Lord Stirrup
Main Page: Lord Stirrup (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Stirrup's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(1 year, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too welcome this overdue opportunity to continue the debate on the courses and potential consequences of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and of the horrific war that has been raging there for over a year and a half.
It is clear that Ukraine has made some progress in pushing back the invading forces over recent months, but it is also clear that the conflict is nowhere near over. As I said in our debate on 9 February,
“offensive action to retake and hold ground is a very different proposition from mounting a defence against the kind of unco-ordinated and poorly led attack that we saw from Russian forces last summer”.—[Official Report, 9/2/23; col. 1364.]
The ability to manoeuvre sizeable units with concentrated firepower, to clear obstacles, both natural and manmade, and to co-ordinate different force elements are all significant challenges to any military, particularly in the absence of air superiority. Of course, the offensive forces need extensive logistical support, technical capabilities and, crucially, significant weapons stocks.
Meanwhile, both sides in this war have learned important tactical lessons from their respective successes and failures. Both sides have demonstrated their resolve to sustain their military efforts over the long term and both sides have reasons to hope for a successful outcome. In the case of Ukraine, sustained financial and logistic support from the West, combined with local innovation, adaptability and enormous courage, have shown the world that Russia is hard pressed just to sustain its illegal gains to date, let alone increase them. But the very things that have benefited Ukraine have also, paradoxically, given the Russian leadership reasons for hope. Their calculus is that a protracted campaign will become increasingly unpopular in the West and that the political will to sustain the financial and materiel costs will erode over time, with a consequent weakening of Ukraine's military ability to resist. Putin no doubt believes that a Republican—not just a Trump but any Republican—victory in next year’s American election could be very helpful in that regard.
All of this underlines the importance of a Western strategy for the support of Ukraine over the long term and, in particular, of Europe developing a sufficiently robust military and industrial capacity to underpin such support. This means substantially increased investment within Europe. Such investment has been talked about in a number of countries, but in many ways, it has not yet materialised. It will, of course, be difficult to deliver in the current economic circumstances, but a failure to deliver it will have far worse consequences, so we must sustain the pressure and set an example in this regard.
There are, I know, some that cling to the hope that an early political settlement can be reached in Ukraine and that this will obviate the need for such a long-term commitment. There are many who hope that such a settlement will then enable a return to the status quo ante bellum—that life can somehow return to normal. They are all of them deceived. They are deceived because it is not just a matter of bringing an end to the fighting. That in itself seems far off and will be difficult to achieve, but even when that moment does come, we will still be faced with a Russia that bears responsibility for a mountain of war crimes—a mountain that grows in size with every day. The consequences of this and of our responses to the situation will be profound.
During the 20th century, the international community went to great lengths to restrict, as far as possible, the suffering and destruction that are the inevitable consequences of war. In particular, the development of the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law has imposed certain important constraints on competence. The use of force must be justified by the doctrine of military necessity. Attacks must never be directed against civilians. Unintended civilian harm must always be proportional to the anticipated military advantage, and appropriate care must be taken to spare the civilian population as much as is feasible.
It is certainly true that such requirements have and are still being ignored in some parts of the world, but until now, the major powers have held fast to the law and have in many cases taken or acquiesced to punitive action against transgressors. It is quite clear, however, that in Ukraine, Russia has made no attempt to comply with any of these legal requirements. Indeed, quite the contrary: it has made a bonfire of the rules. It is engaged in the deliberate and wholesale destruction of civilian infrastructure. It has employed methodical violence against large numbers of Ukrainian non-combatants. It has arbitrarily detained and in many instances executed civilians. It has tortured and raped civilians. It has abducted and in many cases tortured a great many Ukrainian children. There are at least 20,000 documented cases of abduction, and some Russian officials put the number as high as 700,000. The truth is probably somewhere between the two, but wherever it lies, it represents an appalling situation. These are all war crimes. They are not just down to the actions of a few rogue individuals; they are state- endorsed crimes that are being committed on an industrial scale.
In March this year, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin on charges of the abduction of children—the first time such action has ever been taken against a Head of State of a UN P5 nation. Yet there is no prospect of Putin or any of his henchmen appearing in court. Russia has quite deliberately and unashamedly flouted the law of armed conflict in just about every respect. If its actions in this regard are, over time, allowed to pass unsanctioned, then the civilised world’s attempts to contain many of the worst effects of conflict will be in tatters.
President Zelensky has claimed that Ukraine is fighting not just to protect itself but to lessen the risks of illegal aggression elsewhere. He is of course right. That is one of the many powerful reasons why we must support his country in its struggle. But we must also accept, in dealing with a post-conflict Russia, that we will be fighting for the survival of the legal constraints on armed conflict. A failure in that struggle would signal a return to unrestrained savagery in warfare; that surely cannot be an acceptable outcome. There is, alas, no realistic prospect of prosecuting Putin and his accomplices, but the international community simply cannot resume its relations with him as if nothing had happened. It must accept at last that it is dealing not with a normal Government but, as I publicly asserted nine years ago, with a gangster regime—a regime that will tell any lie, betray any promise, and commit any crime in pursuit of what it sees as its interest. The West must respond accordingly. It must impose an appropriate cost on Russia.
That will inevitably have long-term consequences for international relations. There can be no return to the status quo ante bellum. I ask the Minister to confirm that the Government will continue the efforts that have already begun to document and publicise Russia’s abhorrent actions. I further ask what efforts they are making to encourage a long-term international strategy, most particularly amongst our European neighbours, to hold Russia to account for its many and manifold crimes. What consideration have they given to the long- term foreign policy and security consequences of such action?
The conflict in Ukraine has much further to run, but Ukraine will be successful if we hold our nerve and steel ourselves for the long haul. European nations, in particular, must up their efforts in security terms. So far, they have talked a good game; they now have to deliver. I do not exclude the UK from that stricture. Importantly, we must decide how to confront Russia over its heinous and premeditated crimes in Ukraine and what consequences that will have for European security in the years ahead. We have a responsibility not just to ourselves but to future generations to ensure the survival of the legal safeguards that our predecessors set on conflict, which were won only after untold bloodshed and are crucial if we are not to see a widespread return to such suffering.