English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Lord Shipley Excerpts

Tuesday 24th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Shipley]

49: After Clause 9, insert the following new Clause—
“Scrutiny of mayoral commissioners(1) The mayor of a combined county authority must establish, for each commissioner appointed by the mayor, a scrutiny committee composed of elected members of the constituent local authorities.(2) The purpose of each scrutiny committee is to review, assess and report on the exercise of the policy responsibilities of the commissioner to whom it relates.(3) Each scrutiny committee must have the following powers—(a) to require the mayor, the relevant commissioner, or any member of their staff to attend before the committee to give evidence;(b) to require the production of any documents relevant to the exercise of the commissioner’s functions;(c) to publish reports on the committee’s findings and recommendations.(4) The mayor and the relevant commissioner must have regard to any report or recommendation made by the corresponding scrutiny committee under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires a mayor of a combined county authority to establish a scrutiny committee of elected members with powers of summons to examine and report on the mayor’s exercise of functions.

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[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, in this group I have Amendments 49, 95 and 96, and I have signed Amendment 182 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard.

In speaking to Amendment 49, I want to thank the Minister for having written to us last week—she proposed a whole raft of new amendments on the scrutiny functions. My amendment, which would require the mayor of a combined county authority to establish a scrutiny committee of elected members with powers of summons to examine and report on the mayor’s exercise of functions, is therefore rather out of date now, so I will not be pressing that.

However, I want to raise a broader question, because at times the rest of England seems to be following London, and at other times it is not. On this occasion—this relates to Amendment 95—in London, the mayor of London is required to hold a public meeting known as a People’s Question Time twice per financial year to answer questions from the public; that is in Section 48 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999. I would like that to be replicated across all mayors in England so that something similar happens. I think that mayors are going to need—and I hope that they will want—to be held accountable for policy decisions they make. But the Minister might look at that issue of a people’s question time. We shall not reach it tonight for voting purposes, so I can consider what to do as a consequence of the Minister’s reply.

I feel very strongly about Amendment 96. I was a member of a regional development agency a number of years ago, and the RDA was required to turn up to every local council in its area once a year to answer questions from elected members, so that seems an entirely appropriate thing to do. I am suggesting only that a combined authority mayor should

“appear annually before each constituent local authority to answer questions from elected councillors”,

which would strengthen

“democratic accountability within devolved areas”.

I find it difficult to know what would be wrong with that, so I hope very much that the Minister will indicate her approval.

I will not speak about the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, as that would steal his thunder, but he has hit on a very important issue around local public accounts committees. I have similar concerns to those that I think he has, but I will leave it to him. I beg to move.

[Lord Bichard (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak on cue to my Amendment 182, declare an interest as an honorary vice-president of the Local Government Association and thank the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for supporting my amendment.

I welcome the Government’s amendment to establish overview and scrutiny committees. Why then have I persisted in my amendment for what I have called local public accounts committees? It is because the overview and scrutiny committees will focus only on scrutinising strategic authorities. I believe that we need to extend the focus of scrutiny from a single institution—the strategic authority—to the wider scrutiny of the place. The crucial difference between my amendment and the Government’s proposal is that my scrutiny committee would have the power to report not just on strategic authorities but on how effectively all local public service partners were collaborating in a place for the benefit of the public and the wider community.

Why is this so important? I will not go through the points that I made at length in Committee, but over the last four decades our public services have become increasingly fragmented, with the establishment of a myriad of disconnected, sometimes single-purpose agencies whose objectives and targets have on occasions overlapped and even conflicted. As we all know, those agencies have worked too often in silos. As a result, the public have struggled to access or even make sense of the disjointed services that are on offer. Money has been wasted because the silos do not work together to deliver the best value for money. At worst, people, sometimes children, have died because data and intelligence were not shared quickly enough to protect them.

In many places public service partners have worked very hard to break down these silos, but that is not uniformly the case. The prevailing culture in our public services has too often been one of competition rather than collaboration. I am convinced that for that to change we need in every local area a body with the power to scrutinise and report on how all public sector partners co-operate or do not co-operate for the good of citizens. If instead we establish overview and scrutiny and scrutiny committees which address only the performance of a single institution, we will reinforce the silo-based mentality that we have created for another generation—all for the want of adding a simple power for the overview and scrutiny committees to report on how the wider system is working.

If we do give those committees that additional power, we will also demonstrate that in a devolved system, accountability does not always have to be to the centre. Accountability can be local, should be local and can be done more effectively if it is. Extended scrutiny committees and local Public Accounts Committees of this sort would be very visible. They could involve local business communities and the voluntary sector, perhaps with an independent chair. They would become a very visible local body.

I promoted this idea when I was chief executive of Gloucestershire County Council. Your Lordships must suspend your disbelief—that was in the 1980s. Therefore, I was delighted when the English devolution White Paper committed government to explore the local public accounts committee model. The problem is that this Bill and the Government’s amendment do not follow that through. However, my conversations with the Minister since Committee—which I am grateful that she was prepared to be involved in—suggest that she remains supportive of the concept but wants to see more policy development and more stakeholder consultation before progressing further. I understand that.

If the Minister can confirm this from the Dispatch Box tonight, that will take us quite a long way further forward and I will not press this to a vote. If, for example, we could set up a working party to produce a fully formed proposal for local public accounts committees, we would have taken a big, decisive step in changing the very culture of our local public services—from competition to collaboration.

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Under the new system, local electors will be able to petition their committee to examine an issue of local concern. Where at least 0.1% of local electors sign a petition, the local scrutiny committee must decide whether to take the issue forward. This will not prevent mayoral strategic authorities creating other routes for local people to engage with their local scrutiny committee or prevent them establishing their own people’s question time. We will also update the scrutiny protocol to strengthen expectations for how mayoral strategic authorities should engage with the public in an open and transparent way in light of our reforms. With all this in mind, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 49 withdrawn.

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[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, it seems to me that all the amendments in this group would amount to good practice; this is what should happen. I hope the Minister will confirm that the amendments are agreeable.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her Amendments 69 to 74. While I recognise her commitment to accountability in local government, the Bill provides that combined and combined county authorities and independent remuneration panels must take account of any guidance issued by the Secretary of State for this clause.

That guidance will be issued in due course and will provide further details on the matters raised in these amendments. None the less, on the principles raised, I agree with the noble Baroness’s point about transparency. We will seek to be pragmatic, ensuring that we balance clear accountability and transparency against overburdening the authorities in their reporting arrangements. I therefore ask that the noble Baroness withdraws Amendment 69.

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[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, this new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the exercise of powers to borrow money by strategic authorities and their ability to repay the debts incurred. I thank the Minister for her correspondence on powers to borrow after this was debated in Committee. As the previous group focused on precepts, we felt it worth discussing powers to borrow in isolation.

In Committee, we asked one key question: who, in effect, is the guarantor in the event that an authority cannot pay back its borrowing? I appreciate the Minister’s clarification that constituent councils will not be held liable for debts incurred by the authority. However, this is an important area that requires thorough oversight, which is why we tabled Amendment 80 to require the Secretary of State to report on the exercise of powers to borrow money by the strategic authorities and their ability to repay debts incurred. Surely one of the aims of the Government’s plans is to put local government on a stable and sustainable financial footing.

To be clear, we do not object to the ability of authorities to borrow money, but we do think that the Secretary of State and, crucially, Parliament should be aware of the facts. This report would be published, copies would be placed before both Houses of Parliament annually, and it would include an assessment of the ability of specific authorities to meet the debts incurred. This would give Parliament oversight of how much debt has been incurred by specific authorities across the country, as well as their ability to repay that debt. The information could then inform future debates and decision-making about the health of local government finances, and it would no doubt be of use to Secretaries of State themselves. I hope the Government will give this amendment their consideration.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, on this matter, which I have raised on a number of occasions in your Lordships’ House because I have never been clear about who will actually pick up an overspend when one exists. So this partly about the ability to repay debts incurred and partly about who is actually responsible. In other words, are council tax payers of the constituent authorities liable to help to repay debt?

My understanding is that the scrutiny function can now stop this happening in the first place. In other words, one of my concerns about the failure of the scrutiny system has been that it would not be certain that a scrutiny committee would prevent bad financial investment decisions. But what the Government have done by introducing further amendments makes it possible for the overview and scrutiny function to work effectively in that respect.

So I hope the Minister will clarify those matters. I am worried about who is liable for debt and about who is able to authorise substantial expenditure without certainty that a debt can be repaid. But, in the end, will the scrutiny function the Government have now introduced actually prevent the problems the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, has identified?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, for this amendment, requiring the Secretary of State to report on strategic authorities’ exercise of powers to borrow money. I recognise that this is a well-intentioned and well-reasoned amendment, but I do not believe the provision is necessary. Like the rest of local government, combined authorities and combined county authorities must operate within the prudential framework. This comprises statutory duties and codes intended to ensure that all borrowing and investment is prudent, affordable and sustainable. The framework already provides robust oversight and accountability. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, that pre-scrutiny of key decisions by local accounts committees will also help.

In addition, this amendment contradicts the Bill’s aim of furthering devolution and increasing financial autonomy for these authorities, because it would shift reporting requirements up to central government. For these reasons, the proposed amendment is burdensome and duplicative, and I ask that it be withdrawn.