Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill

Lord Shipley Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 27th February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 66 I will speak also to a number of amendments in this group in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Taylor of Stevenage.

Amendment 66 would require an environmental impact assessment to be published following the establishment of a CCA. We have heard in previous debates that the Bill will create a new model of combined authority through county deals, which will provide local leaders with powers to enhance local accountability, join up services and provide transparent decision-making to rejuvenate their communities. Although this is clearly an excellent ambition, previous debates have also demonstrated that there are many unknowns about how things are going to happen, particularly in a practical way, and what the impacts will be.

An environmental impact assessment would ensure that the likely environmental effects of any decisions are fully understood and then properly considered. An EIA would assess the direct and indirect impact based on a wide range of environmental factors—and it is a wide range, which is why an EIA must be considered and published. It could cover population and human health, biodiversity, land and soil, water, air, climate, landscape, material assets and cultural heritage. There is a lot here to be thought about. It is important, particularly given that we do not believe, as others have said in the previous debates around emissions, that the environment has been properly considered as one of the missions; it is not properly built upon throughout the Bill.

Amendment 74, tabled by my noble friend Lady Taylor of Stevenage, asks the Government to define and clarify the purpose of non-constituent members under Clauses 9 and 10, which relate to the appointment of the non-constituent and associate members of a CCA respectively. Our concern is that it is not clear whether there is to be any further guidance on whether certain types of non-constituent or associate members will be prescribed by the Secretary of State or recommended in further guidance, or whether it is entirely for the CCA to determine this class of membership according to what it believes local needs to be; for example, whether an ICS or a hospital trust is invited—because a major priority is to tackle health inequalities—or whether it is felt to be important locally that the local enterprise partnership be a non-constituent member to make a link with economic growth. Clarification on that from the Minister would be very helpful.

We have concerns that Clauses 9 and 10 appear to be qualified by Clause 11, which gives significant powers to the Secretary of State to make regulations in relation to non-constituent members. These include the number of non-constituent members; the appointment, disqualification and resignation, or even removal, of non-constituent members; the appointment of a substitute member to act in place of a constituent member; the maximum number of non-constituent members; and the things that may or may not be done by a non-constituent member. There are also equivalent Secretary of State powers relating to associate members. A circumstance could be imagined where, if the Secretary of State took such powers, the outcomes could end up being the exact opposite of the localism and devolution that the Bill purports to enshrine.

That is our big concern with these clauses, and why the amendment seeks clarification and further definition relating to the role of non-constituent and associate constituent members of the CCA. It is important to understand this properly. We do not want any part of the Bill to start pulling powers back centrally when the Government appear to want the exact opposite.

Amendment 76 in my name carries on from this. It would mean that a CCA could request that regulations are introduced in relation to it. Again, it is about the control that the CCA itself has when looking at regulations and at how it needs to operate and behave effectively for its local community, rather than everything being driven centrally by the Secretary of State.

Amendment 86, from my noble friend Lady Taylor, means that an annual statement must be published to show how much funding is given to each CCA. This should include a cost-benefit analysis. We have talked a lot about funding today and last week. It is a critical central part of achieving success from these clauses and the proposed devolution for England.

Clause 14 specifies the process by which the Secretary of State may draw up regulations for the funding and costs of a CCA to be met by its constituent councils, and how that amount payable will then be determined. While the clause specifies that this has to be done with the consent of constituent councils and the CCA, it does not tell us how any additional funding that may be provided by the Secretary of State, for example through the different competitive bidding pots that exist or any grants that may be given, will be included in the accountability process for the CCA. Clarification around that would be very helpful.

We also cannot ascertain from the clause how the overview and scrutiny committee—or the general public, for that matter—would be able to determine by cost-benefit analysis just how effective, with the funding being contributed to it, the CCA is at then delivering against its objectives for the area. We believe that our amendment provides a simple, straightforward way to provide that accountability through an annually published statement.

Amendment 100 in Clause 23, in the name of my noble friend Lady Taylor, would require the Secretary of State to explain how a local government area will, in future, have access to the powers that it has lost through removal from a CCA. My noble friend referred to this earlier. If the Secretary of State exercises the powers set out in Clause 23 to change the boundary of a CCA and remove a local government area from the existing area of the CCA, they can either transfer those functions to another public authority or remove a particular function of the CCA altogether for that area. While there is provision that the relevant councils must consent to this removal, there is nothing in the Bill as it stands that requires the Secretary of State to specify how any powers or functions will be delivered in future once that membership of the CCA has been terminated. So, again, it would be very helpful if the Minister were able to explain how that would move forward.

Clause 23(8) refers to consent being required from only the county council and not from any district councils that may be constituent members. My noble friend spoke earlier about the important role that district councils should play. They should not be seen just as a stakeholder, a secondary authority that does not have a say in such matters. This would mean that, in effect, an area could be removed from the CCA with the consent of only the county council but not of the constituent district councils that make up the area of the CCA being removed from its boundary. Surely they should have some kind of say in this. Is this what the Bill is intending or is this an oversight? If it is what the Bill is intended to do, would the consent vote required in Clause 23(9) specifically exclude the votes of district council members of the CCA? This is a really important area that we need to clarify.

Amendment 129, again in the name of my noble friend Lady Taylor of Stevenage, would require the Secretary of State to produce guidance on the establishment and operation of CCAs within six months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. The current clause simply states that the Secretary of State,

“may give guidance about anything that could be done”

in relation to this chapter. Well, in view of the fundamental changes to the structure of local government that this chapter on CCAs is introducing, we believe that that is far too vague, and very likely to leave local government with a cloud of uncertainty hanging over it. In view of the fact that there have already been many iterations of the devolution agenda in recent years, we do not believe that it is unreasonable to expect that the Government will work with the sector in order to have, very quickly, clear and detailed guidance in relation to the establishment and the operation of CCAs as soon as possible after Royal Assent. That is why we have asked for this to happen within six months.

I turn finally to Amendment 130, which aims to probe whether the public will be informed of their CCA’s functions. With this amendment, we want to determine whether the Secretary of State will be responsible for setting out the purpose and aims of the CCAs, and how they are to be established and operated; or whether that responsibility will fall to local government. If the latter is the case, will there be new burdens that will require funding in relation to the communications aspects of informing the public about the functions of a CCA? Will any such new burdens extend to any public consultation funding? This may well be required when an area decides to proceed with the establishment of a CCA. We discussed consultation a lot in the last group but one, and the Minister seemed to believe that there was going to be support for any new burdens—so, again, clarification on that would be very welcome. With that, I beg to move.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I want to give very substantial support to what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, has said. She has made several very powerful points. I hope that the Minister will be able to respond to those, because I am as concerned as the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman and Lady Taylor, are about some of these issues. Some of what I want to say I will cover in the next group, so I will try to avoid getting on to the issue of voting powers.

It really is very telling. Amendment 74, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Stevenage, says:

“Within 30 days of this Act receiving Royal Assent, a Minister of the Crown must publish a statement including a definition of ‘non-constituent member’ and a description of their purpose”.


If I may be so bold, I think that is really late. I had expected that we would have this before Report. With the concept of an associate member and the concept of a non-constituent member, I really think that, before this Bill gets any further, we have to understand what the Government are thinking of with those definitions. We can all hazard a guess. I can hazard a guess. Some things have been said and occasionally written, but we have to do better than this.

On page 10 of the Bill, in Clause 11, the Secretary of State is going to make provision by regulations for a whole set of matters about membership. Then, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, rightly identified, it is almost a whole side of the Bill which includes provisions on just about anything you could think of. I am at a loss to understand why these matters are not public at this stage in the consideration of a Bill.

Clause 11(4), “Regulations about members”, says:

“In this section ‘constituent member’, in relation to a CCA, means a member of the CCA (other than any mayor for the area of the CCA) appointed by a constituent council.”


I am sure that is correct, but that is the only definition we have. We have no definition of an associate member or a non-constituent member. Yet, as we will discover in the debate on the next set of amendments, the CCA will have discretion to give those people full votes. There is a big issue here, and I intend to take it further when we get to Report.

All I am trying to do is to support the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, and say to the Government: here we have a number of very serious proposals that, as they stand, are unacceptable.

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[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am going to lose my voice at this rate. I will introduce my amendments in this group and briefly comment on those in the names of other noble Lords.

My Amendment 67 to Clause 8 means that regulations can relate only to the initial constitutional arrangements, and my Amendment 68 means that the regulations relating to the constitutional arrangements of a CCA can be made only after consultation with the CCA. Clause 8 allows the Secretary of State to establish constitutional arrangements, and we do not have a problem with that at all. These are defined as

“membership ... voting powers ... executive arrangements”

and

“functions of any executive body”.

The executive arrangements include government appointments, the functions by which the executive operates, the functions of the executive that might be delegated to the committee, the “review and scrutiny” of the executive, “access to information” about the executive and the disapplication of Section 15 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989—plus the keeping of records. These are important aspects of establishing who will be on a CCA, where decisions will be made and what will and will not be in the public domain.

We believe that, once the Secretary of State sets up the bodies, they really ought to be allowed to get on with the job without undue interference. We believe that we should be able to trust them to exercise the significant power and money functions that will be devolved to them from the centre by this clause. So, if we trust them to do that, we should also trust them to be able to operate their own constitutional arrangements.

My Amendment 67 would insert the word “initial” to demonstrate that the Secretary of State may make provisions about the first set of constitutional arrangements only, and then the CCAs can carry on and do it themselves. Amendment 68 would further ensure that CCAs are consulted on any further regulations that would relate to their constitutional arrangements.

I will speak briefly to my Amendment 88 to Clause 16, which would mean that the

“regulations can only be made with a majority of members of the constituent councils”.

If all the constituent councils are going to feel on a level footing, as it were, with the rest, it is important that they all have that say and that things can change only once there is a majority who actually wants to make that change. It is then more likely to be accepted and moved forward in a constructive manner.

I will comment on a few other amendments. The deletion of the paragraph that the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, has asked for in his Amendment 69

“would reduce the risk of single party control of the executive of a CCA or its committees”.

We strongly agree with the noble Lord on that. It is an important amendment, because the Secretary of State should not be able to make regulations which disapply the political proportionality rules for an executive or committee of a CCA; we believe that that is for the electorate to decide.

We also agree completely with the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, in his Amendment 71, which means that a constituent council can include

“a district council in a two-tier county council for an area within the CCA’s area or proposed area”.

We believe that this is one of a number of places in the Bill where district councils must be allowed to be included as constituent councils in two-tier areas.

The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, has also tabled Amendments 72 and 75, which, again, reduce the risk of one-party dominance. I absolutely understand his point: if you allow voting members to resolve that non-constituent members can vote on a CCA, you could end up with the situation where this class of member is appointed specifically to boost the voting majority of one party. This comes back to us saying earlier that, if you are not careful, you could end up with a situation where things could be manipulated, even if that is not the Government’s intention. We have to be very careful about that, so we strongly support those amendments.

The amendment to Clause 26 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, would require a referendum. I see that she is very keen on referendums today. I am not sure whether this is subject to prior legislation, but I am sure that she can enlighten me. The consultation to which we referred in our amendment in relation to setting up the CCA could carry a requirement that it also determines the nature of that CCA: for example, whether it is to be mayoral-led or indirectly elected, appointed by the CCA. In any case, it is probably good practice to consider a referendum on whether there should be a mayor and whether a CCA is indirectly elected. However, the one concern we have—I am sure that the Minister will refer to this—is the considerable cost of running any referendum; that is the sticking point for us.

Amendment 114, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, ensures that appointments cannot be imposed without scrutiny and without the CCA’s agreement. Again, this is around the appointment of a deputy mayor, in particular. If we assume the current system will continue as it is—that is, where deputy mayors are appointed—I would certainly agree with the noble Lord that this should not be without the scrutiny and agreement of the CCA. The question here is whether a powerful position such as that of deputy mayor should even be appointed in the first place, or whether we should undertake some kind of democratic process for these powerful positions.

Amendment 116A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, seeks to probe the circumstances in which political balance might be inappropriate. This is a very helpful amendment where the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, is seeking to explore the nature of political balance in bodies that exercise joint functions. In effect, these have usually worked without political proportionality being applied, but it would be interesting to hear the Minister’s view on how this might operate going forward.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, has another two amendments. Amendment 120

“would ensure that the CCA is confident that powers being delegated by the deputy mayor are appropriate.”

Sensibly, it seeks to add an extra protection, which we would support—we would not want to see any deputy mayors going rogue, for example. Amendment 122

“would ensure that the views of a majority of the CCA are fully considered”.

Again, we think this is absolutely appropriate. There are important matters that this could cover—for example, the transfer of fire and rescue powers to the chief constable, which is of course a possibility. With that, I beg to move.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I would like first to welcome the offer from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, of a meeting. I suggest that plenty of time be allowed for us to discuss some of the issues that we have been trying to get to the bottom of in our debates so far.

I have six amendments in my name, and they all derive from a first reading of the Bill and the Explanatory Notes. Going back and reading it all again, you realise you actually need to place amendments on these matters. In this group, there are Amendments 69, 72, 75, 114, 120 and 122, and they all have a common theme, which is the centralisation of power and the need for checks and balances in the decision-making process.

Amendment 69 would delete Clause 8(3)(f), which says that

“section 15 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (duty to allocate seats to political groups) in relation to an executive of the CCA or a committee of such an executive”

is disapplied. Therefore, it will not any longer be in place. That says to me that the deletion seems to encourage single-party control of a committee structure of a CCA. I just ask the Minister whether that is wise. It seems to centralise a power to an inner group of the CCA.

There has been a lot of discussion in the last group and then this one about district councils and their rights—clearly the meeting we are going to have will address some of those issues. Amendment 72 is a probing amendment and would prevent non-constituent members of the CCA voting. I say that to draw an explanation of why a non-constituent member of a CCA should have a vote. Why should the non-constituent members of the CCA become voting members? Will they all have a vote, or will it be only some non-constituent members? There is a big issue of principle here. Is it not enough for a non-council-nominating member to be in attendance? It is a simple issue. If you are a full member, you have a vote, and if you have a vote, you must be a full member. In other words, we have to have a discussion about the rights of district councils to be full members and have full votes.

Amendment 75 then addresses the issue of associate members of a CCA having a vote at the discretion of the CCA. I would like the Minister just to explain in what circumstances an associate member would qualify for a full vote. Again, the process could encourage one-party domination, by giving a majority party the right to give a vote to an associate member of their choice—or do I misunderstand? I am very happy to have misunderstood, but I am probing to know what the intention actually is.

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[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments considers various aspects of a combined county authority’s constitution and its day-to-day working. Although I appreciate it is a probing amendment, Amendment 67, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, would remove the ability of the Secretary of State to amend the regulations on the constitution of a combined county authority. These regulations include the membership of the combined county authority, which must be amended if, for example, another area wished to join a CCA. Members of the new area would need to be added to the CCA. If no such change were possible, there could be no change to the make-up of an established combined county authority, regardless of the wishes of the local area. CCAs must retain the flexibility to include a new area or for an area to leave, or to reflect other such changes.

Turning to Amendment 68, I completely agree with the noble Baroness on the need for consultation with combined county authority members on regulations regarding the constitution of a CCA. Clause 44 of the Bill already goes further than this amendment by providing that the consent of all the constituent councils is required if the Secretary of State is to make any such regulations. It is worth my making the point that these clauses should not be read in isolation, but rather in the round.

I noted the noble Baroness’s position that CCAs, once established, should just be allowed to get on with it, without the involvement of or interference by the Secretary of State. I look at the issue from the other perspective. The clause enables constitutional arrangements for a CCA to be established in the regulations that will also establish the CCA. These arrangements are the fundamental working mechanisms of the CCA; they include aspects such as the membership of the CCA. As such, it is appropriate that they are set out in secondary legislation to ensure the establishment of a stable institution with good governance. A CCA can set out its own local constitution or standing orders with additional local working arrangements. This is done locally and does not require secondary legislation. However, the local constitution cannot be allowed to contravene primary or secondary legislation. There has to be consistency, and we believe that this is the right way to ensure that.

Amendment 69, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, would prevent the Secretary of State making provision for the executive of a combined county authority to represent the political make-up of its members. A combined county authority is to be made up of members from each of the constituent councils on a basis agreed by those councils through their consent to the establishing regulations. These regulations will also provide for the make-up of the CCA’s executive. It is essential that the constituent councils can agree together the make-up of the combined county authority’s executive that properly reflects the local political membership of the CCA. This is essential to underpin the collaborative working required to make a CCA work in practice.

The amendment would, in effect, impose on a combined county authority an executive that did not reflect the make-up of CCA members, which could negatively impact on the working of the CCA. It would also place the executive of a combined county authority in a different position from that of either a local authority or a combined authority, neither of which requires political balance.

Amendment 71, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Foster, would enable a two-tier district council to be a constituent member of a combined county authority. As I said, the combined county authority is a new institutional model made up of upper-tier local authorities only. Only two-tier county councils and unitary councils can be constituent members of a CCA. We contend that this model will provide the flexibility required for devolution to areas with two-tier local government, which has proved a challenge to date. It allows a combined county authority to be established with agreement from the councils across the area that will be the constituent members of the CCA; that is, the upper-tier local authorities.

I realise that some noble Lords are sceptical about this, but this model removes the risk of one or two district councils vetoing the wishes of the great majority for devolution, as has happened with some two-tier local government areas wishing to form combined authorities, where unanimous consent from all councils in the area, including upper- and lower-tier councils, is needed.

I come back to a point I made earlier. While they cannot be constituent members of a combined county authority and, as such, cannot consent to its establishment, district councils can have a voice in a CCA via the non-constituent member model, as set out in Clause 9. As stated in the levelling-up White Paper, we expect CCAs and their upper-tier local authorities to work closely with their district councils, and have been pleased to see this happening in deal areas. This flexible model will enable the county, district and unitary councils to work together in the way that best meets local needs and wishes. The bottom line, I contend, is that this amendment would defeat those objectives.

It is important for me to say to the noble Lord, Lord Foster, that we are not taking away district council powers. Devolution is about giving power from Whitehall to local leaders. We expect the upper-tier local authorities we are agreeing devolution deals with to work with district councils, as I have said, to deliver the powers most effectively being provided. In discussions thus far, we have been pleased to see collaboration of the kind I have mentioned.

I realise that Amendment 72 is, in essence, a probing amendment. It will not surprise noble Lords to hear that I cannot accept it, because it would prevent a combined county authority resolving that non-constituent members could exercise a vote on matters where the CCA considered this to be appropriate. Non-constituent members are non-voting members by default. As I tried to make clear earlier, the combined county authority can give them voting rights on most matters, should it wish to. For example, a combined county authority may have provided for there to be some non-constituent members from the area’s district councils to enable their input on matters of importance to district councils in the CCA’s area. The CCA may wish to maximise this input by allowing in certain circumstances for these non-constituent members to vote. This amendment would prevent these non-constituent members being given a vote and would risk undermining the CCA’s ability to work in collaboration with its district councils and other non-constituent members.

Amendment 75, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, would prevent a combined county authority resolving that associate members could exercise a vote on matters where the CCA considered this to be appropriate. I am afraid that this is another proposal that I cannot accept, for reasons similar to those I have just outlined for Amendment 72.

Associate members are non-voting members by default, but the combined county authority can give them voting rights on most matters, should it wish to. For instance, a combined county authority may have provided for an associate member who, for example, may be a local business leader or an expert on a local issue to enable the member’s input on matters on which they have relevant expertise in the CCA’s area. The CCA may wish to maximise this input—

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

May I ask for a point of clarification on the associate members? Is it possible that a CCA can decide to give an associate member a vote, but not other associate members, and on what basis would that decision be made?

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I think the answer to that is yes. CCAs can distinguish between associate members in that way. But they would need to justify to themselves why they were according that difference of treatment. Circumstances would dictate a different course in different circumstances.

I come back to saying that the CCA may wish to maximise the input of associate members by allowing—

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[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

I will just come back to one point. I was a bit puzzled by the Minister’s response to Amendment 69 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley. The Government are taking the power in the Bill to disapply the duty to allocate seats on the basis of political proportionality in the combined authority; they are disapplying that power. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, was seeking to remove that provision so that, if a party had a third or a quarter of the seats, it would expect something similar on the Executive. When the Minister answered the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, he gave an answer that seemed to agree with what he was suggesting while justifying the position of the Government. It seemed perverse.

I know that there are to be proposals for a Nottinghamshire/Derbyshire combined authority. At the moment Derbyshire County Council and Nottinghamshire County Council are controlled by the Conservatives, and Derby City Council is led by the Conservatives. The only Labour council is Nottingham City Council. On the basis set out in the Bill, the three Conservative councils could get together, gang up on the Labour council and throw it out of the committee structure. That surely cannot be right. Why would a minority council join something if it could be ganged up on and removed from the executive? It would not; we want to bring people together. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, is trying to ensure that this problem could not happen. I do not follow the Minister’s arguments, which were in support of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, but were used to say that we cannot have the amendment.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, perhaps I could help the Minister at this point by simply suggesting that we add this to the agenda of our meeting, which gets longer and longer as we speak. It is a very important issue, to which we should add the issue of whether the calculation of political proportionality applies to the membership of the CCA—those who are there—or the bodies that each of those members represents, on behalf of which they have been nominated to attend the CCA. You might get a different answer depending on which it is. To avoid a lengthy evening and discussion at cross purposes, perhaps the Minister will agree that we can talk about it around the table; it might be easier.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, because the last thing I would wish to do is mislead this Committee or lead it down a path that led nowhere. Rather than go round in circles, as I suspect we might if I continued, I would be very happy to take up that suggestion and add it to the agenda of this rather lengthy round table we are planning.

Moving on to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, I completely agree with her on the need for the constituent members of a combined county authority to agree to the conferral of local government functions on a CCA. This is recognised in Clause 16, which provides that the consent of all the constituent councils is required if the Secretary of State is to make regulations conferring any such functions on a CCA. It is essential that all the constituent councils have agreed to the regulations that establish and confer powers on the new institution to support the collaborative working that is essential for a successful CCA.

I turn to some of the broader issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, on Clause 25 standing part. I take on board her instinctive antipathy to the concept of having elected mayors, but let me outline the case in their defence. We have seen from our existing mayors how strong local leadership can enhance economic and other opportunities. Mayors act as champions for their areas, attracting investment and opportunity to their places. They provide that single point of accountability to local citizens. Our devolution framework in the levelling-up White Paper places a strong emphasis on the importance of high-profile, directly elected local leadership, strong local institutions, and joint working across sensible and coherent economic geographies. We believe that high-profile, directly elected leaders—such as a mayor—will be most effective in driving levelling up in an area. Such strong local leadership is essential for delivering better local outcomes and joined-up public services.

As such, level 3 of the devolution framework in the White Paper, which is the highest tier, requires an institution to have a directly elected mayor to access the fullest range of functions and funding. In the case of a combined authority, we have seen that directly elected mayors are the clearest and lightest-touch way to provide that single point of accountability that I have referred to, which enables greater risk taking in decision making. In the case of a local authority, a directly elected mayor increases the visibility of leadership and helps create a greater convening power to delivery place-based programmes. That visibility is not to be derided. The Evaluation of Devolved Institutions report in 2021 found that nearly three-quarters of respondents —72%—across all combined authority areas reported that they were aware of who the mayor of their local area was. London, with 97%, and Manchester, with 88% of respondents, reported the highest level of awareness of who their mayor was.

Many noble Lords will be aware of mayors around the country who are already playing an incredibly powerful role in driving economic growth, as well as improving public services and giving local areas a real voice on the national stage. West Midlands would be a good example, where Andy Street has led work to form Energy Capital with the aim of creating a competitive, secure modern energy system that provides low-cost, clean and efficient power, while Andy Burnham and the Greater Manchester Combined Authority have created Our Pass, a membership scheme to provide free bus travel across Greater Manchester for young people. It greatly improves their ability to take advantage of the city-region’s amenities.

Clause 25 enables regulations to be made for a combined county authority to be led by a mayor. It introduces Schedule 2, which sets out the detail of the electoral arrangements. As I have said, this opens the way for a combined county authority area to benefit from the strongest devolution offer available. As I also mentioned earlier, combined county authorities do not have to have a mayor; they can choose to be non-mayoral. We believe that that choice should be made by the local area, in line with our localism principles. Non-mayoral CCAs can access level 2 of the devolution framework, which in itself is valuable and powerful. This clause provides the mechanism for delivering our aim of having strong, visible and accountable leaders to take devolved powers and budgets, and drive the levelling up in their areas.

Amendment 113, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, seeks to insert a requirement into Clause 26 for there to be a referendum before the Secretary of State may make regulations to provide that a combined county authority should have an elected mayor, and for this question to be approved by a majority of local government electors. I have probably said all I can on the pros and cons of referenda. I am, generally speaking, not a fan, and I have to say that I agree with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, about the cost of putting on a referendum.

Lest there be any doubt about local public involvement, however, I absolutely agree that it is important that the public are consulted on a proposal to introduce a combined county authority mayor in their area, hence the requirement for public consultation in Clauses 43 and 45. For the record, again, Clause 43(4) states that, prior to submitting a proposal for establishing a combined county authority to the Secretary of State, the local authorities proposing to establish it must undertake a public consultation on the proposal in the area that the CCA will cover. If those local authorities are proposing that there is an elected mayor for the CCA, that will be set out in the proposal.

Clause 45(3) includes similar provisions for a proposal from a combined county authority to make changes to existing arrangements relating to that CCA, including introducing an elected mayor for the CCA’s area if moving from a non-mayoral CCA. The authorities or the CCA must undertake a public consultation in those circumstances and submit a summary of consultation responses to the Secretary of State alongside their proposal.

When deciding whether to make the regulations to establish or change a combined county authority for an area, including introducing an elected mayor, one of the tests that the Secretary of State must consider is whether the area’s public consultation is sufficient. If they conclude that it is not, Clauses 44 and 46 provide that the Secretary of State must himself or herself undertake a public consultation before any regulations can be made. So we believe that the existing clauses provide for sufficient local consultation on the introduction of a mayor or a CCA. I know that that reply will not make the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, any happier, but I believe we are closer to her position than perhaps she thought we might be.