(8 years, 4 months ago)
Lords Chamber(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Lords Spiritual (Women) Bill, has consented to place her prerogative, so far is it is affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
My Lords, this Bill will enable female diocesan bishops of the Church of England to become Lords Spiritual sooner than they would under current rules.
The Government have introduced the Bill in response to the welcome change in the law to allow women to be consecrated bishops. That has been a long time coming. As far back as 1975, the General Synod of the Church of England recognised the possibility that women might be ordained ministers. The first female deacons were ordained in 1987 and the first female priests in 1994.
The decision of the General Synod last year finally to allow women to serve as bishops was widely welcomed. The necessary measure was considered by your Lordships last October, when several noble Lords looked forward to the day when we would welcome the first female bishops to this House.
The legislation was completed by the General Synod on 17 November last year and just one month later it was announced that the Reverend Libby Lane would serve as the suffragan Bishop of Stockport. Her consecration on 26 January was an historic occasion in two respects. Not only was it the first consecration of a woman as a bishop of the Church of England, it was the first to be broadcast live on television.
As a suffragan, not a diocesan, bishop, the Right Reverend Libby Lane is not eligible to attend this House as a Lord spiritual. As your Lordships are probably well aware, the 26 bishops who sit here are determined under the Bishoprics Act 1878. They are the most reverend Primates the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Archbishop of York, the right reverend Prelates the Bishop of London, the Bishop of Durham and the Bishop of Winchester, and the 21 longest-serving diocesan bishops of the Church of England.
The Government look forward to the appointment of the first female diocesan bishop. However, under the current rules, it would be many years before she would be able to join the Lords spiritual Bench as one of the 21 longest-serving bishops. Having already waited a long time to benefit from the leadership of female bishops in the church, we would still have to wait some years more to benefit from their presence in this Chamber.
The Government’s Bill addresses this situation. It has been introduced at the request of the most reverend Primate, the Archbishop of Canterbury, on behalf of the church and with the support of Her Majesty’s Opposition. The Bill would alter, for the next 10 years, the operation of the 1878 Act. During that time any vacancy arising among the 21 Lords spiritual whose places are currently determined by seniority would be filled by the most senior female diocesan bishop available. If there are no eligible female bishops, the vacancy would be filled by the most senior male diocesan bishop, as it is under the current arrangement.
This is, as noble Lords will no doubt have noticed, an exceptionally brief Bill. It is also an important and historic one. It does not seek to make changes or reforms to the composition of this House; it simply provides that female bishops will join the Lords spiritual slightly sooner than they would otherwise have done. Not only are the 26 Lords spiritual active and valued Members of this House, but their presence reflects the enduring constitutional arrangement of an established Church of England with the monarch and head of state as its Supreme Governor.
Bishops sit as independent Members of this House. As well as leading the Chamber in prayer at the start of each sitting day, they seek to be a voice both for people of faith and for the communities they serve. Their presence in the Lords is an extension of the Church of England’s general vocation in its role as the established church. In fulfilling its national mission, it is right that the church should, at all levels, seek to reflect the nation that it serves. That is why we welcome the decision to allow women as well as men to be bishops, and why we believe it right to make arrangements for female bishops to sit as Lords spiritual as soon as possible.
The continued presence of bishops in this Chamber was explicitly recommended by the Wakeham commission. The Government’s House of Lords Reform Bill in 2012 would have retained the seats of the Lords spiritual in this House, although it would have reduced their number in recognition of the reduction in the overall number of Peers provided for in the Bill. Those provisions were endorsed by the Joint Committee’s report on the Bill.
We greatly appreciate the wisdom and valued contributions of the Lords spiritual Bench to this Chamber. On behalf of the Government, I extend special thanks today to the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester for their support and assistance to the Government in bringing forward this legislation. We are grateful to the Bishops’ Bench for their ministry in the Chamber. This Bill will strengthen and enrich that ministry by the addition of female Lords spiritual as soon as possible. I warmly congratulate the church on extending its leadership to include women, who have already provided valuable service for many years, and look forward to the day when we will benefit from the presence of female bishops in this House. I beg to move.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I welcome the gracious Speech and the opening remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.
Time constraints have obliged the coalition Government to propose fewer legislative measures than has been the case in the past. This is a good example for future Governments. We have learnt that knee-jerk reactions or chasing headlines are not sensible ways in which to run the country. Just look at the plethora of criminal justice legislation promoted by political parties in the past. Many of the measures have become irrelevant to the changing situation in the country. Some of these measures have still to be implemented.
The past four years have seen some important changes for the better in the criminal justice system. The iniquitous IPP sentence has been abolished. Legislation has restricted the unnecessary use of remand in custody. The prison population has increased at a significantly slower rate than under the previous Government, and estimates of the future prison population have been scaled down.
It is particularly encouraging that there has been a dramatic reduction in the number of juveniles in custody, falling by 55% in the past five years. The number of women in prison has also fallen, from 4,200 in 2010 to 3,800 now. The Government have continued to commit to funding for a national network of liaison and diversion services at police stations and courts to divert mentally disordered offenders to treatment and care. We have passed legislation which, for the first time, will provide prisoners serving sentences of less than 12 months with supervision and support on release.
The Government are taking steps to reduce the indefensible racial disproportionality in the use of stop and search. They have passed legislation to promote the use of restorative justice in the criminal justice process—here thanks are due to the initiative taken by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. They have implemented reforms to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act which will reduce the scope for unfair discrimination against former offenders in the job market and, because employment reduces reoffending, will also increase public safety. The Queen’s Speech announced two further welcome pieces of legislation in the modern slavery Bill and the Serious Crime Bill, which will contain measures to combat slavery, organised crime and child neglect. So far, so good. Regrettably, however, there are some clouds on the criminal justice horizon.
With a general election approaching, the past few months have seen signs of a heightened temptation for politicians to indulge in knee-jerk reactions which do nothing to promote justice or public safety. For example, the Secretary of State for Justice has recently banned the transfer of anyone who has previously absconded from an open prison. This means that an inadequate offender who absconds after receiving distressing news from his family, then thinks better of it a few hours later and hands himself in cannot be transferred back to an open prison later in his sentence. It is true that a small number of prisoners have gone out from an open prison and committed serious offences. However, in 2012 there were 485,000 releases on temporary licence and only 26 prisoners were arrested on suspicion of committing an offence—a rate of five failures in every 100,000 releases. It makes sense to be as rigorous as possible in assessing prisoners’ risk before transferring them to open conditions. However, it is not sensible to introduce sweeping restrictions on the use of open establishments, which greatly reduce overall reoffending by enabling prisoners to be released into the community on a gradual basis rather than suddenly after a period in completely closed conditions.
Over the past few weeks, we have seen the prison population start to rise sharply—by more than 500 in the second half of May—and this may well be in response to the tough rhetoric which is beginning to emerge as a general election approaches. During the next year, we would like to see the Government resist the temptation to engage in knee-jerk reactions or punitive rhetoric. Instead, they should use the next year to promote a series of further measures to improve our criminal justice system, either by implementing them during this Session or by preparing the ground for their implementation in a future Parliament.
First, we need to take further steps to reduce the unnecessary use of imprisonment. This country still uses imprisonment at a higher rate than any other western European country. We have 149 prisoners per 100,000 of the population compared with 100 in France and 77 in Germany. Why is there such an anomaly? Many prisons remain seriously overcrowded and more than 19,000 prisoners are held two to a cell designed for one person. At the same time, the need for public expenditure restrictions has led to a reduction in the number of prison officers relative to the number of prisoners: from 2.9 prisoners per officer in 2000 to 4.8 prisoners per officer last September. This reinforces the case for using prison more sparingly, particularly as community sentences have lower reconviction rates than prison sentences for comparable offenders. We should prohibit courts from using prison, except for dangerous offenders, unless they have first tried an intensive community supervision programme. We should also convert the sentences of existing IPP prisoners into determinate sentences once they have served a period equivalent to double their tariff.
Secondly, the Government should implement the recommendation of the draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill Committee by enabling prisoners to vote if they are serving sentences of 12 months or less or are in the last six months of their sentence. It is now 10 years since the European Court of Human Rights judged that our blanket ban on voting by convicted prisoners violates the European Convention on Human Rights. The longer we continue to ignore our obligations under international law, the longer we are adopting a position which sits badly with our insistence that prisoners and other offenders should respect the rule of law. Respect for the rule of law involves an obligation for nation states as well as individuals to abide by binding legal rulings and not to pick and choose by abiding only by decisions that they choose to accept. We should waste no further time in making this relatively limited change, for which there are strong arguments based on considerations of citizenship and rehabilitation.
Thirdly, we should build on the welcome recent legislation which provides for restorative justice when sentences are deferred by making restorative justice one of the statutory purposes of sentencing and by enabling courts to include specific restorative justice requirements in community orders and youth rehabilitation orders.
Fourthly, the Government should reinforce the steps they are taking to reform stop and search by placing a clear statutory duty on all criminal justice agencies to adopt numerical targets for reducing racial disproportionality in their operations.
Finally, the Government should grasp the nettle and raise this country’s unusually low age of criminal responsibility—currently the lowest in Europe—from 10 to 12. The current position is incompatible with our obligations under international standards of juvenile justice and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Dealing with children of this age through non-criminal processes would hold out more hope of diverting them from offending than subjecting them to punishments in a criminal court. A short criminal justice Bill containing these measures would provide a legacy of which the coalition Government could be proud.
I know that noble Lords from all parties with an interest in the criminal justice and penal system will continue to press for changes along these lines, not only during the current Session but throughout future Parliaments. Let me conclude with a word of caution. We have yet to study detailed provisions of legislative measures proposed by the Government. We are also aware that we have a short parliamentary timetable available to get these measures through both Houses of Parliament. I trust that the Government will accept these sensible amendments. Let us work together so that sensible amendments form part of effective legislation.
My Lords, perhaps I can interrupt at this stage of the proceedings in the absence of a Whip to say that we have an advisory time of five minutes. I am most grateful for the contribution made by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, but I know that other noble Lords will wish to move on, and I hope that they do not mind being reminded of that.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, noble Lords will recall that in Committee, we made the point that injunctions for nuisance and annoyance were certainly very helpful in certain circumstances, but not appropriate in every case. That is now the position adopted by your Lordships’ House, with the amendment to maintain the more serious definition of harassment, alarm and distress and retain the definition of nuisance and annoyance only for specific circumstances, as already provided in housing law, where that definition is entirely reasonable.
In Committee, we argued that ASBOs should be retained because, first, the higher threshold—harassment, alarm and distress—recognises the seriousness of the issue and how devastating anti-social behaviour can be. Secondly, there is the effectiveness and understanding that has grown up around the issue. I appreciate that there were teething problems with ASBOs initially and that there is always room for improvement. But after around 15 years, the various agencies involved know and understand how to use anti-social behaviour orders and could, I think, best advise on any improvements to be made. Thirdly, there is the seriousness of the issue which, given how devastating anti-social behaviour can be, meant that a breach became a criminal offence.
We now await the Government’s response, at Third Reading or later, to the rejection by your Lordships’ House of the definition of “nuisance and annoyance” from every situation. However, the penalties, sanctions and requirements for breach of an IPNA still remain, even with the new definition. It is that area which I seek further clarity on because it is so different from the ASBO penalty. We need an assurance from the Minister that the sanctions will be meaningful and have the effect that the Government claim they will.
The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, said in Committee:
“By moving away from focusing solely on enforcement and getting agencies to work with young people, we can get these young people’s lives back on track. Positive requirements”—
part of the IPNA procedure—
“which are absent at the moment, are integral to this move and to the Bill. Front-line professionals not only know about them, they welcome them. When applying for an injunction agencies will consider whether positive requirements can help address the underlying drivers of the anti-social behaviour. They will be better than individual support orders because positive requirements will be more flexible and can last for more than six months”.—[Official Report, 18/11/13; col. 820.]
What causes us great concern is that the Government have already set about dismantling some of the early intervention, and therefore the positive measures, which were in place in part to tackle anti-social behaviour. For example, the Sure Start centres were established to support any family which needed that support or help but have been decimated. Current estimates are that more than 600 Sure Start centres have been lost across England and Wales. I was told last week that even one in Basildon, where I live, and others in other parts of Essex are being closed. Those centres were important tools to help and support families with young children and in the prevention of anti-social behaviour.
One of the early indicators of the Government’s priorities were the cuts to early intervention grants and programmes, so when the Government rely on positive requirements that will accompany the new injunctions it is extremely worrying that they have said, as the Minister said in Committee, that:
“The Bill makes no provision for the funding of costs”.—[Official Report, 18/11/13; col. 823.]
I refer to pages 26 and 27 of the Explanatory Notes, which talk about the injunctions and give examples of what the positive requirements would be. They could be prohibitions: for example, not being in possession of a can of spray paint in a public place. However, the ones I am specifically concerned about and would welcome in most circumstances say that:
“Requirements would be designed to deal with the underlying causes of an individual’s anti-social behaviour and could include, for example, attendance at an alcohol or drugs misuse course or dog training in the case of irresponsible dog owners”.
The notes go on to say that these have to be monitored and that, before applying positive requirements, the court has to receive evidence on the suitability and enforceability of any requirement. That comes with some costs. Unless the Minister thinks that will be cost-neutral, there are costs associated with those requirements.
If the Government are going to replace a criminal sanction with a requirement, positive or otherwise, they have to be confident that these will be effective, be complied with and be monitored to ensure compliance, otherwise the Government will take action. To breach the terms of that injunction’s positive requirements is a very serious matter; it is punishable by prison. However, if the Government do not make it easy for somebody to comply with the positive requirements laid upon them because there is no support, help or funding for that, they will be moving quickly back to a position where a breach of that injunction is imprisonable and becomes a very serious matter. However, it might not be that person’s fault if they are not able to comply because the Government are not providing the funding for it.
I have some questions for the Minister and would like to know whether he can give me the necessary assurances. First, are the funding and resources available for the requirements to be undertaken? Secondly, are they available for the requirements to be appropriately and accurately monitored? Thirdly, are they also available to take action if that injunction is breached?
Unless those reassurances are forthcoming, there is a real danger that whatever the test for anti-social behaviour—whether it is nuisance and annoyance or harassment, alarm and distress—there will be no effective action against those committing such behaviour. We want those assurances because I would hope that in the public interest we all wanted serious measures that tackled anti-social behaviour and for those measures to be effective. Without such guarantees, it would be totally wrong to scrap what exists and start all over again. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, for tabling this amendment. It brings us back once again to the real failings of one of the key powers introduced by the previous Government to tackle anti-social behaviour.
This Government have been clear that, in developing our reforms, the police, local councils, social landlords and others must focus their response to anti-social behaviour on the needs of victims and put them first. As part of our consultation on the new powers, we asked victims what they want. They told us three things: first, they want their problem to be taken seriously; secondly, they want an efficient service and quick response; and, thirdly, they want the problem to stop and for it not to happen again. That is what this Government also want. That is why we want to support agencies by giving them effective new powers to do this. However, ensuring that the right powers are available also means removing or reforming the existing powers where we know that they do not work as well they should, particularly the anti-social behaviour order.
Front-line professionals have recognised the ASBO’s failings, and this is demonstrated by the most recently published statistics from the Ministry of Justice. Since 2005 there have been year-on-year falls in the number of ASBOs issued, with 1,329 issued in 2012, a decrease of 6% from the 1,414 issued in 2011 and a decrease of 68% since 2005. That is not because ASBOs have been so effective in preventing anti-social behaviour that they are no longer needed.
I made this point in Committee when the noble Baroness tabled a similar amendment, but it is worth repeating: up to the end of 2012, 58% of ASBOs were breached at least once and just over 43% were breached more than once. If an ASBO is breached, on average it is breached five times. Perhaps even more shocking are the figures relating to young people. As I also informed the House in Committee, the breach rate for under-18s is a staggeringly high 69%. To put it another way, over two-thirds of ASBOs against young people are breached. Those are the statistics. Those are the facts. They are certainly not teething issues, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, suggested; the ASBO is a fundamentally flawed device for tackling anti-social behaviour.
It is also a story of abject failure for under-18s who, for whatever reason, have taken the wrong path in their lives. ASBOs have unduly focused on enforcement, criminalising young people with insufficient emphasis on helping young people subject to ASBOs to deal with the reasons for their anti-social behaviour and turn over a new leaf. That is why this Government want to see the back of ASBOs and give the police, local councils, social landlords and others more effective powers to enhance their ability to tackle anti-social behaviour and protect the public.
In her evidence to the Public Bill Committee, the chief constable of Thames Valley, Sarah Thornton, made the point forcefully:
“The fact is, the experience has been that the ASBOs have been quite bureaucratic, in terms of securing them, and maybe not as effective at tackling the problem as we hoped”.—[Official Report, Commons, Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 20/6/13; col. 71.]
The fact is that ASBOs are an all too visible reminder of a broken system which the new powers are designed to fix. As I said in Committee and indeed in our deliberations earlier on Report, the injunction under Part 1 and the criminal behaviour order provided for in Part 2 form major planks of our reforms to give front-line professionals the swift and more effective powers they need to protect victims and communities. The injunction will enable agencies to act more quickly, with its lower civil standard of proof, and will not overly concentrate on enforcing prohibitions or criminalise those who breach it—unlike the ASBO. However, the criminal behaviour order will be available for more serious cases, where there is a criminal conviction. In these cases, it is right for tougher sanctions to be available on breach and, as with the ASBO, breach will be a criminal offence. However, both powers can include positive requirements to help individuals to address the root cause of their anti-social behaviour and help them turn their lives around.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI readily concede the noble Lord’s encyclopaedic knowledge of the Companion, but I think the reasons why the amendments have been brought forward today are very good. However, it is unusual, and perhaps it would have been better to have had longer discussions about some of these issues, and to have had responses that satisfied the House earlier in the Bill’s proceedings.
My Lords, I am sorry if my responses on Report failed to satisfy the House; I hope that I can satisfy it today. I understand that the scheduling of today’s business was agreed through the usual channels, and nobody has a more vested interest in the speedy resolution of business than I do, as I believe I will be the last speaker on today’s business.
My noble friend quite rightly pointed out that his amendments are similar to those which he tabled on Report. I explained then that our principal reasons for resisting the first amendment were the detrimental impact on the statutory appeals framework, and the increased number of appeals and costs that would result. Although this amendment is framed more tightly and specifically, the same detrimental impact will result from it. While I recognise the intention of the amendment is to reduce the delay in bringing an appeal for children and trafficked persons, the consequences for the appeals framework are not justified.
Only a minority of unaccompanied children who claim asylum are affected by this policy in the way described by my noble friend Lord Avebury. It affects only those who are older than 16 and a half when refused asylum but granted some other form of leave. These children are close to adulthood and have a right of appeal should a decision be taken to remove them after their leave runs out at age 17 and a half. As I said last time, this delay is not unreasonable.
I say to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, that the age of 18 is a statutory boundary between childhood and adulthood, and Governments have to live within the constraints of that. It is important to recognise that in all cases, before a child or trafficked person is removed from the UK, they will be entitled to a right of appeal. That is part of the process.
The Government’s policy ensures that individuals do not have multiple appeal rights over a brief period of time, possibly raising the same arguments on each occasion as matters may not have evolved since their last appeal. The amendment would undermine this key principle of the Secretary of State’s asylum appeals framework.
I turn now to Amendment 5, which my noble friend has also brought back. As I set out previously, the individuals we are seeking to capture in this clause are those excluded by the Secretary of State—that is to say, they are individuals who pose the highest threat to the public, be it for engagement in terrorism, serious criminality or unacceptable behaviour. It is therefore only right that an appeal against the cancellation of leave decision that accompanied the Secretary of State’s decision to exclude takes place from outside of the United Kingdom.
To be absolutely clear—I do not want noble Lords to feel that I am seeking to mislead them in any way—and as has been raised in previous debates, there is no policy of waiting for an individual to leave the United Kingdom before excluding them. Indeed, a series of deportation orders in cases in respect of national security activity are ongoing at the moment. However, in many of these cases we are talking about a situation where an individual leaves the United Kingdom for a period of time to meet with like-minded individuals and potentially to acquire new skills which, if utilised back in the United Kingdom, can pose a significant and serious threat to the population as a whole. That is why in such cases, having seen the intent of their activities while abroad, the Secretary of State takes the decision to exclude on the grounds of non-conduciveness. It would be a highly risky strategy to allow such individuals simply to come back to the United Kingdom and to exercise a right of appeal. It would also undermine a crucial disruption tool used for the protection of the general public.
My Lords, I am most grateful for the renewed support of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon. What they have said demonstrates that there is still serious concern across the Floor of the House with regard to both these amendments, particularly in the case of the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, on the rights of the child, which are being jeopardised by the current system. There is a serious question as to whether the system we have now is compatible with our signature to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, both that and concerns about the right of appeal only from abroad may have to wait for further consideration in another place, where I hope that these issues will be picked up. I honestly do not think that my noble friend, although he has tried hard, has given us satisfactory answers to many of the points that have been raised. I mention in particular whether the Home Office has a policy of lying in wait. I cited the detailed evidence which has been—
I am sorry but I did make it patently clear that there is no policy of waiting for people to leave the country before taking these proceedings. That is a matter of fact. I did answer the question.
I know that my noble friend said that, but he did not respond to the point I made about the evidence which has been provided for us by the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association. It says that in many cases the notice is served the day after a person has left the country and that the policy was acknowledged by a senior UKBA official when the matter was addressed at the ILPA AGM in front of 100 people in November 2010. My noble friend did not deny that that evidence existed, nor did he attempt to refute it. If he had said that in the cases where a person’s presence was deemed to be “non-conducive to the public good” the Home Office would not wait until somebody went abroad for a short period, I would have been far happier. The case that he described—where someone is known to be departing from the United Kingdom with the intention of plotting with like-minded individuals abroad to commit or plan further offences against our laws—is, again, hypothetical, but the existence of the suspicions could have enabled the Secretary of State to serve that person with a notice before he left the country. Therefore, there was an element of premeditation in the way that the Secretary of State exercised her powers in the particular case that my noble friend described.
I do not think that we are going to get any further with this matter this afternoon. I shall have to leave it for our colleagues in another place to renew the discussions on both these amendments, as I hope they will. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I cannot promise my noble friend that the Government can be ahead on these issues but I am grateful for the opportunity to debate his amendments. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that the Government keep the workings of the asylum process under review. Indeed, it would be wrong not to do so.
Amendment 113D would create a right of appeal whenever someone is refused asylum and granted any form of leave. As a result there would be more appeals against a refusal of asylum for a group of cases where no immediate right currently exists, and multiple appeals from individuals.
As my noble friend Lord Henley acknowledged in Committee, it is an unfortunate consequence of the otherwise very sensible 12-month restriction that some unaccompanied asylum-seeking children will experience delay in bringing an asylum appeal. My noble friend agreed to review the policy in respect of children to ensure that there were no unintendezd consequences. We have completed that review and concluded that this policy, seen in the context of the statutory appeals framework and current economic circumstances, operates as intended. As my noble friend has said, I have written to him to confirm this.
This amendment is to Section 83 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which provides that an individual may appeal against an asylum refusal when leave is granted for a period longer than 12 months. Amendment 113D would remove the 12-month restriction and create a right of appeal against the refusal of asylum regardless of the period of leave granted. It is not unusual for short periods of leave to be extended more than once. Recent case law means that this amendment could create a right of appeal against the earlier refusal of asylum every time further leave was granted. Therefore, this amendment would have serious and undesirable consequences for the existing appeals framework as it could result in multiple fruitless appeals being used to prolong someone’s time in the UK. In the current economic circumstances, it is vital that resources are used where they are most needed. While I recognise that the intention of this amendment is to reduce delay for children and trafficked persons, the consequences for the appeals framework are not justified for the following reasons.
First, the amendment is too broad. It would extend the right of appeal under Section 83 of the 2002 Act to anyone granted leave after a refusal of asylum, not just children and trafficked persons. This would result in additional costs and resources to administer each appeal. Secondly, only a minority of unaccompanied children who claim asylum are affected by this policy in the way described by my noble friend. It would affect only those who are older than 16 and a half when refused asylum but granted some other form of leave. As we have said, these children are close to adulthood and have a right of appeal should a decision be taken to remove them after their leave runs out at age 17 and a half. This delay is not unreasonable.
Thirdly, while it is correct that trafficked persons are similarly affected, for similar reasons to those we have given in relation to children we believe that the current policy may be equitable in all the circumstances. Section 83 of the 2002 Act affects only those trafficked persons who claim and are refused asylum. It is important to remember that in all cases before a child or any trafficked person is removed from the UK, they will be entitled to a right of appeal. The Government’s policy ensures that individuals do not have multiple appeal rights over a brief period, possibly raising the same arguments on each occasion as matters may not have evolved since their last appeal. The amendment proposed would undermine this key principle of the Secretary of State’s asylum appeals framework. For the reasons set out above, we are not persuaded that the current policy for appeal rights under Section 83 of the 2002 Act, either for children or more generally, has an impact of the magnitude necessary to justify incurring additional expense in relation to appeals.
Amendment 113E concerns the Secretary of State’s powers to certify, under Section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, that removing a person to a safe third country will not breach their human rights where the presumption is that the country to which the person is to be removed is safe. The effect of the certificate is that an appeal can be brought only after the person has been removed. This provision prevents appeals being used to delay removal in hopeless cases. Persons will be removed to a third country only if that country will not remove the person to another country other than in accordance with the refugee convention. If the certificate is challenged by judicial review, the court is required to regard the third country as one where the person’s rights under the refugee convention will not be breached.
Amendment 113E is tabled on the basis that Section 94(8) seeks to oust the jurisdiction of a court to consider the safety of the country of removal. It is, however, unnecessary. The courts are already able to consider whether the person’s human rights might be breached where judicial review challenges the issuing of the certificate. Once removed to the third country, an appeal may be brought and refugee convention issues can be considered. My noble friend asked for some detail here, and I will have to accept his very kind offer to allow me to write to him to give him a response to the data he was seeking.
Amendment 113E also seeks to remove those provisions in Schedule 3 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 that reduce the circumstances in which removal to a safe third country can be frustrated on the grounds of unmeritorious claims about treatment in, or removal from, those countries. The amendment would have a considerable practical impact on removals made to other European countries under the Dublin regulation. That regulation determines which state is responsible for examining an asylum claim. It plays a key role in tackling abuse of asylum systems through the phenomenon of “asylum shopping”. Indeed, the value of the Dublin regulation to the UK is clear. Since 2004, the UK has been able to remove more than 10,000 individuals under the Dublin regulation.
It is argued that the amendments are necessary to reflect the terms of the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case of NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department, dated 21 December 2011. My noble friend referred to this case. The Government respectfully disagree. The ruling in NS gives useful guidance on the correct approach to fundamental rights as a matter of EU law. However, as a matter of practice, it does not significantly change the approach to domestic legislation. The concept of a rebuttable presumption in legislation when considering the impact of the Human Rights Act is not new. It was firmly established by existing case law from the European Court of Human Rights in KRS v UK in 2008 and from the House of Lords in Nasseri v Secretary of State for the Home Department in 2009. What the Luxembourg court has done in NS is confirm that a similar approach should be taken when it is alleged that there is evidence of the Charter of Fundamental Rights being breached.
I turn, finally, to Amendment 113F. The effect of this amendment would be to allow an appeal to proceed where the appellant has been granted leave by the Secretary of State. The purpose of many appeals is to overturn a decision to refuse to grant leave. Consequently, it is the Government’s position that in the majority of cases an appeal should not proceed where leave has been granted. Currently, Sections 104(4A) to 104(4C) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provide that an appeal cannot proceed where the appellant has been granted leave. The exceptions are where the appeal is brought on the ground of race discrimination or where the appeal is against a refusal of asylum and the leave which has been granted is in excess of 12 months. This is consistent with Section 83 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which was the subject of Amendment 113D. Where the appeal does not fall into these two groups, we do not believe it is necessary or appropriate for it to proceed where leave has been granted. The appeal is unnecessary because leave has already been granted. There is no detriment caused by the absence of a right of appeal which will be cured by this amendment. However, making this amendment would have a detrimental impact as additional rights of appeal would arise, each of which represents an additional cost to the Government and the taxpayer. The increased number of potential appeals will place an additional burden on the tribunal and court systems, which are already dealing with significant numbers of immigration appeals.
We do not believe that preserving an appeal right where leave has been granted is necessarily appropriate. Frequently, the Secretary of State makes a grant of leave while an appeal is pending for pragmatic reasons. This avoids unnecessary litigation at a cost to both parties. Where leave has been granted, an appeal can proceed only on an academic, rather than an individual, basis. The tribunal is primarily a fact-finding tribunal and therefore it is not appropriate for a case to proceed before it on an academic basis only. In light of these points, and in the knowledge that I will continue to work with my noble friend and respond to his questions on this issue, I would ask him to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his thorough reply to these three amendments, although—as he would expect—I cannot say that I am entirely satisfied with his response. In the case of Amendment 113D, he did not go into the consequences of giving limited leave to remain to unaccompanied children and trafficked persons—a matter which I tried to outline in moving this amendment. There is room for further examination, and if he is prepared to let me have sight of the review that was undertaken, that would be the most helpful basis on which we might proceed.
As he will have realised, these amendments were all framed by the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and it, too, would like to be consulted in any review that will be undertaken in the future on the implications of the present situation for these unaccompanied children and trafficked persons granted limited leave to remain. My noble friend said that the amendment was too broad; we would be perfectly happy if, as a result of further discussions bringing in the legal advice of ILPA, we could agree on a more limited version of Amendment 113D.
With regard to Amendment 113E, removing someone to a supposedly safe third country does not eliminate the right of appeal, but if you have to exercise the appeal from an overseas country with all the disadvantages that that entails in the way of consulting lawyers, obtaining written statements and so on, the right is really not worth very much. The cases we considered mean that the designation of safe third countries is not a satisfactory way of proceeding, particularly when one considers the position of LGBT asylum seekers. I mentioned them in my remarks, but the Minister did not touch on them in his reply. I realise that I was asking for detailed information about what has happened to LGBT asylum seekers who were returned to supposedly safe countries. Maybe we can review the situation once we have that information in front of us.
On Amendment 113F, I mentioned the remarks of Mr Justice Beatson and thought that maybe my noble friend would not have had time to consider that judgment. Perhaps we can pursue the matter in more detail later. He did not respond to the point that, by granting leave to remain in a series of cases that touched on the same matter of principle, the Secretary of State was avoiding any resolution of the matter of principle, which would be helpful in cutting short proceedings of the tribunals in later cases. Therefore, I do not accept what my noble friend said about the saving of time in the courts; I think the reverse is probably true, but again, perhaps we can leave this for further discussion with the benefit of advice from ILPA at a later date. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords Chamber(12 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, to assist the House, I will move the Motion on Amendment 47 formally because that will enable the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, to move his Amendment 47A, to which I intend to speak in support.
Amendment 47A (to the Motion on Amendment 47)
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, now we are on Amendment 25 and I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, will be pleased that we have an opportunity to debate it. I am much relieved, as my notes for Amendment 22 had long since disappeared.
Government Amendment 25 would add the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission to Schedule 2 to the Bill, which, as noble Lords will remember, deals with mergers. The purpose of the amendment is to provide a vehicle through which to take forward a merger of these bodies, and it responds to a commitment made in our debate in Committee.
I should remind noble Lords that the Government are also minded to transfer most of the consumer enforcement functions and resources of the Office of Fair Trading to trading standards, and advice, information and education functions and resources to Citizens Advice. For that reason, the OFT will need to remain in Schedule 5 in order to facilitate the transfer of most of these functions prior to the expected order to merge. A number of points relating to the consumer landscape were raised by noble Lords in Committee and I am happy to answer questions that may occur in today’s debate.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, asked for more detail about the Government’s proposed consultation. I can inform him that the Government published their proposals for consultation to merge the competition functions of the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission and on other changes to the competition regime on 16 March. I do not know whether noble Lords have been able to obtain a copy, but it is a substantial document of 172 pages, covering the breadth of that particular aspect of government. The consultation will run for three months. The Government hope for as wide an engagement as possible, including holding seminars and specific meetings focused on specific issues. The Government intend to issue in May a further consultation document covering a model for the consumer landscape.
Growth matters now more than ever. Businesses—particularly SMEs—and consumers have been hit hard by the economic crisis. Reform is now important to create the right environment for business to create and enter new markets—reducing barriers to entry and encouraging rivalry between firms to promote lower prices and better quality products and services. There is longer-term potential for growth through benefits reaped from innovation that stems from greater competition in the market place.
Competition is the cornerstone of growth, innovation and consumer choice. The UK competition regime is regarded as one of the best in the world. But it can and should be even better. That means that we also need to have a strong regime to promote effective competition in markets. The Government believe that creating one, powerful Competition and Markets Authority would ensure a more dynamic and flexible use of competition tools and resource and a single advocate for competition in the UK and internationally and would end duplication for business.
The proposals in the consultation document include: creating a single, powerful advocate for competition to ensure a dynamic and flexible use of tools to promote strong and fair competition; increasing business confidence through faster decision-making, ending duplication and giving more predictability of competition processes and decisions; reducing barriers to entry by making it easier for the competition authority to tackle anti-competitive mergers and reforming anti-trust provisions to increase deterrence of anti-competitive and abusive behaviour; delivering faster results for consumers by shortening end-to-end studies and investigations into markets where lack of competition is giving consumers a raw deal; reducing the SME burden by introducing an exemption for small mergers from the merger control regime; and giving small business a voice in an extended super-complaints process to spotlight market features that harm small companies.
Those proposals are an excellent opportunity to strengthen and streamline the competition regime to deliver better outcomes for consumers and increase business confidence. The Government want to strengthen and improve the UK’s competition regime in order to promote growth, innovation and competition. The proposed merger of the OFT and the CC is about creating one, single competition authority that is dynamic and efficient and retains the best aspects of those bodies. The proposed transfer of the OFT’s consumer functions to organisations better placed to ensure enforcement against rogue traders and businesses and give consumers the advice that they need is important to ensure action can be taken at a local level. The Government are consulting on all these proposals. I beg to move.
It would be churlish of me not to welcome the 172-page document that has been issued. I have been one of those who has suggested that one common feature of the Public Bodies Bill is that whole lists of organisations covering every conceivable subject were inserted into schedules, in nearly all cases without any explanation as to why or how their functions would be replaced or where we were to go from here. It was a rushed job. Among the bodies listed when Schedule 7 existed—and I am glad that the Government have got rid of it—were the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission.
The Minister said several months ago when we first touched on this, at Second Reading and in Committee, that the intention was to merge those two bodies. Then it became clear that they were not being abolished but somehow brought together. I say “somehow” because it is only now, or 10 days ago, that we have had the 172 pages of explanation. Delighted though I am to see that document, it still raises the issue of how the Government still want by this amendment to insert the Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading into the schedule when they have not yet had the outcome of the consultation. In other words, the Government still want to determine the future and merger of these two bodies before they have received the answers to the question that the consultation paper very fairly raises of what the advantages or disadvantages would be of a merger.
It is not appropriate in this debate to raise large numbers of issues about that very lengthy document, and I hope there will be other occasions on which to do so. However, in relation to the Office of Fair Trading, which is to become part of the Competition and Markets Authority, a number of provisions in the first eight or 10 sections of the Enterprise Act 2002 list a whole lot of functions for the Office of Fair Trading—to promote consumer interest, to educate and inform consumers and to have various other functions. The Minister might say that some of those functions will go to Citizens Advice and some will go to trading standards offices. That might be so. However, as a debate on this Bill and the loss of the National Consumer Council indicated, the Minister explained that Citizens Advice would be adequately resourced to be able to substitute for what the NCC now does. The suggestion in the consultation paper to which the Minister now refers indicates that the consumer functions of the OFT are to disappear, as are the consumer functions of the National Consumer Council. Am I right in thinking that that is the result of bringing together the competition functions of the OFT and the Competition Commission?
Furthermore, how are the new bodies to function? I am interested to find that the consultation document seems to further the idea that has been working well for 40 or 60 years of a two-stage investigation. The main first investigation, the prosecutorial investigation, was done by the first government department, and then the OFT when it came into existence. The second stage investigation was of a more quasi-judicial type, with experts from different parts of business and the professions brought together in panels to determine individual cases. That range of expertise to be drawn upon by the Competition Commission has generally been thought of, internationally, as a very helpful procedure. As far as I read it—I hope that this is broadly correct—it is intended that the panel system should continue but it is suggested that more people should be full-time rather than part-time. I have generally thought that the very part-time nature of the Competition Commission’s panel members is their plus point, because on every day of the week except for one, or perhaps two, they are in their own business, profession or work and bring that in to inform their work as members of the Competition Commission when investigating cases.
I then noticed that it is intended that the actual employees—the economists, lawyers and civil servants within the Competition Commission—are to operate as teams not just at one stage or at the second stage but right the way through. That might be because there is a conflict in the mind of the Government. It might be to do with wanting to save money, which you do if only one team operates on the same case throughout instead of moving from one to another. Yet it also makes it more difficult, surely, for the second stage to be truly independent of the investigation. To make a rather crude analogy, you have the work of the court getting mixed up with the work of the investigators and the police.
I have those various doubts and questions, but then I, like everyone else who has it, has only just received the consultation paper. I think the noble Lord said that we have two or three months to go through it and give our answers but why, here and now in March when the consultation paper has only just gone out, are we as the House of Lords being asked to determine in this Bill that there shall be a merger of these two bodies?
My Lords, it is important that this is just a preliminary stage to enable this consultation to happen and, if the results of the consultation are sufficiently clear, to go forward with an order that is, as I understand it, amendable—my noble friend will correct me if I am wrong but I think I am right. If one had to do a lot of these exercises through full primary legislation, not only in competition but in all the other areas that this Bill covers, one would have no time in Parliament to do anything else. A review of this kind requires some mechanism of this sort, and we have endeavoured to make the mechanism as close and as secure as we can. It would be a pity to lose this opportunity to do what might be possible in this way, and, so far as I am concerned, putting this into the Bill at this stage is a step in the right direction.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken because I think this has been very useful debate. I emphasise the point made by my noble and learned friend that by inserting these bodies into Schedule 2 we are not predetermining their merger; we are facilitating their merger after a consultative process. Indeed, although statutory instruments are not normally amended in this House, an enhanced procedure in this Bill will enable a full consultative process to take place on the statutory instruments that might be brought before Parliament.
More to the point, the whole process has been evidenced in the foreword, and if noble Lords have got no further than page 1 they will see the foreword by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State Vince Cable in which he talks about the wish to be transparent and open about this process. Indeed, it is in the Government’s interest because the contributions made by noble Lords today have been remarkably powerful and useful. I hope all noble Lords who have spoken will feel free to involve themselves in the whole consultative process, because every single one of them will bring their experience to this regime.
I welcome the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kingsmill, about the strategic objective—trying to get a unified Competition and Markets Authority in place with a primary purpose to be decisive, well informed and speedy. Business demands that of us. We live in a highly competitive world, but we can help ourselves and our fellow industrialists and businessmen by the way in which we construct markets and make sure that they operate in the country’s economic interest and in the consumer’s interest. Although the consumer interest part is being transferred—it will be much more heavily based in trading standards and Citizens Advice—the regime will be co-operative; trading standards officers will still feed in abuses of the market that have become apparent during their investigations.
The noble Lord, Lord Dubs, wondered whether small trading standards departments would be able to take on large organisations. With the backing of competition law, it does not matter how small the authority might be; the power of the law in this regard means that no business, however large, can afford to ignore it. Any systemic abuse through the structure of trading conditions is just the sort of thing that the new authority will take up and investigate at speed.
I am pleased that the idea of the panels is being welcomed. It is part of the detail in the consultation. In many ways, it would be wrong to use this speech to try to predetermine the outcome of that consultation, but there are in the consultative documents steers and guides, at least, to the sort of outcome for which the Government wish. I am moving my amendment today with the idea of facilitating that outcome. Parliament’s role will be to scrutinise both the consultation and anything that is produced under the Bill.
(13 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I also pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Berkeley for raising this matter again. As the noble Lord, Lord Greenway, said, my noble friend is tenacious. However, I am sorry to say that I disagree with the points that he has made. We debated this matter extensively on 21 January and I want to reiterate a couple of points from that debate. The WS Atkins report went into considerable detail on the general lighthouse authorities. The British and Irish Governments have dealt pretty comprehensively with the so-called Irish question and the new strategic board has been set up which will drive further reductions in costs. At the end of the day, the shipping companies pay these costs.
Last Saturday I picked up a lovely little book about the Bell Rock lighthouse, comprising a series of articles written by an assistant lightkeeper in about 1904. The foreword to the book describes how the lighthouse authorities in the UK work. One of the interesting points was that, despite repeated reductions in costs around the turn of that century, the shipping companies were demanding that they should not pay light dues and that the lighthouse authorities be funded out of imperial taxation. Nothing has changed in 110 years.
I do not know many, if any, organisations that could have cut their costs and increased efficiency in the way that the lighthouse authorities have. There have been massive cuts in personnel, huge advances in technology, and that is the way forward. If technology moves forward and becomes affordable, I have no doubt that there will be further reductions in light dues. For the present, however, I see no useful purpose in pressing these amendments. I am pleased to note that the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, has said that they are probing amendments.
My Lords, this has been a useful debate—I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, believes that to be the case—and I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. This is a probing amendment and I accept that in my response. I understand the noble Lord’s purpose, because he has proposed for some time that the general lighthouse authorities that serve the coast of the United Kingdom and Ireland should be merged into one body. Indeed, mention was made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, of the Bill that the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, has presented to the House. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord MacKenzie of Culkein, for his contribution that shows that a lot of progress is being made in this area. It is an opportunity for the use of technology that the authorities have taken advantage of. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Greenway, for his involvement with those bodies, particularly Trinity House. I hope that my noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree will accept that these are probing amendments. I respond in that spirit.
I should explain to noble Lords that the Commissioners of Irish Lights has functions in relation to Northern Ireland and to the Republic of Ireland. Moreover, it is a body established in Dublin under Irish law. In case people fantasise about people earning enormous salaries, no staff member earns €1 million in the employment of that body. It is not for the UK Parliament to purport to abolish or otherwise this body or its functions in relation to the Republic of Ireland.
A recent independent study by the consultants Atkins, to which reference has been made—it was a comprehensive review—addressed the provision of marine aids to navigation and concluded that the present arrangements, whilst complex, achieve the basic objective of ensuring the safety of the mariner and provide high-quality, comprehensive and integrated maritime aids to navigation all around the British Isles. Notably, Atkins recommended some changes to the governance of the general lighthouse authorities through the creation of a joint strategic board. Since last year, with the Shipping Minister’s endorsement, the joint strategic board has worked closely with the Department for Transport and the three general lighthouse authorities to identify further efficiency measures to drive down running costs.
The general lighthouse authorities are no strangers to minimising their costs, as the noble Lord, Lord MacKenzie, said, by adopting new technology, estate rationalisation, joint operational initiatives and the generation of income from their commercial activities. These organisations have ensured that the level of light dues that pay for their work is 40 per cent lower in real terms than in 1993. Indeed, Atkins concluded that the general lighthouse authorities have a strong track record in identifying and realising efficiencies and cost reductions within their operation and support functions. These directly benefit ship owners through reduced burdens on the general lighthouse fund and the real-terms level of light dues.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, has pursued this issue with terrier-like commitment, but I hope that I have been able to provide some clarity on the recent progress that we have made in this area of policy.
I am afraid that I am not in a position to answer the question on the Freedom of Information Act and its application to the various authorities, but I shall try to do so and will write to the noble Lord with that information. With that in mind, and in view of the general lighthouse authorities’ excellent reputation for delivery, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Before I withdraw the amendment, perhaps I may invite him to comment on Amendments 139A and 165A. In the light of the statement that the noble Lord made on the previous occasion that we debated this matter, it is not clear to me whether Trinity House and the Northern Lighthouse Board are meant to remain in Schedule 7 or whether they will be among those that are to be removed. My amendments would remove these two authorities from Schedule 7 to avoid them being changed; the Government have included them in Schedule 7 but they may want that schedule to be removed. My original question was: if the Government want them in Schedule 7, what are they going to do with them when they are in that schedule? Therefore, in theory, the noble Lord should accept my Amendments 139A and 165A on the basis that there will be no change for these two organisations.
I thank the noble Lord for his ingenuity in this respect. He should know that I have added my name to those opposing the question that Schedule 7 stand part of the Bill. Therefore, Schedule 7 will not apply to the Bill, and the noble Lord can rest at east that there will be no way in which these bodies will be included in that schedule.
I thank the noble Lord for that explanation, which gives me great comfort. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I hope that I might, without abusing the rules of Committee stage, make a brief further intervention as I had not anticipated the thrust of the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, on her Amendment 107, for which I apologise. It may be helpful to the Minister if I give him notice of this. As I understood it, the noble Baroness was complaining that the provision in Clause 8 about efficiency, effectiveness, economy and accountability was not sufficient. I hope that my Amendment 106A focuses on that point at least as clearly by saying that one should also take into account,
“fairness, openness, transparency and justice”.
I would like to see some values incorporated into what the Government have to take account of in these matters. Even if my noble friend cannot give me an assurance on that today, I hope that he will reflect on it.
When I made a somewhat similar point to the previous Government, the then Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton of Upholland, immediately took the point and brought forward an amendment to introduce values in a similar context into the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Therefore, I hope that that precedent will carry some weight, whether today or in the future.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, for initiating this debate with his amendments as it is agreeable to return to the way in which the Bill operates, having discussed individual bodies at length. The noble Lord gave very good value, as he always does. I thank all noble Lords who have participated. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, drew the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, and, indeed, that of my noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree, to Clause 8. We are still looking at Clause 8 as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee asked us to do so. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has a slightly jaundiced view of the way in which the Government have established dialogue on the Bill. We are genuinely seeking to introduce a necessary vehicle to deal with the reform of public bodies. I think that there is general agreement on that across the Committee. The previous Government had such a policy and we seek to pursue it in our turn.
The group of amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, would require that, before laying an order under Clauses 2 to 6, a Minister must lay before Parliament a report setting out the reasoning for any change in the status of a body or bodies he or she proposes to make, with the said report being subject to debate and approval by resolution in each House. Amendment 119 would introduce an additional requirement for a report where an order affects a body or office within a particular set of categories. I hope the noble Lord will agree with that summary of what he is seeking to do.
The Government agree that Parliament should have access to appropriate information regarding any proposals to use powers under the Bill. The government amendments that we have introduced in Committee reflect this. In the first instance we have sought, along with Peers from across the House, to introduce a new requirement for Ministers to consult in relation to proposed changes under the Bill. Secondly, government amendments have been tabled which would require any draft instrument laid before Parliament to include an explanatory document which includes details setting out the reasoning behind the order.
These requirements give Parliament ample opportunity to scrutinise the reasoning behind the laying of an order. Amendment 113 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, would effectively require an additional affirmative resolution process for a report concerning a proposed order before the order itself could be made. This amendment risks Parliament being asked to debate a report on a proposed order prior to the consultation on the said order having been concluded. Additionally, it would create a new burden on Parliament itself and on departments as they seek to deliver on the reform package to which the coalition Government are committed.
Amendment 119 would require a Minister making an order affecting a group defined as an economic regulator or a consumer body to place a report before Parliament setting out the reasons for the proposals in the context of that group of bodies as a whole. The Government, of course, recognise that changes to public bodies should not be considered in isolation. I assure the noble Lord that this was not the case for those reforms set out by my right honourable friend the Minister for the Cabinet Office on 14 October. In this instance all reforms were agreed at Cabinet level and involved extensive dialogue between departments. I particularly appreciate the spirit of the noble Lord’s amendment in relation to relatively discrete groups of bodies such as the so-called economic regulators, where a shift in regulatory practice for one could potentially impact on regulatory stability across the sector, and where it is therefore right that Government act in a proportionate, joined-up manner.
As I said at Second Reading—I am happy to reiterate it—the Government intend the economic and regulatory functions of bodies such as Ofcom and Ofgem to be excluded from the powers of the Bill for precisely this reason. I do not believe that it is necessary to place such a requirement in the Bill, because the Government expect Ministers to consider such issues as a matter of course and because our Amendment 118, which requires Ministers to produce an explanatory document with a draft statutory instrument setting out the reasons for an order, will provide another opportunity to inform Parliament of such matters. For example, where a change is proposed to a consumer body or any other body, the Government will be required by Amendment 118 to give reasons for the order that relate to considerations including efficiency, accountability and effective delivery of public functions.
I take note of this debate, in which there have been valuable contributions—not least the ideas on Clause 8 proposed by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter—and I hope that, given my assurances with regard to our commitment to sharing information with the House, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Before my noble friend sits down, will he briefly animadvert on the nature of the explanatory document that he has it in mind to produce? Explanatory Memoranda about Bills often state that they are there only to explain the content, not to provide evidence that has led to formation of the policy. Furthermore, such memoranda frequently state that they are explaining only those matters that are obscure or not clear in the Bill. What is required to be helpful to the deliberative process is an undertaking that these memoranda will contain evidence explaining the policy.
A requirement under our amendments will be that the explanatory documents are properly reasoned and describe not just what a statutory instrument proposes but the reasoning behind the change. They will also include an impact assessment. The idea is that these should be full documents. I understand what my noble friend is saying and I am grateful for his intervention, because Explanatory Memoranda to Bills frequently explain only what a particular clause might seek to do, not its implications. The requirement is that the explanatory documents should explain the reasoning behind a Minister’s approach to laying a statutory instrument.
My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s reply. Indeed, at one point he used the word “agreeable”, which perhaps raised my expectations too much. This short debate has demonstrated a need for the Government to provide a clearer explanation of what they are doing in this area. I saw the noble Lord’s Amendment 118 and, like the noble Lord, Lord Maclennan, I thought that that related to Explanatory Memoranda of the type that normally relate to content, rather than strategy and context. If the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, is saying that the content of the explanatory document will go somewhat wider, I accept that that goes some way towards what I am arguing for.
In relation to the procedural points made by my noble friends Lord Borrie and Lady Hayter, when these amendments were drafted there was another amendment—we have now considered it—in addition to her Amendment 107, which would have strengthened Clause 8 and made more sense of it. I had hoped that that could have been sorted out later, if the Government had stated that in principle they were accepting these amendments. However, Clause 8 as it stands asks the Minister to take these matters into consideration but does not require him to explain them to Parliament in any form. I am concerned that Parliament should, at some stage in the process, hold a substantive debate on the total strategy that lies behind the reason for abolishing or changing the nature of a particular body.
That remains an outstanding issue. When we reach Amendment 118, I hope that the Minister can expand further on how he sees this issue. However, the essential point is that Parliament by this Bill is giving up the right to revert to primary legislative procedure in relation to an organisation that was originally set up after full debate on primary legislation. We need a clear explanation if we are going to cut corners in that way. I still hope that we get there in the secondary, if not in the primary, legislation. If the Minister, before we consider Amendment 118 or at Report, can put a few bones on that, I should be extremely grateful. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.