English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Tuesday 24th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Report (1st Day) (Continued)

20:13

Amendment 49

Moved by

[Lord Shipley]

49: After Clause 9, insert the following new Clause—
“Scrutiny of mayoral commissioners(1) The mayor of a combined county authority must establish, for each commissioner appointed by the mayor, a scrutiny committee composed of elected members of the constituent local authorities.(2) The purpose of each scrutiny committee is to review, assess and report on the exercise of the policy responsibilities of the commissioner to whom it relates.(3) Each scrutiny committee must have the following powers—(a) to require the mayor, the relevant commissioner, or any member of their staff to attend before the committee to give evidence;(b) to require the production of any documents relevant to the exercise of the commissioner’s functions;(c) to publish reports on the committee’s findings and recommendations.(4) The mayor and the relevant commissioner must have regard to any report or recommendation made by the corresponding scrutiny committee under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires a mayor of a combined county authority to establish a scrutiny committee of elected members with powers of summons to examine and report on the mayor’s exercise of functions.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, in this group I have Amendments 49, 95 and 96, and I have signed Amendment 182 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard.

In speaking to Amendment 49, I want to thank the Minister for having written to us last week—she proposed a whole raft of new amendments on the scrutiny functions. My amendment, which would require the mayor of a combined county authority to establish a scrutiny committee of elected members with powers of summons to examine and report on the mayor’s exercise of functions, is therefore rather out of date now, so I will not be pressing that.

However, I want to raise a broader question, because at times the rest of England seems to be following London, and at other times it is not. On this occasion—this relates to Amendment 95—in London, the mayor of London is required to hold a public meeting known as a People’s Question Time twice per financial year to answer questions from the public; that is in Section 48 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999. I would like that to be replicated across all mayors in England so that something similar happens. I think that mayors are going to need—and I hope that they will want—to be held accountable for policy decisions they make. But the Minister might look at that issue of a people’s question time. We shall not reach it tonight for voting purposes, so I can consider what to do as a consequence of the Minister’s reply.

I feel very strongly about Amendment 96. I was a member of a regional development agency a number of years ago, and the RDA was required to turn up to every local council in its area once a year to answer questions from elected members, so that seems an entirely appropriate thing to do. I am suggesting only that a combined authority mayor should

“appear annually before each constituent local authority to answer questions from elected councillors”,

which would strengthen

“democratic accountability within devolved areas”.

I find it difficult to know what would be wrong with that, so I hope very much that the Minister will indicate her approval.

I will not speak about the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, as that would steal his thunder, but he has hit on a very important issue around local public accounts committees. I have similar concerns to those that I think he has, but I will leave it to him. I beg to move.

[Lord Bichard (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak on cue to my Amendment 182, declare an interest as an honorary vice-president of the Local Government Association and thank the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for supporting my amendment.

I welcome the Government’s amendment to establish overview and scrutiny committees. Why then have I persisted in my amendment for what I have called local public accounts committees? It is because the overview and scrutiny committees will focus only on scrutinising strategic authorities. I believe that we need to extend the focus of scrutiny from a single institution—the strategic authority—to the wider scrutiny of the place. The crucial difference between my amendment and the Government’s proposal is that my scrutiny committee would have the power to report not just on strategic authorities but on how effectively all local public service partners were collaborating in a place for the benefit of the public and the wider community.

Why is this so important? I will not go through the points that I made at length in Committee, but over the last four decades our public services have become increasingly fragmented, with the establishment of a myriad of disconnected, sometimes single-purpose agencies whose objectives and targets have on occasions overlapped and even conflicted. As we all know, those agencies have worked too often in silos. As a result, the public have struggled to access or even make sense of the disjointed services that are on offer. Money has been wasted because the silos do not work together to deliver the best value for money. At worst, people, sometimes children, have died because data and intelligence were not shared quickly enough to protect them.

In many places public service partners have worked very hard to break down these silos, but that is not uniformly the case. The prevailing culture in our public services has too often been one of competition rather than collaboration. I am convinced that for that to change we need in every local area a body with the power to scrutinise and report on how all public sector partners co-operate or do not co-operate for the good of citizens. If instead we establish overview and scrutiny and scrutiny committees which address only the performance of a single institution, we will reinforce the silo-based mentality that we have created for another generation—all for the want of adding a simple power for the overview and scrutiny committees to report on how the wider system is working.

If we do give those committees that additional power, we will also demonstrate that in a devolved system, accountability does not always have to be to the centre. Accountability can be local, should be local and can be done more effectively if it is. Extended scrutiny committees and local Public Accounts Committees of this sort would be very visible. They could involve local business communities and the voluntary sector, perhaps with an independent chair. They would become a very visible local body.

I promoted this idea when I was chief executive of Gloucestershire County Council. Your Lordships must suspend your disbelief—that was in the 1980s. Therefore, I was delighted when the English devolution White Paper committed government to explore the local public accounts committee model. The problem is that this Bill and the Government’s amendment do not follow that through. However, my conversations with the Minister since Committee—which I am grateful that she was prepared to be involved in—suggest that she remains supportive of the concept but wants to see more policy development and more stakeholder consultation before progressing further. I understand that.

If the Minister can confirm this from the Dispatch Box tonight, that will take us quite a long way further forward and I will not press this to a vote. If, for example, we could set up a working party to produce a fully formed proposal for local public accounts committees, we would have taken a big, decisive step in changing the very culture of our local public services—from competition to collaboration.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments raises important issues concerning accountability and transparency within our evolving system of devolved governance. Amendments 49, 95 and 96 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, engage with the central principle that, where power is exercised, it should be subject to effective and visible scrutiny. I am sure that all noble Lords agree with that principle. These amendments would ensure that it extends directly to elected mayors.

Amendment 49 proposes dedicated scrutiny committees with powers to summons and to report. This reflects a desire to ensure that mayoral commissioners are properly held to account. Amendments 95 and 96 similarly seek to strengthen direct lines of accountability, whether through public-facing forums such as the People’s Question Time in London, which we have heard about, or through structured engagement with elected members of constituent authorities. We recognise the intent behind these proposals, particularly the effort to align arrangements more closely with established practices, as we have heard about on the Mayor of London.

Government Amendments 67 and 68 introduce substantial new schedules at a very late stage in the Bill. They set out an extensive and detailed framework for overview and scrutiny committees in mayoral combined county authorities. While the aim to strengthen scrutiny is clearly welcome, the scale and complexity of these provisions inevitably raise a number of questions that merit careful consideration. It is regrettable that this has been tabled at such a late stage in the parliamentary process of the Bill’s passage.

The proposed role for independent or external experts on scrutiny committees is notable. It would be helpful to understand more clearly who these individuals might be, how they are to be appointed and how their independence will be defined and safeguarded. Questions also arise as to whether there is sufficient capacity and expertise available across the country to support this model in practice. I look to the Minister for a response on these matters.

Further, there are important practical considerations about how members of these committees are to be appointed, the role of elected councillors within them and the extent to which their proceedings and findings will be made publicly accessible. The mechanisms by which members of the public can raise issues and engage with the scrutiny process are also of clear importance. There is perhaps a broader question as to whether lessons might be drawn from existing models, including the arrangements that have been in place for some time in Greater London for the scrutiny of directly elected mayors.

Finally, Amendment 182 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, raises the interesting proposal of local public accounts committees. We believe that the principles of strengthening financial oversight and cross-agency accountability are important, although the precise design and implications of such bodies, as we heard from the noble Lord, would clearly require careful thought and planning. Therefore, I very much look forward to the Minister’s response on this proposition.

This group highlights the central importance of scrutiny within any system of devolved governance. I look forward to the Minister addressing how the Government intend to ensure that these new structures are both effective in practice and clearly understood by those they are intended to serve.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Baroness Taylor of Stevenage) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Bichard and Lord Shipley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, for their amendments on scrutiny and accountability. These have been recurring themes during debates on the Bill. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott and Lady Pinnock, and the noble Lords, Lord Jamieson and Lord Wallace, for their contributions to these discussions. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Bichard and Lord Bassam, for their very constructive engagement and the insights they have shared with me on this issue. While I appreciate the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, on the late introduction of these amendments, I felt that our discussions on scrutiny in Committee were too important for us not to respond as a Government.

In the English devolution White Paper, we committed to exploring a local public accounts committee model to provide a vehicle to scrutinise local public spending. This recognised that the powers afforded for local scrutiny were not commensurate to the increased scale of powers and responsibilities devolved to mayoral strategic authorities. Local scrutiny committees will replace overview and scrutiny committees in mayoral combined and combined county authorities, providing an enhanced scrutiny regime with stronger oversight and a broader remit to reflect the scale of mayoral responsibilities, with greater teeth to hold mayors to account.

To answer the points about some of the detail raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, as with the existing system, the chair of the committee must be from a different party from the mayor or be an independent person appointed through an open and fair competition. At least 60% of committee members must be councillors from constituent local authorities, rather than the current requirement that at least half of members must be local councillors. These committees must also reflect the political make-up of the area. They will be able to shape early decision-making and undertake value-for-money assessments across the full scope of a mayoral strategic authority’s work. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, was particularly interested in that ability to shape decision-making before things came before the boards for decision.

The committees will have the power to make recommendations on the quality of decisions and on the use of public funds. They will have the authority to challenge decisions taken by the mayor, commissioners and senior officials and to require attendance and information at evidence sessions. This will also extend to key stakeholders outside the mayoral strategic authority, who will be defined in regulations. Those who fail to comply without reasonable excuse will face a civil penalty, on which further details will be established in regulations.

20:30

To raise the quality of scrutiny, each local scrutiny committee will be required to consult independent expertise as part of their inquiries. We will set out in regulations that this should take the form of an independent panel. Where significant issues are raised, they will be able to share reports and recommendations with any government department or public body, and this will inform whether the Government need to take interventions to support an institution. To ensure that scrutiny is driven by local concerns, residents will be able to petition their local scrutiny committee to consider specific issues.

This system will exist in all mayoral strategic authorities except the Greater London Authority, where, as noble Lords have pointed out, there are specific arrangements for the London Assembly to continue to act as the scrutiny body. The London Assembly has the powers to question the Mayor of London, compel senior officials to attend and conduct investigations. Therefore, we do not intend to make any changes to the scrutiny arrangements in London at this time, but we always keep these things under review.

The enhanced regime will be introduced first in the established mayoral strategic authorities in 2027, before extending to all mayoral strategic authorities in 2028. We will continue to review the most effective models for local accountability, including exploring a local accounting officer model. These measures will ensure that the right checks and balances exist at local level to ensure that mayors and their administrations are held to account, with the interests of local people at the heart of the system. I commend these amendments to the House.

Amendment 182 relates to local public accounts committees. The Government have engaged significantly on these proposals. Feedback was clear from strategic authorities and the think tank sector: a new system of scrutiny must complement rather than duplicate existing arrangements. It could cut across other forms of local scrutiny, such as integrated care boards, and exactly who would be held accountable across tiers of local and national government could prove unclear.

The noble Lord, Lord Bichard, knows that I have carefully listened to and considered his proposals, and we will continue to keep local scrutiny under review as we develop devolved responsibilities. This will require a much wider consideration of other scrutiny bodies to ensure that we do not duplicate or confuse existing structures. I think there is room for further work on this, and I look forward to working with the noble Lord on his proposal.

For the time being, local scrutiny committees will have a clear focus, centred around a mayor’s areas of competence and general functions. They will conduct thematic inquiries and hold mayors to account on these issues. Local scrutiny committees also go further than the proposed model for local public accounts committees by including provision for sanctions for non-compliance, requirements to consult independent expertise, and a route for public engagement via petitions.

In regulations, we will set out further detail on the enhanced scrutiny regime. This will include which stakeholders outside a mayoral strategic authority should be within the purview of a local scrutiny committee. We will conduct extensive engagement on this next phase of work. These regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring they receive suitable parliamentary scrutiny. While this model differs from the previously envisaged form of local accounts committees, it will provide the right form of scrutiny to support measures brought forward in the Bill.

I know that the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, has indicated his wish to withdraw Amendment 49, but I will make just one comment on it. Local scrutiny committees will go further than the noble Lord’s amendments, as I think he has recognised, by creating sanctions for mayors and commissioners who fail to comply with asks from their committee.

On Amendment 96, it remains important that all tiers of local government work constructively together in the interests of their communities, but this amendment would not support that aim. I understand the intention behind it, but this proposal is duplicative and will place avoidable burdens on mayors and constituent authorities. Mayoral strategic authorities operate overview and scrutiny committees that are made up of councillors from constituent authorities. These committees already have the power to require the mayor to attend and answer questions. As local scrutiny committees are introduced, the English devolution accountability framework will be updated to reflect the new system. This will provide further guidance on effective ways of working with constituent councils in light of the reforms. Mandating the mayor to attend multiple annual meetings across all constituent councils would create a significant and unnecessary burden. These measures will deliver the strength and local assurance the sector has asked for without imposing additional bureaucracy on councils or mayors.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for Amendment 95. I agree that opportunities for mayors to be held to account directly by all their constituents are a vital part of good democracy. People’s question times are already strongly encouraged by the scrutiny protocol, while other areas provide a direct route through standing items at their overview and scrutiny committees. Areas should continue to engage with constituents in the way that best meets the needs of local people. Therefore, we do not intend to mandate this in law.

Under the new system, local electors will be able to petition their committee to examine an issue of local concern. Where at least 0.1% of local electors sign a petition, the local scrutiny committee must decide whether to take the issue forward. This will not prevent mayoral strategic authorities creating other routes for local people to engage with their local scrutiny committee or prevent them establishing their own people’s question time. We will also update the scrutiny protocol to strengthen expectations for how mayoral strategic authorities should engage with the public in an open and transparent way in light of our reforms. With all this in mind, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 49 withdrawn.

Schedule 3: Commissioners

Amendments 50 and 51

Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

50: Schedule 3, page 122, line 24, leave out “paragraphs 4(3) and 5” and insert “paragraph 4(3)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would be consequential on the amendment to leave out paragraph 5 of the new Schedule 2A that is inserted by Schedule 3 to the Bill.

51: Schedule 3, page 123, line 4, at end insert “, whether by relating to—
(a) one or more aspects of that area of competence, or(b) that area of competence generally.”Member’s explanatory statement
This would make clear that a person’s work as commissioner can relate to aspects of an area of competence or the area of competence as a whole.

Amendments 50 and 51 agreed.

Amendment 52 not moved.

Amendments 53 to 56

Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

53: Schedule 3, page 123, leave out lines 21 to 32
Member’s explanatory statement
This would enable more than one commissioner to operate in a particular area of competence (by leaving out paragraph 5 of the new Schedule 2A that is inserted by Schedule 3 to the Bill).

54: Schedule 3, page 124, line 3, leave out “and” and insert—
“(aa) the commissioner must not carry out any work as commissioner, except work in preparation for the ending of the appointment in accordance with paragraph (b); and”Member’s explanatory statement
This would apply where a mayor ceases to hold office early (eg. because of resignation or death) and any commissioners appointed by the mayor also leave office. The amendment would stop the commissioners from carrying out work until they leave office, unless it is work in preparation for the ending of the appointment.

55: Schedule 3, page 127, line 34, leave out “, 4(3) or 5” and insert “or 4(3)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would be consequential on the amendment to leave out paragraph 5 of the new Schedule 2A that is inserted by Schedule 3 to the Bill.

56: Schedule 3, page 127, line 40, after “conditions” insert “or otherwise in accordance with contract law”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would make clear that (for example) instant dismissal where allowed by contract law is within this provision.

Amendments 53 to 56 agreed.

Amendments 57 and 58 not moved.

Amendments 59 and 60

Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

59: Schedule 3, page 130, line 15, leave out “paragraphs 4(3) and 5” and insert “paragraph 4(3)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would be consequential on the amendment to leave out paragraph 5 of the new Schedule 5BA that is inserted by Schedule 3 to the Bill.

60: Schedule 3, page 130, line 27, at end insert “, whether by relating to—
(a) one or more aspects of that area of competence, or(b) that area of competence generally.”Member’s explanatory statement
This would make clear that a person’s work as commissioner can relate to aspects of an area of competence or the area of competence as a whole.

Amendments 59 and 60 agreed.

Amendment 61 not moved.

Amendments 62 to 65

Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

62: Schedule 3, page 131, leave out lines 7 to 18
Member’s explanatory statement
This would enable more than one commissioner to operate in a particular area of competence (by leaving out paragraph 5 of the new Schedule 5BA that is inserted by Schedule 3 to the Bill).

63: Schedule 3, page 131, line 28, leave out “and” and insert—
“(aa) the commissioner must not carry out any work as commissioner, except work in preparation for the ending of the appointment in accordance with paragraph (b); and”Member’s explanatory statement
This would apply where a mayor ceases to hold office early (eg. because of resignation or death) and any commissioners appointed by the mayor also leave office. The amendment would stop the commissioners from carrying out work until they leave office, unless it is work in preparation for the ending of the appointment.

64: Schedule 3, page 135, line 24, leave out “, 4(3) or 5” and insert “or 4(3)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would be consequential on the amendment to leave out paragraph 5 of the new Schedule 5BA that is inserted by Schedule 3 to the Bill.

65: Schedule 3, page 135, line 30, after “conditions” insert “or otherwise in accordance with contract law”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would make clear that (for example) instant dismissal where allowed by contract law is within this provision.

Amendments 62 to 65 agreed.

Amendment 66 not moved.

Amendments 67 and 68

Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

67: After Schedule 3, insert the following new Schedule—
“ScheduleMayoral CCAs: overview and scrutiny committeesPart 1New scrutiny regime for CCAs that are established mayoral strategic authoritiesIntroduction
1 LURA 2023 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule.The new scrutiny regime
2 After Schedule 1 insert—“Schedule 1AMayoral CCAs that are EMSAs: overview and scrutiny committees and audit committeeApplication of this Schedule
1 (1) This Schedule applies to a CCA if it is an established mayoral strategic authority.(2) Accordingly, in the following paragraphs of this Schedule— (a) “CCA” means a CCA that is an established mayoral strategic authority;(b) a reference to an overview and scrutiny committee is a reference to such a committee of a CCA that is an established mayoral strategic authority.(3) For provision about the scrutiny of other CCAs, see Schedule 1.Functions of overview and scrutiny committee
2 (1) A CCA must arrange for the appointment by the CCA of one or more committees of the authority (referred to in this Schedule as overview and scrutiny committees).(2) The arrangements must ensure that the CCA’s overview and scrutiny committee has power (or its overview and scrutiny committees have power between them)—(a) to investigate matters of local interest;(b) to make reports or recommendations to the CCA or mayor on matters of local interest.(3) The arrangements must (in particular) ensure that the CCA’s overview and scrutiny committee has power (or its overview and scrutiny committees have power between them)—(a) to make reports or recommendations to the CCA with respect to the discharge of any functions that are the responsibility of the CCA;(b) to make reports or recommendations to the mayor with respect to the discharge of any general functions.(4) The arrangements must (in particular) ensure that the CCA’s overview and scrutiny committee has power (or its overview and scrutiny committees have power between them)—(a) to review or scrutinise decisions made, or other action taken, in connection with the discharge of any functions which are the responsibility of the CCA;(b) to review or scrutinise decisions made, or other action taken, in connection with the discharge by the mayor of any general functions;(c) to review—(i) the policy outcomes which were intended to result from action taken in connection with the discharge of any functions that are the responsibility of the CCA, and(ii) the effectiveness of that action in achieving those outcomes;(d) to review—(i) the policy outcomes which were intended to result from action taken in connection with the discharge by the mayor of any general functions, and(ii) the effectiveness of that action in achieving those outcomes;(5) The arrangements made in accordance with sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) must (in particular) ensure that—(a) where a decision or other action involves expenditure of the CCA, the review or scrutiny of it includes an assessment of value for money;(b) where the discharge of a function involves expenditure of the CCA—(i) any report includes a report on value for money;(ii) where appropriate, recommendations are made in relation to value for money.(6) When assessing value for money, an overview and scrutiny committee must have regard to any guidance issued by a public authority. (7) The power of an overview and scrutiny committee under sub-paragraph (3)(a) or (3)(b) to make reports or recommendations with respect to the discharge of any functions includes power to make recommendations about the way that a function is, or is proposed to be, discharged.(8) The power of an overview and scrutiny committee under sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (4)(b) to review or scrutinise a decision made but not implemented includes—(a) power to direct that a decision is not to be implemented while it is under review or scrutiny by the overview and scrutiny committee, and(b) power—(i) to recommend that the decision be reconsidered, or(ii) to make recommendations about the way that the function is, or is proposed to be, discharged.(9) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA must publish details of how it proposes to exercise its powers in relation to the review and scrutiny of decisions made but not yet implemented and its arrangements in connection with the exercise of those powers.(10) Before complying with sub-paragraph (9) an overview and scrutiny committee must obtain the consent of the CCA to the proposals and arrangements.(11) If—(a) an overview and scrutiny committee makes a recommendation to the CCA or mayor under sub-paragraph (7) or (8)(b), and(b) the CCA or mayor does not intend to give effect to the recommendation (at all or in part),the CCA or mayor must give the committee a written notice of that intention and of the reasons for not giving effect to the recommendation.(12) An overview and scrutiny committee may send a copy of any report or recommendations made by it to any public authority (including the Secretary of State or another Minister of the Crown, or any government department).(13) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA may not discharge any functions other than the functions conferred by or under this Schedule.(14) Any reference in this Schedule to the discharge of any functions includes a reference to the doing of anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of those functions.Overview and scrutiny committees: supplementary provision
3 (1) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA—(a) may appoint one or more sub-committees, and(b) may arrange for the discharge of any of its functions by any such sub-committee.(2) A sub-committee of an overview and scrutiny committee may not discharge any functions other than those conferred on it under sub-paragraph (1)(b).(3) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA may not include a member of the CCA (including the mayor for the CCA’s area or deputy mayor).(4) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA is to be treated as a committee or sub-committee of a principal council for the purposes of Part 5A of the Local Government Act 1972 (access to meetings and documents of certain authorities, committees and sub-committees).(5) Subsections (2) to (5) of section 102 of the Local Government Act 1972 apply to an overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA as they apply to a committee appointed under that section. (6) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA—(a) may require a key person to attend before it to answer questions, and(b) may invite other persons to attend meetings of the committee.(7) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA—(a) may require a key person to provide it with information or documents, and(b) may invite other persons to provide it with information or documents.(8) Regulations under paragraph 4(1) may make provision about—(a) information or documents whose provision may, or may not be, required under sub-paragraph (7)(a);(b) information or documents whose provision may, or may not be, invited under sub-paragraph (7)(b).(9) A requirement under sub-paragraph (6)(a) or (7)(a) can only be imposed on a person by written notice given to the person; and the period between the notice being given and the date when the requirement must be complied with must be—(a) 10 working days, or(b) if that period of notice is unreasonably short, such longer period as is reasonable.(10) A person on whom a requirement is imposed under sub-paragraph (6)(a) or (7)(a) is required to comply with the requirement.(11) If—(a) an overview and scrutiny committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(6)(a), required a person to attend a meeting of the committee,(b) the person does not attend the meeting in compliance with the requirement, and(c) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not attending the meeting,the committee must publish notice of the non-attendance in such manner as the committee thinks appropriate and a scrutiny officer of the committee (appointed in accordance with regulations made under 4(2)(d)) must give a copy of the notice to the person who did not attend.(12) For provision about the consequences of a failure to comply with a requirement imposed under sub-paragraph (6) or (7), see paragraphs 7 and 8.(13) A person is not obliged—(a) by sub-paragraph (6) to answer any question which the person would be entitled to refuse to answer in or for the purposes of proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or(b) by sub-paragraph (7) to provide any information which the person would be entitled to refuse to provide in or for the purposes of proceedings in a court in England and Wales.(14) In exercising, or deciding whether to exercise, any of its functions an overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA must have regard to any guidance for the time being issued by the Secretary of State.(15) Guidance under sub-paragraph (14) may make different provision for different cases or for different descriptions of committee.(16) In sub-paragraphs (3) to (14) references to an overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA include references to any sub-committee of such a committee.Power to make further provision about overview and scrutiny committees
4 (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision about overview and scrutiny committees of a CCA. (2) Provision under sub-paragraph (1) may in particular include provision—(a) about the membership of an overview and scrutiny committee and the voting rights of such members;(b) about the payment of allowances to the members of an overview and scrutiny committee;(c) about the person who is to be chair of an overview and scrutiny committee;(d) for the appointment of persons to act as scrutiny officers of an overview and scrutiny committee;(e) about how and by whom matters may be referred to an overview and scrutiny committee;(f) requiring persons (whether members of the CCA or other persons) to respond to reports or recommendations made by an overview and scrutiny committee;(g) about the publication of reports, recommendations or responses;(h) about information which must, or must not, be disclosed to an overview and scrutiny committee (whether by members of the CCA or by other persons);(i) as to the minimum or maximum period for which a direction under paragraph 2(8)(a) may have effect.(3) Provision of the following kinds must be made under sub-paragraph (1)—(a) provision about when and how an overview and scrutiny committee must involve independent experts in its activities;(b) provision about how an overview and scrutiny committee must take account of the work undertaken by the independent experts involved in its activities;(c) provision for the remuneration of independent experts.(4) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (2)(a) so as to ensure that at least 60% of members of an overview and scrutiny committee are members of the CCA’s constituent councils.(5) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (2)(b) so as to ensure that all the members of an overview and scrutiny committee are entitled to be paid allowances in respect of activities of the descriptions specified in regulations under this paragraph.(6) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (2)(c) so as to ensure that the chair of an overview and scrutiny committee is—(a) an independent person (as defined by the regulations), or(b) an appropriate person who is a member of one of the CCA’s constituent councils.(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (6)(b) “appropriate person” means a person who is not a member of a registered political party of which the mayor is a member.(8) In sub-paragraph (2)(d) the reference to a “scrutiny officer” of an overview and scrutiny committee is a reference to a person appointed with the function of—(a) promoting the role of the committee, and(b) providing support and guidance—(i) to the committee and its members, and(ii) to members of the CCA (so far as relating to the functions of the committee).(9) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (2)(d) so as to ensure that an overview and scrutiny committee has at least two scrutiny officers. (10) Provision under sub-paragraph (2)(g) may include provision for descriptions of confidential or exempt information to be excluded from the publication of reports, recommendations or responses.(11) In this paragraph “registered political party” means a party registered under Part 2 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.(12) In this paragraph references to an overview and scrutiny committee include references to any sub-committee of such a committee.Style by which committees to be known
5 (1) The overview and scrutiny committees are to have—(a) the style “local scrutiny committee”, or(b) any other style that is specified in regulations under paragraph 4(1).(2) The specified style may (in particular) be—(a) a variant of “local scrutiny committee”, or(b) “overview and scrutiny committee” or a variant of it.(3) The power under section 252(1) to make different provision for different purposes includes power to specify different styles under this paragraph in relation to overview and scrutiny committees of different descriptions of CCAs.Petitions
6 (1) A CCA must make arrangements (“petition arrangements”) in relation to its overview and scrutiny committee, or each such committee, under which—(a) a local elector is able to start a petition calling upon the committee to exercise its functions in relation to a matter of local interest that is specified in the petition, and(b) other local electors are able to indicate their support for the petition within a period specified in the petition arrangements.(2) Petition arrangements must secure that—(a) a local elector is able to start any petition by electronic means or non-electronic means, and(b) other local electors are able to indicate support for any petition by electronic means or non-electronic means.(3) An overview and scrutiny committee must reject a petition in any of the following cases—(a) the petition is explicitly seeking new or increased expenditure of the CCA;(b) the specified matter is not a matter of local interest;(c) the committee could not exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter without prejudicing civil proceedings or criminal proceedings which have been brought or which, in the view of the committee, are likely to be brought reasonably soon (whether in England and Wales or elsewhere);(d) the petition is offensive, abusive or vexatious.(4) In a case where the number of local electors who are petitioners is at least 0.1% of the total number of local electors, an overview and scrutiny committee must decide whether or not to exercise its functions in relation to the matter of concern to which the petition relates.(5) In any other case, an overview and scrutiny committee may decide whether or not to exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter to which the petition relates. (6) In deciding whether or not to exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter to which a petition relates, an overview and scrutiny committee must (in particular) take into account the effective use of the committee’s time and resources.(7) Within the period of 30 days beginning with the day on which an overview and scrutiny committee makes a relevant decision about a petition, the committee must—(a) publish written notice of the following matters—(i) the relevant decision;(ii) the reasons for making the relevant decision;(iii) how the committee proposes to exercise its functions (in the case of a relevant decision to exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter to which the petition relates); and(b) give written notice of those matters to the person who started the petition.(8) Regulations under paragraph 4(1) may make provision about petition arrangements and petitions, including—(a) provision about grounds on which an overview and scrutiny committee must or may make a relevant decision about a petition;(b) provision about matters which must or may be taken into account in making a relevant decision about a petition;(c) provision for an overview and scrutiny committee to be able to combine petitions relating to similar specified matters;(d) provision about verifying whether persons are local electors;(e) provision about whether the number of local electors who are petitioners is at least 0.1% of the total number of local electors;(9) In this paragraph—“local elector” , in relation to a petition, means a person who would be entitled to vote as an elector at an election for the return of a mayor for the area of the CCA concerned;“petitioner” means a local elector who has—(a) started a petition, or(b) indicated support for a petition,in accordance with the petition arrangements;“relevant decision about a petition” means—(a) a decision by an overview and scrutiny committee to reject a petition, or(b) a decision by an overview and scrutiny committee whether or not to exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter to which a petition relates;“specified matter” means the matter that is specified in a petition in accordance with the petition arrangements.Financial penalties for failure to attend committee meetings, answer questions or provide information etc
7 (1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, give overview and scrutiny committees the power to impose a civil penalty on—(a) a person who fails to attend an overview and scrutiny committee meeting;(b) a person who fails to answer a question put at an overview and scrutiny committee meeting;(c) a person who fails to provide an overview and scrutiny committee with information or a document;(d) a person who misleads an overview and scrutiny committee. (2) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person fails to attend an overview and scrutiny committee meeting if—(a) the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(6)(a), required the person to attend the meeting,(b) the person does not attend the meeting, and(c) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not attending the meeting.(3) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person fails to answer a question put at an overview and scrutiny committee meeting if—(a) the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(6)(a), required the person to attend the meeting,(b) the question is properly put to the person at the meeting,(c) the person does not answer the question, and(d) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not answering the question.(4) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person fails to provide an overview and scrutiny committee meeting with information or a document if—(a) the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(7)(a), required the person to provide the information or document,(b) the person does not provide the information or document, and(c) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not providing the information or document.(5) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person misleads an overview and scrutiny committee meeting if—(a) the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(7)(a), required the person to provide information or a document, and(b) the person intentionally alters, suppresses, conceals or destroys the information or document.(6) Regulations under this paragraph—(a) must provide for the amount or maximum amount of a civil penalty — and such an amount or maximum must not exceed £5,000;(b) may provide for the power to impose a civil penalty to be exercisable only in relation to persons of a description specified in the regulations; and such a description of person may (in particular) consist of all or any of the following—(i) mayors for the areas of CCAs;(ii) deputy mayors appointed by such mayors;(iii) commissioners appointed by such mayors;(c) must make provision for appeals against the imposition of civil penalties (which may include provision enabling a civil penalty to be confirmed, withdrawn or varied in its amount on an appeal).(7) In order to take account of changes in the value of money, the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for the sum for the time being specified in sub-paragraph (6)(a).Termination of office for failure to attend committee meetings
8 (1) This paragraph applies to a person who holds one of the following offices in relation to a CCA (the “relevant CCA”)—(a) mayor for the area of the relevant CCA;(b) deputy mayor appointed by such a mayor;(c) commissioner appointed by such a mayor. (2) The person ceases to hold the office if—(a) the person fails to attend six overview and scrutiny committee meetings (the “six missed meetings”), and(b) there is the required link between the six missed meetings.(3) The person who holds the office fails to attend an overview and scrutiny committee meeting if—(a) the committee is a committee of the relevant CCA,(b) the meeting is a compulsory meeting for the person as holder of that office,(c) the person does not attend the meeting, and(d) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not attending the meeting.(4) There is the required link between the six missed meetings if—(a) the six missed meetings are consecutive overview and scrutiny committee meetings that are compulsory meetings for the person as holder of the office, or(b) the period between the first and last of those six missed meetings is 12 months or shorter.(5) In determining whether there is the required link by virtue of sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b)—(a) it does not matter if the six missed meetings are meetings of the same committee, or different committees, of the CCA;(b) it does not matter if there are any meetings of an overview and scrutiny committee that—(i) fall between the first and last of the six missed meetings, and(ii) are not compulsory meetings for the person as holder of the office.(6) If a person ceases to hold office by virtue of this section—(a) the CCA’s monitoring officer (within the meaning of section 5 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989) must—(i) publish notice that the person has ceased to hold office in such manner as the monitoring officer thinks appropriate, and(ii) give a copy of the notice to the person who has ceased to hold office;(b) the person ceases to hold office at the end of the day of the last of the six missed meetings.(7) If a notice given under paragraph 3(11) of a person’s non-attendance at a meeting of an overview and scrutiny committee relates to the last of the six missed meetings that result in the person’s loss of office by virtue of this paragraph, the notice must include a statement of that fact.(8) If a person ceases to hold an office by virtue of this section, that loss of office does not prevent that person from subsequently—(a) taking that office again, or(b) taking any other office referred to in sub-paragraph (1).(9) An overview and scrutiny committee meeting is a “compulsory meeting” for a person if the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(6)(a), required that person to attend the meeting.(10) This paragraph applies to a commissioner whether appointed—(a) under a worker’s contract,(b) under a contract other than a worker’s contract, or(c) otherwise than under a contract; and references to the office of commissioner (including holding office) are to be read accordingly in the case of a commissioner appointed under a contract.Audit committees
9 (1) A CCA must arrange for the appointment by the CCA of an audit committee.(2) The functions of the audit committee are to include—(a) reviewing and scrutinising the CCA’s financial affairs,(b) reviewing and assessing the CCA’s risk management, internal control and corporate governance arrangements,(c) reviewing and assessing the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which resources have been used in discharging the CCA’s functions, and(d) making reports and recommendations to the CCA in relation to reviews conducted under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c).(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—(a) the membership of a CCA’s audit committee;(b) the appointment of the members;(c) the payment of allowances to members of the committee who are members of a constituent council.(4) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (3) so as to ensure that at least one member of an audit committee is an independent person (as defined by the regulations).Interpretation
10 In this Schedule—“commissioner” means a commissioner appointed under section 29A;“key person” , in relation to an overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA, means—(a) the mayor for the area of the CCA;(b) the deputy mayor for that area;(c) a commissioner appointed by the mayor for that area;(d) the officers of the CCA;(e) a member of the CCA who has responsibilities in relation to a particular area of policy;(f) a person of any other description that is specified in regulations;“matter of local interest” , in relation to an overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA, means a matter which both—(a) relates to the area of the CCA, and(b) relates—(i) to functions that are the responsibility of the CCA (whether exercisable by the CCA or the mayor), or(ii) otherwise to any aspect of any area of competence set out in section 2 of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026;but it does not include any matters which relate to the functions of police and crime commissioners;“value for money” means the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the expenditure of the CCA.”Part 2Amendments consequential on Part 1 of this ScheduleIntroduction
3 LURA 2023 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule.Section 15: overview and scrutiny committees
4 (1) Section 15 is amended in accordance with this paragraph. (2) In subsection (1), after“CCAs”insert“that are not established mayoral strategic authorities”.(3) After subsection (1) insert—“(1A) Schedule 1A makes provision for CCAs that are established mayoral strategic authorities to have overview and scrutiny committees and audit committees.”(4) In subsection (2), for “that Schedule” substitute “those Schedules”.(5) After subsection (2) insert—“(3) In this section and Schedules 1 and 1A “established mayoral strategic authority” has the same meaning as in the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026 (see section 1(6)(b) of that Act).”Section 29: deputy mayors
5 In section 29(3)—(a) in paragraph (b), omit “or”;(b) in paragraph (c), at the end insert“, or(d) the person ceases to be deputy mayor by virtue of paragraph 8 of Schedule 1A.”Schedule 1: overview and scrutiny committees
6 (1) Schedule 1 is amended in accordance with this paragraph.(2) In the heading, after “Authorities” insert “except EMSAs”.(3) Before paragraph 1 (and the italic heading preceding it) insert—“Application of this Schedule
A1 (1) This Schedule applies to a CCA if it is not an established mayoral strategic authority.(2) Accordingly, in the following provisions of this Schedule—(a) “CCA” means a CCA that is not an established mayoral strategic authority;(b) a reference to an overview and scrutiny committee is a reference to such a committee of a CCA that is not an established mayoral strategic authority.(3) For provision about the scrutiny of CCAs that are established mayoral strategic authorities, see Schedule 1A.”(4) After paragraph 3 insert—“Style by which committees to be known
3A (1) Regulations under paragraph 3(1) may (in particular) specify the style which the overview and scrutiny committees of CCAs are to have.(2) The specified style may (in particular) be a variant of “overview and scrutiny committee”.(3) The power under section 252(1) to make different provision for different purposes includes power to specify different styles under this paragraph in relation to different descriptions of CCAs.”Schedule 2: election of Mayors of CCAs etc
7 In Schedule 2, after paragraph 11 insert—“Failure to attend meetings of overview and scrutiny committee: loss of office
11A Paragraph 8 of Schedule 1A makes provision for a person’s term of office as mayor to end because of repeated failure to attend meetings of an overview and scrutiny committee.” Schedule 2A: commissioners
8 In Schedule 2A (inserted by Schedule 3 to this Act), in paragraph 9—(a) in paragraph (d), omit “or”;(b) after paragraph (d) insert“, or(da) the person ceases to be a commissioner by virtue of paragraph 8 of Schedule 1A, or”Part 3Extension of new scrutiny regime to all mayoral CCAsIntroduction
9 LURA 2023 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule.Amendment of section 15
10 (1) Section 15 (as amended by paragraph 4 of this Schedule) is amended in accordance with this paragraph.(2) In subsection (1), for“CCAs that are not established mayoral strategic authorities”substitute“non-mayoral CCAs”.(3) In subsection (1A), for“CCAs that are established mayoral strategic authorities”substitute“mayoral CCAs”.(4) Omit subsection (3).Exclusion of all mayoral CCAs from scrutiny regime in Schedule 1 LURA 2023
11 (1) Schedule 1 (as amended by paragraph 6 of this Schedule) is amended in accordance with this paragraph.(2) In the heading, for “Combined County Authorities except EMSAs” substitute “Non-mayoral Combined County Authorities”.(3) For paragraph A1 substitute—A1 “(1) This Schedule applies to a non-mayoral CCA.(2) Accordingly, in this Schedule “CCA” means only a non-mayoral CCA.(3) For provision about the scrutiny of mayoral CCAs, see Schedule 1A.”(4) In paragraph 1 (functions of overview and scrutiny committees)—(a) omit sub-paragraph (3);(b) in sub-paragraph (4), omit “and (3)(a)”.(5) In paragraph 2 (overview and scrutiny committees: supplementary provision)—(a) in sub-paragraph (3), omit “(including, in the case of a mayoral CCA, the mayor for the CCA's area or deputy mayor)”;(b) in sub-paragraph (6)(a), omit “(including, in the case of a mayoral CCA, the mayor for the CCA's area and deputy mayor)”.(6) In paragraph 3 (power to make further provision about overview and scrutiny committees), for sub-paragraph (5) substitute—“(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(b) “appropriate person” means a person who is not a member of the registered political party which has the most representatives among the members of the constituent councils (or, if there is no such party because two or more parties have the same number of representatives, is not a member of any of those parties).” Inclusion of all mayoral CCAs in the new scrutiny regime
12 (1) Schedule 1A (as inserted by paragraph 2 of this Schedule) is amended in accordance with this paragraph.(2) In the heading, for “CCAs that are established mayoral strategic authorities” substitute “Mayoral CCAs”.(3) For paragraph A1 substitute—A1 “(1) This Schedule applies to a mayoral CCA.(2) Accordingly, in the following provisions of this Schedule—(a) “CCA” means a mayoral CCA;(b) a reference to an overview and scrutiny committee is a reference to such a committee of a mayoral CCA.(3) For provision about the scrutiny of non-mayoral CCAs, see Schedule 1.””

68: After Schedule 3, insert the following new Schedule—
“ScheduleMayoral combined authorities: overview and scrutiny committeesPart 1New scrutiny regime for combined authorities that are established mayoral strategic authoritiesIntroduction
1 LDEDCA 2009 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule.The new scrutiny regime
2 After Schedule 5A insert—“Schedule 5AAMayoral combined authorities that are EMSAs: overview and scrutiny committees and audit committeeApplication of this Schedule
1 (1) This Schedule applies to a combined authority if it is an established mayoral strategic authority.(2) Accordingly, in the following paragraphs of this Schedule—(a) “combined authority” means a combined authority that is an established mayoral strategic authority;(b) a reference to an overview and scrutiny committee is a reference to such a committee of a combined authority that is an established mayoral strategic authority.(3) For provision about the scrutiny of other combined authorities, see Schedule 5A.Functions of overview and scrutiny committee
2 (1) A combined authority must arrange for the appointment by the combined authority of one or more committees of the authority (referred to in this Schedule as overview and scrutiny committees).(2) The arrangements must ensure that the combined authority’s overview and scrutiny committee has power (or its overview and scrutiny committees have power between them)—(a) to investigate matters of local interest;(b) to make reports or recommendations to the combined authority or mayor on matters of local interest.(3) The arrangements must (in particular) ensure that the combined authority’s overview and scrutiny committee has power (or its overview and scrutiny committees have power between them)—(a) to make reports or recommendations to the combined authority with respect to the discharge of any functions that are the responsibility of the combined authority; (b) to make reports or recommendations to the mayor with respect to the discharge of any general functions.(4) The arrangements must (in particular) ensure that the combined authority’s overview and scrutiny committee has power (or its overview and scrutiny committees have power between them)—(a) to review or scrutinise decisions made, or other action taken, in connection with the discharge of any functions which are the responsibility of the combined authority;(b) to review or scrutinise decisions made, or other action taken, in connection with the discharge by the mayor of any general functions;(c) to review—(i) the policy outcomes which were intended to result from action taken in connection with the discharge of any functions that are the responsibility of the combined authority, and(ii) the effectiveness of that action in achieving those outcomes;(d) to review—(i) the policy outcomes which were intended to result from action taken in connection with the discharge by the mayor of any general functions, and(ii) the effectiveness of that action in achieving those outcomes;(5) The arrangements made in accordance with sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) must (in particular) ensure that—(a) where a decision or other action involves expenditure of the combined authority, the review or scrutiny of it includes an assessment of value for money;(b) where the discharge of a function involves expenditure of the combined authority—(i) any report includes a report on value for money;(ii) where appropriate, recommendations are made in relation to value for money.(6) When assessing value for money, an overview and scrutiny committee must have regard to any guidance issued by a public authority.(7) The power of an overview and scrutiny committee under sub-paragraph (3)(a) or (3)(b) to make reports or recommendations with respect to the discharge of any functions includes power to make recommendations about the way that a function is, or is proposed to be, discharged.(8) The power of an overview and scrutiny committee under sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (4)(b) to review or scrutinise a decision made but not implemented includes—(a) power to direct that a decision is not to be implemented while it is under review or scrutiny by the overview and scrutiny committee, and(b) power—(i) to recommend that the decision be reconsidered, or(ii) to make recommendations about the way that the function is, or is proposed to be, discharged.(9) An overview and scrutiny committee of a combined authority must publish details of how it proposes to exercise its powers in relation to the review and scrutiny of decisions made but not yet implemented and its arrangements in connection with the exercise of those powers.(10) Before complying with sub-paragraph (9) an overview and scrutiny committee must obtain the consent of the combined authority to the proposals and arrangements. (11) If—(a) an overview and scrutiny committee makes a recommendation to the combined authority or mayor under sub-paragraph (7) or (8)(b), and(b) the combined authority or mayor does not intend to give effect to the recommendation (at all or in part),the combined authority or mayor must give the committee a written notice of that intention and of the reasons for not giving effect to the recommendation.(12) An overview and scrutiny committee may send a copy of any report or recommendations made by it to any public authority (including the Secretary of State or another Minister of the Crown, or any government department).(13) An overview and scrutiny committee of a combined authority may not discharge any functions other than the functions conferred by or under this Schedule.(14) Any reference in this Schedule to the discharge of any functions includes a reference to the doing of anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of those functions.Overview and scrutiny committees: supplementary provision
3 (1) An overview and scrutiny committee of a combined authority—(a) may appoint one or more sub-committees, and(b) may arrange for the discharge of any of its functions by any such sub-committee.(2) A sub-committee of an overview and scrutiny committee may not discharge any functions other than those conferred on it under sub-paragraph (1)(b).(3) An overview and scrutiny committee of a combined authority may not include a member of the combined authority (including the mayor for the combined authority’s area or deputy mayor).(4) An overview and scrutiny committee of a combined authority is to be treated as a committee or sub-committee of a principal council for the purposes of Part 5A of the Local Government Act 1972 (access to meetings and documents of certain authorities, committees and sub-committees).(5) Subsections (2) to (5) of section 102 of the Local Government Act 1972 apply to an overview and scrutiny committee of a combined authority as they apply to a committee appointed under that section.(6) An overview and scrutiny committee of a combined authority—(a) may require a key person to attend before it to answer questions, and(b) may invite other persons to attend meetings of the committee.(7) An overview and scrutiny committee of a combined authority—(a) may require a key person to provide it with information or documents, and(b) may invite other persons to provide it with information or documents.(8) Regulations under paragraph 4(1) may make provision about—(a) information or documents whose provision may, or may not be, required under sub-paragraph (7)(a);(b) information or documents whose provision may, or may not be, invited under sub-paragraph (7)(b).(9) A requirement under sub-paragraph (6)(a) or (7)(a) can only be imposed on a person by written notice given to the person; and the period between the notice being given and the date when the requirement must be complied with must be— (a) 10 working days, or(b) if that period of notice is unreasonably short, such longer period as is reasonable.(10) A person on whom a requirement is imposed under sub-paragraph (6)(a) or (7)(a) is required to comply with the requirement.(11) If—(a) an overview and scrutiny committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(6)(a), required a person to attend a meeting of the committee,(b) the person does not attend the meeting in compliance with the requirement, and(c) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not attending the meeting,the committee must publish notice of the non-attendance in such manner as the committee thinks appropriate and a scrutiny officer of the committee (appointed in accordance with regulations made under paragraph 4(2)(d)) must give a copy of the notice to the person who did not attend.(12) For provision about the consequences of a failure to comply with a requirement imposed under sub-paragraph (6) or (7), see paragraphs 7 and 8.(13) A person is not obliged—(a) by sub-paragraph (6) to answer any question which the person would be entitled to refuse to answer in or for the purposes of proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or(b) by sub-paragraph (7) to provide any information which the person would be entitled to refuse to provide in or for the purposes of proceedings in a court in England and Wales.(14) In exercising, or deciding whether to exercise, any of its functions an overview and scrutiny committee of a combined authority must have regard to any guidance for the time being issued by the Secretary of State.(15) Guidance under sub-paragraph (14) may make different provision for different cases or for different descriptions of committee.(16) In sub-paragraphs (3) to (14) references to an overview and scrutiny committee of a combined authority include references to any sub-committee of such a committee.Power to make further provision about overview and scrutiny committees
4 (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision about overview and scrutiny committees of a combined authority.(2) Provision under sub-paragraph (1) may in particular include provision—(a) about the membership of an overview and scrutiny committee and the voting rights of such members;(b) about the payment of allowances to the members of an overview and scrutiny committee;(c) about the person who is to be chair of an overview and scrutiny committee;(d) for the appointment of persons to act as scrutiny officers of an overview and scrutiny committee;(e) about how and by whom matters may be referred to an overview and scrutiny committee;(f) requiring persons (whether members of the combined authority or other persons) to respond to reports or recommendations made by an overview and scrutiny committee;(g) about the publication of reports, recommendations or responses; (h) about information which must, or must not, be disclosed to an overview and scrutiny committee (whether by members of the combined authority or by other persons);(i) as to the minimum or maximum period for which a direction under paragraph 2(8)(a) may have effect.(3) Provision of the following kinds must be made under sub-paragraph (1)—(a) provision about when and how an overview and scrutiny committee must involve independent experts in its activities;(b) provision about how an overview and scrutiny committee must take account of the work undertaken by the independent experts involved in its activities;(c) provision for the remuneration of independent experts.(4) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (2)(a) so as to ensure that at least 60% of members of an overview and scrutiny committee are members of the combined authority’s constituent councils.(5) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (2)(b) so as to ensure that all the members of an overview and scrutiny committee are entitled to be paid allowances in respect of activities of the descriptions specified in regulations under this paragraph.(6) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (2)(c) so as to ensure that the chair of an overview and scrutiny committee is—(a) an independent person (as defined by the regulations), or(b) an appropriate person who is a member of one of the combined authority’s constituent councils.(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (6)(b) “appropriate person” means a person who is not a member of a registered political party of which the mayor is a member.(8) In sub-paragraph (2)(d) the reference to a “scrutiny officer” of an overview and scrutiny committee is a reference to a person appointed with the function of—(a) promoting the role of the committee, and(b) providing support and guidance—(i) to the committee and its members, and(ii) to members of the combined authority (so far as relating to the functions of the committee).(9) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (2)(d) so as to ensure that an overview and scrutiny committee has at least two scrutiny officers.(10) Provision under sub-paragraph (2)(g) may include provision for descriptions of confidential or exempt information to be excluded from the publication of reports, recommendations or responses.(11) In this paragraph “registered political party” means a party registered under Part 2 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.(12) In this paragraph references to an overview and scrutiny committee include references to any sub-committee of such a committee.Style by which committees to be known
5 (1) The overview and scrutiny committees are to have—(a) the style “local scrutiny committee”, or(b) any other style that is specified in regulations under paragraph 4(1).(2) The specified style may (in particular) be—(a) a variant of “local scrutiny committee”, or (b) “overview and scrutiny committee” or a variant of it.(3) The power under section 117(1A) to make different provision for different purposes includes power to specify different styles under this paragraph in relation to overview and scrutiny committees of different descriptions of combined authorities.Petitions
6 (1) A combined authority must make arrangements (“petition arrangements”) in relation to its overview and scrutiny committee, or each such committee, under which—(a) a local elector is able to start a petition calling upon the committee to exercise its functions in relation to a matter of local interest that is specified in the petition, and(b) other local electors are able to indicate their support for the petition within a period specified in the petition arrangements.(2) Petition arrangements must secure that—(a) a local elector is able to start any petition by electronic means or non-electronic means, and(b) other local electors are able to indicate support for any petition by electronic means or non-electronic means.(3) An overview and scrutiny committee must reject a petition in any of the following cases—(a) the petition is explicitly seeking new or increased expenditure of the combined authority;(b) the specified matter is not a matter of local interest;(c) the committee could not exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter without prejudicing civil proceedings or criminal proceedings which have been brought or which, in the view of the committee, are likely to be brought reasonably soon (whether in England and Wales or elsewhere);(d) the petition is offensive, abusive or vexatious.(4) In a case where the number of local electors who are petitioners is at least 0.1% of the total number of local electors, an overview and scrutiny committee must decide whether or not to exercise its functions in relation to the matter of concern to which the petition relates.(5) In any other case, an overview and scrutiny committee may decide whether or not to exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter to which the petition relates.(6) In deciding whether or not to exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter to which a petition relates, an overview and scrutiny committee must (in particular) take into account the effective use of the committee’s time and resources.(7) Within the period of 30 days beginning with the day on which an overview and scrutiny committee makes a relevant decision about a petition, the committee must—(a) publish written notice of the following matters—(i) the relevant decision;(ii) the reasons for making the relevant decision;(iii) how the committee proposes to exercise its functions (in the case of a relevant decision to exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter to which the petition relates); and(b) give written notice of those matters to the person who started the petition.(8) Regulations under paragraph 4(1) may make provision about petition arrangements and petitions, including— (a) provision about grounds on which an overview and scrutiny committee must or may make a relevant decision about a petition;(b) provision about matters which must or may be taken into account in making a relevant decision about a petition;(c) provision for an overview and scrutiny committee to be able to combine petitions relating to similar specified matters;(d) provision about verifying whether persons are local electors;(e) provision about whether the number of local electors who are petitioners is at least 0.1% of the total number of local electors;(9) In this paragraph—“local elector” , in relation to a petition, means a person who would be entitled to vote as an elector at an election for the return of a mayor for the area of the combined authority concerned;“petitioner” means a local elector who has—(a) started a petition, or(b) indicated support for a petition,in accordance with the petition arrangements;“relevant decision about a petition” means—(a) a decision by an overview and scrutiny committee to reject a petition, or(b) a decision by an overview and scrutiny committee whether or not to exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter to which a petition relates;“specific matter” means the matter that is specified in a petition in accordance with the petition arrangements.Financial penalties for failure to attend committee meetings, answer questions or provide information etc
7 (1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, give overview and scrutiny committees the power to impose a civil penalty on—(a) a person who fails to attend an overview and scrutiny committee meeting;(b) a person who fails to answer a question put at an overview and scrutiny committee meeting;(c) a person who fails to provide an overview and scrutiny committee with information or a document;(d) a person who misleads an overview and scrutiny committee.(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person fails to attend an overview and scrutiny committee meeting if—(a) the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(6)(a), required the person to attend the meeting,(b) the person does not attend the meeting, and(c) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not attending the meeting.(3) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person fails to answer a question put at an overview and scrutiny committee meeting if—(a) the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(6)(a), required the person to attend the meeting,(b) the question is properly put to the person at the meeting,(c) the person does not answer the question, and(d) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not answering the question.(4) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person fails to provide an overview and scrutiny committee meeting with information or a document if— (a) the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(7)(a), required the person to provide the information or document,(b) the person does not provide the information or document, and(c) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not providing the information or document.(5) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person misleads an overview and scrutiny committee meeting if—(a) the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(7)(a), required the person to provide information or a document, and(b) the person intentionally alters, suppresses, conceals or destroys the information or document.(6) Regulations under this paragraph—(a) must provide for the amount or maximum amount of a civil penalty—and such an amount or maximum must not exceed £5,000;(b) may provide for the power to impose a civil penalty to be exercisable only in relation to persons of a description specified in the regulations; and such a description of person may (in particular) consist of all or any of the following—(i) mayors for the areas of combined authorities;(ii) deputy mayors appointed by such mayors;(iii) commissioners appointed by such mayors;(c) must make provision for appeals against the imposition of civil penalties (which may include provision enabling a civil penalty to be confirmed, withdrawn or varied in its amount on an appeal).(7) In order to take account of changes in the value of money, the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for the sum for the time being specified in sub-paragraph (6)(a).Termination of office for failure to attend committee meetings
8 (1) This paragraph applies to a person who holds one of the following offices in relation to a combined authority (the “relevant combined authority”)—(a) mayor for the area of the relevant combined authority;(b) deputy mayor appointed by such a mayor;(c) commissioner appointed by such a mayor.(2) The person ceases to hold the office if—(a) the person fails to attend six overview and scrutiny committee meetings (the “six missed meetings”), and(b) there is the required link between the six missed meetings.(3) The person who holds the office fails to attend an overview and scrutiny committee meeting if—(a) the committee is a committee of the relevant combined authority,(b) the meeting is a compulsory meeting for the person as holder of that office,(c) the person does not attend the meeting, and(d) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not attending the meeting.(4) There is the required link between the six missed meetings if—(a) the six missed meetings are consecutive overview and scrutiny committee meetings that are compulsory meetings for the person as holder of the office, or(b) the period between the first and last of those six missed meetings is 12 months or shorter.(5) In determining whether there is the required link by virtue of sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b)— (a) it does not matter if the six missed meetings are meetings of the same committee, or different committees, of the combined authority;(b) it does not matter if there are any meetings of an overview and scrutiny committee that—(i) fall between the first and last of the six missed meetings, and(ii) are not compulsory meetings for the person as holder of the office.(6) If a person ceases to hold office by virtue of this section—(a) the combined authority’s monitoring officer (within the meaning of section 5 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989) must—(i) publish notice that the person has ceased to hold office in such manner as the monitoring officer thinks appropriate, and(ii) give a copy of the notice to the person who has ceased to hold office;(b) the person ceases to hold office at the end of the day of the last of the six missed meetings.(7) If a notice given under paragraph 3(11) of a person’s non-attendance at a meeting of an overview and scrutiny committee relates to the last of the six missed meetings that result in the person’s loss of office by virtue of this paragraph, the notice must include a statement of that fact.(8) If a person ceases to hold an office by virtue of this section, that loss of office does not prevent that person from subsequently—(a) taking that office again, or(b) taking any other office referred to in sub-paragraph (1).(9) An overview and scrutiny committee meeting is a “compulsory meeting” for a person if the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(6)(a), required that person to attend the meeting.(10) This paragraph applies to a commissioner whether appointed—(a) under a worker’s contract,(b) under a contract other than a worker’s contract, or(c) otherwise than under a contract;and references to the office of commissioner (including holding office) are to be read accordingly in the case of a commissioner appointed under a contract.Audit committees
9 (1) A combined authority must arrange for the appointment by the combined authority of an audit committee.(2) The functions of the audit committee are to include—(a) reviewing and scrutinising the combined authority’s financial affairs,(b) reviewing and assessing the combined authority’s risk management, internal control and corporate governance arrangements,(c) reviewing and assessing the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which resources have been used in discharging the combined authority’s functions, and(d) making reports and recommendations to the combined authority in relation to reviews conducted under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c).(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—(a) the membership of a combined authority’s audit committee;(b) the appointment of the members; (c) the payment of allowances to members of the committee who are members of a constituent council.(4) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (3) so as to ensure that at least one member of an audit committee is an independent person (as defined by the regulations).Interpretation
10 In this Schedule—“commissioner” means a commissioner appointed under section 107CA;“key person” , in relation to an overview and scrutiny committee of a combined authority, means—(a) the mayor for the area of the combined authority;(b) the deputy mayor for that area;(c) a commissioner appointed by the mayor for that area;(d) the officers of the combined authority;(e) a member of the combined authority who has responsibilities in relation to a particular area of policy;(f) a person of any other description that is specified in regulations.“matter of local interest” , in relation to an overview and scrutiny committee of a combined authority, means a matter which both—(a) relates to the area of the combined authority, and(b) relates—(i) to functions that are the responsibility of the combined authority (whether exercisable by the combined authority or the mayor), or(ii) otherwise to any aspect of any area of competence set out in section 2 of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026;but it does not include any matters which relate to the functions of police and crime commissioners;“value for money” means the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the expenditure of the combined authority.”Part 2Amendments consequential on Part 1 of this ScheduleIntroduction
3 LDEDCA 2009 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule.Section 104: overview and scrutiny committees
4 (1) Section 104 is amended in accordance with this paragraph.(2) In subsection (9), after“combined authorities”insert“that are not established mayoral strategic authorities”.(3) After subsection (9) insert—“(9A) Schedule 5AA makes provision for combined authorities that are established mayoral strategic authorities to have overview and scrutiny committees and audit committees; and provision made in an order under subsection (1) is subject to that Schedule.”(4) After subsection (9A) insert—“(9B) In this section and Schedules 5A and 5AA “established mayoral strategic authority” has the same meaning as in the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026 (see section 1(6)(a) of that Act).” Section 107C: deputy mayors
5 In section 107C(3), after paragraph (c) insert—(a) (d) the person ceases to be deputy mayor by virtue of paragraph 8 of Schedule 5AA.”Schedule 5A: overview and scrutiny committees
6 (1) Schedule 5A is amended in accordance with this paragraph.(2) In the heading, after “Authorities” insert “except EMSAs”.(3) Before paragraph 1 (and the italic heading preceding it) insert—“Application of this Schedule
A1 (1) This Schedule applies to a combined authority if it is not an established mayoral strategic authority.(2) Accordingly, in the following provisions of this Schedule—(a) “combined authority” means a combined authority that is not an established mayoral strategic authority;(b) a reference to an overview and scrutiny committee is a reference to such a committee of a combined authority that is not an established mayoral strategic authority.(3) For provision about the scrutiny of combined authorities that are established mayoral strategic authorities, see Schedule 5AA.”(4) After paragraph 3 insert—“Style by which committees to be known
3A (1) Regulations under paragraph 3(1) may (in particular) specify the style which the overview and scrutiny committees of combined authorities are to have.(2) The specified style may (in particular) be a variant of “overview and scrutiny committee”.(3) The power under section 117(1A) to make different provision for different purposes includes power to specify different styles under this paragraph in relation to different descriptions of combined authorities.”Schedule 5B: election of Mayors of combined authorities etc
7 In Schedule 5B, after paragraph 11 insert—“Failure to attend meetings of overview and scrutiny committee: loss of office
11A Paragraph 8 of Schedule 5AA makes provision for a person’s term of office as mayor to end because of repeated failure to attend meetings of an overview and scrutiny committee.”Schedule 5BA: commissioners
8 In Schedule 5BA (inserted by Schedule 3 to this Act), in paragraph 9—(a) in paragraph (d), omit “or”;(b) after paragraph (d) insert“, or(da) the person ceases to be a commissioner by virtue of paragraph 8 of Schedule 5AA, or”Part 3Extension of new scrutiny regime to all mayoral combined authoritiesIntroduction
9 LDEDCA 2009 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule.Amendment of section 104
10 (1) Section 104 (as amended by paragraph 4 of this Schedule) is amended in accordance with this paragraph. (2) In subsection (9), for“combined authorities that are not established mayoral strategic authorities”substitute“non-mayoral combined authorities”.(3) In subsection (9A), for“combined authorities that are established mayoral strategic authorities”substitute“mayoral combined authorities”.(4) Omit subsection (9B).Exclusion of all mayoral combined authorities from scrutiny regime in Schedule 5A LDEDCA 2009
11 (1) Schedule 5A (as amended by paragraph 6 of this Schedule) is amended in accordance with this paragraph.(2) In the heading, for “Combined Authorities except EMSAs” substitute “Non-mayoral Combined Authorities”.(3) For paragraph A1 substitute—A1 “(1) This Schedule applies to a non-mayoral combined authority.(2) Accordingly, in this Schedule “combined authority” means only a non-mayoral combined authority.(3) For provision about the scrutiny of mayoral combined authorities, see Schedule 5AA .”(4) In paragraph 1 (functions of overview and scrutiny committees)—(a) omit sub-paragraph (3);(b) in sub-paragraph (4), omit “and (3)(a)”.(5) In paragraph 2 (overview and scrutiny committees: supplementary provision)—(a) in sub-paragraph (3), omit “(including, in the case of a mayoral combined authority, the mayor for the combined authority's area or deputy mayor)”;(b) in sub-paragraph (6)(a), omit “(including, in the case of a mayoral combined authority, the mayor for the combined authority's area and deputy mayor)”.(6) In paragraph 3 (power to make further provision about overview and scrutiny committees), for sub-paragraph (5) substitute—“(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(b) “appropriate person” means a person who is not a member of the registered political party which has the most representatives among the members of the constituent councils (or, if there is no such party because two or more parties have the same number of representatives, is not a member of any of those parties).”Inclusion of all mayoral combined authorities in the new scrutiny regime
12 (1) Schedule 5AA (as inserted by paragraph 2 of this Schedule) is amended in accordance with this paragraph.(2) In the heading, for “combined authorities that are established mayoral strategic authorities” substitute “Mayoral combined authorities”.(3) For paragraph A1 substitute—A1 “(1) This Schedule applies to a mayoral combined authority.(2) Accordingly, in the following provisions of this Schedule—(a) “combined authority” means a mayoral combined authority; (b) a reference to an overview and scrutiny committee is a reference to such a committee of a mayoral combined authority.(3) For provision about the scrutiny of non-mayoral combined authorities, see Schedule 5A.””

Amendments 67 and 68 agreed.

Clause 10: Combined authorities and CCAs: allowances for members with special responsibilities

Amendment 69

Moved by

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook]

69: Clause 10, page 12, line 33, after “publish” insert “quarterly”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that reports on allowances are published quarterly.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group, all of which are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Jamieson, relate to Clause 10 and the reporting of allowances within combined county authorities. These amendments are straightforward but they address an important principle: transparency and the use of public money.

The amendments seek to do three things: first, to ensure that reports on allowances are published on a quarterly basis; secondly, to require that those reports include not only the amounts paid but the evidence submitted by members, particularly those with special responsibilities; and, thirdly, to ensure that such reports are published online and are readily accessible to the public. None of these proposals is onerous; nor do they seek to disrupt the functioning of combined authorities. Rather, they aim to strengthen public confidence by ensuring that decisions about remuneration are open, visible and properly evidenced.

Public trust in local institutions depends not only on decisions that they are taking but on how transparently those decisions are made. If allowances are justified, why should the evidence supporting them not be published alongside the figures? Indeed, why should such information not be in the public domain as a matter of course? These amendments also reflect the evolving role of combined authorities. As they take on greater responsibilities and greater public funding, so too must they meet higher expectations of accountability. With increased power must come increased transparency. Is it not reasonable to expect that information on the use of public funds is not published routinely rather than intermittently? Should that information not include the justification for payments made by those in positions of additional responsibility?

I anticipate that it may be argued that existing arrangements are sufficient or that flexibility is required, but if the current system already delivers transparency, what objection can there be to making it clearer, more regular and more accessible? If it does not already do this, should we not take this opportunity to strengthen it?

These amendments go to the heart of accountability. If we are to entrust combined authorities with significant powers and resources, we must also ensure that they are subject to consistent, visible and robust scrutiny. I beg to move.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, it seems to me that all the amendments in this group would amount to good practice; this is what should happen. I hope the Minister will confirm that the amendments are agreeable.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her Amendments 69 to 74. While I recognise her commitment to accountability in local government, the Bill provides that combined and combined county authorities and independent remuneration panels must take account of any guidance issued by the Secretary of State for this clause.

That guidance will be issued in due course and will provide further details on the matters raised in these amendments. None the less, on the principles raised, I agree with the noble Baroness’s point about transparency. We will seek to be pragmatic, ensuring that we balance clear accountability and transparency against overburdening the authorities in their reporting arrangements. I therefore ask that the noble Baroness withdraws Amendment 69.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

We have heard from the Minister that the functions may already exist to provide a degree of oversight. However, the question before us is not simply whether information is recorded; rather, it is whether that information is made very visible, accessible and consistently available to the public.

These amendments do not seek to impose unnecessary burdens. They set out a reasonable expectation that reporting should be regular, transparent and accessible; in short, that it should meet the standards that the public are entitled to expect. This is not about questioning the integrity of those involved. It is about ensuring that the systems within which they operate command public confidence, and that confidence rests on transparency.

I listened to the Minister. We will wait until the guidance comes out to ensure that it reflects what we think the public deserve. At this point, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 69 withdrawn.

Amendments 70 to 74 not moved.

Amendment 75

Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

75: Clause 10, page 14, line 31, leave out “CCA” and insert “combined authority”
Member’s explanatory statement
This provision is about combined authorities, and so this amendment would correct the reference to “CCA” that appears here.

Amendment 75 agreed.

Amendment 76

Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

76: After Clause 10, insert the following new Clause—
“Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs: overview and scrutiny committees(1) Schedule (Mayoral CCAs: overview and scrutiny committees) changes the system of overview and scrutiny committees for mayoral CCAs. (2) Schedule (Mayoral combined authorities: overview and scrutiny committees) changes the system of overview and scrutiny committees for mayoral combined authorities.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would introduce the new Schedules about overview and scrutiny committees of mayoral CCAs and combined authorities (which would be inserted after Schedule 3 by other amendments in my name).

Amendment 76 agreed.

20:45

Clause 11: Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs: precepts

Amendment 77

Moved by

[Lord Jamieson]

77: Clause 11, page 14, line 33, leave out subsection (1)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to remove amendments to the precept arrangements set out in section 40 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook regarding the changes proposed in this Bill to the mayoral precept arrangements. As we raised in Committee, it is important to ensure value for money and that a mayoral precept is used not to compensate for cuts in government funding but to support delivery for an area. Additional responsibilities should not be placed on local authorities without adequate funding.

On Amendment 77, as was said in Committee, these precept arrangements were only recently and carefully set out in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 as a result of many long hours of debate in this House. The Minister has explained that these changes will allow mayors to precept for all an authority’s functions. However, stability is important to long-term confidence in local government finance, so we oppose revisiting this framework before the recent changes have had a chance to bed in.

Amendment 78 seeks to bring the precept arrangements in line with the amounts permitted for county councils and unitary authorities. While we accept that a mayoral authority is different from other authorities, this in itself does not justify an exemption from well-understood precept arrangements. In Committee, the Minister said the limit would make the value of a precept insignificant. Does that mean that the Government envisage yet more tax increases?

This brings me to Amendment 79, requiring mayors to explain to the public their reasons for any increases to the precept. This would apply whenever the mayor of a strategic authority sets a precept higher than the one set for the previous financial year. When people are asked to pay more, they deserve to know why, particularly given the current cost of living. To ensure full transparency and that this information is accessible, our amendment requires that a statement be published on the authority’s website, detailing the amount of the increase and explaining the purposes for which the additional revenue is to be used. This cannot be done in hindsight. The statement must be published before or at the same time as the precept is set. Again, engagement with the local community should not be treated as an afterthought. Unless we hear convincing arguments against this amendment, I am minded to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 79.

There is a broader concern that this Bill would enable, intentionally or not, excessive tax increases on local people at a time when they can least afford them. I beg to move.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, for the amendments on precepts. The precept reforms which Amendment 77 seeks to prevent will enable mayors to levy a precept across the full range of an authority’s functions, giving them greater freedom in how they resource and deliver their priorities. I remind noble Lords that mayors have had the statutory ability to issue a precept since 2017, when it was introduced by the then Government. Importantly, it remains entirely for each mayor to decide whether to make use of it.

Under the current framework, any precept that is raised can be spent only on designated mayoral functions, rather than on the full suite of an authority’s responsibilities. This restriction is both arbitrary and unhelpful in practice. It could, for instance, allow investment in transport but not in skills related initiatives. Our intention is to equip mayors with the means to address barriers to growth and improve outcomes for their communities. To do this effectively, they must be able to allocate resources across all functions of the authority, not just a narrow subset.

Amendment 78 would automatically apply council tax referendum principles to strategic authorities. This would unnecessarily restrict mayors’ ability to determine how best to deliver for their residents and local economies. The Secretary of State already has the power to set referendum principles for strategic authorities, if needed. In practice, mayoral precepts are relatively small. If their increases were capped in the same way as council tax, the sums involved would be minimal in most areas, limiting their usefulness for supporting local priorities.

The Government have been clear that any rises in the mayoral precept should remain fair and proportionate. However, imposing the same limits as on councils would reduce local flexibility. This approach cuts across the spirit of the Bill and of devolution more broadly. Our aim is to empower mayors to invest in their communities, strengthen public services and support economic growth. The Government already consult annually on the local government finance settlement, which is the proper mechanism for considering these issues for authorities and taxpayers.

Turning to Amendment 79, as I have noted, the ability to issue a mayoral precept has existed in law since 2017, when it was introduced by the then Government. Whether to introduce a precept is a local decision and would need to be approved through the budget voting process within each combined authority or combined county authority. This includes setting out the precept amount and what it is intended to fund.

It is also worth pointing to the council tax billing requirements. Under the Council Tax (Demand Notices) (England) Regulations 2011, the information supplied with bills must include details of each local authority’s gross expenditure and its council tax requirement. It must also include an explanation of the reasons for the difference between the amounts. Where a mayoral combined or combined county authority issues a precept, it is covered by these provisions. This ensures residents can see both the amount of the mayoral precept and what it is funding. This information is also published on websites and if the taxpayer requires it, they can have it in a hard copy. As such, the system already builds in a statutory requirement for transparency and justification.

For the reasons I have set out, the Government cannot support the amendments in this group, and I ask noble Lords not to press them.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his response. However, we believe that there needs to be greater transparency in the approach to local taxation, to encourage not just accountability for financial decisions but also public trust. Therefore, if the Government do not wish to press ahead with their changes to their precept arrangements, I will focus on Amendment 79. This amendment is not asking for much. It reflects the simple expectation that any increases to taxation by the mayor are explained transparently and are accessible to the members of the public they serve. This requirement will support, not obstruct, good decision-making and management of local government finance. Therefore, on this amendment I will test the opinion of the House. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 77.

Amendment 77 withdrawn.

Amendment 78 not moved.

Amendment 79

Moved by

[Lord Jamieson]

79: After Clause 11, insert the following new Clause—
“Duty to publish statement on increase of mayoral precept(1) Where the mayor of a strategic authority sets a precept which is higher than the precept set for the previous financial year, the mayor must publish a statement explaining the reasons for the increase.(2) A statement under subsection (1) must—(a) be published on the authority’s website,(b) set out the amount of the increase, and(c) explain the purposes for which the additional revenue is to be used.(3) The statement must be published before, or at the same time as, the precept is set.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires mayors to explain to the public their reasons for any increases to the precept.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.

20:53

Division 5

Amendment 79 disagreed.

Ayes: 70

Noes: 132

21:03

Amendment 80

Moved by

[Lord Jamieson]

80: After Clause 12, insert the following new Clause—
“Report on the exercise of powers to borrow(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the exercise of powers to borrow money by strategic authorities.(2) This report must include an assessment of the ability of specific authorities to meet the debts incurred.(3) Copies of that report must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the exercise of powers to borrow money by strategic authorities and their ability to repay the debts incurred.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, this new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the exercise of powers to borrow money by strategic authorities and their ability to repay the debts incurred. I thank the Minister for her correspondence on powers to borrow after this was debated in Committee. As the previous group focused on precepts, we felt it worth discussing powers to borrow in isolation.

In Committee, we asked one key question: who, in effect, is the guarantor in the event that an authority cannot pay back its borrowing? I appreciate the Minister’s clarification that constituent councils will not be held liable for debts incurred by the authority. However, this is an important area that requires thorough oversight, which is why we tabled Amendment 80 to require the Secretary of State to report on the exercise of powers to borrow money by the strategic authorities and their ability to repay debts incurred. Surely one of the aims of the Government’s plans is to put local government on a stable and sustainable financial footing.

To be clear, we do not object to the ability of authorities to borrow money, but we do think that the Secretary of State and, crucially, Parliament should be aware of the facts. This report would be published, copies would be placed before both Houses of Parliament annually, and it would include an assessment of the ability of specific authorities to meet the debts incurred. This would give Parliament oversight of how much debt has been incurred by specific authorities across the country, as well as their ability to repay that debt. The information could then inform future debates and decision-making about the health of local government finances, and it would no doubt be of use to Secretaries of State themselves. I hope the Government will give this amendment their consideration.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, on this matter, which I have raised on a number of occasions in your Lordships’ House because I have never been clear about who will actually pick up an overspend when one exists. So this partly about the ability to repay debts incurred and partly about who is actually responsible. In other words, are council tax payers of the constituent authorities liable to help to repay debt?

My understanding is that the scrutiny function can now stop this happening in the first place. In other words, one of my concerns about the failure of the scrutiny system has been that it would not be certain that a scrutiny committee would prevent bad financial investment decisions. But what the Government have done by introducing further amendments makes it possible for the overview and scrutiny function to work effectively in that respect.

So I hope the Minister will clarify those matters. I am worried about who is liable for debt and about who is able to authorise substantial expenditure without certainty that a debt can be repaid. But, in the end, will the scrutiny function the Government have now introduced actually prevent the problems the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, has identified?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, for this amendment, requiring the Secretary of State to report on strategic authorities’ exercise of powers to borrow money. I recognise that this is a well-intentioned and well-reasoned amendment, but I do not believe the provision is necessary. Like the rest of local government, combined authorities and combined county authorities must operate within the prudential framework. This comprises statutory duties and codes intended to ensure that all borrowing and investment is prudent, affordable and sustainable. The framework already provides robust oversight and accountability. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, that pre-scrutiny of key decisions by local accounts committees will also help.

In addition, this amendment contradicts the Bill’s aim of furthering devolution and increasing financial autonomy for these authorities, because it would shift reporting requirements up to central government. For these reasons, the proposed amendment is burdensome and duplicative, and I ask that it be withdrawn.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

I just have a quick question before I make my closing speech. Local authorities are required to have a Section 151 officer. Will the strategic authority be required to have one?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I do not want to give a definitive answer to that from the Dispatch Box, but I think the answer is yes—it would certainly be in accordance with local government accounting procedures and practice for anybody involved in spending local government finance to have the professional assistance of a Section 151 officer. I will reply in further detail to the noble Lord.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the Minister’s response on this matter and her continued engagement since Committee. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for his comments.

We will not push this further beyond reminding the House that this is an aspect of local government finance that deserves continued scrutiny and oversight to ensure that authorities can repay the debts incurred through their powers to borrow. I thank noble Lords for their valuable contributions on this first day on Report and thank the Minister for her responses. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 80 withdrawn.

Consideration on Report adjourned.