Health and Care Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Wednesday 26th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, the purpose of Clause 26 is to introduce a process by which the Care Quality Commission inspects integrated care systems. The structure of this is the subject of my Amendments 162A and 164A. Those two amendments go together—they are not separate, but entirely linked. The purpose of Amendment 162A is to remove the process by which the Secretary of State sets objectives and priorities for the Care Quality Commission in undertaking such inspections of integrated care systems; Amendment 164A then seeks to insert a process by which the Secretary of State, and indeed others, are consulted by the Care Quality Commission over the quality indicators that it would use to assess the quality and performance of integrated care systems.

A bit of background would be helpful for noble Lords in this respect. Think back to what the Care Quality Commission’s existing statutory arrangements are in relation to reviews and performance assessments of existing bodies in the National Health Service. The structure is very straightforward. The commission is asked to set quality indicators, to consult on those and then to review against them and produce reports. I know from personal experience that the Secretary of State cannot direct the Care Quality Commission to undertake a particular review, but they can certainly make a request, and their role as steward of the whole healthcare system has certainly led Secretaries of State to do that from time to time. But the legislation does not permit the Secretary of State to direct the Care Quality Commission in how it does its job; it is an independent body corporate. There is intrinsic merit in the Care Quality Commission, as an inspectorate, operating independently. The structure of this clause in this Bill is at odds with the way in which the existing legislation is structured in the 2008 NHS Act as amended. The effect of these two amendments would be to restore the independence of the Care Quality Commission in undertaking its activities and in the way in which it goes about its job.

The Government’s drafting of the legislation is wrong anyway. There are references to objectives and priorities. The priorities are referred to in new subsection (3), inserted by Clause 26(2), which says that they

“must include priorities relating to leadership, the integration of services and the quality and safety of services.”

I have to say that this is teaching grandmothers to suck eggs. There is no way in which the Care Quality Commission is not going to incorporate such indicators of quality. We know that from the generic nature of the quality indicators that it uses generally for existing NHS bodies. The reference to setting objectives is not only novel but completely undefined. The Secretary of State can set whatever objectives they wish to; we do not know what they are and there is no indication of what they might be. Taking out references to objectives and priorities seems to me to be a very good thing.

As it happens—I declare my own role in this—in the 2012 legislation there was previously a process by which the Secretary of State set standards for the Care Quality Commission in determining what the quality indicators should look like. We actually took that out of the 2012 legislation, precisely on these grounds: that the Care Quality Commission is, and should be, as independent as possible.

I think this clause proceeds from the mistaken apprehension that the Care Quality Commission is a part of the management process of the NHS. It is not. If the Secretary of State wishes integrated care systems to proceed in any particular way, the Secretary of State has the means to do so available via the mandate; the Government plan to add specific powers of direction; and NHS England has duties that go in exactly the same direction. The Care Quality Commission is not part of the management process for integrated care systems; it is an inspectorate. If—and this is a risk we must avoid—the Secretary of State were directly intervening to set objectives for integrated care systems to be inspected subsequently by the Care Quality Commission, whereas NHS England is itself setting objectives for integrated care systems through its responsibilities and duties, those two may come into conflict.

For all those reasons, the Government would be well advised to accept these two amendments and put the Care Quality Commission into the independent role in relation to ICSs that it, and people working in the National Health Service, would recognise as being its role. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has set out the tensions underlying the Bill about returning to the Secretary of State powers over independent, arms-length bodies; specifically, in this amendment, the inspections carried out by the Care Quality Commission in its role as a regulatory body. He rightly reminded us of the current arrangements, which give the CQC the ability to set its indicators and which, frankly, work well. I will not repeat his arguments, except to say in a slightly wider context that almost every piece of legislation brought to Parliament by this Government has given Ministers more powers—including, as in Clause 26, the power to intervene and to change remits.

The noble Lord’s amendments maintain the independence that the CQC—and other regulatory bodies—need to be able to inspect and make rulings without fear of favour or influence from politicians, while ensuring that the CQC must consult the Secretary of State when it revises indicators of quality for the purposes of assessment. That seems to me to provide the requirement for the CQC and the Secretary of State to engage in dialogue, but without the political intervention outlined in Clause 26(2) and (5).

Can the Minister explain why the Government feel the need to remove the independence of the CQC—whether this is an issue of management, as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said—and how giving the Secretary of State these powers can maintain the independence of a regulatory body?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, it is essential that we get the arrangements for the Care Quality Commission right throughout the Bill, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for trying to do that through these amendments. If the health and social care provided is to be of the highest standards, we must ensure, through the powers of scrutiny and review in your Lordships’ House, that we enable the watchdog to have the proper tools and framework to achieve that, so I support the amendments.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, emphasised, this is about putting the responsibility in the right place to ensure that a key inspectorate can do an independent job and support proper integration and delivery. I hope the Minister will accept the good sense in these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

I remind the Committee that both the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Masham, will be contributing remotely. I call the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.

[Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I have signed two amendments in this very wide-ranging group. The first, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is Amendment 264 on the appointment of surgical consultants. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, said in your Lordships’ House recently, 48% of advertised consultant posts last year went unfilled. Given our discussions about the workforce earlier this week, we need as many posts filled as possible and to remove any bureaucratic barriers to so doing.

Part of the problem at the moment is that trusts are having difficulties establishing appointment panels which can make these consultant appointments. Currently, the rules are too tightly drawn in the National Health Service (Appointment of Consultants) Regulations 1996 and the subsequent 2005 guidance. The members of all the royal colleges across the UK have a wealth of expertise, but the current legislation says that only members of English royal colleges can help trusts fill their appointment duties. In its helpful briefing, the Royal College of Surgeons says that the Royal College of Emergency Medicine, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow and the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh are excluded from being eligible to join these panels. This amendment would be a simple remedy and speed up the appointment of much-needed consultants, and I do hope that the Minister can agree to it.

I have also signed Amendment 266 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, on the urgent need to ensure that practitioners undertaking non-surgical aesthetic procedures such as lip fillers, injectables, thread lifts, semi-permanent make-up, laser treatments, piercings and tattoos are properly trained and licensed. These treatments are easily available to members of the public, but without the safeguards required when being carried out in the health sector. I am afraid that we see daily in the press and media reports on the many problems when treatments go wrong, which can include infection, disfiguration and burns, among other serious issues. When treatments do go wrong, it is usually the NHS that has to pick up the pieces, so I believe it is very much in the interests of the Department of Health and Social Care to accept this amendment.

The signatories to this amendment have been working with the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, alongside a coalition of public health organisations and industry representatives, so that we can make sure that a licensing scheme can be introduced for all non-surgical aesthetic procedures. This will enable the setting of appropriate standards, a level playing field for practitioners and, importantly, protect consumers in this sector.