Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 11th July 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

1: Before Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Tests for the intrusion of privacy
In making decisions and taking actions under this Act a public authority must have regard to the following—(a) the rule of law,(b) necessity,(c) proportionality,(d) the need for restraint,(e) the need for effective oversight,(f) recognition of necessary secrecy,(g) the principle of minimal secrecy,(h) the need for transparency,(i) legislative clarity, and(j) multilateral collaboration.”

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have put our names to Amendments 1 and 2. Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee have said that privacy should be at the heart of the Bill. Although the Government have made some attempt to put an overriding privacy clause at the beginning of the Bill, we feel that that does not go far enough. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie—in a letter to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, dated 8 July—spells out the importance of the 10 tests for the intrusion of privacy which the RUSI panel that looked into investigatory powers came up with. Amendment 1 attempts to put those 10 tests for the intrusion of privacy in the Bill.

Although one might consider some of the principles to be obvious, such as “rule of law”, “necessity” and “proportionality”, there are other important elements of the 10 tests—in particular, “restraint”, as it should never become routine for the state to intrude on the lives of its citizens; “transparency”, as it must be evident how the law applies to the citizen if the rule of law is to be upheld; and “multilateral collaboration”, as government policy on intrusion should be capable of being harmonised with that of like-minded open and democratic Governments.

In the letter to which I have referred from the noble and learned Lord, the Government set out what I consider to be a rather optimistic view of how the Bill complies with the 10 tests. We will see, over the course of Committee, how we on these Benches do not share the noble and learned Lord’s optimism about how the Bill actually complies with them. As I said just now, we believe that the privacy aspects of the Bill need to be enhanced, in particular to increase the regard that people have to the Human Rights Act in implementing the Bill.

Section 46 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 provides for a Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. This is already in legislation—it just has not been enacted by the Government—and we believe that it could also strengthen the privacy elements. We support the additional safeguards for confidential journalistic sources and material. We are concerned about how wide so-called targeted interception warrants can be, going beyond simply named individuals to organisations and even groups of organisations.

We are also concerned about the whole issue of the so-called double lock. Why, in non-contentious law enforcement cases, does there need to be any involvement by the Secretary of State at all? Why is there inconsistency between intelligence services’ equipment interference warrants, where there is a double lock, and law enforcement equipment interference warrants, where the Secretary of State is not involved at all, despite equipment interference being more intrusive than interception? We are concerned about how judicial review principles, which judicial commissioners are supposed to apply to decisions of the Secretary of State, can apply if only one side of the argument is present, because the applicant for the warrant puts forward the case for the issuing of the warrant and there is nobody arguing against it.

There is judicial authorisation of interception warrants in all “Five Eyes” countries and international co-operation—as I have just indicated from the 10 principles —is extremely and increasingly important. To ensure that there is co-operation between the UK and other countries, particularly the United States, proper judicial authorisation, not simply judicial review, should be an important part of the Bill.

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[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I ask whether I have completely lost the plot here. I thought this was the first group of amendments, Amendments 1, 2 and 3. I do not understand why we are ranging over the entire Bill.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, what I am trying to demonstrate here is to counter what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said in his letter, that the Bill complied with the 10 tests put forward by RUSI. I am simply indicating where we feel that the Bill is deficient.

Moving on, we share others’ concerns that the technical capability notices and national security notices, only enforceable against UK companies, could make British products and systems more vulnerable to illegal hacking. There could be a considerable competitive disadvantage to UK companies as a result.

We are concerned about the operation of the filter. As I said at Second Reading, it creates a virtual database, and the noble and learned Lord in his summing up—

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I share the view of the noble and learned Lord. I am a simple sailor, and I am totally confused now as to exactly what the noble Lord is trying to do. Are we trying to insert an amendment, or are we having another Second Reading? The noble Lord is continually saying, “As I said at Second Reading”, but we do not do Second Reading a second time.

[Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab)]

Unless you are a Liberal Democrat.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am trying to demonstrate—and in many cases, obviously, not succeeding—why the 10 tests as set out in the report are necessary, and how the Bill fails to meet those 10 tests.

As I was saying, on the filter, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, in his summing up said that it did not create a database. I said in my Second Reading speech that it creates a virtual database. No doubt, we can discuss that issue when we come to it.

Overall, we feel that having the 10 tests as part of the Bill is an important safeguard for the privacy of individuals, and would place limitations on what the Government can do. I beg to move.

[Lord Janvrin (CB)]

I speak to Amendment 3, in my name, and note my interest as a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. A lot of the points made by the committee have already been taken on board by the Government following discussions and scrutiny in another place.

In the committee’s report on the draft Bill, we recommended that privacy protections should form the backbone of the legislation around which the exceptional powers are then built. This is absolutely crucial to the whole purpose of the Bill. Following scrutiny in another place, the Bill introduced in this House now has in Clause 2 provisions on “General duties in relation to privacy”. I hope that your Lordships welcome the inclusion of the new clause, which crucially includes the requirement that intrusive powers should be used only when the information being sought cannot be obtained by other less intrusive means.

However, the Bill still lacks a clear statement at the beginning about the right to privacy. This is the purpose of the amendment in this group in my name. We propose inserting a new subsection at the very start of the Bill, which places an individual’s right to privacy at the forefront of the legislation. I note that this amendment is similar to Amendment 2 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, which attempts to achieve something similar, although I suggest that the amendment in my name is the more straightforward of the two options before us.

Finally, I think that this short but necessary amendment is compatible with the more detailed provisions already existing in Clauses 1 and 2.

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[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, before my noble friend responds, having heard the discussion across the Chamber, I am satisfied by the explanation offered by the noble Earl. For this reason, respectfully, to be overspecific about principles that support the whole concept of privacy runs the risk of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius: that is, by being too specific, you prevent the opportunity to look at wider considerations. That may be rather a technical view to take at this stage but it also underlines the points that have been made already about the general thrust of this legislation, which has innovated to an extent that would not have been thought possible even five years ago.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the comments from noble Lords from around the Chamber, and particularly to the Minister. As we go through the Bill, we will, at each power, indicate how we believe the provisions do not match the 10 tests in the way the noble and learned Lord set out in his letter. However, we can leave that until we reach those sections of the Bill. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, indicated that, of the three amendments, Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, would be the best to include. If it was necessary, we would be very happy to support Amendment 3.

If I may, I will speak––with some trepidation––in defence of my noble friend Lord Strasburger. There are people in the UK who have the sorts of concerns that he has articulated and it is very important that, during our discussions in the House, we seek every opportunity to reassure people who hold those views, however outlandish some Members of the Committee might consider them. At this stage, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

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[Lord Strasburger]

My Lords, Amendment 17 in my name would provide for a statutory public interest defence for the offence set out in Clause 3. Clause 3 effectively reproduces the RIPA Section 1 criminal offence of phone hacking, of which the Prime Minister’s director of communications, Andy Coulson—among others—was convicted when he was editor of the News of the World.

I invite the House to support the amendment in this group proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, which provides access to justice for victims of phone hacking and incentivises the adoption of the Leveson reforms which the Government have stalled on. But there is another matter which must be considered and which my amendment addresses—the absence of a statutory public interest defence for voicemail interception or any other type of breach of Clause 3.

Let us consider a situation where suspected serious wrongdoing is being investigated by a journalist or NGO and that journalist or NGO has no faith that the police will adequately investigate the matter; for example, a case of police corruption or, more practically, a case where the police have failed to investigate a case such as that of Jimmy Savile. In such circumstances, if the journalist or NGO intercepted voicemail messages which showed the corruption or illegality, and then exposed it, that person should have a defence that he or she can rely on.

Amendment 17 provides for this. The CPS can of course choose not to prosecute under the public interest arm of the “threshold test for prosecutors”, but that is not good enough. Prosecutors make their decisions on the public interest element after reviewing a file of evidence produced for them by the police and after an investigation which addresses the separate question of whether there is enough evidence to pass the first, evidential arm of the threshold test. Such a police investigation could last for months, if not years, and will involve interviews under caution, search warrants and perhaps arrest. That is a real disincentive to investigative journalism.

If there is a statutory public interest defence, the police will be able to see at an early stage that however much evidence they gather to prove that the act took place, or indeed even in the case of an admission, they will not be able to defeat the defence if the facts are clearly made out and their investigations will be curtailed. The benefit of a public interest defence therefore is not so much that it will allow investigators in the public interest to be acquitted at trial, or even that the CPS will choose not to prosecute on the evidential arm before even having to consider the public interest, but that the police will abandon investigations where the public defence is clearly made out in the facts. That will have the benefit of removing the chilling effect of potential police investigations and possible prosecution from investigative journalists who we rely on on these occasions to root out wrongdoing. Perhaps I may invite the Minister to engage in a constructive discussion about whether a narrow but valuable defence can be crafted. After all, noble Lords will be aware that there is a statutory public interest defence in Section 55 of the Data Protection Act, a provision that in Clause 1 of this Bill the Government are relying on as adequately protecting our privacy.

The investigative journalist Nick Davies of the Guardian exposed the hacking scandal. Had he had to intercept voicemail messages between Andy Coulson and one of the several convicted news editors who served under him in order to bring the story to our attention, that would have been in the public interest. It would not have been right that in the absence of a public interest defence which the police knew was valid, he had been arrested and questioned by the very police force whose failures he uncovered. That is why this amendment is so important and I commend it to your Lordships.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 16, 20, 21, 22 and 84 in this group.

Amendment 16 concerns the offence of unlawful interception, but in the Bill as drafted that applies only to public telecommunications systems, private telecommunications systems and public postal services. It does not apply to private postal services. Examples of those could be the postal services used by the legal profession such as Legal Post and DX. Can the Minister inform the Committee why private postal services are not included in that provision?

Amendment 20 relates to the provision that,

“Conduct which has lawful authority for the purposes of this Act … is to be treated as lawful for all other purposes”.

Presumably, this provision is to avoid the problem we have had in the past where, while interception or equipment interference was allowed under one piece of legislation, it was an offence under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Presumably, that is why this provision has been included, but surely it should apply to existing legislation—and it should state that it should apply to existing legislation—not to legislation in the future.

Amendment 21 is again about any other conduct under the Bill being treated,

“as lawful for all purposes”.

Surely this should not be as broad as that. It should be restricted to what is lawful only for the purposes of this Bill.

Amendment 22 concerns the service of monetary penalty notices. Paragraph 4(4)(g) of Schedule 1 allows for an oral hearing before the commissioner, but the amendment would add that the person who applies for and is granted an oral hearing before the commissioner can be legally represented.

Returning to something that I referred to in my opening remarks, Amendment 84 is about restrictions on unauthorised disclosures which as written would prevent the Secretary of State from disclosing the existence and contents of a warrant. The amendment would allow the Secretary of State to disclose the existence and details of a warrant if she felt it was necessary in order for Parliament to carry out its functions. As I mentioned before, I do not see how the argument can be made that the Secretary of State should be involved in the authorising of warrants because she can be held to account, when she is not able, under the terms of the Bill as drafted, even to admit that such a warrant exists.

[Baroness Hollins (CB)]

My Lords, I gave evidence to the Leveson inquiry about the press intrusion suffered by my family and I am going to speak to Amendments 18 and 246 in my name.

In Section 1(3) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, there was a statutory tort for interception of communications. This has not been recodified in the Bill, presumably because the common law has proven to be a sufficient basis for legal actions against those who hack communications. The effect of subsection (1) in my Amendment 18 is to reinstate that tort. The effect of subsections (2) to (5) in my amendment are then to provide access to justice for victims of phone hacking—the criminal offence recodified in subsection (1). It will enable them to sue, without cost risk to themselves, those newspapers which have invaded their privacy but are refusing to guarantee low-cost arbitration.

I hope that this amendment will encourage the Government to bring into effect law already passed by this House and the House of Commons in Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. Amendment 18 replicates Section 40 of that Act in a limited way for claims made by victims of the interception of private communications—phone hacking—because only these claims are in the scope of this Bill. The consequential amendment to Clause 243 would have the effect of automatically commencing the provision immediately after Royal Assent to prevent government non-commencement, as has happened with Section 40. Of course, if the Government commence Section 40 forthwith, this amendment will be withdrawn. If the Government do not, this amendment would have the same effect as that law, at least for victims of phone hacking.

I am very grateful to noble Lords from across the House who are supporting these amendments, and for briefings and drafting assistance from Hacked Off, through which I have been introduced to many other victims of press abuse. I remind noble Lords that Lord Justice Leveson’s inquiry found that voluntary newspaper self-regulation by the Press Complaints Commission had failed appallingly and urged Parliament and the Government to ensure that any new regulator set up by the press would be accredited by an independent recognition panel to assure its independence and effectiveness. The idea was, and Parliament agreed, that the newspapers would have to join such a regulator and not be allowed to set up another version of the PCC. The terms of Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act were agreed, somewhat reluctantly, by the Government to avoid defeat in both Houses in March 2013.

Section 40 was part of the cross-party agreement which included the royal charter, and was signed by the Prime Minister and the leaders of the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. As a result of this agreement, the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, withdrew his amendment to the Enterprise Bill in March 2013 which would have implemented the Leveson-recommended recognition panel by statute. Ben Bradshaw MP and Simon Hughes MP similarly withdrew their amendments to the Crime and Courts Bill, which would have brought in a stronger and faster version of Section 40.

Section 40 provides protection from court costs in libel, harassment and privacy cases involving newspapers and has three policy aims. The first is to guarantee access to justice for claimants in libel and privacy cases against non-Leveson-regulated newspapers. The second is to protect investigative and public interest journalism at newspapers from court costs and thus from so-called “libel chill”. The third incentivises non-Leveson-regulated newspapers to join a Leveson-style self-regulator which has been accredited as independent and effective.

Section 40 would have to be commenced in the usual way provided in all Bills,

“on a day appointed by the Secretary of State”.

It was agreed, cross-party, that commencement of Section 40 would be well before the exemplary damages provision in Sections 34 to 39. Those sections, on exemplary damages, were to come into effect one year after the royal charter Press Recognition Panel had been set up, which should have been in November last year. This makes Section 40 well overdue. Ministers made multiple explicit commitments on the Floor of both Houses to bring in Section 40—I have a list of 25 such commitments. However, last October the Secretary of State announced at a meeting of newspaper editors, that he was “not minded” to commence the statute. Since then, despite being asked on a number of occasions, the Secretary of State has apparently failed to point to any precedent for such non-commencement of part of an Act of Parliament.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness. It was raised by Scottish colleagues—Scottish colleagues with whom I do not agree—but I am quite happy to undertake to write to her. I should say it was raised by the Scottish Law Society, not the Scottish Bar.

Amendments 18 and 246 were spoken to very clearly by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady O’Neill, and the noble Lords, Lord Lipsey and Lord Oates. While I am quite happy to write on the matter of press regulation and the commencement of Section 40, press regulation is not the purpose of the Bill. I have to make that clear in this context because while I understand the points that are being made, they do not arise directly in the context of these amendments.

Moreover, the relevant amendments are not considered necessary. There is already a criminal offence where unlawful interception takes place on a public or private telecommunications system or a public postal service. There is also a cause of action which applies in a limited set of circumstances, where the criminal offence does not apply. Where there is an allegation that unlawful interception has taken place on behalf of a public authority, a person may seek recourse through the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which has the power to provide redress, including awarding damages.

Where the conduct relates to an individual who does not belong to a public authority, there are other causes of action which may be applicable. I may have misunderstood the noble Baroness that the tort which currently exists in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—allowing an individual to take action against a person who has the right to control the use or operation of a private telecommunications system and who intercepts a communication on that system—has been added to the Bill by way of Clause 8, and that happened after the debate on the Bill in the other place. In these circumstances, we are not prepared to accept the amendments.

Turning to Amendments 20 and 21, Clauses 6(2) and 6(3) are important because they provide that where a public authority, or a telecommunications operator, is acting in accordance with a warrant properly obtained under the Bill, or the provisions of Clauses 42 to 50, they can be sure that they are not breaking any other law or required to obtain additional authorisations. This legal certainty is vital for those engaged in the essential work of keeping us safe.

The first amendment seeks to provide that future legislation could make that conduct unlawful for certain purposes. I understand the principle the noble Lords seek to achieve but I do not believe it is necessary. Nothing in the Bill prevents Parliament amending the legislation at a future date to make any of the activity unlawful or provide that some additional authorisation is required.

The second amendment seeks to amend subsection (3). The purpose of this subsection is to make clear that conduct undertaken in accordance with a warrant or which is authorised by any of Clauses 42 to 50 is to be treated as lawful. This is vital in providing companies with reassurance that by complying with a warrant they will not be acting unlawfully in relation to their regulatory obligations or other legislation. The effect of this amendment would be to provide that the conduct is lawful only for the purposes of the Bill. My concern, were we to accept this amendment, would be that we would remove the legal certainty that the companies and agencies rely on to do their job and to keep us safe. We therefore do not accept the amendment.

Amendment 84 relates to exceptions from the duty not to make unauthorised disclosures about warrants. It is absolutely right that the Secretary of State should be accountable to Parliament, even for the most sensitive decisions concerning the most sensitive powers. But when it comes to such matters, which necessarily must remain secret, it is absolutely right that Parliament provides a mechanism for the Secretary of State to be held to account, while at the same time doing nothing to jeopardise national security. That is the very reason for the existence of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

To put beyond doubt that the Secretary of State is, and will continue to be, accountable to Parliament through the ISC for decisions relating to warrants, the Government amended Clause 54 and Clause 123 to make clear that the Secretary of State may disclose matters relating to warrants to the ISC. This will allow the ISC to carry out its statutory functions in holding the Government to account, while maintaining our security. It is right for the ISC to carry out this function and it would not be appropriate for disclosure to be made to Parliament as a whole. To do so would breach the long-standing principle of successive Governments to neither confirm nor deny matters relating to intelligence and security and could risk jeopardising our national security. Accordingly, I invite the noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Paddick]

Can the Minister clarify whether it is not then an offence for the Secretary of State to disclose the existence or content of a warrant to the ISC? That is not our understanding of the Bill.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It may be then that we have to agree to disagree. It is my understanding of the Bill and it is our position that the Secretary of State is entitled to make disclosure to the ISC for the purposes of answering to the ISC in this context.