English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debate20:53 - Division on Amendment 79 - Ayes: 70 / Noes: 132 - Amendment 79 disagreed.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments raises important issues concerning accountability and transparency within our evolving system of devolved governance. Amendments 49, 95 and 96 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, engage with the central principle that, where power is exercised, it should be subject to effective and visible scrutiny. I am sure that all noble Lords agree with that principle. These amendments would ensure that it extends directly to elected mayors.
Amendment 49 proposes dedicated scrutiny committees with powers to summons and to report. This reflects a desire to ensure that mayoral commissioners are properly held to account. Amendments 95 and 96 similarly seek to strengthen direct lines of accountability, whether through public-facing forums such as the People’s Question Time in London, which we have heard about, or through structured engagement with elected members of constituent authorities. We recognise the intent behind these proposals, particularly the effort to align arrangements more closely with established practices, as we have heard about on the Mayor of London.
Government Amendments 67 and 68 introduce substantial new schedules at a very late stage in the Bill. They set out an extensive and detailed framework for overview and scrutiny committees in mayoral combined county authorities. While the aim to strengthen scrutiny is clearly welcome, the scale and complexity of these provisions inevitably raise a number of questions that merit careful consideration. It is regrettable that this has been tabled at such a late stage in the parliamentary process of the Bill’s passage.
The proposed role for independent or external experts on scrutiny committees is notable. It would be helpful to understand more clearly who these individuals might be, how they are to be appointed and how their independence will be defined and safeguarded. Questions also arise as to whether there is sufficient capacity and expertise available across the country to support this model in practice. I look to the Minister for a response on these matters.
Further, there are important practical considerations about how members of these committees are to be appointed, the role of elected councillors within them and the extent to which their proceedings and findings will be made publicly accessible. The mechanisms by which members of the public can raise issues and engage with the scrutiny process are also of clear importance. There is perhaps a broader question as to whether lessons might be drawn from existing models, including the arrangements that have been in place for some time in Greater London for the scrutiny of directly elected mayors.
Finally, Amendment 182 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, raises the interesting proposal of local public accounts committees. We believe that the principles of strengthening financial oversight and cross-agency accountability are important, although the precise design and implications of such bodies, as we heard from the noble Lord, would clearly require careful thought and planning. Therefore, I very much look forward to the Minister’s response on this proposition.
This group highlights the central importance of scrutiny within any system of devolved governance. I look forward to the Minister addressing how the Government intend to ensure that these new structures are both effective in practice and clearly understood by those they are intended to serve.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Baroness Taylor of Stevenage) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Bichard and Lord Shipley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, for their amendments on scrutiny and accountability. These have been recurring themes during debates on the Bill. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott and Lady Pinnock, and the noble Lords, Lord Jamieson and Lord Wallace, for their contributions to these discussions. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Bichard and Lord Bassam, for their very constructive engagement and the insights they have shared with me on this issue. While I appreciate the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, on the late introduction of these amendments, I felt that our discussions on scrutiny in Committee were too important for us not to respond as a Government.
In the English devolution White Paper, we committed to exploring a local public accounts committee model to provide a vehicle to scrutinise local public spending. This recognised that the powers afforded for local scrutiny were not commensurate to the increased scale of powers and responsibilities devolved to mayoral strategic authorities. Local scrutiny committees will replace overview and scrutiny committees in mayoral combined and combined county authorities, providing an enhanced scrutiny regime with stronger oversight and a broader remit to reflect the scale of mayoral responsibilities, with greater teeth to hold mayors to account.
To answer the points about some of the detail raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, as with the existing system, the chair of the committee must be from a different party from the mayor or be an independent person appointed through an open and fair competition. At least 60% of committee members must be councillors from constituent local authorities, rather than the current requirement that at least half of members must be local councillors. These committees must also reflect the political make-up of the area. They will be able to shape early decision-making and undertake value-for-money assessments across the full scope of a mayoral strategic authority’s work. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, was particularly interested in that ability to shape decision-making before things came before the boards for decision.
The committees will have the power to make recommendations on the quality of decisions and on the use of public funds. They will have the authority to challenge decisions taken by the mayor, commissioners and senior officials and to require attendance and information at evidence sessions. This will also extend to key stakeholders outside the mayoral strategic authority, who will be defined in regulations. Those who fail to comply without reasonable excuse will face a civil penalty, on which further details will be established in regulations.
Member’s explanatory statement
This would be consequential on the amendment to leave out paragraph 5 of the new Schedule 2A that is inserted by Schedule 3 to the Bill.
Member’s explanatory statement
This would enable more than one commissioner to operate in a particular area of competence (by leaving out paragraph 5 of the new Schedule 2A that is inserted by Schedule 3 to the Bill).
Member’s explanatory statement
This would be consequential on the amendment to leave out paragraph 5 of the new Schedule 5BA that is inserted by Schedule 3 to the Bill.
Member’s explanatory statement
This would enable more than one commissioner to operate in a particular area of competence (by leaving out paragraph 5 of the new Schedule 5BA that is inserted by Schedule 3 to the Bill).
“ScheduleMayoral CCAs: overview and scrutiny committeesPart 1New scrutiny regime for CCAs that are established mayoral strategic authoritiesIntroduction
1 LURA 2023 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule.The new scrutiny regime
2 After Schedule 1 insert—“Schedule 1AMayoral CCAs that are EMSAs: overview and scrutiny committees and audit committeeApplication of this Schedule
1 (1) This Schedule applies to a CCA if it is an established mayoral strategic authority.(2) Accordingly, in the following paragraphs of this Schedule— (a) “CCA” means a CCA that is an established mayoral strategic authority;(b) a reference to an overview and scrutiny committee is a reference to such a committee of a CCA that is an established mayoral strategic authority.(3) For provision about the scrutiny of other CCAs, see Schedule 1.Functions of overview and scrutiny committee
2 (1) A CCA must arrange for the appointment by the CCA of one or more committees of the authority (referred to in this Schedule as overview and scrutiny committees).(2) The arrangements must ensure that the CCA’s overview and scrutiny committee has power (or its overview and scrutiny committees have power between them)—(a) to investigate matters of local interest;(b) to make reports or recommendations to the CCA or mayor on matters of local interest.(3) The arrangements must (in particular) ensure that the CCA’s overview and scrutiny committee has power (or its overview and scrutiny committees have power between them)—(a) to make reports or recommendations to the CCA with respect to the discharge of any functions that are the responsibility of the CCA;(b) to make reports or recommendations to the mayor with respect to the discharge of any general functions.(4) The arrangements must (in particular) ensure that the CCA’s overview and scrutiny committee has power (or its overview and scrutiny committees have power between them)—(a) to review or scrutinise decisions made, or other action taken, in connection with the discharge of any functions which are the responsibility of the CCA;(b) to review or scrutinise decisions made, or other action taken, in connection with the discharge by the mayor of any general functions;(c) to review—(i) the policy outcomes which were intended to result from action taken in connection with the discharge of any functions that are the responsibility of the CCA, and(ii) the effectiveness of that action in achieving those outcomes;(d) to review—(i) the policy outcomes which were intended to result from action taken in connection with the discharge by the mayor of any general functions, and(ii) the effectiveness of that action in achieving those outcomes;(5) The arrangements made in accordance with sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) must (in particular) ensure that—(a) where a decision or other action involves expenditure of the CCA, the review or scrutiny of it includes an assessment of value for money;(b) where the discharge of a function involves expenditure of the CCA—(i) any report includes a report on value for money;(ii) where appropriate, recommendations are made in relation to value for money.(6) When assessing value for money, an overview and scrutiny committee must have regard to any guidance issued by a public authority. (7) The power of an overview and scrutiny committee under sub-paragraph (3)(a) or (3)(b) to make reports or recommendations with respect to the discharge of any functions includes power to make recommendations about the way that a function is, or is proposed to be, discharged.(8) The power of an overview and scrutiny committee under sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (4)(b) to review or scrutinise a decision made but not implemented includes—(a) power to direct that a decision is not to be implemented while it is under review or scrutiny by the overview and scrutiny committee, and(b) power—(i) to recommend that the decision be reconsidered, or(ii) to make recommendations about the way that the function is, or is proposed to be, discharged.(9) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA must publish details of how it proposes to exercise its powers in relation to the review and scrutiny of decisions made but not yet implemented and its arrangements in connection with the exercise of those powers.(10) Before complying with sub-paragraph (9) an overview and scrutiny committee must obtain the consent of the CCA to the proposals and arrangements.(11) If—(a) an overview and scrutiny committee makes a recommendation to the CCA or mayor under sub-paragraph (7) or (8)(b), and(b) the CCA or mayor does not intend to give effect to the recommendation (at all or in part),the CCA or mayor must give the committee a written notice of that intention and of the reasons for not giving effect to the recommendation.(12) An overview and scrutiny committee may send a copy of any report or recommendations made by it to any public authority (including the Secretary of State or another Minister of the Crown, or any government department).(13) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA may not discharge any functions other than the functions conferred by or under this Schedule.(14) Any reference in this Schedule to the discharge of any functions includes a reference to the doing of anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of those functions.Overview and scrutiny committees: supplementary provision
3 (1) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA—(a) may appoint one or more sub-committees, and(b) may arrange for the discharge of any of its functions by any such sub-committee.(2) A sub-committee of an overview and scrutiny committee may not discharge any functions other than those conferred on it under sub-paragraph (1)(b).(3) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA may not include a member of the CCA (including the mayor for the CCA’s area or deputy mayor).(4) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA is to be treated as a committee or sub-committee of a principal council for the purposes of Part 5A of the Local Government Act 1972 (access to meetings and documents of certain authorities, committees and sub-committees).(5) Subsections (2) to (5) of section 102 of the Local Government Act 1972 apply to an overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA as they apply to a committee appointed under that section. (6) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA—(a) may require a key person to attend before it to answer questions, and(b) may invite other persons to attend meetings of the committee.(7) An overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA—(a) may require a key person to provide it with information or documents, and(b) may invite other persons to provide it with information or documents.(8) Regulations under paragraph 4(1) may make provision about—(a) information or documents whose provision may, or may not be, required under sub-paragraph (7)(a);(b) information or documents whose provision may, or may not be, invited under sub-paragraph (7)(b).(9) A requirement under sub-paragraph (6)(a) or (7)(a) can only be imposed on a person by written notice given to the person; and the period between the notice being given and the date when the requirement must be complied with must be—(a) 10 working days, or(b) if that period of notice is unreasonably short, such longer period as is reasonable.(10) A person on whom a requirement is imposed under sub-paragraph (6)(a) or (7)(a) is required to comply with the requirement.(11) If—(a) an overview and scrutiny committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(6)(a), required a person to attend a meeting of the committee,(b) the person does not attend the meeting in compliance with the requirement, and(c) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not attending the meeting,the committee must publish notice of the non-attendance in such manner as the committee thinks appropriate and a scrutiny officer of the committee (appointed in accordance with regulations made under 4(2)(d)) must give a copy of the notice to the person who did not attend.(12) For provision about the consequences of a failure to comply with a requirement imposed under sub-paragraph (6) or (7), see paragraphs 7 and 8.(13) A person is not obliged—(a) by sub-paragraph (6) to answer any question which the person would be entitled to refuse to answer in or for the purposes of proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or(b) by sub-paragraph (7) to provide any information which the person would be entitled to refuse to provide in or for the purposes of proceedings in a court in England and Wales.(14) In exercising, or deciding whether to exercise, any of its functions an overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA must have regard to any guidance for the time being issued by the Secretary of State.(15) Guidance under sub-paragraph (14) may make different provision for different cases or for different descriptions of committee.(16) In sub-paragraphs (3) to (14) references to an overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA include references to any sub-committee of such a committee.Power to make further provision about overview and scrutiny committees
4 (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision about overview and scrutiny committees of a CCA. (2) Provision under sub-paragraph (1) may in particular include provision—(a) about the membership of an overview and scrutiny committee and the voting rights of such members;(b) about the payment of allowances to the members of an overview and scrutiny committee;(c) about the person who is to be chair of an overview and scrutiny committee;(d) for the appointment of persons to act as scrutiny officers of an overview and scrutiny committee;(e) about how and by whom matters may be referred to an overview and scrutiny committee;(f) requiring persons (whether members of the CCA or other persons) to respond to reports or recommendations made by an overview and scrutiny committee;(g) about the publication of reports, recommendations or responses;(h) about information which must, or must not, be disclosed to an overview and scrutiny committee (whether by members of the CCA or by other persons);(i) as to the minimum or maximum period for which a direction under paragraph 2(8)(a) may have effect.(3) Provision of the following kinds must be made under sub-paragraph (1)—(a) provision about when and how an overview and scrutiny committee must involve independent experts in its activities;(b) provision about how an overview and scrutiny committee must take account of the work undertaken by the independent experts involved in its activities;(c) provision for the remuneration of independent experts.(4) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (2)(a) so as to ensure that at least 60% of members of an overview and scrutiny committee are members of the CCA’s constituent councils.(5) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (2)(b) so as to ensure that all the members of an overview and scrutiny committee are entitled to be paid allowances in respect of activities of the descriptions specified in regulations under this paragraph.(6) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (2)(c) so as to ensure that the chair of an overview and scrutiny committee is—(a) an independent person (as defined by the regulations), or(b) an appropriate person who is a member of one of the CCA’s constituent councils.(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (6)(b) “appropriate person” means a person who is not a member of a registered political party of which the mayor is a member.(8) In sub-paragraph (2)(d) the reference to a “scrutiny officer” of an overview and scrutiny committee is a reference to a person appointed with the function of—(a) promoting the role of the committee, and(b) providing support and guidance—(i) to the committee and its members, and(ii) to members of the CCA (so far as relating to the functions of the committee).(9) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (2)(d) so as to ensure that an overview and scrutiny committee has at least two scrutiny officers. (10) Provision under sub-paragraph (2)(g) may include provision for descriptions of confidential or exempt information to be excluded from the publication of reports, recommendations or responses.(11) In this paragraph “registered political party” means a party registered under Part 2 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.(12) In this paragraph references to an overview and scrutiny committee include references to any sub-committee of such a committee.Style by which committees to be known
5 (1) The overview and scrutiny committees are to have—(a) the style “local scrutiny committee”, or(b) any other style that is specified in regulations under paragraph 4(1).(2) The specified style may (in particular) be—(a) a variant of “local scrutiny committee”, or(b) “overview and scrutiny committee” or a variant of it.(3) The power under section 252(1) to make different provision for different purposes includes power to specify different styles under this paragraph in relation to overview and scrutiny committees of different descriptions of CCAs.Petitions
6 (1) A CCA must make arrangements (“petition arrangements”) in relation to its overview and scrutiny committee, or each such committee, under which—(a) a local elector is able to start a petition calling upon the committee to exercise its functions in relation to a matter of local interest that is specified in the petition, and(b) other local electors are able to indicate their support for the petition within a period specified in the petition arrangements.(2) Petition arrangements must secure that—(a) a local elector is able to start any petition by electronic means or non-electronic means, and(b) other local electors are able to indicate support for any petition by electronic means or non-electronic means.(3) An overview and scrutiny committee must reject a petition in any of the following cases—(a) the petition is explicitly seeking new or increased expenditure of the CCA;(b) the specified matter is not a matter of local interest;(c) the committee could not exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter without prejudicing civil proceedings or criminal proceedings which have been brought or which, in the view of the committee, are likely to be brought reasonably soon (whether in England and Wales or elsewhere);(d) the petition is offensive, abusive or vexatious.(4) In a case where the number of local electors who are petitioners is at least 0.1% of the total number of local electors, an overview and scrutiny committee must decide whether or not to exercise its functions in relation to the matter of concern to which the petition relates.(5) In any other case, an overview and scrutiny committee may decide whether or not to exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter to which the petition relates. (6) In deciding whether or not to exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter to which a petition relates, an overview and scrutiny committee must (in particular) take into account the effective use of the committee’s time and resources.(7) Within the period of 30 days beginning with the day on which an overview and scrutiny committee makes a relevant decision about a petition, the committee must—(a) publish written notice of the following matters—(i) the relevant decision;(ii) the reasons for making the relevant decision;(iii) how the committee proposes to exercise its functions (in the case of a relevant decision to exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter to which the petition relates); and(b) give written notice of those matters to the person who started the petition.(8) Regulations under paragraph 4(1) may make provision about petition arrangements and petitions, including—(a) provision about grounds on which an overview and scrutiny committee must or may make a relevant decision about a petition;(b) provision about matters which must or may be taken into account in making a relevant decision about a petition;(c) provision for an overview and scrutiny committee to be able to combine petitions relating to similar specified matters;(d) provision about verifying whether persons are local electors;(e) provision about whether the number of local electors who are petitioners is at least 0.1% of the total number of local electors;(9) In this paragraph—“local elector” , in relation to a petition, means a person who would be entitled to vote as an elector at an election for the return of a mayor for the area of the CCA concerned;“petitioner” means a local elector who has—(a) started a petition, or(b) indicated support for a petition,in accordance with the petition arrangements;“relevant decision about a petition” means—(a) a decision by an overview and scrutiny committee to reject a petition, or(b) a decision by an overview and scrutiny committee whether or not to exercise its functions in relation to the specified matter to which a petition relates;“specified matter” means the matter that is specified in a petition in accordance with the petition arrangements.Financial penalties for failure to attend committee meetings, answer questions or provide information etc
7 (1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, give overview and scrutiny committees the power to impose a civil penalty on—(a) a person who fails to attend an overview and scrutiny committee meeting;(b) a person who fails to answer a question put at an overview and scrutiny committee meeting;(c) a person who fails to provide an overview and scrutiny committee with information or a document;(d) a person who misleads an overview and scrutiny committee. (2) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person fails to attend an overview and scrutiny committee meeting if—(a) the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(6)(a), required the person to attend the meeting,(b) the person does not attend the meeting, and(c) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not attending the meeting.(3) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person fails to answer a question put at an overview and scrutiny committee meeting if—(a) the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(6)(a), required the person to attend the meeting,(b) the question is properly put to the person at the meeting,(c) the person does not answer the question, and(d) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not answering the question.(4) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person fails to provide an overview and scrutiny committee meeting with information or a document if—(a) the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(7)(a), required the person to provide the information or document,(b) the person does not provide the information or document, and(c) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not providing the information or document.(5) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person misleads an overview and scrutiny committee meeting if—(a) the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(7)(a), required the person to provide information or a document, and(b) the person intentionally alters, suppresses, conceals or destroys the information or document.(6) Regulations under this paragraph—(a) must provide for the amount or maximum amount of a civil penalty — and such an amount or maximum must not exceed £5,000;(b) may provide for the power to impose a civil penalty to be exercisable only in relation to persons of a description specified in the regulations; and such a description of person may (in particular) consist of all or any of the following—(i) mayors for the areas of CCAs;(ii) deputy mayors appointed by such mayors;(iii) commissioners appointed by such mayors;(c) must make provision for appeals against the imposition of civil penalties (which may include provision enabling a civil penalty to be confirmed, withdrawn or varied in its amount on an appeal).(7) In order to take account of changes in the value of money, the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for the sum for the time being specified in sub-paragraph (6)(a).Termination of office for failure to attend committee meetings
8 (1) This paragraph applies to a person who holds one of the following offices in relation to a CCA (the “relevant CCA”)—(a) mayor for the area of the relevant CCA;(b) deputy mayor appointed by such a mayor;(c) commissioner appointed by such a mayor. (2) The person ceases to hold the office if—(a) the person fails to attend six overview and scrutiny committee meetings (the “six missed meetings”), and(b) there is the required link between the six missed meetings.(3) The person who holds the office fails to attend an overview and scrutiny committee meeting if—(a) the committee is a committee of the relevant CCA,(b) the meeting is a compulsory meeting for the person as holder of that office,(c) the person does not attend the meeting, and(d) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for not attending the meeting.(4) There is the required link between the six missed meetings if—(a) the six missed meetings are consecutive overview and scrutiny committee meetings that are compulsory meetings for the person as holder of the office, or(b) the period between the first and last of those six missed meetings is 12 months or shorter.(5) In determining whether there is the required link by virtue of sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b)—(a) it does not matter if the six missed meetings are meetings of the same committee, or different committees, of the CCA;(b) it does not matter if there are any meetings of an overview and scrutiny committee that—(i) fall between the first and last of the six missed meetings, and(ii) are not compulsory meetings for the person as holder of the office.(6) If a person ceases to hold office by virtue of this section—(a) the CCA’s monitoring officer (within the meaning of section 5 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989) must—(i) publish notice that the person has ceased to hold office in such manner as the monitoring officer thinks appropriate, and(ii) give a copy of the notice to the person who has ceased to hold office;(b) the person ceases to hold office at the end of the day of the last of the six missed meetings.(7) If a notice given under paragraph 3(11) of a person’s non-attendance at a meeting of an overview and scrutiny committee relates to the last of the six missed meetings that result in the person’s loss of office by virtue of this paragraph, the notice must include a statement of that fact.(8) If a person ceases to hold an office by virtue of this section, that loss of office does not prevent that person from subsequently—(a) taking that office again, or(b) taking any other office referred to in sub-paragraph (1).(9) An overview and scrutiny committee meeting is a “compulsory meeting” for a person if the committee has, in accordance with paragraph 3(6)(a), required that person to attend the meeting.(10) This paragraph applies to a commissioner whether appointed—(a) under a worker’s contract,(b) under a contract other than a worker’s contract, or(c) otherwise than under a contract; and references to the office of commissioner (including holding office) are to be read accordingly in the case of a commissioner appointed under a contract.Audit committees
9 (1) A CCA must arrange for the appointment by the CCA of an audit committee.(2) The functions of the audit committee are to include—(a) reviewing and scrutinising the CCA’s financial affairs,(b) reviewing and assessing the CCA’s risk management, internal control and corporate governance arrangements,(c) reviewing and assessing the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which resources have been used in discharging the CCA’s functions, and(d) making reports and recommendations to the CCA in relation to reviews conducted under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c).(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—(a) the membership of a CCA’s audit committee;(b) the appointment of the members;(c) the payment of allowances to members of the committee who are members of a constituent council.(4) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (3) so as to ensure that at least one member of an audit committee is an independent person (as defined by the regulations).Interpretation
10 In this Schedule—“commissioner” means a commissioner appointed under section 29A;“key person” , in relation to an overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA, means—(a) the mayor for the area of the CCA;(b) the deputy mayor for that area;(c) a commissioner appointed by the mayor for that area;(d) the officers of the CCA;(e) a member of the CCA who has responsibilities in relation to a particular area of policy;(f) a person of any other description that is specified in regulations;“matter of local interest” , in relation to an overview and scrutiny committee of a CCA, means a matter which both—(a) relates to the area of the CCA, and(b) relates—(i) to functions that are the responsibility of the CCA (whether exercisable by the CCA or the mayor), or(ii) otherwise to any aspect of any area of competence set out in section 2 of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026;but it does not include any matters which relate to the functions of police and crime commissioners;“value for money” means the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the expenditure of the CCA.”Part 2Amendments consequential on Part 1 of this ScheduleIntroduction
3 LURA 2023 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule.Section 15: overview and scrutiny committees
4 (1) Section 15 is amended in accordance with this paragraph. (2) In subsection (1), after“CCAs”insert“that are not established mayoral strategic authorities”.(3) After subsection (1) insert—“(1A) Schedule 1A makes provision for CCAs that are established mayoral strategic authorities to have overview and scrutiny committees and audit committees.”(4) In subsection (2), for “that Schedule” substitute “those Schedules”.(5) After subsection (2) insert—“(3) In this section and Schedules 1 and 1A “established mayoral strategic authority” has the same meaning as in the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026 (see section 1(6)(b) of that Act).”Section 29: deputy mayors
5 In section 29(3)—(a) in paragraph (b), omit “or”;(b) in paragraph (c), at the end insert“, or(d) the person ceases to be deputy mayor by virtue of paragraph 8 of Schedule 1A.”Schedule 1: overview and scrutiny committees
6 (1) Schedule 1 is amended in accordance with this paragraph.(2) In the heading, after “Authorities” insert “except EMSAs”.(3) Before paragraph 1 (and the italic heading preceding it) insert—“Application of this Schedule
A1 (1) This Schedule applies to a CCA if it is not an established mayoral strategic authority.(2) Accordingly, in the following provisions of this Schedule—(a) “CCA” means a CCA that is not an established mayoral strategic authority;(b) a reference to an overview and scrutiny committee is a reference to such a committee of a CCA that is not an established mayoral strategic authority.(3) For provision about the scrutiny of CCAs that are established mayoral strategic authorities, see Schedule 1A.”(4) After paragraph 3 insert—“Style by which committees to be known
3A (1) Regulations under paragraph 3(1) may (in particular) specify the style which the overview and scrutiny committees of CCAs are to have.(2) The specified style may (in particular) be a variant of “overview and scrutiny committee”.(3) The power under section 252(1) to make different provision for different purposes includes power to specify different styles under this paragraph in relation to different descriptions of CCAs.”Schedule 2: election of Mayors of CCAs etc
7 In Schedule 2, after paragraph 11 insert—“Failure to attend meetings of overview and scrutiny committee: loss of office
11A Paragraph 8 of Schedule 1A makes provision for a person’s term of office as mayor to end because of repeated failure to attend meetings of an overview and scrutiny committee.” Schedule 2A: commissioners
8 In Schedule 2A (inserted by Schedule 3 to this Act), in paragraph 9—(a) in paragraph (d), omit “or”;(b) after paragraph (d) insert“, or(da) the person ceases to be a commissioner by virtue of paragraph 8 of Schedule 1A, or”Part 3Extension of new scrutiny regime to all mayoral CCAsIntroduction
9 LURA 2023 is amended in accordance with this Part of this Schedule.Amendment of section 15
10 (1) Section 15 (as amended by paragraph 4 of this Schedule) is amended in accordance with this paragraph.(2) In subsection (1), for“CCAs that are not established mayoral strategic authorities”substitute“non-mayoral CCAs”.(3) In subsection (1A), for“CCAs that are established mayoral strategic authorities”substitute“mayoral CCAs”.(4) Omit subsection (3).Exclusion of all mayoral CCAs from scrutiny regime in Schedule 1 LURA 2023
11 (1) Schedule 1 (as amended by paragraph 6 of this Schedule) is amended in accordance with this paragraph.(2) In the heading, for “Combined County Authorities except EMSAs” substitute “Non-mayoral Combined County Authorities”.(3) For paragraph A1 substitute—A1 “(1) This Schedule applies to a non-mayoral CCA.(2) Accordingly, in this Schedule “CCA” means only a non-mayoral CCA.(3) For provision about the scrutiny of mayoral CCAs, see Schedule 1A.”(4) In paragraph 1 (functions of overview and scrutiny committees)—(a) omit sub-paragraph (3);(b) in sub-paragraph (4), omit “and (3)(a)”.(5) In paragraph 2 (overview and scrutiny committees: supplementary provision)—(a) in sub-paragraph (3), omit “(including, in the case of a mayoral CCA, the mayor for the CCA's area or deputy mayor)”;(b) in sub-paragraph (6)(a), omit “(including, in the case of a mayoral CCA, the mayor for the CCA's area and deputy mayor)”.(6) In paragraph 3 (power to make further provision about overview and scrutiny committees), for sub-paragraph (5) substitute—“(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(b) “appropriate person” means a person who is not a member of the registered political party which has the most representatives among the members of the constituent councils (or, if there is no such party because two or more parties have the same number of representatives, is not a member of any of those parties).” Inclusion of all mayoral CCAs in the new scrutiny regime
12 (1) Schedule 1A (as inserted by paragraph 2 of this Schedule) is amended in accordance with this paragraph.(2) In the heading, for “CCAs that are established mayoral strategic authorities” substitute “Mayoral CCAs”.(3) For paragraph A1 substitute—A1 “(1) This Schedule applies to a mayoral CCA.(2) Accordingly, in the following provisions of this Schedule—(a) “CCA” means a mayoral CCA;(b) a reference to an overview and scrutiny committee is a reference to such a committee of a mayoral CCA.(3) For provision about the scrutiny of non-mayoral CCAs, see Schedule 1.””
Baroness Scott of Bybrook
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that reports on allowances are published quarterly.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group, all of which are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Jamieson, relate to Clause 10 and the reporting of allowances within combined county authorities. These amendments are straightforward but they address an important principle: transparency and the use of public money.
The amendments seek to do three things: first, to ensure that reports on allowances are published on a quarterly basis; secondly, to require that those reports include not only the amounts paid but the evidence submitted by members, particularly those with special responsibilities; and, thirdly, to ensure that such reports are published online and are readily accessible to the public. None of these proposals is onerous; nor do they seek to disrupt the functioning of combined authorities. Rather, they aim to strengthen public confidence by ensuring that decisions about remuneration are open, visible and properly evidenced.
Public trust in local institutions depends not only on decisions that they are taking but on how transparently those decisions are made. If allowances are justified, why should the evidence supporting them not be published alongside the figures? Indeed, why should such information not be in the public domain as a matter of course? These amendments also reflect the evolving role of combined authorities. As they take on greater responsibilities and greater public funding, so too must they meet higher expectations of accountability. With increased power must come increased transparency. Is it not reasonable to expect that information on the use of public funds is not published routinely rather than intermittently? Should that information not include the justification for payments made by those in positions of additional responsibility?
I anticipate that it may be argued that existing arrangements are sufficient or that flexibility is required, but if the current system already delivers transparency, what objection can there be to making it clearer, more regular and more accessible? If it does not already do this, should we not take this opportunity to strengthen it?
These amendments go to the heart of accountability. If we are to entrust combined authorities with significant powers and resources, we must also ensure that they are subject to consistent, visible and robust scrutiny. I beg to move.
Lord Shipley (LD)
My Lords, it seems to me that all the amendments in this group would amount to good practice; this is what should happen. I hope the Minister will confirm that the amendments are agreeable.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her Amendments 69 to 74. While I recognise her commitment to accountability in local government, the Bill provides that combined and combined county authorities and independent remuneration panels must take account of any guidance issued by the Secretary of State for this clause.
That guidance will be issued in due course and will provide further details on the matters raised in these amendments. None the less, on the principles raised, I agree with the noble Baroness’s point about transparency. We will seek to be pragmatic, ensuring that we balance clear accountability and transparency against overburdening the authorities in their reporting arrangements. I therefore ask that the noble Baroness withdraws Amendment 69.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
We have heard from the Minister that the functions may already exist to provide a degree of oversight. However, the question before us is not simply whether information is recorded; rather, it is whether that information is made very visible, accessible and consistently available to the public.
These amendments do not seek to impose unnecessary burdens. They set out a reasonable expectation that reporting should be regular, transparent and accessible; in short, that it should meet the standards that the public are entitled to expect. This is not about questioning the integrity of those involved. It is about ensuring that the systems within which they operate command public confidence, and that confidence rests on transparency.
I listened to the Minister. We will wait until the guidance comes out to ensure that it reflects what we think the public deserve. At this point, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
This provision is about combined authorities, and so this amendment would correct the reference to “CCA” that appears here.
“Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs: overview and scrutiny committees(1) Schedule (Mayoral CCAs: overview and scrutiny committees) changes the system of overview and scrutiny committees for mayoral CCAs. (2) Schedule (Mayoral combined authorities: overview and scrutiny committees) changes the system of overview and scrutiny committees for mayoral combined authorities.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would introduce the new Schedules about overview and scrutiny committees of mayoral CCAs and combined authorities (which would be inserted after Schedule 3 by other amendments in my name).
Lord Shipley (LD)
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, on this matter, which I have raised on a number of occasions in your Lordships’ House because I have never been clear about who will actually pick up an overspend when one exists. So this partly about the ability to repay debts incurred and partly about who is actually responsible. In other words, are council tax payers of the constituent authorities liable to help to repay debt?
My understanding is that the scrutiny function can now stop this happening in the first place. In other words, one of my concerns about the failure of the scrutiny system has been that it would not be certain that a scrutiny committee would prevent bad financial investment decisions. But what the Government have done by introducing further amendments makes it possible for the overview and scrutiny function to work effectively in that respect.
So I hope the Minister will clarify those matters. I am worried about who is liable for debt and about who is able to authorise substantial expenditure without certainty that a debt can be repaid. But, in the end, will the scrutiny function the Government have now introduced actually prevent the problems the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, has identified?
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, for this amendment, requiring the Secretary of State to report on strategic authorities’ exercise of powers to borrow money. I recognise that this is a well-intentioned and well-reasoned amendment, but I do not believe the provision is necessary. Like the rest of local government, combined authorities and combined county authorities must operate within the prudential framework. This comprises statutory duties and codes intended to ensure that all borrowing and investment is prudent, affordable and sustainable. The framework already provides robust oversight and accountability. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, that pre-scrutiny of key decisions by local accounts committees will also help.
In addition, this amendment contradicts the Bill’s aim of furthering devolution and increasing financial autonomy for these authorities, because it would shift reporting requirements up to central government. For these reasons, the proposed amendment is burdensome and duplicative, and I ask that it be withdrawn.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
I just have a quick question before I make my closing speech. Local authorities are required to have a Section 151 officer. Will the strategic authority be required to have one?
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
I do not want to give a definitive answer to that from the Dispatch Box, but I think the answer is yes—it would certainly be in accordance with local government accounting procedures and practice for anybody involved in spending local government finance to have the professional assistance of a Section 151 officer. I will reply in further detail to the noble Lord.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful for the Minister’s response on this matter and her continued engagement since Committee. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for his comments.
We will not push this further beyond reminding the House that this is an aspect of local government finance that deserves continued scrutiny and oversight to ensure that authorities can repay the debts incurred through their powers to borrow. I thank noble Lords for their valuable contributions on this first day on Report and thank the Minister for her responses. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.