Future Capability of the Armed Forces

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 16th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the most obvious and urgent thing to say about military capability is that we have nothing like enough of it, either now or as currently planned for the future. This must be addressed as a matter of urgency but, in the limited time available to us in this debate, I want to make three points about the nature of those capabilities.

First, I warn against oversimplification when considering future force structures. Recent debate has focused on the need for much greater numbers of uncrewed and, in some cases, autonomous vehicles in all three environments—what are commonly but inaccurately termed drones. I agree with the general proposition, but such vehicles are not the solution to everything. Ukrainians have used them very successfully to make up for their relative shortage of front-line personnel, and we can certainly employ them to create more mass. They will be a key feature of the future force mix, but they will form part of the force structure, not the whole of it. It is crucial that we adopt transformational technologies, but we should not imagine that any one of them will solve all our problems.

Secondly, whatever capabilities we have at the start of any high-intensity conflict, they will not be sufficient to sustain our effort through to victory. Some, perhaps much of them, will be destroyed in the early fighting and will have to be replaced. At the same time, technological developments and enemy initiatives will force us to adapt accordingly. It is worth remembering that many of the capabilities the Ukrainians are employing so successfully against Russia today did not exist four years ago. Therefore, we will need an agile, innovative and rapidly scalable industrial base that can support such an effort—not just traditional defence companies but the high technology sector more widely. This will require a substantial and steady stream of investment over time to underpin the necessary research and development and, importantly, to attract the necessary private sector investment.

Finally, I warn against focusing solely on capital investment. Military capability requires not just the right equipment but the people who can operate it effectively in the most demanding and dangerous conditions. That means that both regulars and reserves need regular and rigorous training. Without it, we will be sending them into combat inadequately prepared for what they will face. This not only weakens our war-fighting effectiveness but exposes our people to unnecessarily high risk. This would be an act of criminal negligence.

Our training requires not just equipment but the fuel, the spares and the other support necessary for its operation. This is paid for by resource funding, not capital. Such funding is under pressure and, despite some rebalancing in the investment plan, it remains insufficient. Our people are already inadequately trained for high-intensity conflict. In-year pressure on the defence budget means that this will get worse. I understand that the MoD can do little about the problem in the current financial year, but I ask the Minister to assure the House that the position will be transformed in future years. The Government simply cannot go on failing our people and the country more widely in this way.

Most of what I have urged—I could have urged much more—comes down to funding. The settlement in the defence investment plan was inadequate and incoherent in the light of the commitment that the Government have rightly made to NATO. This failure endangers us all and it must be put right very quickly.