House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 11th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, time precludes me from digressing to explain why my noble friend Lord True and the noble Lord, Lord Newby, exaggerated the significance of Magna Carta. The charter of 1215 did not have the impact they ascribe to it. I fear that this may be the only observation I make today that has not already been made by others.

As several speakers in this debate have stressed, any proposed changes to the composition, or indeed the structure or powers, of the House should be assessed in terms of their impact on the capacity of the House to fulfil its functions. Form should follow function. This House complements the House of Commons by fulfilling tasks that the elected House does not have the time, or sometimes the political will, to carry out. It fulfils these tasks by virtue of having, at the individual level, a membership that is characterised by experience and expertise and, at the collective level, the composition that gives it some detachment from government. It is the latter point on which I wish to focus.

The principal argument for the membership of the House of hereditary Peers derives not from who they are, or what they do—important though both are, as we have heard from many speakers—but rather from how they get here. They constitute the only body of Peers who arrive independent of prime ministerial patronage. Not only who they are, but their number, is not within the gift of the Prime Minister. That ensures some degree of detachment.

Prime Ministers may nominate persons of distinction; they may show some restraint in the number they nominate; they may be generous in inviting leaders of other parties to put forward names. The problem is that they may do none of these things. This has the potential to degrade the capacity of the House to fulfil its essential functions. As several noble Lords have already said, there is value in having a route into the House that is independent of prime ministerial control.

That is not an argument against passing this Bill. It is an argument against passing it is as a stand-alone Bill. If one removes the independent route into the House, one has to substitute a route that brings in Members that are not here on the basis of unrestrained prime ministerial power. The Bill therefore needs to be linked to one that covers the process by which names are proposed to the sovereign, be it independent of the Prime Minister or through ensuring that the Prime Minister does not nominate individuals who lack the experience or expertise—or for that matter the commitment —necessary to fulfil the essential tasks of the House.

The passage of this measure addressing output therefore needs to be conjoined with one that addresses input. I have a Bill being debated later this Session that addresses the points I have made, but obviously it does not need to be that Bill. The key point is that the provisions of this Bill should not be commenced until such time as a Bill addressing nominations, ensuring that there is some means of Members coming in independent of unrestrained, and possibly ill-judged, patronage is achieved.

This is wholly in line with the Government’s proposals for House of Lords reform. It ensures that two of their proposals are linked rather than treated as discrete measures, each independent of the other. The Government’s commitment to reform the appointments process must march in step with their commitment to enact this Bill. Picking up on the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Quin, this would not be a big-bang reform and I believe there would be consensus. It will be valuable to hear from the Leader of the House what is the argument of principle against adopting such an approach.