Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

I readily concede the noble Lord’s encyclopaedic knowledge of the Companion, but I think the reasons why the amendments have been brought forward today are very good. However, it is unusual, and perhaps it would have been better to have had longer discussions about some of these issues, and to have had responses that satisfied the House earlier in the Bill’s proceedings.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach)]

My Lords, I am sorry if my responses on Report failed to satisfy the House; I hope that I can satisfy it today. I understand that the scheduling of today’s business was agreed through the usual channels, and nobody has a more vested interest in the speedy resolution of business than I do, as I believe I will be the last speaker on today’s business.

My noble friend quite rightly pointed out that his amendments are similar to those which he tabled on Report. I explained then that our principal reasons for resisting the first amendment were the detrimental impact on the statutory appeals framework, and the increased number of appeals and costs that would result. Although this amendment is framed more tightly and specifically, the same detrimental impact will result from it. While I recognise the intention of the amendment is to reduce the delay in bringing an appeal for children and trafficked persons, the consequences for the appeals framework are not justified.

Only a minority of unaccompanied children who claim asylum are affected by this policy in the way described by my noble friend Lord Avebury. It affects only those who are older than 16 and a half when refused asylum but granted some other form of leave. These children are close to adulthood and have a right of appeal should a decision be taken to remove them after their leave runs out at age 17 and a half. As I said last time, this delay is not unreasonable.

I say to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, that the age of 18 is a statutory boundary between childhood and adulthood, and Governments have to live within the constraints of that. It is important to recognise that in all cases, before a child or trafficked person is removed from the UK, they will be entitled to a right of appeal. That is part of the process.

The Government’s policy ensures that individuals do not have multiple appeal rights over a brief period of time, possibly raising the same arguments on each occasion as matters may not have evolved since their last appeal. The amendment would undermine this key principle of the Secretary of State’s asylum appeals framework.

I turn now to Amendment 5, which my noble friend has also brought back. As I set out previously, the individuals we are seeking to capture in this clause are those excluded by the Secretary of State—that is to say, they are individuals who pose the highest threat to the public, be it for engagement in terrorism, serious criminality or unacceptable behaviour. It is therefore only right that an appeal against the cancellation of leave decision that accompanied the Secretary of State’s decision to exclude takes place from outside of the United Kingdom.

To be absolutely clear—I do not want noble Lords to feel that I am seeking to mislead them in any way—and as has been raised in previous debates, there is no policy of waiting for an individual to leave the United Kingdom before excluding them. Indeed, a series of deportation orders in cases in respect of national security activity are ongoing at the moment. However, in many of these cases we are talking about a situation where an individual leaves the United Kingdom for a period of time to meet with like-minded individuals and potentially to acquire new skills which, if utilised back in the United Kingdom, can pose a significant and serious threat to the population as a whole. That is why in such cases, having seen the intent of their activities while abroad, the Secretary of State takes the decision to exclude on the grounds of non-conduciveness. It would be a highly risky strategy to allow such individuals simply to come back to the United Kingdom and to exercise a right of appeal. It would also undermine a crucial disruption tool used for the protection of the general public.

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[Lord Avebury]

My Lords, I am most grateful for the renewed support of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon. What they have said demonstrates that there is still serious concern across the Floor of the House with regard to both these amendments, particularly in the case of the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, on the rights of the child, which are being jeopardised by the current system. There is a serious question as to whether the system we have now is compatible with our signature to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, both that and concerns about the right of appeal only from abroad may have to wait for further consideration in another place, where I hope that these issues will be picked up. I honestly do not think that my noble friend, although he has tried hard, has given us satisfactory answers to many of the points that have been raised. I mention in particular whether the Home Office has a policy of lying in wait. I cited the detailed evidence which has been—

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am sorry but I did make it patently clear that there is no policy of waiting for people to leave the country before taking these proceedings. That is a matter of fact. I did answer the question.

[Lord Avebury]

I know that my noble friend said that, but he did not respond to the point I made about the evidence which has been provided for us by the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association. It says that in many cases the notice is served the day after a person has left the country and that the policy was acknowledged by a senior UKBA official when the matter was addressed at the ILPA AGM in front of 100 people in November 2010. My noble friend did not deny that that evidence existed, nor did he attempt to refute it. If he had said that in the cases where a person’s presence was deemed to be “non-conducive to the public good” the Home Office would not wait until somebody went abroad for a short period, I would have been far happier. The case that he described—where someone is known to be departing from the United Kingdom with the intention of plotting with like-minded individuals abroad to commit or plan further offences against our laws—is, again, hypothetical, but the existence of the suspicions could have enabled the Secretary of State to serve that person with a notice before he left the country. Therefore, there was an element of premeditation in the way that the Secretary of State exercised her powers in the particular case that my noble friend described.

I do not think that we are going to get any further with this matter this afternoon. I shall have to leave it for our colleagues in another place to renew the discussions on both these amendments, as I hope they will. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.