Environment Bill

Lord Rooker Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 30th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, explained her Amendment 103 extremely well. I will speak to my Amendment 109. We have Euro 2020, Wimbledon, the cricket and the Environment Bill—how much better could it be for all of us? There is so much pleasure in such a short time.

My Amendment 109 would introduce a new clause into the Bill that is intended to address some extensive governance gaps in environmental law that have arisen because of the UK’s departure from the EU. Amendment 109 places an obligation on the Secretary of State to report to the office for environmental protection “any information” that was previously required to be reported to the European Commission relating to environmental law and its application. This could include, for example, requirements to report on ambient air quality and pollutant emissions or on the implementation of key fisheries rules, both of which were previously required to be reported to the European Commission but are now no longer required under UK law. These are two helpful examples but reporting requirements were removed through EU exit statutory instruments across the whole spectrum of environmental policy areas. Without such a replacement, there will inevitably be a reduction in transparency and accountability, both of which are crucial to the effective implementation of environmental legislation.

To ensure that the amendment does not place an unnecessary burden on either the Secretary of State or the office for environmental protection, the latter must review these reporting requirements

“no later than two years”

after the Environment Bill has passed into law. If the OEP determines that an existing

“reporting requirement is no longer necessary to contribute to environmental protection or the improvement of the natural environment, it must arrange for a report setting out its reasons to be ... laid before Parliament, and ... published.”

The Secretary of State is then obliged to

“lay before Parliament, and publish, a copy of the response”

to the report within three months.

Why is this amendment necessary? The reporting of information relating to environmental law is absolutely vital to ensure transparency and accountability in environmental policy-making and ensure that government and stakeholders can identify and address environmental impacts. Continuity over time in the information being recorded and reported can also help to reveal trends and increase transparency.

However, several requirements for the Secretary of State to report information to the European Commission in relation to environmental law have been lost because of the UK’s departure from the EU and the subsequent adoption of new statutory instruments. This poses a serious threat to the effective application of environmental law in the UK—because we all know that there are quite a lot of people who try to evade these particular laws—and the Government’s ability to achieve their stated aim and manifesto promise of leaving the environment in a better state than that in which it was found.

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I will be brief. I put my name down to speak on this group expressly to support Amendment 103—because, given our earlier debates on the office for environmental protection and its independence, I want to test the extreme limits of Defra’s control, if there are any. I would have thought that it is a given that Amendment 103 should be accepted. If it is not, that tells us something about Defra’s controlling nature regarding the work of the office for environmental protection. That is the only point that I want to make.

A subsidiary point is that I also support Amendment 114, and, later today, I will also speak to Amendment 114A, which is effectively a fallback position for the amendment in this group.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, Amendment 114 operates in close relationship to Amendment 78, which we debated on Monday, to which I had attached my name. Both amendments address the relationship between the Armed Forces and the Treasury in the Bill and certain exemptions provided to them.

Amendment 78 and our debate on it talked about exemptions for action; Amendment 114 talks about removing exemptions for disclosure of or access to information. The arguments for the Government to hold their current position and not include this amendment are even weaker when we talk about information—because we are not talking about actual action.

However, it is worth going back to what the Minister said in the debate on Monday, which can help to inform this amendment. He said that including Amendment 78

“could restrict our response to urgent threats. Policy decisions concerning defence are often made rapidly, or even in real time”—[Official Report, 28/6/21; col. 579.]

due to “urgent … operational imperatives”. In that debate, we talked about a couple of interesting case studies: a new housing estate and, as the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, mentioned, a pile being driven into a creek because it might assist in the mooring of submarines. Neither of these in any way fits the definition of urgent defence imperative.

However, I acknowledge that there are occasions on which there may be a need to, perhaps, put in some very urgent flood defences or build a pandemic hospital—the kinds of security threats that we are now facing on a regular basis—so it may be necessary to act urgently. However, I come back to that debate on Amendment 78, in which the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, cited some detailed legal material, saying that the precautionary principle, which those who are seeking to amend the Bill desire, “already includes proportionality”. Of course, if something is needed for an urgent matter of national defence, clearly it would be proportionate to act as necessary. It would not be unreasonable to then provide information about what damage had been done in terms of defence. I cannot think what one might conceivably claim regarding why information should not be provided about the damage that the Treasury might have had to do to the environment for whatever reason, if one can possibly imagine such a thing.

We are talking a lot today about openness and informing the public about what is being done to the environment. In that context, Amendment 114—I still stand by Amendment 78 in some combination when we get to Report—is essential.

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[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I support Amendments 105, 106, 107 and 108 in this group. Indeed, I raised the issue of Clauses 37(7) and 37(8) at Second Reading and made it clear that I, as a non-lawyer, was relying on the Bingham Centre’s rule of law analysis of this part of the Bill. I am going to leave the experts—we have already heard from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—to deal with the legal flaws. I just want to give a couple of examples that Second Reading did not allow because of the time limits.

The first is the culling of sea-birds in the Ribble estuary. The case of RSPB v Secretary of State in 2015 concerned the decision by the Secretary of State to grant permission for a cull of sea-birds. The Court of Appeal ruled that the direction to cull was not consistent with the objectives of managing their population. Under this Bill, the statement of non-compliance would declare such a cull not in compliance with environmental law but it would not stop the cull. What would be the use of such a declaration? A paper remedy is no remedy at all.

A second, more recent example, concerns Manston Airport. Permission to use Manston Airport was given by way of a particular kind of statutory instrument: a development consent order, or DCO. The DCO was contested and the Secretary of State conceded that it had been made unlawfully. The planning court quashed the DCO, meaning that it had no legal effect. Under Clause 37(7), notwithstanding it was unlawful, the DCO would remain valid.

The third example, which I will not go into in detail, concerns the case of Dover District Council v CPRE Kent. This regarded a proposed development in an area of outstanding natural beauty. The Supreme Court quashed the permission. Under Clause 37(7), there would be nothing to prevent it going ahead.

Clause 37(8) also presents problems with the rule of law, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said. A local authority could give a developer the right to clear woodland to build houses. In so doing, the local authority could be breaching environmental law. The developer will have spent money on paperwork and planning. It may become non-compliant at an environmental review but, because the developer has spent money and expects to profit from the development, the development must go ahead. This is absolutely crazy. According to the Bingham Centre, this introduces

“a new ‘polluter doesn’t pay’ principle into environmental law.”

This is a new normal: unlawful actions by a public authority remain valid; it restricts the awards of a remedy by the court; it requires a court to endorse unlawful action if quashing that action would hurt a person who stands to benefit from it. The Minister must have some really good, detailed answers to these points and the others he is going to hear this afternoon—far more satisfactory than what he has managed to conjure up so far on the Bill. He must appreciate that there will be chaos on Report as the Bill gets torn apart.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and speak to the same amendments.

If the Bill is to be effective and to work, there are two main areas that need change. The first is clarity in relation to all the duties imposed because without clear duties, interlocking targets, interim targets and environmental plans, there is no effective concrete law that can be applied.

The second area where it has changed is enforcement. On Monday we had a useful debate on the independence of the OEP. Today, we turn to a second aspect of enforcement: the remedies that must be available if court proceedings are required. I very much hope that the independent strength and force of the OEP, together with clear duties set out in the Bill, will mean that recourse to courts is rarely necessary. However, that may be a pious hope because it is obvious that in this area there are immense conflicts of interest between those looking at the long term and those who seek to protect short-term or other interests. It seems to me, therefore, that an amount of litigation and enforcement action taken through the courts is inevitable.

I believe that view must be shared by the Government because why, otherwise, would they seek to constrain two important aspects of our common-law tradition? The first is to curtail the judicial function and the second is to curtail the discretion of the enforcer. I will deal with each aspect in turn but, unless changes are made to this part of the Bill, I entirely agree with everyone who has spoken about teeth. I will not attempt to describe the kind of teeth required, only to say that they must ensure that the Bill is not a long series of statements but will actually work for future generations.

I will now deal with each amendment in turn. I will deal with them briefly and in the order in which they are set out, not as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, did, but I entirely agree with him that the critical amendment is Amendment 107. Amendment 105 changes the provision in the Bill that seeks to stop proceedings at a particular point in time being brought together. I find this very difficult to fathom. It is a very inefficient way of dealing with things, apart from being unjust. A court always likes to have all the relevant cases in front of it so that it can do justice. I ask the Minister: why do the Government wish to impede justice in this respect?

Amendments 106 and 107 can be taken together because they deal with the consequences of a decision by the court that what has happened has not been lawful. It seems to me very difficult to understand how a Government who believe in the rule of law—and I believe this Government firmly believe in the rule of law—wish to say that there are to be no consequences of a failure to comply with the law. That is very difficult to understand. However, much more serious, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others have pointed out, is the restriction on remedies. I have no doubt that the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and its very able lawyers are well aware that, from time to time, in several cases, judges have to deal with circumstances where the rights of other people are affected or there is a question about good administration. A judge then takes, for example, the prejudice to the rights of certain people on the one hand and balances it against the considerations on the other. That is an ordinary judicial function.

The Bill seeks to take that function away from a judge by imposing a restriction that requires a judge to be satisfied that if one single person would suffer hardship or prejudice to his rights, that means the court cannot do justice. I ask why. To my mind, it is a very undesirable attack on the way in which traditionally in this country we have approached matters of judicial review of government action. Until now, the judges have been trusted. It is a remarkable fact that, although there are complaints from time to time that far too many decisions are overturned on judicial review, the general effect of judicial review and the knowledge of the consequences of the remedies has been to improve good administration. The Government are successful in the overwhelming number—a percentage in the high 90s—of cases. I therefore wonder: what is driving the Government in this case to curtail the doing of justice by judges? It seems to me that there is no reason whatever for it. Surely, they can trust the judges on this aspect.

The last of these amendments is to the provision that seeks to curtail the right of the OEP to bring judicial review. Why take away its discretion? Do the Government not trust it? Surely, with an agency that is independent and to be chaired by a person of the calibre of the chairman designate, it is very difficult to understand why a Government wish to restrict its discretion for the future in bringing cases. They must also appreciate that if a judicial review has brought late, the judge can refuse a remedy. There is the lock of the discretion of the trusted OEP, with judicial discretion as a backstop. Why do the Government need more? We should trust our common-law traditions and leave matters to the discretion of the judiciary and to the discretion of the enforcer.

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Moved by

[Lord Rooker]

108A: Clause 42, page 25, line 23, leave out “26(1) or”
Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment would exclude from the prohibition on disclosure in Clause 42(1)(a) information obtained by the Office for Environmental Protection under Clause 26(1).

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

In moving Amendment 108A, I will speak also to the other amendments in this group, all originally tabled in the name of my noble friend Lord Wills, who regrets that he is unable to be with us today. The first four refer to Clause 42, and the final one to Clause 45.

My main concern is the effect of Clause 42 on the right of access to environmental information under the Environmental Information Regulations 2004—the EIR. Clause 42(1) prohibits the disclosure of several classes of information by the office for environmental protection. These are: information provided to the OEP to assist it with its functions by a body with public functions under Clause 26(1); and specified information about OEP enforcement action, including any information notice or decision notice it serves, any related correspondence with an authority, and information provided to it by the authority.

Clause 42(2) describes the circumstances in which disclosure to the public will be permitted. These are: if the body supplying the information, the OEP or authority, consents—but this does not apply to an information notice or a decision notice—or if the OEP has concluded that it intends to take no further steps in relation to the matter. That is set out in subsection (2)(h).

Clause 42(3) prohibits disclosure of certain information by public authorities, particularly those which are the subject of OEP enforcement action. Clause 42(4) provides exceptions to the prohibition. None of the exceptions to the prohibitions under Clause 42 permits disclosure for the purpose of complying with the EIR or the Freedom of Information Act.

However, the Explanatory Notes set out an entirely different view. Paragraph 365 says that Clause 42

“does not override the EIR which will still apply to the OEP and other public bodies. The OEP will be required to consider requests for disclosure of information made under the EIR on a case by case basis, including assessing whether any appropriate exception will apply.”

Paragraph 366 adds:

“This clause will also not override or disapply other existing legislative provision on public access to information such as the Freedom of Information Act 2000”.


This second statement is plainly wrong. Section 44(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act exempts from access any information whose disclosure

“is prohibited by or under any enactment”.

This is an absolute exemption to which the Freedom of Information Act’s public interest test does not apply. Any statutory prohibition which applies to the information overrides the FoI right of access.

The position under the EIR is more complicated. Regulation 5(6) of the EIR states:

“Any enactment or rule of law that would prevent the disclosure of information in accordance with these Regulations shall not apply.”


Prior to Brexit, that would have guaranteed that a statutory prohibition could not undermine the EIR right of access, as the regulations implement an EU directive. The supremacy of EU law meant that it could not be set aside by domestic law. That principle no longer applies.

The EIR are now retained EU law. As I understand the position, from various briefings and from our own discussions, it is that, following the implementation period—IP—completion day:

“The principle of the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law passed or made on or after exit day.”


That is in Section 5(1) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.

“So domestic law passed after IP completion day will trump provisions in retained EU law that are of EU origin and which would have benefited from the principle of supremacy before IP completion day”—


that is the legal opinion given out by firms such as Gowling WLG.

The Bill’s prohibitions on disclosure postdate the implementation period and are clearly incompatible with the EIR rights of access. So long as the prohibitions apply, they appear to override the EIR right of access to the information concerned. Let us take an example. The OEP will be prohibited from disclosing any information supplied to it by a body with public functions under Clause 26(1). This requires such a body to provide information to the OEP if it asks for it in connection with its functions. Substantial classes of information could be affected, given the OEP’s broad functions. These, of course, include monitoring progress towards improving the environment, meeting environmental targets and implementing environmental legislation, as well as advising Ministers and investigating failures by public authorities to comply with environmental law.

Let us suppose that the OEP receives a request for the underlying data on which it has based a statement about air or water quality. If that information has come from a body with public functions, it will be subject to the prohibition. The OEP could disclose this after it had decided to take no further steps about the matter—but when would that happen? Monitoring is an ongoing process. The publication of an annual monitoring report under Clause 27(7)—which is unlikely to contain the complete monitoring data—will not mark the end of the OEP’s involvement. The problem revealed by the monitoring may persist for years, endangering human health or the environment. The OEP may need to advise the Minister, perhaps repeatedly, to address the matter. It may need to investigate any failure to comply with environmental law. The more serious the problem, the longer the prohibition will continue to prevent disclosure—an absurd situation.

The information, of course, might be disclosed if the body supplying it consents; but it may not do so, particularly if the information shows that the problem is the result of its own failings. The withholding of such information would be a serious blow to the public’s right to know, to informed public debate and to public confidence in the OEP. It is almost inconceivable that such data could be withheld under the EIR. To do so, an authority would have to show that disclosure would “adversely affect” a specified interest, consider whether the public interest required disclosure, and apply

“a presumption in favour of disclosure”.

If the information concerned emissions, significant EIR exceptions, such as those for commercial confidentiality or the interests of a person supplying information voluntarily, would be disapplied altogether. How does a blanket prohibition on disclosure, which takes no account of the public interest, advance environmental protection? And by the way, I realise that a member of the public could go with an FOI request direct to the body concerned, but how do they know what the body is going to be? That is the point: we will not know unless people are told.

The same obstacle would apply to information which an authority had supplied to the OEP in the course an OEP investigation. It could be disclosed only when the OEP had decided to take no further action or the body supplying the information consented. Again, this contrasts this with the EIR approach. EIR regulation 12(5)(b) allows an authority to withhold information if disclosure would

“adversely affect the course of justice, the ability of a person to receive a fair trial or the ability of a public authority to conduct an inquiry of a criminal or disciplinary nature”.

The Information Commissioner’s guidance highlights the “very wide” scope of the “course of justice” limb of this exception, which it says applies to information about law enforcement investigations or proceedings and civil and criminal investigations and proceedings. This is how information the disclosure of which might undermine law enforcement is protected by other regulators, including the Environment Agency, local authorities, the Health and Safety Executive and the police. To withhold information, they must show that disclosure would adversely affect the course of justice and that, on balance, the public interest favours confidentiality.

In 2017, the tribunal that deals with EIR and FOI appeals ruled on a request relating to a factory at which a fatal explosion had occurred. It held that a request for the findings of an earlier investigation into the factory should be denied because the information was likely to form part of the prosecution case, and media coverage of that investigation would have compromised the remaining police interviews and risked jeopardising a fair trial. However, in a 2007 decision involving a fatal outbreak of food poisoning, the tribunal found that disclosure in that case would not affect the trial. It commented:

“A blanket refusal to disclose all potentially relevant information may well not be justified. A public authority … ought to give careful consideration to the potential effect on the criminal proceedings of the particular information being requested ... but if, on a sensible reading of the documentation in question, its disclosure would not adversely affect the prospects of a fair trial, then the fact that the information has some connection with the subject matter of a prosecution will not be sufficient justification for nondisclosure ... on the special facts of this case, the disclosure ... would not have adversely affected the accused’s ability to have a fair trial.”


Amendment 108A would remove the reference to Clause 26(1) from Clause 42(1)(a). Information provided to the OEP by bodies with public functions could then be disclosed on request, subject to the EIR exceptions. Amendments 108B and 108C would permit disclosure for the purpose of complying with the EIR or FOI Act or subject access under data protection legislation. This is what the Explanatory Notes say is already the position. If so, the Government should have no objection to stating that on the face of the Bill. If the prohibitions in fact override EIR right of access, the UK will be in breach of Article 4 of the Aarhus convention, which requires the UK to provide a statutory right of access to environmental information. It does not permit information to be withheld on a class basis. The public interest in disclosure must be taken into account and exemptions applied in a “restrictive way”.

Clause 42(7) addresses a separate issue. It refers to the information to which Clauses 42(1) and 42(3) would apply, disregarding the exceptions to these prohibitions. The clause provides that, where information is “environmental information”, it will be considered to be held

“in connection with confidential proceedings”.

This would bring it within the range of an exception in EIR Regulation 12(5)(d), which states that

“a public authority may refuse to disclose information to the extent that its disclosure would adversely affect ... the confidentiality of the proceedings of that or any other public authority where such confidentiality is provided by law”.

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[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for his introduction. He is right to emphasise the importance of transparency, a point made equally well by my noble friend Lord Lucas and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.

I reiterate the position on information disclosure for the OEP. The Government have been clear that the environmental information regulations and the Freedom of Information Act will apply to information held by the OEP and public authorities. The Bill does not in any sense override that legislation. The OEP would have to consider any request against the relevant legislation on a case-by-case basis.

The OEP will assess whether any exemption or exception to the relevant regime applies to the information. If so, it will consider whether a public interest weighing exercise is required under that exemption. If a public interest test is required, it will carry out a balancing exercise before deciding whether the public interest requires that the information should be disclosed or withheld.

Turning to Amendments 108A to 108D, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wills, although I agree that it is important that the OEP operates transparently, it must be allowed the discretion necessary to operate effectively. The OEP’s enforcement framework has been designed to resolve issues as effectively and efficiently as possible. To do so, it is important to have a safe space where public authorities can confidently share information and allow the OEP to explore potential pragmatic solutions before issuing formal notices. The noble Lord’s proposals would effectively remove that forum, meaning that public authorities might prefer to advance to more formal stages where information disclosure exemptions may apply due to confidentiality of proceedings. That would undermine the framework and result in slower resolution and poorer value from public funds.

On Amendment 114A, Clause 45(2)(a) excludes the disclosure of or access to information from the OEP’s remit. These matters are explicitly excluded in order to avoid overlap between the remit of the OEP and that of the Information Commissioner’s Office. This is further clarified in paragraph 383 of the Bill’s Explanatory Notes. The existing drafting of this provision allows greater flexibility to ensure that overlaps are avoided. Not only does it allow the OEP and courts to decide on the meaning of the exemption to the OEP’s remit on a case-by-case basis; it accounts for any future changes to relevant legislation that may cause overlap between the two bodies. The Information Commissioner’s Office will still have the remit to uphold information rights in the public interest, promoting openness by public bodies and data privacy for individuals.

I hope that answers the noble Lord’s questions and I ask that he withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the Minister has spent just three minutes on this crucial part of the Bill. I will not try to respond now; I will take advice on what he said, but we will no doubt come back to this issue on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 108A withdrawn.