Public Order Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 1st November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, in this country, we accept the principle of peaceful assembly in public places as a foundation of our system of participatory governance based on democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the arguing of ideas with which others do not agree. But that is a balance. It requires give and take. Our society acknowledges that such assembly may annoy or cause offence to others who oppose the ideas that a particular protest seeks to promote. As noble Lords have observed, in a democratic society based on the rule of law, political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realisation is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression.

However, well-established law in this country protects only the right to peaceful assembly. Peaceful events often cause real but relatively modest disruption. We tolerate and permit that. On the other hand, seriously disruptive protests and invasions of private property do not deserve protection. The courts have rightly held that public authorities are entitled to interfere with protest where there is a legitimate purpose, such as the prevention of disorder and, importantly, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

What we are talking about with this Bill is a balance for society as a whole. The right to protest in a public place is not unfettered. It must be balanced against the rights of the rest of society, and those have been held to include the right to move freely on public roads without restriction. So there is an important balancing act to be conducted for us as members of society as a whole.

We therefore have laws that regulate protests and give the police existing powers both to control assemblies and processions and to avoid serious—I emphasise “serious”—disruption to daily life. In this context, hitherto well established in this country, peaceful protests and demonstrations take place. They do so on notice to the relevant authorities. In London, we are told when there are to be major demonstrations and roads will be closed. The public and the emergency services can plan accordingly. There will of course be resulting disruption, but it is on notice and we can take steps to mitigate it. It is, as I said, a matter of necessary give and take.

When that happens, those of us who are protesting and participating in a demonstration, which may be a very large demonstration—some will be surprised to hear that I have marched on a demonstration—make our point. We receive the public attention that we have sought. The rest of London, or wherever it is, suffers a degree of inconvenience, but it is usually manageable and no serious harm is done. That is what is involved in living in a healthy, vibrant democracy.

However, in recent years, certain groups have gone beyond the norm. What they have done has been all take and no give. It is not about the subject matter. Of course climate change is very important, and of course people must have the right to demonstrate about it—we must all think carefully about how we are going to go forward and what will happen to our children and grandchildren after we have gone—but when protesters sit in the road and block and prevent all passage, they stop fellow members of society going about their lawful business and conducting their lives.

Importantly, such demonstrations, at which this Bill is aimed, are not done on notice. They are done unannounced and secretly. They are deliberately disruptive of society and where they go is far beyond what is acceptable. So what are we seeing? Fellow citizens are now taking matters into their own hands. That risks disorder, as the Metropolitan Police has said. Something has to be done. The difficult question is whether this Bill—all parts of it—provides the right answers. It is plain that we are going to have to look at that very carefully in Committee.

Let me address a few of the clauses. For my part, I do not see a problem with the essence of Clause 1. It is needed. The Bill focuses on what causes “serious disruption” to individuals or organisations. That is reasonable. It is not in accordance with the tradition of protest and demonstrations in our society. A business or organisation that has been invaded should get the protection that is proposed. That is why we have a police force; we are not back in the 18th century. Individually targeted businesses should not have to resort to their own private expense of injunctions and so on to justify themselves. In this democratic society, we rely on a proper police force to intervene so that we do not take matters into our own hands.

There is a place for the provisions related to tunnelling and the other provisions in Clauses 3 to 8, but Clause 9 is a difficult and delicate clause. Health workers and their patients should be spared intrusion of the sort that they suffer. They must be left in peace. The objective is sound. In Committee, we can look to see whether the drafting is as good as it may be.

I have serious reservations about Clauses 11 to 14, on stop and search without suspicion. Powers to stop and search have had an unhappy history in the magistrates’ courts—what used to be called the police courts—of this country. They have historically been misused. They alienate sections of society. People are picked on because they are the wrong colour or the police do not like the cut of their jib. We do not want to go back to that. I will look at those provisions with great care and will take some persuading that Clauses 11 to 14 are appropriate and necessary. Moving forward, I, like the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, am concerned about the wisdom of the injunctive powers in Clause 18.

I shall finish here. As I said, of course people should be free to demonstrate on climate change or anything else of significance, but this must be within bounds. It is not protests and marches in the form we all understand that are targeted by this Bill; it is what is done in the name of protests and how protests are conducted. Notwithstanding my concerns about some of the details of this Bill—and, indeed, the specific provisions to which I have drawn attention, all of which are important—there is a need for new powers to deal with specific types of aggressive protest that really are new to us. The Bill is needed, but it will need careful attention in Committee to consider which provisions are necessary and which should be revised or omitted.

Public Order Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, has made some very important points, particularly in relation to the police. It is worth elaborating for a couple more sentences. The fact is that the police already have great powers to deal with demonstrations and simply do not use them, as he suggested—partly because the police do not carry a huge amount of trust. The fact is also that these demonstrations reflect a huge amount of feeling among the public, and the police do not wish to stand out against those very strong feelings. Adding further powers for the police is not going to be helpful because the police will simply not use them for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Deben, very brilliantly—as always—pointed out. My main argument against these powers is that there is no point in them. They are designed to frighten people not to go out on protests. The police do not want these powers; they know that they would not use them. Therefore, they should not be introduced by Parliament.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 55. I am grateful to follow the speech of my noble friend Lord Faulks. My amendment addresses the legal difficulties caused by the judgment of the Supreme Court in 2021 in the case of Ziegler, in respect of offences in which it will be, and will remain, a defence for a person charged to prove that they had a lawful or reasonable excuse for the act in question.

The judgment in Ziegler concerned Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980, which makes it an offence for a person

“without lawful authority or excuse”

wilfully to obstruct

“free passage along a highway”.

The Supreme Court ruled that the exercise of the convention rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association—which might loosely be summarised as the right to protest—constituted a lawful excuse. This has the effect that, before a person may be convicted of obstructing the highway, the prosecution must prove that a conviction would be a proportionate and thus justified interference with that person’s convention rights. In practice, this has caused real difficulties for the police, who at times have appeared paralysed. It has made it difficult for judges to run trials fairly and for magistrates to reach decisions.

My amendment leaves in the word “reasonable”. It does not make it a strict offence to obstruct the highway. You can still do it if you have a “lawful authority or excuse”. What is to be judged in future would be the duration and nature of what is done, not the fact that you have what you consider to be a high motive—whether it is flat-earth or anti-abortion protesters, it does not matter. It is not about whether you are a good person, or you think you are a good person; it is about what you are actually doing and whether you are stopping ambulances and people going about their daily lives unreasonably and for too long.

The amendment means that conduct being intended or designed to influence government or public opinion will not, of itself, make it reasonable or lawful. That is consistent with the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court. I stress that the court has said:

“In a democratic society based on the rule of law, the ideas which challenge the existing order and whose realisation is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression”.


However, the law protects only the right to peaceful assembly. Articles 10 and 11 of the convention establish that public authorities are entitled to interfere with the right to protest for legitimate purposes such as the prevention of disorder, the prevention of crime and—importantly—the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It is not about stopping every march, but about stopping prolonged obstruction. That is what we are about.

The Strasbourg court has gone on to rule that the rights of the public include the right to move freely on public roads without restriction, so there are two rights here; you have a right to protest, but the general public also have a right to move freely on public roads without restriction. It is a balancing exercise. The court has further recognised that states have a wide margin of appreciation in determining necessity when it comes to taking action against those who deliberately disrupt traffic or other aspects of normal life.

The right to protest in a public place exists, but it is not unfettered. It must be balanced against the rights of your fellow citizens. If the public are to be protected in the face of these novel types of protest we have not seen before, which in their duration and nature go far beyond what is fair and reasonable, the police must be able to intervene and not be paralysed by anxiety. Peaceful assembly and ordinary marches will still be protected. The public will still have to suffer and tolerate a measure of inconvenience and delay, but that will be within bounds.

My amendment would end the state of affairs in which persons who obstruct the highway, damage property or seek to avoid arrest can distort and upset the proper balance by asserting their motive. Peaceful protest will be permitted, but the balance will be restored. That is why, at the end of the amendment, it makes it plain that

“this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.

Henceforth, if my amendment is adopted, your assertion of a high motive will not suffice. You will be judged by what you did, how long it went on for, and the effect on other people.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, as the House has just heard from my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, the area of law we are dealing with is the proportionate interference with convention rights. I respectfully agree with him that the decision of the Supreme Court in Ziegler raises the question of the correct balance and makes it important for the House to legislate in this area. However, it is my misfortune to disagree with him that we should take this opportunity to overturn the decision in Ziegler. Rather, I respectfully commend the approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, which has been set out for us this evening by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.

Critically, the presumption of innocence is at the heart of our judicial process, and I do not think that any of these amendments cut across that. There are three reasons why I suggest that the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, which is supported by the Government, ought to be accepted. The first is the point made by the Constitution Committee that we need precision in this area. Secondly, there is the fundamental point that we should not be leaving this to the police or the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis; as Parliament, we should take the opportunity, and indeed the responsibility, to draw the bounds of the offences in this area. Thirdly, we need to remember that, at the moment, Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires the court to read any legislation, if possible, consistently with the convention. Absent, I suggest, the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, there is a real risk that the court will read down clauses to make them consistent with how it considers convention rights should be applied.

On the basis of the approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, there is scope for reasonable excuse, but it is limited. That means we do not run the risk of the courts deciding cases on an unanticipated, or perhaps even incorrect, basis. We also do not need—despite my noble friend Lord Sandhurst’s amendment—to overturn the Ziegler case; what we will have, however, is a consistent, clear and precise approach to criminal law, which is precisely what we ought to have. I accept that some of my colleagues at the Bar may not be particularly happy with that, but, in this area and perhaps in others, their loss may indeed be the law’s gain.

Public Order Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 28th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, this Bill was always about political signals, not sensible policy. Finally, even signals must change. I respect the Minister, but others in the Home Office have been slow to respond to the concerns of the British public about abuses of broad police powers.

Much has happened and even more has been exposed since this Bill began its passage last May. Last July Wayne Couzens lost an appeal against a whole life sentence for the abduction, rape and murder of Sarah Everard while he was a serving police officer, after a purported stop and arrest for breach of lockdown laws in March 2021. Last month David Carrick was imprisoned for 30 years for an unrestrained 18-year campaign of rape and abuse while he was a serving police officer.

Also last month, YouGov reported that 51% of Londoners do not trust the Metropolitan Police very much or at all. Last week, as we have heard, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, called for a “fundamental reset” of the use of stop and search, which she said is

“currently deployed by the Met at the cost of legitimacy, trust and, therefore, consent.”

Just yesterday the Children’s Commissioner, Dame Rachel de Souza, found that nearly 3,000 children aged between eight and 17 had been strip-searched under stop and search powers between 2018 and 2022. Nearly 40% of them were black. Half of those strip searches had no appropriate adult present.

All this relates to the use and abuse of current police powers. Still, today we are being asked yet again to green-light new powers to stop and search peaceful protesters without even a reasonable suspicion of criminality. When trust in policing and the rule of law is in jeopardy, if this House does not exercise its constitutional duty to say “enough”—no more power without at least the modest statutory responsibilities set out in Motion A1 in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker—what are we for?

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I had not planned to speak, but it is important to remember that we are not dealing simply with peaceful protests. I remind the House of what I said on a previous occasion in respect of these amendments. We are dealing with organised, large-scale disruption, using implements. The purpose of the disruption, as the disrupters make plain, is not simply to protest but to stop citizens going about their lawful business for a disproportionate length of time. As I reminded the House previously, the European Court of Justice in Strasbourg has said more than once that such activity is unlawful and that protests that go beyond merely protesting can legitimately be stopped by government.