Property (Digital Assets etc) Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Second reading committee
Wednesday 6th November 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a most interesting debate. I am grateful, as are others, to the Minister for his careful opening.

On this side we welcome the Bill. It may be small in size but it is big in importance, and we may yet find that it is perfectly formed. The last Conservative Administration deserves credit, I suggest, for having asked the Law Commission in 2020 to review this field of law. It is also very timely that we are debating this during the presidential election, because I see from my phone that bitcoin has risen over 7% in value today. So, this is an important, real topic for many people.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, the Law Commission has produced two admirable reports. The Bill, we suggest, is a necessary but appropriately constrained measure. I shall be interested to hear the evidence in Committee, but it is plain that such a Bill is necessary to clarify the definition of what is capable of being property and to give enforceable rights where there might otherwise be doubt.

The English common law has given property rights to two categories of thing, as we have heard: so-called things in possession, which are generally tangible, visible objects, and so-called things in action, such as debts, and the rights to sue for breach of contract and company shares.

However, the world moves fast, and we are now confronted with digital assets. These sit less easily in our current definitions. They can include crypto tokens, cryptocurrency and non-fungible tokens. They are increasingly important to modern society, whether we personally like them or not. It is important that we keep the strong position that English common law holds in international trade, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, reminded us. We need to enforce the position of the City of London and the role of its lawyers in the important commerce that they bring to this country, and the tax and other benefits which flow from that.

There is a need for action to enable ongoing innovation growth in the sector. This has given rise to the Law Commission’s definition of a third category of property. It should take account of recent technological developments without creating hard boundaries which exclude or misdescribe future categories of property as yet unimagined.

The Law Commission is of the view that the common law of England is the better vehicle for determining those things that properly can and should be the object of personal property rights. They need not necessarily even be digital things. It points out that they could include, for example, carbon emission allowances. The world moves fast, and the law must keep up, but it cannot anticipate everything. As the Law Commission points out, an overprescriptive definition will leave things frozen in time.

In chapter 2 of its July report, the commission explains that the common law is in general sufficiently flexible and already able to accommodate digital assets. It agreed with Sir Geoffrey Vos, Master of the Rolls, who, speaking extrajudicially, said:

“We should try to avoid the creation of a new legal and regulatory regime that will discourage the use of new technologies rather than provide the foundation for them to flourish”.


The Law Commission concluded that it should take a tripartite approach to law reform. First, the common law is in general sufficiently flexible and already able to accommodate digital assets, so any law reform should be through further common law development where possible. Secondly, it recommended targeted statutory law reform and no more. That should confirm and support the existing common law position or fill a gap where common law development is not realistically possible. Thirdly, it said the making of arrangements for the provision of further guidance from industry experts should occur. We are not concerned with that third category.

So, the commission concluded, the law in England and Wales is now relatively certain. Most areas of residual legal uncertainty are highly nuanced and complex, in part because both the digital asset markets and the technology that supports them continue to evolve. Although some digital assets are not easy to place in traditional categories of things to which personal property rights can relate, this does not prevent them from being capable of attracting personal property rights.

The commission has said that it is clear what should take place in common law. It was persuaded by consultees that it would be helpful to express in legislation that certain digital assets are capable of attracting personal property rights and, therefore, to support the existing common law and take away any uncertainty. It set out certain principles that are beyond argument, I suggest. We should champion and support the inherent flexibility of the common law; it is already sufficiently flexible to accommodate most, if not all, digital assets. We should seek by statute only to confirm the existing common law position or to reform it where the common law cannot develop the legal certainty that the market requires. We must ensure that there is consistency with other legal and regulatory regimes where possible.

English common law has already proved resilient in the face of new technology. It has been flexible enough to answer legal questions concerning digital assets. It is developing a sophisticated regime that recognises and protects the newest features. It provides the market with a good balance of certainty and flexibility. Our English jurisdiction is well placed to provide a coherent and globally relevant legal regime for existing and new types of digital asset. As the noble Lord, Lord Freyberg, said in his interesting speech, if the Bill leaves gaps—particularly in respect of non-fungible tokens in the art market—we should examine the potential remedies, if there are any, in Committee. However, intervention by statute should not undermine the high level of existing certainty, lead to undue complexity or create a significant risk of boundary issues—the Law Commission was clear on that—because the wrong sort of statutory intervention might not be capable of distinguishing between different implementations of similar technology in the way the common law can.

The Bill, with its one simple clause, is the product of much deliberation at the highest level. The definition has been drafted with great care. I note the subtle differences between the version now before this Committee and the earlier draft, produced in February. The Committee will hear evidence about whether that balance is now right and whether there are appropriate additions or amendments, but, to me, at the present time, it is plain that the draft before us should not be amended without compelling reasons. I commend the Bill to the Committee.