Higher Education and Research Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 16th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 65 and 510 in this group were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, who is unable to be with us today. I wish to make a few comments in support of those amendments.

The concept of quasi-legislation—the generation of rules and guidance by public authorities—is not new. However, the use of such quasi-legislation appears to be growing: it is convenient to government, it provides some degree of flexibility and it may also put it beyond legislative scrutiny and approval unless provision is made for such scrutiny and approval.

This Bill is of extreme importance. It creates a body, the Office for Students, that is much more powerful than HEFCE. The functions that it draws together are quite substantial and extensive. They enable the OfS, essentially, to shape the nature of higher education. That in itself raises issues which we will be discussing further. However, here, under Clause 2(2), we have the power to give guidance but without any transparency and with no parliamentary involvement. That matters, especially in the context of this Bill. Through the power to give guidance, the Minister may, effectively, usurp the power of the OfS. I am sure my noble friend the Minister will say that guidance will be rare and benign, but there is nothing to stop a future Secretary of State with less than benign intent using the power on a scale that is significant, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

As the noble Baroness has just said, this provision has been commented on by the Delegated Powers Committee. It stressed that there is no parliamentary scrutiny of the guidance and no requirement for it to be published. In response to the Government’s defence of the provision, the committee goes on to say:

“We are wholly unconvinced by the Department’s reasons”.


That includes, as I have already stressed, the fact that the remit of the OfS goes far broader than HEFCE, and the guidance that the Minister can give to HEFCE has no statutory basis.

The committee also makes the point, of course, that the requirement for the OfS to “have regard to” guidance rather limits it. The Office for Students could, if it had cogent reasons, discard the guidance. However, there would have to be compelling reasons for that, and, as the Delegated Powers Committee points out, under Clause 71(1), the Secretary of State has the power to give the OfS “general directions” about the performance of its functions.

There is a powerful case for ensuring there is parliamentary scrutiny and engagement in respect of the power to give guidance—that is the purpose of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane. Other provisions in the Bill are clearly Henry VIII provisions. The measure is extensive in terms of the concept of quasi-legislation. I am sure we will be coming back to this on several occasions during the passage of the Bill. However, I look forward to my noble friend’s response acknowledging the significance of the powers that are being confirmed and I look forward to hearing what the Government plan to do about it.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I support what has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, and draw attention to my own interests in the register. We have a perfectly clear piece of legislation in Clause 2(1), in which Parliament tells the OfS what it must do and what it must have regard to. We then have the creation in Clause 2(2) to Clause 2(6) of guidance which has absolutely no parliamentary scrutiny, whether before or after the Secretary of State chooses to issue that guidance. It looks like legislation, because it is contained in Clause 2, but it is not legislation and it should be.

There is a remarkably strange feature if we turn 44 pages onwards to Clause 71, where we have the power granted to the Secretary of State to give directions. Of course, that is going to be a necessary ingredient of the Bill. The strange thing about it is that in the directions, Clause 71(2) is in identical terms to the guidance authorisation in Clause 2(3); Clause 71(3) replicates Clause 2(4); and Clause 71(4) replicates Clause 2(5). In other words, there are identical provisions in these two clauses: one creates the power in the Secretary of State to give guidance, the other gives the Secretary of State, after Parliament has agreed, the power to issue directions.

As far as I can see, there is no indication about the criteria which should be applied as to whether a particular directive by the Secretary of State should be treated as guidance or legislation. The fact of the matter is that there is now going to be power to give guidance with no statutory scrutiny and power or authority to give directions which will be subject to statutory scrutiny. There is no logical reason why we should have such an absurd situation. The amendment proposes simply that the guidance should be brought before the House at some stage in the process so that the House can have a look at it. We should have a chance to consider guidance issued by the department in this influential new arrangement.

[Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve (CB)]

I support the amendment. I think there are wider reasons for feeling that not everything can be well done by guidance. Among other things, guidance sits there in the cupboard, so to speak, and there is no reason for the Executive or Parliament to review it until somebody is tripped up in an unfortunate way.

Guidance seeks a sharper definition between what may and may not be done—between compliance and infraction—than is probably feasible. There is much to be said for a somewhat more formal procedure that will make it clear what has parliamentary backing, because it is a statutory instrument, and what does not. Excessive reliance on guidance would weaken the structure of the Bill and create a degree of persisting uncertainty. People are frequently being tripped up by guidance of which they have never heard which lives in an obscure place. That is unnecessary.

Higher Education and Research Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 18th January 2017 Lords Chamber

Amendment 159 would remove that last option. As drafted, the provision could mean that the OfS, whose own action is being appealed, might be the body that took the final decision—in effect, as a judge in its own cause. So it would be very helpful if the Minister could explain why this will not be so and tell us whether any further route of appeal exists once the First-tier Tribunal remits the decision to the OfS in this way. I beg to move.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendment. I shall not repeat how subjective the test is,

“if it appears to the OfS”—

but it is entirely subjective. These are very wide-ranging powers that are envisaged; they are very serious powers that will be exercised. Of course, as the Minister said on 9 January, they are powers that will have to be exercised reasonably, not on a whim, and would be subject to a judicial review—but a judicial review of such a decision would succeed only if the decision made by the OfS were unreasonable in a particular legal sense, so that no body exercising these particular powers in this situation could have exercised them in this way. It will not succeed merely because the decision is wrong.

If I may make it more personal, two reasonable people can disagree with each other and both can still be reasonable. If the Minister disagrees with me—perhaps he will, perhaps he will not—I may respectfully suggest to him that he is wrong, but I would certainly not suggest to him that he was being unreasonable. It is a point of view. There is a great deal to be noticed in the context of what the reasonable exercise of powers actually amounts to.

These amendments are designed, as I see it, to secure from the outset that the office must believe that there are reasonable grounds for its decision to deploy its statutory powers. Framed in this way, the grounds for relief can themselves be examined. Although there are passages in the schedule which deal with that, it would encourage greater thought and analysis being given to any process of deploying the draconian powers that are being vested in the office.

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie]

My Lords, I do not rise to add anything to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—I am not able to do so; the points they make sound very sensible and backed up with legal opinion. I hope that the Minister will take them on board. I rise on an amendment on which I and my colleagues have no involvement to make the more general point that I am sure that the Minister is going to say, “This is all very well, it sounds fine, but it’s not necessary—in the best of all worlds it will all be fine”. It is getting very tiresome. This is not the way in which legislation is meant to progress in your Lordships’ House. There have been absolutely zero concessions so far from the Government since the Bill came to your Lordships’ House. It is inconceivable that anyone outside looking in would accept that every amendment put forward is unnecessary or does not fit in with the Bill. That cannot be the case. I say in all good faith to the noble Viscount the Minister—and to the noble Baroness the Minister—that I am not making a political point as it is not one of my amendments but, with so many amendments on this Bill, they cannot all simply be turned down flat. I hope that he will bear that in mind, if not on this group of amendments then as we move forward.

Higher Education and Research Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 8th March 2017 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Judge]

117: Clause 46, page 27, line 24, leave out from “appeal” to end of line 27 and insert “shall be on the grounds that the decision was wrong.”

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as the commissary for the University of Cambridge and a visiting professor at King’s College London. I regard Amendment 123 as consequential on Amendment 117. The amendment arises in the context of what was described just a few minutes ago as the last-resort power, granted by Clauses 44 and 54 of the Bill. The OfS has power to revoke the authority of a university to grant degrees and to deprive the university of the name and title “university”. They are, either or both, processes that would destroy the university in question.

The Bill envisages an appeal process but, certainly in relation to these powers—in my respectful submission, destructive powers—it would be depressingly inadequate. The objective of Clause 46, and Clause 56 as amended, is to provide an appropriate remedy for such a destructive power. A remedy is provided in the Bill: a form of judicial review. I am not sure that many in this House will often hear a former judge deride a remedy by way of judicial review, and I am not deriding it—I am saying that it is not good enough, because a judicial review has limitations. It provides for an assessment of the process for correcting errors, but it is not, and never has been, a remedy that enables the merits, or otherwise, of a particular case and decision to be considered. In other words, it does not provide for a full appeal from the decision—rather a review of the way in which the decision was reached.

My argument is very simple: that simply will not do here. You cannot win a judicial review, and the grounds provided in the present Bill do not enable you to provide an argument based on this simple proposition that the decision was wrong—that’s it—and it should. A step of this kind, which can lead to the destruction of a university, is so serious that the university should be entitled to go to the First-tier Tribunal with the simple argument, “This is not good enough. Your judgment is wrong. You have made a premature decision. You have made a decision that is too severe”. None of those arguments is encapsulated in the present basis for appeal that is provided.

A university can argue that the decision was wrong in law, but that is not much of a concession, since being wrong in law is being wrong in law. It can argue that the decision was unreasonable, but unreasonable does not mean wrong. Two perfectly reasonable people can disagree. Both would be reasonable; neither would be unreasonable. To be unreasonable in the law—and I hope that I shall be excused for using this sort of language—you have to be able to show that the decision was batty, which is not quite what we have in mind here. As to the facts, that does not help very much, because what matters is the inference that you draw from the facts, and subsection (2)(c) of this clause, listing the present grounds, underlines how limited the basis of appeal would be.

The argument is that we are dealing with the issue of last resort—the final destruction of a university and an institution’s ability to grant degrees—and we are saying that, at best, you are entitled to a judicial review. I speak of course in the context of the university, but it is just worth bearing in mind that we are also talking about something that affects the students at that university as well as the staff and those who have left that university, particularly those who have left it in the last few years, on whose CV there appears a first class honours degree from X failed university. From their point of view, it would be just as catastrophic as it would be for the university itself.

Finally, we must hope that these powers will never be used and that the issue will never arise for decision. If it does arise, it will be a very rare occasion. If what we are considering is an issue of this importance, which will, one hopes, occur only very rarely, we must make a proper remedy. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Young of Cookham]

The noble and learned Lord qualified his question with the remark “with the resources at my disposal”. The answer is that I do not have that answer at my disposal, but I will of course make inquiries and write to him.

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, we have just heard an utterly reasonable argument but, with great respect, it is wrong, and that is the issue the amendment is intended to address. Reasonable decisions may be wrong. Looking at this issue in depth, one hopes that the power will never have to be exercised. However, if it is, it will be an extraordinary power wielded by the OfS and it will not be open to the university in question to say, “We agree. All your facts are well set out but you have reached the wrong conclusion”. That seems to be a ground of appeal that ought to be available.

We need not worry that amending the clause in the way we have respectfully suggested will lead to a huge torrent of cases. We hope that there will be no case at all but, if it arises, the straightforward way to go about it will be to say to the tribunal, “We are arguing that this was wrong”. The tribunal is well able to assimilate the reasons why the OfS reached the decision it did, and will hear argument on behalf of the university. I propose to ask for the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Judge]

123: Clause 56, page 36, line 9, leave out from “appeal” to end of line 12 and insert “shall be on the grounds that the decision was wrong.”

Higher Education and Research Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 27th April 2017 Lords Chamber

To conclude, the Government fully share the aim of increasing the number of students and young people registered to vote. We agree with noble Lords that it is vital that we have a healthy democracy that works for everyone, and that the views of students and young people are reflected in a democratic process. I firmly believe that these amendments will help achieve this goal and I beg to move the Motion.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly to Motion F. The original Bill produced an appeal system that was far too narrow, and the amendment that I and my noble friend Lord Lisvane proposed suggested that it should be wider. We used words which were reflective of advocacy rather than law, and argued that the ground of appeal should be on the basis that the decision was wrong. That view appealed to this House. We have reconsidered it and discussed it with the Secretary of State and the Minister. The amendment now proposed by the Government makes much better law and, given that, I support it.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as in the register. I am very grateful to the Government for tabling Commons Amendments 15A and 15B and put on record my specific thanks to the Ministers—the honourable Jo Johnson and Chris Skidmore—along with their officials, for their time and willingness to find a compromise following the adoption by the House of my amendment on Report. This issue has been the subject of powerful advocacy by my honourable friend Paul Blomfield MP, who has done much work on the registration of students to vote, and by organisations such as Bite The Ballot and by the APPG on Democratic Participation.

The voice and views of the Association of Electoral Administrators was extremely helpful in supporting my case, and I have to say that the chief executive John Turner expressed some surprise that the Minister suggested on Report that the association did not take a positive view. UUK has been helpful to me personally, although it is divided on the issue. I trust that it will now do everything possible to ensure that all universities comply with this new obligation at the earliest opportunity.

I well understand that we all have the same aim: to enable the greatest number of students to register to vote and thus shape the future of this country so that it works for young people. It will probably not be possible for ministerial guidance to be published before the enrolment of students this autumn, so I hope that the Minister in office, whoever it is, will draw the attention of higher education institutions to the numerous examples of best practice that exist, including those cited by the Minister today. I am very proud of what Bath has done in these endeavours. I am grateful to the Minister for suggesting what will be in the guidance, which is very welcome, but could he say when the guidance is likely to be published and when the Government, if they are a Conservative Government, might expect higher education institutions to comply with the new obligation? Although we might not have another general election for perhaps five years, there will be local government elections in England in May 2018 and my fervent hope is that all HE institutions will have a system in place by then.

I reiterate my thanks and look forward to working with the next Government to ensure that the maximum number of students register to vote so that not only their voices are heard but their views are expressed in the ballot box, thus enabling them to exert maximum influence, as they should, in the democratic life of this country.

As I will not speak again on this Bill, I wish to say that I too think the way in which all Benches have co-operated and collaborated on it has been extraordinary and very welcome. To be partisan for a moment, great thanks go to my noble friend Lord Stevenson and the support he has received from Molly Critchley. I understand that my noble friend is shortly to step down from the Front Bench. He has done the most superb job, not just for the Labour Benches but for the House as a whole, and I look forward to working with him on the Back Benches.