Lord Norton of Louth
Main Page: Lord Norton of Louth (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Norton of Louth's debates with the Cabinet Office
(7 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my noble friend Lord Cormack had planned to speak in today’s debate, but regrets that he is not able to be here as he is indisposed. As this is a Second Reading debate, I intend to focus on the principle of the Bill. Before I do, I want to comment on the extent of the views of the public on the issue of reform. There is a general assumption that people are keen to change your Lordships’ House and I want to put that into perspective.
I would remind noble Lords of a Populus poll a decade ago which put different options on reform of the Lords. In respect of the proposition that at least half the Members of the House of Lords should be elected so that the upper Chamber of Parliament had democratic legitimacy, 72% agreed. On the proposition that the House of Lords should remain a mainly appointed House because that gave it a degree of independence from electoral politics and allowed people with a broad range of experience and expertise to be involved in the law-making process, 75% agreed in the very same poll.
Another poll a decade ago asked the public what they thought were the important factors in determining the legitimacy of the House of Lords. The most important was trust in the appointments process, with some 76% rating it as very important. The next was that this House considers legislation carefully, which 73% thought was very important. The third was that many Members are experts in their field; 54% thought that that was important. That the House acts in accordance with public opinion; 53% thought that was important. Only then do we get to some Members being elected by the public, which only half thought was important.
In other words, the public give priority to what the noble Baroness referred to in terms as “output legitimacy” rather than “input legitimacy”. They would rather retain the functions of the present second Chamber than give priority to the election of its Members—and it is that principle I will focus on because the noble Baroness quite rightly distinguished between input and output legitimacy. I want to challenge the point about input legitimacy and make the case that one can argue for the existing House based on that very legitimacy.
It is all too easy to generate a scheme for reform of this House. Plenty of people come up with a pet scheme, often thinking that they are the first to propose indirect elections through learned societies or direct elections through regional elections when in fact they are only the latest in a long line of people who have thought of such a scheme. In effect they are starting at the end, not at the beginning. They do not begin from first principles. Why do we need reform—or rather, why do we need to introduce an elected second Chamber?
The proponents tend to take the reason as being self-evident—to some extent this was apparent in the speech of the noble Baroness—and, because it is deemed to be self-evident, they focus on the detail rather than seeking to justify the principle. Election of the second Chamber is offered as the democratic option. The problem with that is that it is not self-evident at all. It is possible to argue that an elected second Chamber is not necessary for the purpose of having a democratic political system. Indeed, I shall develop the case that having an appointed second Chamber actually helps to protect the accountability at the heart of a democratic polity.
Democracy is a contested concept, but if we take its roots, demos and kratos, we have rule of or by the people. It refers to a form of government other than that of monarchy or aristocracy. The key point is that it refers to a body that is to govern—one derived from the authority of the people. In essence, it is about how people choose to govern themselves. There are different ways in which they may choose to do that. We are too large a nation to have direct democracy, so we pursue a western model of liberal and representative democracy. In our system, people choose who is to form the Government though elections to the House of Commons. The party gaining an absolute majority of seats is invited to form a Government. The Government are then responsible for implementing their programme of public policy. Despite what some critics may say, parties in government do not have a bad track record of implementing manifesto promises. In any event, the people know that there is one body, the party in government, responsible for public policy and that the body can be held accountable for that policy. The people can reward or remove that party at the next election. We have what has been termed a system of representative and responsible government.
Our existing second Chamber, which is this House, does not challenge the core accountability that is at the heart of our political system. Ultimately, those elected by the people can get their way. In this House we focus on means, not ends. We are a complementary, not a competing, second Chamber. The United Kingdom thus get the benefits of a bicameral legislature without undermining the accountability that is at the heart of the political system. This House adds value by fulfilling functions that the other House does not have the time or the political will to fulfil, but without challenging its fundamental role in our political system.
Electing a second Chamber, far from enhancing democracy, could undermine the very accountability at the heart of the political system. It would create a Chamber that might not necessarily be equal with the first but would have the basis for demanding more powers, as well as utilising the powers of this House that are presently not used. Election would kick away the rationale for the Parliament Acts. They might remain on the statute book, but the moral basis for them would disappear. Indeed, there is no reason why the noble Baroness’s Bill should not include a clause repealing the Parliament Acts, because it removes their raison d’être.
An elected second Chamber would be in a position to challenge, and compete with rather than complement, the first Chamber, which we could no longer refer to as the elected Chamber. Conflict between the Chambers would, if experience elsewhere is a guide, have the potential to produce deals that would favour not necessarily the electors but parties or special interests, and could be agreed away from the glare of public observation. It would undermine the accountability at the heart of our political system. Electors would not know who to hold to account for outcomes of public policy. There would no longer be one body, the party in government, responsible for public policy.
I will quote my colleague Professor Colin Tyler, a specialist in democratic theory. Giving written evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill, he stated that,
“democratising one part of Parliament (the Lords) will reduce the democratic character of the whole (Parliament). And ultimately it is the democratic character of Parliament that matters, not the democratic character of its constituent parts considered in isolation from each other”.
Thus I regard the Bill as being flawed in principle—and even those who do not are likely to find it problematic. It follows the Parliament (No. 2) Bill of 1969 in creating voting and non-voting Members. The criticisms of the proposal are as germane now as they were in 1969. On that occasion, the Labour MP Willie Hamilton tabled an amendment to remove the distinction between voting and non-voting Peers. He objected to the two-tier membership, summarising his key contention in a memorable phrase:
“It seems that a voteless peer would be as impotent as a castrated tomcat”.—[Official Report, Commons, 19/2/69; col. 481.]
In his view there would be first-class and second-class Members. The noble Baroness said that we have that at the moment because there are people who attend and those who are not so regular in their attendance—but everybody is none the less equal in terms of their status in this place.
It is not clear what benefit would derive from having non-voting Peers, not least from the perspective of government. Ministers would know that they constitute no threat. We have enough difficulty as it is using the threat of voting against the Government to get a Minister to pay serious attention to proposed amendments. Having voting rights gives one a capacity for some leverage; without them, one is no threat to government. There is thus a serious debate to be had as to whether the provision for non-voting Peers should remain in the Bill. One could argue that one should either confer voting rights or remove the Members altogether from the House.
There are other provisions that clearly merit critical debate, but my detailed concerns can be pursued in Committee. My principal objection is that the Bill is built on weak foundations. Once those foundations give way, the edifice collapses.
My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, who, in his own way, has tried to bring clarity to a very complex situation in House of Lords reform. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for bringing this Bill forward. It is very important, and I will explain why in a moment.
I shall preface my comments by saying that noble Lords and this House do some very good work. Since I have been here—I am one of the newer Members of this House—I have often been asked how I would describe the House of Lords. I say, “A vacuum cleaner”. People look at me rather strangely, and I say, “Because it cleans up a lot of dust and dirt in the legislation that comes from the other place and passes it back much cleaner and with much more clarity”.
However, being a good vacuum cleaner is not good in terms of a modern, outward-looking, functioning democracy, and therefore I shall start where the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, started. There is a matter of principle here. In a modern democracy, the people should elect those who make, reform and review their law. It is a matter of fundamental principle. I noticed that in quoting what the public want the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, used statistics that are a decade old. I shall bring to his attention and that of the House the fact that there are many newer surveys. A Survation poll in 2015 showed that only 12% of those polled supported the status quo of a wholly or predominantly appointed House. Another poll done in the Midlands in 2015 showed that 52% of the electorate said that they wanted a wholly democratically elected House and only 28% said that Members should be appointed by experience or knowledge. An i-Say online poll in 2014 showed that 60% of respondents wanted a wholly democratically elected second Chamber and only 34% wanted the status quo.
The noble Lord is quite right that if citizens are offered a dichotomous choice, that is what they come up with. That is fairly consistent. When they are given a range of options, not least between input and output legitimacy, you tend to get very different views. It all depends. My point was that it depends on how you phrase the question.
Indeed, the noble Lord is correct. When you give the public a loaded question, as in some of the examples that he gave, the response is the same. All I am pointing out is that using data that are 10 years out of date does not help the debate.
That comes to my other point which is about expertise. Sometimes the expertise in this House is up to date and very good, but sometimes it might not be up to date.
When we talk about that matter of principle and what the public say, it is quite important that we understand that there is a need to see what they are saying. I came here because of what happened when the coalition Government tried to reform the House of Lords. I did not want to be a Member of your Lordships’ House until then, but when I was asked by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, I said yes because I genuinely believed in the concept and principle that this House should be democratically elected. I took the view that it was all right for me to be outside the House saying that, but sometimes you have to step up to the plate so that your vote counts and you can make the reform that you wish to make. I have to say that my opinion has been strengthened since I have been here, even though I do see some good work in the House.
It is quite strange that in 2017, in a modern democracy, we have a House of patronage and privilege. It is quite amazing. Our approach until now has been to tinker, and although I respect the work that the Lord Speaker’s committee is doing and the view of the House that we should reform, it is tinkering with what for me is fundamentally wrong with the House in terms of principle. It is like looking at a modern highway system, where people are talking about using electronic and driverless cars, while we are talking about which different carriage to put on the horse. It is not appropriate just to talk about reducing the numbers in the House. The Bill puts the concept of democracy and an elected House very much in the spotlight, and that is why I support it.
However, the Bill can be improved. I shall not go over arguments that have already been addressed, but I feel that having a group of Members who are not elected but can stay here causes problems, in terms of both size and logistics. That part of the Bill needs looking at again. I also want to mention the voting system itself. This is where, as a Liberal Democrat, I put my anorak on and start talking about different proportional systems. Your Lordships would expect a Liberal Democrat to do that, but I believe that the voting system in the Bill needs to be changed because, as a lot of people say, the list system gives power to the parties rather than the electorate. It is the party that decides where and how somebody goes on the list, and therefore it is more or less a party choice who gets there. I support the multi-member single transferable vote system, because that gives real power to people to have a choice—not just of one person but of a number of people who they might wish to give a preference to. They can choose between parties and between party and non-party. If someone has an expertise in or relevance to that region, people can choose them and have the power to rank them. The make-up of the House would be very different and there would be less power in the hands of the parties than if we stuck to the list system. It would allow the electorate to have a voice in giving a preference to people who were not just on the party list. I support that.
Another issue that keeps getting raised is the power of the House, and the suggestion that there will somehow be a constitutional crisis if the House is democratically elected. Let us be very clear: if the House was democratically elected, there would not be a constitutional crisis around the breakfast tables in Sheffield, Sunderland or Southend. The world would continue. The evolution of our democracy and this House would continue. That is the way that we work. This democracy and this Parliament do not sit in isolation, and there are many examples across the world of bicameral institutions where the second Chamber is elected. There is an extremely good study by UCL which looks at them. There are 58 Parliaments across the world with a second Chamber, and 24 of those are directly elected—24 out of the 58. Are we saying that across the world there are 24 Parliaments that cannot and do not function, do not have rules about checks and balances, and cannot do things? The two Parliaments that always get talked about in terms of deadlock are those of Italy and, particularly, the USA, but interestingly, those are the two Parliaments specifically where the second Chamber either has equal powers or, in the case of the US in some areas, more powers. That is what creates that deadlock. No one here is talking about significantly changing the powers of this House in terms of being a reforming and revising Chamber. I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich that we will have to look at some powers within that but I am not of the view that this creates either a deadlock or a constitutional crisis, and examples around the world prove that to be the case.
In fact, I argue that this might naturally strengthen democracy, as the democratically elected second Chamber could flex its muscles accordingly. Since I came to this House, I have been amazed by how many times this House backs away from acting on a matter of principle because it is afraid of what the other House might say. If we had a democratically elected House, with very clear powers, as I have explained exist in 24 countries around the world, that would give us the flexibility to flex our muscles appropriately and prevent a democratically elected dictatorship through the Executive being able to get their will when and how they it want in both Houses of this Parliament. I think a second elected Chamber could increase democracy, hold the Executive more to account and give the voice of the people a greater say in their democracy.
I shall come back to one other issue before I wind up. By having a second elected Chamber, we would have a whole new cadre of career politicians. As I said, with STV that would not necessarily be the case, but I would also like to look at a right of recall. I support a limit of one term; we can argue over whether it should be eight, 10 or 15 years. I support the idea that there needs to be accountability in the Bill. If there is to be just one term, there has to be some right of recall if someone does something wrong, so that even within that term the electorate can have the person they elected recalled. Their elected representatives cannot just do what they want when they want without having some accountability to the electorate that they serve.
I support the general thrust and principle of the Bill. As I have said, it could enhance the democracy of our Parliament. It could still mean that we had a different voting system and a mixture of people in this House. For me, it is a matter of principle that it is accountable, elected and answerable to the people we serve and make laws for. It could also hold the Executive more to their mandate than this House does at times because it is afraid to flex the muscles that a democratically elected second Chamber, within the powers specified, would have.