue of what any restrictions on the sources of information under Clause 15(10) should involve. The Government hope and believe that third parties such as trade associations will provide information to the adjudicator in a responsible and helpful way and that this clause will never need to be activated. Nevertheless, it is important that we give proper scrutiny to the details of how the clause can be activated and what it should include.
The clause as drafted provides the most suitable way to restrict information. The sources that would still be allowed to provide information are those identified as most suitable by the Government following their consideration of pre-legislative scrutiny by the Business, Innovation and Skills Select Committee. These have been carefully considered as sources that could provide useful information without the risk of the adjudicator being deluged with complex but essentially weak complaints.
My noble friend Lord Eccles suggested that retailers should be included in the list of sources of information. Clearly retailers will have relevant information about whether a breach has occurred and this will be central to investigations. However, the place for this to be heard is in investigations, where the adjudicator can seek relevant information without revealing details of complaints. The decision to start an investigation is based on complaints or other information giving reasonable grounds to suspect that the code has been breached, not on an attempt to weigh all the arguments.
My noble friends Lord Razzall and Lord Teverson suggest that trade associations should be added to the list. However, trade associations are the primary group that this power to limit the sources of information is intended to address. The power has been introduced in the light of concerns that trade associations might raise complex but unjustified complaints. This could put a strain on the adjudicator’s time and resources, as well as unnecessary burdens on the retailers.
The noble Lords, Lord Knight and Lord Grantchester, suggest that the Secretary of State should be able to specify sources through guidance. However, such an extension would be a more serious matter than is suited for guidance, which the adjudicator must “take account of” but which is not strictly binding.
Clause 15(10) has been deliberately written to restrict the sources of information to those that are most likely to have information regarding a breach of the code. This will ensure that trade associations and other third parties have a clear incentive to act responsibly. It would be invidious to put the Secretary of State in a position where he or she had to pick which third parties or classes of third party were responsible and which were not, and such an amendment could lead to the very lobbying and campaigning that we hope to avoid.
Finally, the noble Lords, Lord Knight and Lord Grantchester, have also proposed an amendment to Clause 23 that is relevant here. It would mean that Clause 15(10) required an affirmative resolution. Throughout the Bill we have striven to ensure that a suitable level of parliamentary scrutiny is provided for any orders.
The Government believe that the negative procedure is suitable here as the content of the order is very clearly defined in the Bill, and because an order can be made only as the result of a triennial review involving widespread consultation. The Delegated Powers Committee considered this order specifically and confirmed that it was satisfied with our reasons for this being a negative procedure.
I hope that these answers to the amendments have been helpful. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 111A, which would amend Clause 19 by removing subsection (5) and replacing it with a new subsection. This concerns the same issue of the flat-rate levy. Clause 19(5) specifies that it should be the same for all retailers unless the Secretary of State decides otherwise and makes an order that allows it to reflect expense and time. My amendment does away with the first phase of the flat-rate levy. It is on very much the same ground as other amendments in this group. Mine would enable the Secretary of State to decide the criteria that should be applied for a variable levy.
I repeat what I said on Amendment 87C, which referred to this issue. There is a basic problem in that a flat-rate levy will not change behaviour because there will be no reward to retailers for avoiding getting into trouble and behaving well. We need to start on a strong footing and, as the noble Lord, Lord Knight, has just said, on an equitable footing that reflects the size of the different retailers. I am conscious that the Minister has said that she will deal with this issue when she responds to this group of amendments.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 114, which is very straightforward. Under Clause 19(5), the Secretary of State must make an order to allow the adjudicator to differentiate. My noble friend Lord Razzall and I believe that the adjudicator should have this direct ability. Again, we have this indirect method of making decisions through the Secretary of State. I am sure that the Secretary of State has far more important things to do than decide the specific division of the levy among the small population of large retailers. If we are to have a serious adjudicator, we should give that person the authority to undertake that task. If we feel that the adjudicator’s decisions are wrong, I am sure that other provisions in the Bill will ensure that that is communicated to him or her.
My Lords, many noble Lords have given close consideration to how the levy to fund the adjudicator should be raised. The noble Lords, Lord Borrie, Lord Knight of Weymouth and Lord Grantchester, proposed similar amendments, respectively suggesting that the Bill should specify that the adjudicator “must” or “shall”, rather than “may”, levy funds from the retailers. I agree with the principle that the adjudicator should raise its funds from the retailers. This is intended as the adjudicator’s primary funding source. Other forms of income, such as payment for the cost of individual investigations or loans and grants from the Secretary of State, are intended to be secondary.
However, simply specifying that raising funds is obligatory would not have a clear outcome unless the Bill specified when the adjudicator must do so. The current drafting is intended to allow the adjudicator to levy funds whenever he or she deems it necessary, not to impose a schedule of when he or she may or must raise funds. I believe that we agree on the principle that the adjudicator should be funded by the retailers, but I also believe that the current drafting gives the adjudicator greater flexibility and is preferable.
The noble Lord, Lord Borrie, proposed a further amendment removing the need for the Secretary of State to give consent before a levy is raised. I am sympathetic to the principles of avoiding unnecessary hurdles and the need for independence for the adjudicator. However, this amendment would give the adjudicator a completely free hand to raise funds from the retailers without the oversight of Ministers. The Secretary of State needs only to give consent and may not direct the adjudicator to raise any levy, but some accountability is necessary.
The noble Lords, Lord Knight of Weymouth and Lord Grantchester, proposed that the levy should initially be divided according to the large retailers’ turnover. That possibility was considered during pre-legislative scrutiny, but the Government believe that it would be unfair to assume that a retailer’s size correlates with how much it breaches the code or with how much of the adjudicator’s resource it is likely to demand. The principle of fairly sharing the cost of the adjudicator is better served by the ability to vary the payments of retailers based on the estimated expense and time of dealing with them in the light of experience.
I turn to Amendment 110A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising. This would require an order to be made before a levy is imposed, and would mean that consultation must take place before imposing the levy and before any subsequent increase in the levy. I believe that unnecessary bureaucracy should be avoided wherever possible. The Government’s intention to fund this body via a levy has been clearly set out in previous consultations and policy documents; the mechanism for a levy and how it is to be imposed can be read from the Bill. I therefore see no need to require the imposition of an order, or for a further round of consultation, before imposing the levy, particularly when the levy is subject to the approval of the Secretary of State and not simply at the adjudicator’s discretion.
On my noble friend’s question about limiting the amount of the levy, a limit on how much can be raised could tie the hands of the adjudicator, particularly if there was a costly appeal for which funds were needed. The fact that the Secretary of State must approve each levy is an assurance that it will not be misused.
This brings me to Amendment 114, tabled by my noble friends Lord Razzall and Lord Teverson. This would remove the requirement for the Secretary of State to make an order before the adjudicator can vary the way the levy is made. Given the principles of avoiding bureaucracy that I have just set out, I am willing to look again at whether an order is necessary before a levy can be varied in the proportionate way set out in the latter part of subsection (5). The fact that individual levies would still need to be approved by the Secretary of State could provide an adequate safeguard, and I will happily discuss this issue further with my noble friends Lord Razzall and Lord Teverson before the next stage of the Bill. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, will also be happy to discuss this issue, as I believe that her amendment shares the same objective of avoiding bureaucratic delay. However, the Government feel that varying the levy should be a matter for the independent adjudicator and that the role of the Secretary of State should be simply to give consent.