Lord Mann
Main Page: Lord Mann (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Mann's debates with the HM Treasury
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt would be tempting to go into some detail on derivatives. Indeed, I have written a public paper about what should happen with over-the-counter derivatives, but suffice it to say that, for the purposes of this debate, I wholeheartedly support the proposal put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Oldham West and Royton (Mr Meacher), which is part of the solution. The concept that all derivatives could be exchanged in the way that he proposes creates complexity and is unsustainable, but the idea that there should not be large-scale clearing house involvement is of great importance.
The opaqueness of the current situation spreads beyond the financial institutions into the largest corporations, which represent about 7% of a market that is specifically concentrated on this country. That is part of the meat of the issue, and it surrounds the financial crisis that we and the rest of the world faced. Very little attention has been given to this in recent times, or at any time since the financial crisis, but the principle must be one of transparency. Otherwise, we get insider trading—the sharing of information. Whether it is done legally because laws are not strong enough or illegally, there is an imperative towards insider trading because it is so lucrative. This opaqueness is fundamental to the problems that we have had, and we have seen it in other sectors such as insurance.
That opaqueness, together with huge bonuses—however they are described by the industry—will lead to people making unsubstantiated claims and reckless gambles. If they have no personal liability—in other words, if they are gambling with other people’s money—which is precisely the problem we had in the run-up to the financial crisis, then there is no comeback, and banks can go out of business. We have seen that with the biggest banks, including Lehman Brothers. One day, the executives are seen scuttling out with their files, and the next day—or perhaps a year or two later—they are coming back into the financial world with more huge salaries and huge bonuses: ever onwards, ever upwards. That is the mentality that underpinned the crisis.
It is not only I or my right hon. Friend the Member for Oldham West and Royton who have this problem but the head of the stock exchange, who said to the Treasury Committee, in relation to the lack of clearing houses and the risks involved, that we are potentially sowing the seeds of the next financial crisis. The conflict between the stock exchange, and others who backed it, and the Government needs to get greater public exposure because it is fundamental to the Government’s weakness in failing to understand that instead of short-term remedies, the creation of transparency is fundamental to the solutions we need.
There were three major problems in the financial crisis. First, we have heard about people living beyond their means—well, the people who were living way beyond their means in this case were those in the financial institutions. That was not properly recognised at the time, or properly regulated. They were borrowing money against something they did not have—a hope, an expectation, a guess for the future, presuming that it would come right in the end—and of course they were personally incentivised so to do.
Secondly, there is off shoring. We have not done enough in this House—I am critical of the previous Government in this respect, as well as the current one—to deal with the British dependencies that are fundamental to the opaqueness of off-shoring. We can do a significant amount about that.
Thirdly, the big investment banks are ferociously competitive in some areas and form an oligarchy in others. They allow no real competition and dominate with their excessive fees and powers. If we get on top of that, the House and the Government—whichever party is in power —will be able to avert future financial crises. If we fail to do so, the next crisis, whether it is in the short or medium term, could hit us just as ferociously as the last.
I, too, congratulate the Backbench Business Committee and my right hon. Friend the Member for Oldham West and Royton (Mr Meacher) on setting up this thoughtful and well-tempered debate. A number of good ideas have been shared among all parts of the House. In fact, there has been much more consensus between the Back Benchers on both sides of the Chamber than between the Front Benchers. We will see whether policy can be shaped by the virtues of our debate, because there has been quite a lot to take away from these discussions.
It is important to reflect on the wide-ranging set of reforms needed to bolster our banks against a repeat of the credit crunch and, as we all want eventually, to create a financial services industry that is sustainable and diverse, and that serves the best interests of both savers and borrowers. There are a number of significant systemic reforms that it is important to reflect on. I shall touch on many of the comments that have been made, but the first point is to look at the motion that is before us. As we can see from the Order Paper, the Government and the Opposition each tabled an amendment to the motion, although neither of us were fortunate enough to have our amendment selected. For our part, although we agree almost entirely with my right hon. Friend, the element in the motion touching on derivatives requires a little more thought.
Many commentators have rung alarm bells about the swirling volumes of derivatives activity in the past decade, with multi-trillion dollar flows and British banks holding at least £l trillion in derivatives. However, derivatives are, for good or ill, a reality of the modern global economy whereby companies and other investors gain exposure to an underlying asset or offset their exposure to that asset without actually buying or selling that asset in the first place. Derivatives are supposed to be designed to reduce risk and volatility for companies, employees and consumers. For example, an airline can hedge—or insure itself—against volatility in fuel prices by taking out a futures derivative, thereby offsetting its exposure to price changes. However, as my right hon. Friend and others have said, the problem is that betting on the future prices of financial assets has proved irresistibly alluring to traders and bankers, who can make billions off the back of this market without having to own the assets on which they are gambling.
There is therefore quite an irony in the fact that products that are intended to help alleviate risk have in many ways massively increased the systemic risk to the economy. Add to that the sheer complexity and opacity, as many hon. Members have mentioned, of some derivative products—collateralised debt obligations-squared, and so forth—and we end up with companies holding derivatives positions that their own management do not understand, failing to appreciate the risks involved. That is why the history of recent collapses has been intricately tied to that problem—including at Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Long-Term Capital Management and even Barings—yet we have still not properly grappled with it.
The reason why we on the Opposition Front Bench cannot quite support my right hon. Friend’s motion is that it essentially calls for an end to over-the-counter derivatives trading and the introduction of a central clearing house. I can see the attraction of that—the standardisation of products and the stronger likelihood that the regulator could peer inside and comprehend the nature of the risks involved—but the downsides are that derivatives could not be easily tailored to the specific needs of the buyer. With the vast majority of derivatives currently privately traded between two parties, the consequences of that structural requirement for exchange trading in all circumstances could be disadvantageous. For instance, could there be a constraint on the specific maturity of the futures options? Would we be unwittingly re-injecting risk into the economy by constraining the ability to hedge responsibly?
The Opposition need, however, to recognise the urgent and far-reaching reforms that are required. Do we need an urgent and thorough review of derivatives and policy on them? Yes, absolutely: both regulators and markets need more transparency in over-the-counter derivatives activities, particularly given the possibility of greater exchange trading. By the way, we also need greater scrutiny of the role played by the credit rating agencies, as the hon. Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom) and others said, given that they have blessed many products with triple A ratings that did not necessarily translate into reality. Should we require greater registration and transparency in these over-the-counter deals? Yes, absolutely. There is too much secrecy, and the consequences for the taxpayer are ultimately too great.
We do not necessarily need to end all bilateral trading of derivatives, but to pick up where the G20 in Pittsburgh left off in 2009. It resolved to move towards greater exchange trading, but not necessarily the end of all over-the-counter trading. I know that we disagree on this specific point in the wording of the motion, but it is important that we should be responsible when considering some of the reforms that are being suggested. It is good that the Backbench Business Committee has enabled this debate to take place today.
I have doubts about the Government's policy on this because they are leaving it very much to the European institutions to lead on this matter, and leaving it up to the European market infrastructure regulations, which are now emerging as the only likely vehicle for reform. It is striking that Ministers are happy to be led, rather than showing leadership on this matter themselves, especially as the UK financial services industry is at the forefront of many of these activities. I urge Ministers to be far more front-footed on these reforms, rather than hanging back and complaining that details and policy are being foisted upon them.
We also need to consider some of the other regulatory shortcomings that have been raised in the debate, including those relating to bonuses, to management incentives skewing behaviour, and to transparency. I do not want to be too partisan, but I find certain aspects of this situation astonishing. My hon. Friends the Members for Streatham (Mr Umunna) and for Leeds East (Mr Mudie) said that the Government needed to show more leadership on banker remuneration. We have seen the appalling confusion and weak will of Ministers even over listing the number of bankers earning more than £1 million. Even that seems to have been a difficult step for them to take.
It is a particular shame that the Business Secretary is not here tonight—at least we have a couple of Liberal Democrats representing him here—especially as he was so vociferous on this subject exactly a year ago in his article in the Daily Mail. He described the proposal to disclose simply the number of bankers earning more than £1 million as a “whitewash”, saying that it would represent only “a small advance”. He went on to say:
“Shareholders who own the banks and the taxpayers who guarantee them have every right to know who is being paid how much and for what…Directors of public companies are already required to declare their earnings…The failure of Walker to grasp this is compounded by Alistair Darling’s meek acceptance of his recommendations. There are splits in the Government…Taxpayers sign the bankers’ bonus cheques, so we must see the names and numbers on them.”
We clearly do not need to wait to see the Business Secretary’s appearance on the Christmas special of “Strictly Come Dancing”; he is perfectly able to perform his volte-faces, somersaults and U-turns one after the other. He is performing spectacular political cartwheels more often than ever before.