Higher Education and Research Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 6th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as professor of government at the University of Hull and as chair of the Higher Education Commission, which draws together figures from business, Parliament and academia. I am also one of the co-chairs of the Parliamentary University Group, which held a valuable meeting this morning on the relationship between social media and student mental health.

My starting point is that a higher education Bill has been needed for some time, especially to reform the regulatory framework of higher education. The Higher Education Commission published a well-received report three years ago arguing that the existing regulatory structures were, as we put it, outmoded and unfit for purpose. Failure to address the problem, we argued, put students at risk, especially in the increasingly diversified HE sector. We favoured a new regulatory architecture, not for the sake of regulation per se but in order to protect students, maintain HE’s global reputation and encourage investment. There are features of the Bill that chime with the recommendations of the HE Commission and I therefore welcome the provisions that provide a more secure and sustainable regulatory framework.

However, I have concerns with the framework, especially what may be termed the gold-plating. Too much power, as we have heard, is concentrated in the centre. I have problems with other parts of the Bill, not least, but not exclusively, those covering the proposed teaching excellence framework. I can summarise my principal concerns under three heads.

First, I welcome the recognition of the importance of teaching and that it is given some parity of esteem with research. However, my concern is that research and teaching remain treated as discrete aspects of higher education. I endorse strongly the comments of my noble friend Lord Patten of Barnes and of the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Finsbury. Incentives need to be created to cultivate the relationship between teaching and research, both at the institutional and sector levels.

Secondly, the provisions of the Bill are not sufficiently robust in terms of student protection. Requiring HE institutions to provide student protection plans is a starting point but should not be an end-point. There need to be more robust provisions in the Bill to ensure that students are able to continue their education in the event of institutional failure. The HE Commission recommended an ABTA-like levy on HE providers to create a fund to cover for any eventuality of institutional failure. There are other ways of providing cover, but that at least would provide reassurance to students. Leaving student protection plans as no more than empty shells in the Bill is insufficient.

Thirdly, the provision for a teaching excellence framework is flawed. The proposed TEF operates at the institutional level, whereas, as my noble friend has already mentioned, teaching excellence needs to be measured at the degree or course level. One only has to look at the figures in the National Student Survey of satisfaction to see the variation within institutions. Furthermore, as we have heard, the metrics to be employed do not really get at the quality of teaching. What is proposed in the Bill is far too blunt. The likelihood is that, as with the REF, universities will engage in gaming the system and devote considerable resources to the task. The REF exercise, after many years, remains flawed, and the danger is that the TEF will be even more problematic. It may well serve to drive up costs rather than teaching quality.

I end on a point of general principle: the Bill should be based on the principle of subsidiarity. There are certain things that need to be done nationally, but everything else should be left to the institutions of higher education to determine individually or, in some cases, collectively. There is a need for as much transparency as possible, so that prospective students can make informed choices. The more choice available, the better. We need to encourage innovation and diversity. We need to protect institutional autonomy and, as has already been stressed, to distinguish between quality and standards. Perhaps my noble friend the Minister can tell us what plans there are to amend the Bill further to ensure that it complies with the principle of subsidiarity. I appreciate that there was a Green Paper and a White Paper, but perhaps my noble friend can also tell us why this Bill was not subject to pre-legislative scrutiny.

Higher Education and Research Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 16th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Garden of Frognal (LD)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group to which I have added my name and those that have come from the Cross Benches—Amendments 69 and 510—on which I think we will be hearing shortly. These amendments come out of the report from the Delegated Powers Committee, which claims that the wide range of functions that are now being conferred on the Office for Students will give it the ability to bring change to the whole of the higher education sector. We consider that the guidance issued by the Secretary of State under Clause 2 will act as a significant control over how the Office for Students exercises its functions. However, we cannot guarantee that Secretaries of State will always be wise and non-interventionist, and I think that these amendments will provide much-needed safeguards in the Bill.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 65 and 510 in this group were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, who is unable to be with us today. I wish to make a few comments in support of those amendments.

The concept of quasi-legislation—the generation of rules and guidance by public authorities—is not new. However, the use of such quasi-legislation appears to be growing: it is convenient to government, it provides some degree of flexibility and it may also put it beyond legislative scrutiny and approval unless provision is made for such scrutiny and approval.

This Bill is of extreme importance. It creates a body, the Office for Students, that is much more powerful than HEFCE. The functions that it draws together are quite substantial and extensive. They enable the OfS, essentially, to shape the nature of higher education. That in itself raises issues which we will be discussing further. However, here, under Clause 2(2), we have the power to give guidance but without any transparency and with no parliamentary involvement. That matters, especially in the context of this Bill. Through the power to give guidance, the Minister may, effectively, usurp the power of the OfS. I am sure my noble friend the Minister will say that guidance will be rare and benign, but there is nothing to stop a future Secretary of State with less than benign intent using the power on a scale that is significant, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

As the noble Baroness has just said, this provision has been commented on by the Delegated Powers Committee. It stressed that there is no parliamentary scrutiny of the guidance and no requirement for it to be published. In response to the Government’s defence of the provision, the committee goes on to say:

“We are wholly unconvinced by the Department’s reasons”.


That includes, as I have already stressed, the fact that the remit of the OfS goes far broader than HEFCE, and the guidance that the Minister can give to HEFCE has no statutory basis.

The committee also makes the point, of course, that the requirement for the OfS to “have regard to” guidance rather limits it. The Office for Students could, if it had cogent reasons, discard the guidance. However, there would have to be compelling reasons for that, and, as the Delegated Powers Committee points out, under Clause 71(1), the Secretary of State has the power to give the OfS “general directions” about the performance of its functions.

There is a powerful case for ensuring there is parliamentary scrutiny and engagement in respect of the power to give guidance—that is the purpose of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane. Other provisions in the Bill are clearly Henry VIII provisions. The measure is extensive in terms of the concept of quasi-legislation. I am sure we will be coming back to this on several occasions during the passage of the Bill. However, I look forward to my noble friend’s response acknowledging the significance of the powers that are being confirmed and I look forward to hearing what the Government plan to do about it.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I support what has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, and draw attention to my own interests in the register. We have a perfectly clear piece of legislation in Clause 2(1), in which Parliament tells the OfS what it must do and what it must have regard to. We then have the creation in Clause 2(2) to Clause 2(6) of guidance which has absolutely no parliamentary scrutiny, whether before or after the Secretary of State chooses to issue that guidance. It looks like legislation, because it is contained in Clause 2, but it is not legislation and it should be.

There is a remarkably strange feature if we turn 44 pages onwards to Clause 71, where we have the power granted to the Secretary of State to give directions. Of course, that is going to be a necessary ingredient of the Bill. The strange thing about it is that in the directions, Clause 71(2) is in identical terms to the guidance authorisation in Clause 2(3); Clause 71(3) replicates Clause 2(4); and Clause 71(4) replicates Clause 2(5). In other words, there are identical provisions in these two clauses: one creates the power in the Secretary of State to give guidance, the other gives the Secretary of State, after Parliament has agreed, the power to issue directions.

As far as I can see, there is no indication about the criteria which should be applied as to whether a particular directive by the Secretary of State should be treated as guidance or legislation. The fact of the matter is that there is now going to be power to give guidance with no statutory scrutiny and power or authority to give directions which will be subject to statutory scrutiny. There is no logical reason why we should have such an absurd situation. The amendment proposes simply that the guidance should be brought before the House at some stage in the process so that the House can have a look at it. We should have a chance to consider guidance issued by the department in this influential new arrangement.

Higher Education and Research Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 18th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve (CB)]

My Lords, as a long-term university teacher, often rated by my students, both in this country and overseas, I have a sense of some metrics that are less gameable than others. That is surely what any attempt to measure things must look like. Student satisfaction about the beer is, obviously, not the best place to look. There are some well-known ways of looking at teaching which, if one can get the measurements, are quite useful. One might be how much a student has actually attended the required instruction. Statistics have been collected on this by the Higher Education Policy Institute, but if it was known that they were a metric I fear that they would be gamed. It is remarkable—and I think that I mentioned this at Second Reading—that the average for UK students a few years ago, when I last looked, was 13 hours per week of non-required work, above lecture and lab hours. That is not huge, but it varied from a number that I dare not even state to 51 hours of private study a week. That was for medics at some of our leading universities. That is one metric that cannot be gamed, but there are a few others. The number of pages written in a term or semester is quite instructive, and the number of those pages that receive feedback or commentary is another instructive metric. All those things are unglamorous—but you have to take extreme care in using them. Simple online tests of mastery of first language, second language and relevant mathematics might be worth looking at, but I do not think that student satisfaction is going to give us an accurate view of what is really going on.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this grouping, and I declare my interest as a serving academic. I share the views of the noble Lord, Lord Desai, who I gather is a fellow graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, on the NSS, and to some extent those of my noble friend Lord Willetts. The survey provides valuable feedback and is a useful form of intelligence, but I am not sure that it can bear the weight that it has been given in this proposal for the TEF.

I commend the Government for recognising the importance of teaching and their acknowledgement of the complementarity of teaching and research. I commend them also for seeking to enhance teaching excellence. Ensuring that more information, and comparable information, is made available to prospective students, and encouraging the dissemination of best practice within HE, are wholly commendable goals. My amendments would protect the provision of information. I have no problem with introducing incentives to HE institutions to enhance teaching quality, but where we need to stress test this part of the Bill is in creating a statutory link between teaching quality and the level of fees being charged for that teaching.

There are three problems with the link stipulated in the Bill. The first is defining what is meant by teaching excellence. The proposed metrics for the TEF are too blunt to meet the assessment criteria and, in some respects, too narrow. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill state:

“The Teaching Excellence Framework is intended to provide clear, understandable information to students about where teaching quality is outstanding and to establish a robust”—


I always worry the moment I see the word “robust”—

“framework for gathering information to measure teaching in its broadest sense”.

I have no problem with the first part of the statement. It is the second part that is problematic. What is meant by teaching “in its broadest sense”? For me, it encompasses the capacity to develop not only intellectual but also personal skills that will enable students to fulfil their full potential as individuals in wider society. This may not be confined to career goals but may extend to being worthwhile members of society—in effect, good citizens. How does one measure that added value? It goes beyond the assessment criteria. I have serious concern with some of the metrics, because I fear that they may privilege status rather than teaching excellence.

The second concern is that, in so far as one can assess teaching excellence, quality is at department or course level, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, and others have stressed. One has only to look at the National Student Survey to see variations between the aggregate at institutional level and the performance at subject and course levels. Yet the intention is to enable an institution to charge a higher fee level, which may apply to all courses, even those which deliver less quality than courses at other institutions which are not able to increase their fees.

The third concern, as we have heard already from the noble Lord, Lord Watson, is that there is no clear link between fees and teaching excellence. Higher fees will not necessarily serve to drive up teaching quality, but rather enable HE providers to spend more on marketing and ensuring brand recognition. More money may be spent on providing services to students, but not necessarily on their teaching.

In short, the proposal before us is based on a concept that is not clearly defined, cannot fairly be applied at institutional level and asserts a link that has not been proven. I look forward to my noble friend the Minister assuaging my concerns.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

I declare an interest as former principal of St Anne’s, Oxford, and former independent adjudicator of higher education. I am speaking in support of Amendment 122. I have three very brief points to make.

First, it has been alleged that the whole purpose of the Bill is to enable universities to raise fees, and that all the contortions that we are going through in relation to the Bill is centred on this one element—that one will be able to raise fees if the teaching is good. That seems to me not a healthy way to approach it.

Secondly, there is profound disagreement about what is good teaching. One metric is likely to be the prevention of drop-outs and helping students from non-traditional or underprivileged backgrounds to get through the course without failing. This must tempt tutors and lecturers to spoon-feed and it is simply not clear in higher education whether the temptation for spoon-feeding—a brief term but I think all noble Lords understand what I mean—will be enhanced by some of the metrics, as I understand them.

My third point is related to the question of teaching students from less-privileged backgrounds. What will this link do to social mobility? The better universities, however they are judged, are quite likely to be Oxbridge and the Russell group, are they not? They will be able to charge higher fees. Some other universities, which will be taking more of those from underprivileged and less-traditional backgrounds, and may be doing more spoon-feeding, may well find that their teaching is not rated so highly, for reasons that all of us who have ever taught such students very well understand. They will charge lower fees. It will become a reinforcing division: the so-called “best” universities charging the higher fees will attract those students who can afford them and the not so good under this scale—the bronze—will likely get the not-so-good students who cannot afford the fees. This will really damage social mobility and parity of esteem, not to mention the fact that this is coupled with the abolition of maintenance grants, meaning that more students will be forced to go to their local university. So my question to the Minister is: what effect do the Government think the linking of fees to teaching quality will have on social mobility?

Higher Education and Research Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 18th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

My Lords, with this amendment we move to registration conditions, and a number of issues arise in this and subsequent groups in relation to these conditions. The conditions are very important and I do not think that we should skip too quickly over them, despite what I just said about trying to move forward quickly. As well as my amendments, to which other noble Lords have very kindly added their name, this group includes an interesting amendment from the right reverend Prelate. They affect some important issues and it is worth pausing slightly on each amendment as we go through.

Amendment 132 picks up the hopefully unlikely situation that if a provider was to close—or, as does happen, a course closes—there should not be any reasonable financial loss transferred to individual students. There are one or two scare stories about how difficult it is sometimes to extricate students who have commitments, particularly when a course has an overseas engagement. The amendment is valuable in that it picks up on an area that is not covered well in the Bill. However, it may not be necessary to press it if sufficient reassurances about the processes that would be applied can be given when the noble Baroness comes to respond.

Amendment 133 was an attempt to use the registration conditions contained in the Bill to, in this particular clause, try to sketch out a bit more what was meant by saying that there is a vision of what universities are in the United Kingdom. The amendment lists a range of issues that one would hope to see in these institutions, which may or may not be attractive to the Government in trying to help with their understanding of it. It is a probing amendment and deals with something that is of interest. We will read what they say in due course and think about bringing it back, if necessary.

Amendment 134 would enable the OfS to set stricter requirements for new providers to get on to the register by looking in more detail than is perhaps given in the Bill at the moment at previous history and the forecast of future sustainability. The problem we come up against is that, in considering challenger institutions, we are often talking about very small and relatively recently formed organisations, some of which may not even have proper corporate status or, indeed, the issues related to that, which I gather have been touched on in the Minister’s recent letter about what was required of an institution intending to register as a university—that was very helpful. This plays back against a little of that because there will be concerns about small institutions. They may be unwarranted but size is a factor in what may be required to sustain an institution. We need to think about track records and these entry requirements might be worth considering in that context.

With Amendment 138 we are again back to the question of what happens in the event of the failure of a course or institution. It is more about courses and focuses on simple protection plans which would make sure that there was no disruption to the studies of existing students if a particular course was pulled out, and more generally would make sure that institutions that fail have got plans in place to ensure that the students effected are not lost to the system, for example, and that there are other arrangements.

Our attention has been drawn to the phrasing of the Technical and Further Education Bill, which contains significant recommendations in this area. They do not appear in the Higher Education and Research Bill and I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why we do not have the same degree of reassurance in this area as we will have when the Technical and Further Education Bill becomes law. There is a gap—it may just be because the two Bills are proceeding at a different pace—and if it is possible to look at that and bring back something on Report, it would be a good thing.

Amendment 149 relates to a technical question about what happens to students in any suspension period. At the moment the regulations are clear in general terms but they are not specific about what would happen in terms of notifying students. The student protection plan agreement should be revisited to make sure that that is covered.

Amendment 224 would ensure that when higher education providers produce an access and participation plan there is a consultation process with the students—and it gives a definition of the students who would be consulted. I beg to move.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 138, to which I am a signatory.

I made the point at Second Reading that a shell provision for student protection plans is not sufficient to reassure students that, in the event of institutional failure, they will be able to continue their education. I chair the Higher Education Commission and in our report, Regulating Higher Education, we stressed the need to have a strategy in place that allowed for an institution to exit the market in an orderly manner with the right level of protection in place for students.

Institutional failure would create obvious problems for students, not least in terms of disrupting their education and potentially leaving them adrift, at significant financial cost. As we argued, good governance and proper scrutiny should reduce the chances of failure, but there needs to be greater attention given to what happens when an institution does fail.

On the recommendation of HEFCE, we looked at the travel insurance industry, which participates in a sector-wide scheme to protect air passengers. We argued that this model could be applied to the HE sector, with a requirement for institutions to sign up and pay a sum per student into a fund which would cover costs in the event of failure. Our recommendation was:

“Institutions need to be better prepared for the possibility of a failure in the sector. Given the potential damage this could inflict on students and the sector as a whole, a ‘protection’ or ‘insurance’ scheme coordinated by the lead regulator should be put in place”.


I welcome the fact that the Bill recognises the need to have some student protection plan in place, but merely placing a duty on the OfS to ensure that such plans are in place is inadequate, in my view, for the purpose of providing the reassurance to students before they embark on a course of higher education that they will be able to complete it. The more new entrants come in to HE and the more a market exists, the greater the risk becomes. However, it is not the new entrants causing the potential problem; that already exists. It just exacerbates the potential.

Higher Education and Research Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 23rd January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 251 in this grouping. In opening, I stress that I do not have a problem with alternative providers in HE. I chair the Higher Education Commission and we are presently undertaking an inquiry into alternative providers. They are numerous and the nature of their provision varies enormously. I heard from some of them earlier this afternoon. Some cater to thousands of students, others to a small number in what are essentially niche subjects.

What is important is that arrangements are in place to protect students. Last week we discussed the provision for student protection plans. At issue here is the giving of degree-awarding powers and the need to ensure that such powers are conferred on bodies that have the proven capacity to maintain the required standards of a UK degree, and to do so for as long as they have such powers.

There is considerable concern about provision for “probationary” degree-awarding powers. If a probationary period is to mean anything, it is that the continuation of degree-awarding powers is not guaranteed at the end of the period. What happens at the end of the three-year probationary period if such powers are not continued? What happens to students still at the institution? What worth attaches to the degrees of those who have already graduated? Furthermore, what is the risk to the UK HE brand if probationary degree-awarding powers are conferred on bodies with no established track record of delivering high-quality education? My amendment seeks to protect the position of students and of the HE brand, by ensuring that the OfS may not authorise a provider to grant degrees, unless the provider has validation arrangements in place.

I appreciate that confining the provision to validation by existing HE institutions runs the risk of imposing uniformity, with established institutions not being too keen on validating innovative teaching methods and possibly not fully appreciating the value of the alternative provision. The way round that is to ensure that there is an independent validating body. Clause 47 enables the Secretary of State to authorise the OfS to be the validator of last resort, but I recognise the problem of allowing the regulator to have such a power. It is not a power that should be vested in the regulator. I would rather see an independent body, akin to the old CNAA, created. That deserves serious consideration. I thus favour amending this clause along the lines of Amendment 251 and the other amendments in this group, along with the later removal of Clause 47 and its replacement by a provision that would create a body equivalent to the old CNAA. That, to my mind, would inject the necessary protections while not deterring new entrants to the field.

[Lord Kerslake (CB)]

My Lords, I speak in favour of Amendments 251, 252, 259 and 260. In doing so, I very much echo the thoughts of the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. These amendments would remove the probationary powers provisions and put a higher test before universities could award degrees. I tabled these amendments because the Government have seriously underestimated the risk to the reputation of the university sector in what they are doing. Collectively, we need to safeguard this reputation and to require that the OfS or a separate body—as has just been proposed—has the necessary confidence that the organisation to which it is granting degree-awarding powers has the capability to do this on an enduring basis.

I ask noble Lords to put themselves in the position of a student, either in this country or abroad, who comes across the word “probation”. They might wonder what the word means and look at the dictionary here. What the dictionary says is that it relates,

“to a process of testing or observing the character or abilities of a person who is new to a role or job”,

or,

“relating to the release of an offender from detention subject to a period of good behaviour under supervision”.

I venture to suggest that not many students would be reassured by that definition and by the prospect of undertaking a degree at the end of which it would be possible for the whole institution to be found inadequate in its requirements, which must be a possibility under the very definition of these provisions. The term “probationary” is wrong and the concept of “probationary” is wrong. We should, instead, insist that anybody in a position to award degrees is able to do so with an enduring capability. This is a crucial point and it is unfortunate that we are coming to it so late in the evening, because I believe it to be fundamental.

The question your Lordships might ask is: what problem is trying to be solved? I am strongly in favour of new market entry and improving the validating process where it needs improving, but where is the body of evidence that justifies the introduction of probationary degrees? I cannot find it. I have looked carefully at the documents produced on Friday by the Minister, which were very helpful. Page 7 of the factsheet on the validation process refers to “anecdotal evidence”. I suggest that we as the House of Lords should not take our decisions on the basis of anecdotal evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

There can indeed be quite a full debate on the causes of the changes and I hope that in previous debates I have acknowledged the changes in the marketplace. Our aim as a Government is to address these changes. I think that we are all on the same page on that. I am happy to speak to the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, further on that particular issue—in other words, concerning the issues that are leading up to our reforms.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My noble friend has dealt with the point about a body that is awarded a degree-awarding power on a probationary basis and then does not have that power granted at the end of the probationary period, where for current students a student protection plan would be in place. However, if it is a degree-awarding body it may have already awarded degrees. What value does he think would attach to those degrees?

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

Again, I can speak to my noble friend outside the Chamber, but surely there is no change to the current situation. In an extreme position where a provider fails, a student who has a degree from that failed provider would have to take that with him or her. There is surely no change and no reflection in terms of what we are trying to do here.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

Indeed, the noble Lord makes a good point. I am sure that will be taken into account in terms of any further improvements we might wish to make.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

Before my noble friend sits down, could he just clarify on the first amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane? Under Clause 40(10), the OfS can make an order exercisable by statutory instrument and,

“is to apply to such an instrument as if the order had been made by a Minister of the Crown”.

Am I therefore right in believing that, under Clause 113(3), if it is a statutory instrument, it could be prayed against? If that is the case, does that not put the Minister in a difficult situation?

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

My noble friend is very adroit at raising some complicated issues. I should answer the question but also go into some detail as to the different scenarios that might occur. I respect the quality of advice that he gives.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 282A and 347B, which stand in my name. I declare an interest as the pro-chancellor of Lancaster University.

I am learning a lot tonight about parliamentary procedure and affirmative resolutions, and about the relationships between independent regulators, Secretaries of State and Ministers, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, on carrying out such a good exercise in educating me. The questions posed by these amendments are very important. My noble friend Lord Judd is right: if you are to have a much more liberalised system with free entry, you have to have regulation and procedures so that it operates in a fair way.

The purpose of my amendments is simple. I would like to see the OfS be under a statutory obligation to set out its reasons for all the decisions that it has taken. I would like Parliament, once a year, to be able to debate a report which looks at whether, having set out a common set of principles by which the rules should operate, the regulator sticks with it. I think that that is a necessary addition to the ad hoc business of affirmative statutory instruments, and that it would be a sensible addition to the Bill.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I have great sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, has just said. On the lead amendment, Amendment 282, which seeks to make such an order subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, I revert to a point that I made a few moments ago. As I read it, the order-making power in subsection (5) would presumably be subject to being prayed against. I would have thought that if any authorisation was revoked, it would be likely to be highly controversial and therefore might well trigger the order being prayed against. However, that would create the same situation, because the revocation would be by the OfS but the defence would have to be by the Minister, who would be somewhat detached from the whole exercise. I am not sure how that is addressed, and I look forward to my noble friend’s comments.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to explain the provisions on the revocation of degree-awarding powers and university title. I make it absolutely clear that these powers are not intended for frequent use, as I have mentioned before. We see them as a rarely used but necessary safeguard for quality in the system. We know that these powers are significant and that is why we have endeavoured to include strong safeguards, including a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. We have listened carefully and will continue to reflect on whether there are further improvements that we can make, and we will no doubt discuss this matter further on Report.

Our higher education system is world-class and university title and degree-awarding power are valuable assets. It is the responsibility of those that have obtained these prestigious titles to uphold their reputation. However, without powers to hold such providers accountable, we risk undermining the reputation of our universities. Let us consider the impact if a university’s quality and standards were to drop to a wholly unacceptable level, to the extent that it was widely known that its degrees were not comparable to others and the provider in question had done nothing to address this. Would we really want such an institution to continue to benefit from the prestige of a university title?

Higher Education and Research Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 6th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 57. At earlier stages of the Bill I have welcomed the provisions of Clause 13, which provide that the Office for Students can generate student protection plans. That is to be welcomed but, as the noble Lord indicated, the problem is that we do not know what form that protection will take and more needs to be set out on the face of the Bill. I moved an amendment in Committee to try to address this issue but, at that stage, the Government were not receptive. Therefore, we really need to come back to it.

As the noble Lord said, it is the Office for Students—students are meant to be at the heart of this measure, yet they will have no idea of what protection they have when they undertake a course of study. When it comes to protection, Clause 13 gives the example of a course failing to be provided. So precisely what protection is being accorded to students? They need that reassurance if they are to sign up for and pursue courses in the first place. Amendment 57 gets at this problem and I welcome the fact that we are again considering it. As I said, students deserve to have some idea of what protection they will have when they undertake a course of study.

[Baroness Wolf of Dulwich]

My Lords, I support the amendments to which I have put my name and agree with everything that both noble Lords have said so far.

When the Higher Education and Research Bill was first introduced, both Ministers pointed out that the environment in which higher education takes place has changed dramatically in recent years, and indeed it has. Very large numbers of students now take out large loans in the belief, and with the confidence, that the institutions they attend have in some sense been guaranteed by government—that what they are doing is safe in that they will be able to complete their studies. Fortunately, in most cases that is true, but of course it is not always or necessarily true. Anybody who looks at the experience in other countries will realise that institutions do fail, and indeed some of our non-degree-awarding institutions have failed in the past. The Competition and Markets Authority says cheerfully on its website that the sign of a healthy sector is that some exit occurs. Exit sounds quite cool—unless you happen to be one of the students in an exiting institution.

At the same time as this Bill is going through, the Technical and Further Education Bill is being debated, mostly in the Moses Room. As I attend the sittings of both Bills, part of the time I whinge but mostly it is a very informative exercise because we now have a tertiary sector as much as anything else. However, the protections being introduced for students in further education colleges go well beyond anything that has been specified for students in higher education, and that is highly regrettable. It is really important that in this new and changed environment, we realise that students need new and changed protection.

To give an example, for a long time the training sector has had many quite small, and sometimes quite large, rapidly changing institutions. Just before these Bills were introduced in the House, we heard the first story of a training provider that went into liquidation, leaving many people with outstanding loans and no obvious recourse. In the few weeks that both Bills have started to work their way through the House, there have been two other such failures. I shall be happy to give their names to anyone who is curious to know them, but, once again, we are left with, in this case, adult learners who have loans but no ongoing course.

When I raised this issue with the Minister and officials, I was told that the risks were lower for university students because they were more mobile and less local. However, that really is not true. It is not true of my own, but it is true of many of our university institutions that they have home students who are almost all highly local—often because they come from less advantaged families and are very unhappy about taking out major maintenance loans. So they are very local, and if their institution fails, they do not have anywhere else to go.

I hope very much that Ministers feel able, ideally, to accept Amendment 57, which seems to me the least that we can do in an environment where we are, in effect, making a promise to students. If it turns out that, for good reasons, that promise cannot be kept, they ought to be looked after.