Health and Care Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Wednesday 26th January 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Lansley]

162A: Clause 26, page 37, leave out lines 23 to 30
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with another to this Clause, would remove the power of the Secretary of State to set, and from time to time revise, objectives and priorities for the CQC, but would require the CQC to consult the Secretary of State when it revises indicators of quality for the purposes of assessments under subsection (4).

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, the purpose of Clause 26 is to introduce a process by which the Care Quality Commission inspects integrated care systems. The structure of this is the subject of my Amendments 162A and 164A. Those two amendments go together—they are not separate, but entirely linked. The purpose of Amendment 162A is to remove the process by which the Secretary of State sets objectives and priorities for the Care Quality Commission in undertaking such inspections of integrated care systems; Amendment 164A then seeks to insert a process by which the Secretary of State, and indeed others, are consulted by the Care Quality Commission over the quality indicators that it would use to assess the quality and performance of integrated care systems.

A bit of background would be helpful for noble Lords in this respect. Think back to what the Care Quality Commission’s existing statutory arrangements are in relation to reviews and performance assessments of existing bodies in the National Health Service. The structure is very straightforward. The commission is asked to set quality indicators, to consult on those and then to review against them and produce reports. I know from personal experience that the Secretary of State cannot direct the Care Quality Commission to undertake a particular review, but they can certainly make a request, and their role as steward of the whole healthcare system has certainly led Secretaries of State to do that from time to time. But the legislation does not permit the Secretary of State to direct the Care Quality Commission in how it does its job; it is an independent body corporate. There is intrinsic merit in the Care Quality Commission, as an inspectorate, operating independently. The structure of this clause in this Bill is at odds with the way in which the existing legislation is structured in the 2008 NHS Act as amended. The effect of these two amendments would be to restore the independence of the Care Quality Commission in undertaking its activities and in the way in which it goes about its job.

The Government’s drafting of the legislation is wrong anyway. There are references to objectives and priorities. The priorities are referred to in new subsection (3), inserted by Clause 26(2), which says that they

“must include priorities relating to leadership, the integration of services and the quality and safety of services.”

I have to say that this is teaching grandmothers to suck eggs. There is no way in which the Care Quality Commission is not going to incorporate such indicators of quality. We know that from the generic nature of the quality indicators that it uses generally for existing NHS bodies. The reference to setting objectives is not only novel but completely undefined. The Secretary of State can set whatever objectives they wish to; we do not know what they are and there is no indication of what they might be. Taking out references to objectives and priorities seems to me to be a very good thing.

As it happens—I declare my own role in this—in the 2012 legislation there was previously a process by which the Secretary of State set standards for the Care Quality Commission in determining what the quality indicators should look like. We actually took that out of the 2012 legislation, precisely on these grounds: that the Care Quality Commission is, and should be, as independent as possible.

I think this clause proceeds from the mistaken apprehension that the Care Quality Commission is a part of the management process of the NHS. It is not. If the Secretary of State wishes integrated care systems to proceed in any particular way, the Secretary of State has the means to do so available via the mandate; the Government plan to add specific powers of direction; and NHS England has duties that go in exactly the same direction. The Care Quality Commission is not part of the management process for integrated care systems; it is an inspectorate. If—and this is a risk we must avoid—the Secretary of State were directly intervening to set objectives for integrated care systems to be inspected subsequently by the Care Quality Commission, whereas NHS England is itself setting objectives for integrated care systems through its responsibilities and duties, those two may come into conflict.

For all those reasons, the Government would be well advised to accept these two amendments and put the Care Quality Commission into the independent role in relation to ICSs that it, and people working in the National Health Service, would recognise as being its role. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has set out the tensions underlying the Bill about returning to the Secretary of State powers over independent, arms-length bodies; specifically, in this amendment, the inspections carried out by the Care Quality Commission in its role as a regulatory body. He rightly reminded us of the current arrangements, which give the CQC the ability to set its indicators and which, frankly, work well. I will not repeat his arguments, except to say in a slightly wider context that almost every piece of legislation brought to Parliament by this Government has given Ministers more powers—including, as in Clause 26, the power to intervene and to change remits.

The noble Lord’s amendments maintain the independence that the CQC—and other regulatory bodies—need to be able to inspect and make rulings without fear of favour or influence from politicians, while ensuring that the CQC must consult the Secretary of State when it revises indicators of quality for the purposes of assessment. That seems to me to provide the requirement for the CQC and the Secretary of State to engage in dialogue, but without the political intervention outlined in Clause 26(2) and (5).

Can the Minister explain why the Government feel the need to remove the independence of the CQC—whether this is an issue of management, as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said—and how giving the Secretary of State these powers can maintain the independence of a regulatory body?

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for that explanation, which, I am sorry to tell him, wholly fails to provide reassurance. First, he was wrong, in the sense that he maybe implied that my amendments would have removed the Secretary of State’s requirement to approve the indicators on which the commission chooses to base its reviews. That is left in at new Clause 46B(4)(b), so the approval of the Secretary of State for the indicators would remain. What is being taken out by my amendments is the requirement for the Secretary of State to set objectives and priorities. I am afraid that everything that my noble friend said went to support my view that there is an erroneous perception on the part of the Government that the CQC must be turned into an integral part of the management of the NHS and the integrated care system. That is simply not the case.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her support. I quibble with her slightly in a pedantic way. We should not talk about the CQC as just another regulator; it is the inspectorate. In my experience, inspection should never be regarded as a substitute for management. Quality is integral to the management of the service. The CQC is there to determine and review whether that quality is being achieved, which is why I am perfectly happy for the Secretary of State, and indeed others, to be consulted and for the Secretary of State to approve the indicators of quality that the CQC arrives at. Frankly, however, for the Secretary of State to go further and start to prescribe the way the objectives of the CQC are set in this way is directly at odds with how the CQC reviews and reports on other NHS bodies. I can see the drift of this. If we accept it, we will end up with the CQC being told by the Secretary of State what its indicators of quality are for every NHS body and setting objectives and priorities for the CQC right across the board, which is completely at odds with the independence of the CQC.

I shall make one final point. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Altmann. Exactly the same argument applies to Clause 137, although I have not tabled amendments to it. It creates the CQC’s additional scrutiny and performance assessment of social care functions. We should therefore come back to precisely the point that she is talking about, as she suggests.

I hope my noble friend the Minister will take my point and that we might have further conversations between now and Report. However, I have to tell him that it is not just me who raises these points; I have been asked by representative bodies within the NHS to do so. We should take them seriously and hope that between now and Report we might see whether there are better ways to structure Clause 26 to secure both the Government’s objectives and what the NHS would expect to happen. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 162A withdrawn.

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As we have heard from the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Patel, this is a very easy issue to address. There is no objection, and it would send a very powerful signal, with regard not only to the importance of professional participation in the appointment of future consultants but to the recognition that, although health is a devolved matter, we recognise the United Kingdom as a single entity in so many questions for the provision of health and, in particular, the training and development of healthcare professionals and their ability to work across our entire country.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, can I just take us back to Amendment 266, to which I have added my name, before we lose sight of it? It was helpfully introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, and its purposes were explained very well by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.

I just want to add a bit of context, which I hope will commend itself in particular to my noble friend Lord Howe on the Front Bench, in that he and I tackled together the PIP breast implant problems that emerged in December 2010 and which led directly, subsequently, to us asking the distinguished first medical director of NHS England, Bruce Keogh, to undertake an inquiry. Since the report of that inquiry, we have made considerable progress. Most recently, noble Lords will recall that the noble Baroness, Lady Wyld, took through the Private Member’s Bill from Laura Trott in the other place to assist in the regulation of Botox treatment for under-18s.

The point is that there is still unfinished business. Amendment 266 relates to giving the Secretary of State the power to set up a licensing process for non-surgical cosmetic procedures—not through the CQC in this case, because the CQC regulates healthcare professionals, but almost certainly through the mechanism of asking local authorities to undertake a licensing process. It gives the Secretary of State all the flexibility that we have grown accustomed to legislation having to give them, but it does so in a way that enables the regulation that would be brought in using this power to be proportionate, being very clear that it should apply only to those activities that present a significant risk. It makes sure that it takes advantage, for example, of the national standards that have been put in place by the Joint Council for Cosmetic Practitioners. It would be very helpful in trying to mitigate the risks associated with non-surgical cosmetic procedures.

Amendment 293 in my name is a follow-up to a Private Member’s Bill that made no progress. It again follows Bruce Keogh’s report and looks to give the General Medical Council the legislative opportunity and requirement to bring forward a scheme to put surgeons who have a specialty relating to cosmetic surgery on to its specialist registers. With Amendment 293, we have the benefit of being able to do this by virtue of the recommendations in recent years from the Cosmetic Surgery Interspecialty Committee of the Royal College of Surgeons. It gives us an opportunity to give those who wish to undertake surgical treatments for cosmetic purposes the opportunity to see who is on the specialist register. All this relates to the safety of those undertaking cosmetic treatments, which is a large number of people; there is a large amount of activity and a significant need for the consumers of these services to have a degree of protection. I think we can make progress on that.

In the rest of this group, we have another opportunity to take action. My noble friend was right when she spoke about a more general approach. She will recall that, in April 2014, the Law Commission produced its recommendations on the regulation of healthcare professionals, so there is an opportunity to do something here. If we do not do it in this Bill, it would not hurt for the Government to tell us more about how they might make progress on the broader regulation, in addition to what is being proposed here.

I want to mention two other things. First, we had an earlier debate about access to innovative medicines. This is another opportunity for my noble friend to tell the Committee that NHS England is proceeding with its consultation on the implementation of the innovative medicines fund. Secondly, we do not need to repeat the short debate we had in Grand Committee not so very long ago under the auspices of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who enabled us to present a lot of arguments about the future of NHS Resolution and clinical negligence within the NHS. We do not need to repeat that, but Amendments 178 and 297E would of course help us in that direction, not least by repealing the redundant NHS Redress Act 2006, which has never been implemented. With that thought, I pass the ball to the noble Lord, Lord Storey.

[Lord Bethell (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 266 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, and Amendment 293 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lansley for all the reasons that my noble friend just articulated. I will not repeat them as he put them so very well. However, I would say to the Minister that, coming from the innovation space, I can see that the technologies for both cosmetic surgery and non-surgical cosmetic interventions are improving all the time. There is an incredibly rapid pace of change. They are set to continue to get better and better, so the marketplace is getting more sophisticated and their popularity is also exploding. We have been briefed on evidence about the role of social media in promoting non-surgical cosmetic interventions in particular. This is exciting, because it is great that people have access to these interesting products, but also extremely worrying, because not all the surgeries and non-surgical interventions are successful. It is the right time for the Government to intervene, so that we have a register of cosmetic surgical practitioners and a much clearer regulatory regime for non-surgical interventions.

I am pro cosmetic surgery. As a young boy, I had an inherited condition of having very big, sticking-out ears, which my father had and my cousins and aunts have, and it was miserable. I had them pinned back and I am very grateful that that happened. It meant that I could be a much more confident person as I grew up. I am pro cosmetic interventions; if people want to use the benefits of medicine to improve their confidence in the way they look, I applaud that. However, standing next to my noble friend Lady Cumberlege, I am also aware of Bruce Keogh’s extremely good report and the very large number of interventions that have not gone well. I know that the Minister’s instincts are not to intervene unless absolutely required and my suggestion to him is that we have hit that moment. The marketplace is exploding and now is the right time to intervene.

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I may make two quick points. At an earlier stage in the Committee, using the example from the noble Lord, Lord Mawson, in relation to Bromley by Bow and north-east London, I asked why the legislation cannot allow clinical commissioning groups, as they have established themselves over years, to continue as place-based committees or subsidiary elements of an integrated care system. I am sure that many of them would be willing to do so; we should allow them to do exactly that, because there is otherwise a gap in relation to how large ICBs will do their place-based work.

Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, referred to what I said about provider collaboratives. I still think it. Where are we going to end up with this? It will be with NHS England having within it, as each integrated care board has within it, the provider interest and the commissioner interest. The Government purport to be abolishing the purchaser/provider split. Every Secretary of State prior to the former Secretary of State, Matt Hancock, seemed to believe in it, with the exception of Frank Dobson. There was a reason why we did that: because it is a fact. We might legislatively abolish the purchaser/provider split, but, in reality, it will exist. As my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral said earlier, if that conflict of interest is not properly recognised and managed, it will emerge with potentially damaging consequences. Transparency about how provider interests are to be properly managed inside the NHS is not something I yet see in the substance of the Bill. I hope that my noble friend on the Front Bench will agree to think hard about this and perhaps talk about how we might give transparency and accountability to that conflict of interest.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 165 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. This is a small but important group of amendments.

I have added my name to the amendment because I am interested in what is happening to primary care and particularly the voice of GPs in the new arrangements. Frankly, we are not hearing much about them. As it stands, the legislation will place NHS trusts and foundation trusts in quite a privileged position in deciding how plans are made and resources allocated. I am not quite sure where the voice of GPs comes into the new arrangements. I understand that NHS England has commissioned a review of the role of primary care in the NHS structures, but my understanding is also that it will not report until after the Bill has been passed if we continue with the current timetable. Frankly, by then, it will be a bit late to make sure that we have got the arrangements absolutely right.

It is right that primary care commissioning is undertaken at a local level by people with relevant knowledge and skills, and with the necessary experience of what primary care needs to look like at locality level. That is why it is right that the new place-based partnerships are to be given that commissioning role. However, like the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, I think it is important that these primary care commissioning arrangements are established in statute, because it is only if that happens that Parliament will be clear about the accountability arrangements and the governance and leadership. It is also important that there is real transparency in the system. At the moment, it all feels a bit opaque. I hope that the Minister can give some assurances on this point.

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Again, I say that you cannot consider this group of amendments without taking account of the noble Baroness’s group of amendments, which are equally important, and the other accretions of power that the Minister is taking. I hope the Minister will give a proper justification—I have not yet heard one—for why the Secretary of State feels the need to take these powers. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I shall intervene relatively briefly. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, quite rightly said that this is a significant departure from the intentions of the 2012 legislation. The 2021 Act, among other things, created the body that is now NHS England and gave it independence. None of that independence was intended to mean, nor has proven to, that it was not responsive to even the day-to-day wishes of a Secretary of State, as I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, would verify. What it did put in statute was that, if the Secretary of State wants to set something as an objective of NHS England, they put it in the mandate. If the Secretary of State requires a change to those objectives, they publish a revision to the mandate.

Going beyond it is, I think, the product of circumstances where we had a Secretary of State who was encountering an emergency and thought he could press lots of buttons and things would happen, but pressed some and they did not. I think, even in his experience, that was more outside NHS England than inside it— I may be wrong, but that was certainly my impression. The point is that the Secretary of State did not even realise what powers he had in an emergency; they are all there and he was not required to change the mandate, because it was an emergency. In a public health emergency, none of this, strictly speaking, is within the same bounds.

Ministers have quite rightly said that this is the Bill the NHS asked for. But Clause 39 is not the clause that the NHS asked for; it is the opposite of what it is asking for. There are many practical issues. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is right; if it appears, including to the senior people and bright youngsters, that power is going to shift from NHS England back to the Department of Health and Social Care, they will go and work in the department. One of the things I was most pleased about was that some of the brightest and best, including civil servants in the department who I knew well, went to work in NHS England, because they thought, “This is a great future.” That is terrific, because one of the problems was that NHS managers were being imported into the Department of Health, rather than bright policymakers going to the NHS. The NHS is too important an institution for it not to have the best possible policymakers under its own purview.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Walmsley, have done a sterling job in trying to mitigate a general power of direction for the Secretary of State. Frankly, I have not heard a case for it, it is contrary to where we are and where we need to go, and the simplest thing is to simply take Clause 39 out of the Bill.

[Lord Warner (CB)]

My Lords, it is a delight to follow the noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord Hunt, on this set of amendments, with which I totally agree. I want to dilate for a few moments on the realpolitik of being a Minister in the great, august organisation called the Department of Health and Social Care. I can say some things that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, as a former elected Minister, possibly cannot.

When I ceased to be a Parliamentary Secretary and was promoted to work with the big boys and girls as a Minister of State, and had to deal with issues such as reconfiguration, poor performance and so forth, I became used to regularly meeting elected MPs who wanted to tell me about the errors of their ways in decisions that had been taken in the public interest. There was a steady flow of them, which, if I may say, tended to get bigger the nearer you got to an election. If people wanted to go through the archives, I would refer them to the history of Lewisham Hospital and of Chase Farm Hospital, to name but two.

Very often in these situations, it is not about closing a whole hospital but about re-engineering—we will come to some of this in the next group. I give the example of stroke services in London. It is re-engineering a particular set of services, which the local MP is then put up for trying to ensure that change does not happen. That is where you need to help Ministers do the right thing, when it is in the public interest to make changes. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, help Ministers do the right thing.

The point the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, made is absolutely valid. In many of these circumstances, it becomes very difficult if you are an elected Minister—as distinct from an appointed Minister, who does not have to face the electorate—to resist some of the local pressures to avoid change which would be disadvantageous to a local hospital. For those realpolitik reasons, I think the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is on the right track and we should support the amendments.

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Let me give my noble friend one simple example of how this could shift decision-making from NHS bodies to the Secretary of State. We discussed previously, in an earlier group, the availability of in vitro fertilisation services. There will be pressure on the Secretary of State to issue a direction that the NICE recommended availability of in vitro fertilisation services should be provided. By what means is the Secretary of State going to say, “No, I can’t issue such a direction”? It is entirely within his power to do so. The pressures will all be on the Secretary of State to issue directions to do things that the NHS locally may choose or choose not to do. The power will shift. Is he aware of what he is wishing for?

[Lord Warner (CB)]

Before the Minister answers that question, could I add another? We have had 10 years’ experience of NHS England under three chief executives and a number of different chairmen. Can the Minister give any examples of where the powers the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, gave the Secretary of State have been inadequate for them to give direction to NHS England?

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

The Secretary of State cannot issue a direction to CCGs or ICBs on any of this using this power. We have been clear that direction cannot be given in relation to drugs, medicines or on treatments that NICE has recommended or issued guidance on. I gave the example of where we want this guidance—with the draft guidelines published for ICBs. The Secretary of State would be able to intervene and ask to see that guidance—

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend again but let us be clear: the Secretary of State would be asked to give a direction in line with NHS guidance. There is nothing in the exception in Clause 39 which says that the Secretary of State cannot give such a direction.

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

If my noble friend will allow me, I will have to consider that and write, and make that available to all noble Lords.

We have included a number of exceptions to the power of direction in the Bill to ensure that the Secretary of State is not able to intervene in day-to-day operational matters. For example, there is no intention to use the power to direct NHS England on procurement matters.

On Clause 64, the rationale for removing these duties is twofold. First, the pandemic has highlighted the importance of different parts of the health and care system working together. The clause removes some barriers in legislation that hinder collaboration between system partners. It facilitates collaboration between NHS England and system partners and enables broader thinking about the interests of the wider health system. Secondly, removing the Secretary of State’s duty to promote autonomy will put increased accountability at the heart of the Bill.

Overall, these clauses encompass flexibility, allowing Ministers to act quickly and set direction, while balanced with safeguards and transparency requirements to ensure that they can be held to account. I understand that there are a number of concerns about this group of amendments and others. I am sure we will have a number of discussions, but in the meantime, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.