(8 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, perhaps within two minutes I will complete my observations to support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. To anticipate what my noble friend the Minister is going to say, I acknowledge that there is force in his prospective argument, which I suspect will be that if we allow these amendments we facilitate a number of unmeritorious applications to the courts, and that will stand in the way of the Bill being effective. There is force in that argument, but I put before your Lordships three considerations that point the other way.
First, the judiciary can be more robust in the way it deals with unmeritorious applications. Furthermore, although I am not an expert in this field at all—I have not practised in immigration law for a long time—a more effective filter could be put in place to weed out the unmeritorious. That is the first point. The second is really the point of principle: I regard it as very dangerous indeed to exclude individuals who happen to be within the jurisdiction from having recourse to the courts for protection. I regard that as a very dangerous proposition, and we should accede to it with the greatest caution. That takes me to my last point, which is essentially a pragmatic one. Those of your Lordships who share my doubts, especially on the matter of principle, should ask themselves whether the Bill is likely to achieve its policy objective. If it is not, we will be doing things that are very bad in principle in support of a policy that will achieve nothing.
My own judgment—I concede that it is a matter of judgment—is that individuals will not be deterred from crossing the channel in small boats by the slight prospect of being relocated to Rwanda. If that is right, we will be doing something that is in principle profoundly wrong in support of a policy that is going nowhere. It is for that combination of reasons that I shall support the noble Baroness. I have spoken for three minutes.
My Lords, I would like to ask the Minister one question in the context of the provisions in Clause 4. Is it or is it not the Government’s policy that they will look at each individual case, regardless of any other evidence, even if it is only to decide that there are no merits in that particular person’s case?
My Lords, I will speak only once today, as I did on Monday. The Greens will vote for all the amendments that are called. Some Members of your Lordships’ House quoted the book Nineteen Eighty-Four on Monday, and I have a favourite quote as well:
“Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four”.
It is the freedom to speak truth, even when the ruling party is declaring otherwise.
That is what we are debating today. We are debating whether this authoritarian Government can declare that the objective truth of facts decided by the courts can be overruled. If we allow it, it is another big step towards a dictatorship—intentional or not. I know that the majority of people in your Lordships’ House know that the Government are wrong. I also know that many still cling to the belief that the House of Lords should not vote to stop the Government passing the most draconian of laws.
What are we going to do once we have voted on our amendments, and tried to do our job of improving the Bill, when the Government then ignore us? Will we do nothing again? We did nothing last year when a Minister overruled a vote in this House and gave the police draconian powers via a ministerial decree. It was the first time a Minister had ever used a statutory instrument to overturn a vote in this House, but the Labour Party failed to back my fatal amendment. I look forward to being told that that piece of legislation is going to be repealed as well.
We are paid more than £300 per day to come here and talk and vote, but what is the point of all our hard work if the Government ignore us? Either your Lordships’ House starts to act in defence of our liberal democracy and against the extremists at the heart of government, or we abolish this place and create an elected second Chamber with some backbone. I look forward to more defeats for the Government in these votes.
(9 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as someone who was called to the Bar many years ago and has not subsequently done a great deal of law directly, I have been interested, amused and dazzled by the breadth of learning that we have heard.
I would like to make a couple of remarks. I start with what the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said. We live in a world where we have domestic jurisdiction, but also where everyday life is very significantly affected by all kinds of international agreements and arrangements, and we all benefit from that. Against that background, it is important that that system remains stable and respected; if it does not, we will all suffer.
We have heard this evening the arguments as to whether there is jurisdiction in respect of interim injunctions from the ECHR. I personally do not feel qualified one way or another to make a value judgment about that. What I do think is important is that, once you have got the interim injunction—and I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said—that is a piece of evidence that is relevant to the issues that we are discussing.
On balance, the interim injunctions—there are not many of them, as the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, said —are evidence that something is not quite right. I am therefore concerned about the provisions in Clause 5 that we have been talking about: there will be a power with the Minister to set aside a piece of evidence, which I believe has come from a respectable source, that something is not right.
I think the remarks of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, were very important. Regardless of international law, this is important in the context of domestic law, where there is real evidence—and I think it is real evidence—that something is awry. If you are to have some provision of the kind that we are considering this evening, there has to be a presumption that it will be adhered to but also that, if you are concerned, there is some kind of mechanism to set it aside, rather than the other way around.
My Lords, as a signatory to the stand-part proposition in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I will confine my remarks to the question of whether it is contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights, and thus to international law, for a contracting state to disregard interim measures issued by the European court under Rule 39. Spoiler alert: it is, and the question is not so difficult as some noble Lords have suggested.
I declare an interest as a member of the Bar who has appeared for 30 years or so in that Strasbourg court, both for applicants and for states, and who has therefore been on the wrong end of some Rule 39 measures, including at least one which the court had to be persuaded to reverse. So I welcome the steps that the European Court of Human Rights is taking, partly at the instigation of this country’s Government, to improve its procedures and make them more transparent, including, as the court itself announced on 23 November last year, the attribution of interim measures to the judges who made them.
We have heard a lot about the Policy Exchange paper of last May. The arguments have been very well summarised in other speeches, particularly those of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, who has spoken to them a couple of times. Happily, I do not need to take your Lordships through those arguments or, indeed, the detailed rebuttals of them, which will be found in the Bingham Centre report of July of last year. Both reports are footnoted in the Constitution Committee report, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has referred. The reason that I do not need to do that is that the position was made completely clear in law by the European court, in a judgment that has been referred to: the 2005 judgment of the Grand Chamber in Mamatkulov v Turkey.
It has been mentioned, but I will say a little more about it. Of the 17 judges who ruled on this issue in the Grand Chamber, a clear majority of 14 held that Article 34 of the convention, which guarantees the effective exercise of the right of application to the Strasbourg court, is violated when a state fails to comply with interim measures. For 13 of those 14, violation follows automatically from a failure to comply. The 14th thought that there was a violation if, as in Mamatkulov itself, applicants are as a matter of fact prevented from effectively exercising their right of application,
Three judges dissented: those appointed by Turkey, Russia and Liechtenstein. Their dissent is long and tightly argued. Policy Exchange would have been proud to publish it. Its authors looked at the text, the preparatory materials, state practice, the analogy with the International Court of Justice and the relevant rules of international law—all ground covered subsequently by Professor Ekins and tonight by the noble Lord, Lord Howard, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann. They accused the court, just as Professor Ekins did, of exercising a legislative rather than an interpretative function.
Court cases, unlike academic debates, produce clear winners and losers. The result of Mamatkulov, since followed in other judgments, is quite simply conclusive of the matter. The arguments advanced by the dissenting judges, and later by Professor Ekins, were decisively rejected. Why does this matter? Again, noble Lords have had reference to it: the reason it matters is Article 32 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides two things of importance. First,
“the jurisdiction of the court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation of the convention”.
Secondly, as my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton said:
“In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide”.
That is really it. The European Court interpreted Article 34 in Mamatkulov as requiring compliance with interim measures issued by the court because, as the court put it in its judgement at paragraph 135, interim measures
“play a vital role in avoiding irreversible situations that would prevent the Court from properly examining the application and when appropriate securing to the applicant the practical and effective benefit of the Convention rights asserted”.
That ruling is binding, as the United Kingdom agreed it would be when we signed and ratified the convention, including Article 32. Perhaps we should not be very surprised that a treaty means what the court constituted to interpret it says that it means. Even the dissenting judges did not suggest otherwise. They did not like the majority judgment, but neither did they describe it, in a word recently used by Professor Ekins, as “lawless”. They accepted it.
State practice since the Mamatkulov decision is supportive of it. The Committee of Ministers, of all the Council of Europe states, resolved in 2010 that
“the Court’s case law has clearly established that Article 34 of the Convention entails an obligation for States Parties to comply with an indication of interim measures made under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court”.
The requirement on states parties to comply with interim measures was reiterated in the Izmir Declaration of 2011 on the Brussels Declaration of 2015, to which of course the United Kingdom was a party. It was endorsed in very clear terms by the French Conseil d’Etat as recently as 7 December last year, when that senior court required a person deported to Uzbekistan in breach of interim measures to be repatriated at the state’s expense.
In a recent email to noble Lords, Policy Exchange described its own 2023 paper as “authoritative”. I am afraid that whoever wrote that was high on their own supply. It is supported neither by the court whose job it is to provide authoritative interpretations of the convention nor by state practice, nor even, subject to anything the Minister may say, and I will be listening carefully, by our own Government. That at any rate is what I take from the last paragraph of the ECHR memorandum on the Bill.
To throw this established position into doubt might once have been merely eccentric; in current conditions, it is positively dangerous. As recently as 2005 there was a culture of compliance. The Strasbourg court could say, in Mamatkulov, paragraph 105:
“Cases of States failing to comply with indicated measures remain very rare”.
However, the “good chaps” theory no longer prevails in the Council of Europe. Russia challenged the jurisdiction of the court in 2021 when it required Alexei Navalny to be immediately released from prison due to the risk to his life and health—interim measures strongly supported by our Government—while Poland challenged it last year when its previous Government refused to comply with interim measures relating to the politicisation of its judiciary.
Supranational courts do not have bailiffs to enforce their decisions. The fabric of international law—that “gentle civiliser of nations”, as it was once described—is easily torn but not so easily repaired. It can be torn by acts such as that which is proposed to us—acts that enable or facilitate actions in breach of international law.
Clause 5 is peculiar, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, have both said. If Rwanda is as safe, as the Government invite us to declare, Clause 5 is unnecessary. If it is not safe, Clause 5 will compound the injustice of Clause 4. Either way, Clause 5 extends the damage already done by Section 55 of the Illegal Migration Act because it severs the link, praised by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, between non-compliance and procedural reform. If we accept this clause, we will not only be authorising Ministers to contravene this country’s obligations; we will be handing an excuse to illiberal Governments across the continent to do the same, and worse. We should be ashamed to do so.
(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am loath to say “yes” to a leading question from a leading lawyer, but he is absolutely right, of course. For those words added to what I said earlier and paragraph 104, which we have already had referred to, the
“necessary changes may not be straightforward, as they require an appreciation that the current approach is inadequate, a change of attitudes, and effective training and monitoring”.
If you read the Supreme Court judgment, you will know what we have to test in order to prove Rwanda’s safety. That is what the committees of this House have been trying to do.
This suite of amendments turns it all around. It says that it is the judgment of the Government, which they would have to bring forward in an order for the House to accept, but before that they would have to address all the issues in Amendment 84 which are proposed for new Clause 84(1)(c). They would also have to consult and be certain that they had made the case. If, at the end, Parliament approved the order that the Government had put before it, the courts could intervene and test it on the basis of fact. That is our current procedure for dealing with issues of this sort. I am loath to say that this is back to the future, but it is keeping in track where we stand as a Parliament—how we make decisions, where they are tested and whether they can be tested in the courts.
We cannot allow a dangerous precedent to be set with this overreach of Parliament’s role. The courts need to remain as the check and balance on the exercising of the Secretary of State’s power. Parliament cannot be allowed to overturn the evidence-based findings of fact made by the highest court in the UK, given that this Bill is there for ever and does not look at what happens in the future. We need to stand firm against the Government’s attempt to subvert the separation of powers in this country. Today, this is about asylum seekers; tomorrow, this precedent will be applied to the next group who find themselves as the latest scapegoats of the Government.
I end with the words of the late Lord Judge in this Chamber. I sat here listening to him and I hear those words echoing in my head now. He said:
“the rule of law is a bulwark against authoritarian incursion, and even the smallest incursion threatens it”.—[Official Report, 19/10/20; col. 1286.].
Those are wise words. This suite of amendments seeks to uphold the principle that he espoused so powerfully. I beg to move.
My Lords, I regret that I was not able to take part in discussion on the previous group because I was on the train as it began.
The point that has been made here is an important one, which I did not hear elaborated on during the debate on the first group. Without wishing to disparage Rwanda in any way, countries in that part of the world do have a habit from time to time of changing their regimes, and those regimes often have very different characteristics. If you are approaching this problem, which seems to me entirely reasonable in normal circumstances, that the country where the asylum seekers end up should be safe, it does not follow that once it has been ruled to be safe it then continues to be safe. The problem with Clause 1(2)(b) is that, if the wording remains as it is now, even if you go through the procedures that the noble Lord, Lord German, is discussing, once there has been a ruling that the country is safe then there is no means to return to the question if circumstances fundamentally and damagingly change.
I commend to my noble friend the concept of the rolling sunset, which he will find in Amendments 81 and 82.
My Lords, I have adverted at some length already to the Monitoring Committee that is in place and to the work currently under way by judicial and bureaucratic civil servant staff assisting the Rwandans in working through these matters.
My Lords, I am feeling slightly confused at this point. Am I correct in saying that the Government accept that, at present, Rwanda has not fully adhered to the commitments that it has given and that it follows that, by reference to those tests, it would be unsafe? As I understand it, even if the Government did nothing, if this Bill goes on the statute book as currently drafted, no changes will take place in the wider world and, suddenly, Rwanda becomes a safe country. Is that the reality of what we are looking at?
My Lords, the intention of the Bill is to provide that Rwanda is a safe country. As I have explained to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in discussing Article 22 of the treaty, in the event of some disturbance to that situation the matter will be approached on a Government-to-Government basis by the convening of the relevant committee within 14 days.
Returning to a text which was prepared earlier for me, I ask the Committee to bear in mind that Article 10 of the treaty sets out particular assurances for the treatment of relocated individuals in Rwanda, including abiding by the refugee convention in relation to those seeking asylum. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 3 of the treaty, the parties agree that the obligations therein shall be met in respect of all relocated individuals, regardless of their nationality and without discrimination. Under this commitment, Rwanda will treat all groups of people fairly. Furthermore, Article 10(3) in the treaty sets out clearly that the only place to which Rwanda can remove individuals—we have covered this ad longam—is the United Kingdom, which ensures that there is no risk of refoulement.
For noble Lords who remain concerned as to whether the Rwandan Government will abide by the treaty, the independent monitoring committee will be in place to ensure that obligations in the treaty are adhered to. For an initial period of at least three months, there will be enhanced monitoring; that shall take place daily to ensure rapid identification of, and response to, any shortcomings. I refer the Committee in that regard to Article 15(7) of the treaty. This enhanced phase will ensure that monitoring and reporting take place in real time. Individuals who are relocated to Rwanda will be able to raise any issues of concern, should they arise, with the committee. It should also be remembered, as I have said on a number of occasions, that this is a legally binding treaty that will become part of Rwandan domestic law.
Taking all of this into consideration, I submit that these amendments are unnecessary. Further, they undermine the objective of the Bill, unnecessarily delaying, potentially, the relocation of individuals to Rwanda. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, each and every amendment proposed to this Bill shows the sheer nonsense of it. We are being forced by this Government to deny reality. We are being forced to create an enduring piece of legislation that states the proposition that Rwanda is “conclusively” safe, which cannot be rebutted even by conclusive proof to the contrary. This is Alice in Wonderland; it is complete and utter nonsense.
I have signed Amendments 6, 20 and 26 in the name of the learned Lord—I am sorry, it is very late—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. I have tucked myself under his coat-tails because they are incredibly sensible amendments. They at least require the Rwanda treaty to be given effect and to remain fully implemented for the Act to have effect.
However, even with that, I am not sure that we can legislate that Rwanda is conclusively safe, so my Amendment 93 would go further. It would require the whole Act to be scrapped on the day that the Secretary of State is presented with evidence that Rwanda is not conclusively a safe country. Noble Lords might call this a wrecking amendment; I would call it a huge dollop of sanity in the mad world of this Bill. Surely the Minister and all other noble Lords should support this. Why would anyone want a piece of legislation to exist on the statute book with a key provision that
“Every decision-maker must conclusively treat the Republic of Rwanda as a safe country”,
if Rwanda is not conclusively safe? Rwanda is either conclusively safe or it is not. If it is conclusively safe, why do we need legislation to force decision-makers to treat it as such? If it is not conclusively safe, why would we force decision-makers to treat it as though it is? This clause is either pointless or plainly false. I struggle to see how this Bill was ever written. Did lawyers really write this Bill? I cannot believe that anyone is going to defend it when it is so patently stupid.
My Lords, I rise just to say that I entirely agree with those who have said that we should look carefully at the direction of travel suggested by the amendments from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and encourage the Government to do the same.
It seems to me that the Government have got themselves into a pretty strange position. In proceeding with what they want to do, they have given themselves a binary choice: either legislate a fundamental untruth or find a way of establishing a system that will bring about and give confidence on the safety of Rwanda. If they do not want to do the former—and they should not—they must investigate ways of doing the latter.
My Lords, I shall first address the remarks of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lincoln. Speaking entirely for myself, nothing I say is intended to cast any aspersions on the state of Rwanda, the suffering that it has gone through or the plight in which it currently finds itself. I found his remarks incredibly moving. The Supreme Court made clear that it was not a lack of good faith that had led Rwanda to be in the position that it is in; it was just that Rwanda did not have a system that could properly deal with the analysis of asylum claims in a way that would be acceptable to the commitments that we as a country have made to asylum seekers.
I agree very strongly with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said: that Clause 1, in so far as it says that
“Rwanda is a safe country”
is not right, and it would be wrong for us as a Parliament, or as the House of Lords, to agree to that which we know is wrong.
May I address the four alternatives that are now before the House as a means of trying to deal with that? First, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has proposed that one can give effect to the provisions of the legislation only if the joint committee, set up under Article 16 of the recent Rwanda-UK treaty, says that the agreement is being complied with, and that committee would have to act on the advice of the monitoring committee. In principle, that sounds quite a good idea. As the noble and learned Lord acknowledged, one should recognise—I do not say this in a disparaging way—that the joint committee is just the two Governments.
If it is the joint committee alone, that gives no additional assurance. Because the UK Government want to do this come what may, it is hard to imagine that the Rwandan Government are going to say that they are not complying with a treaty which they say they are complying with and have committed themselves to complying with. If it was only the joint committee under Article 16, that would not provide much protection, I say with some respect.
The amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, says that the joint committee has got to act on the advice of the monitoring committee. Only if the monitoring committee positively advises that the agreement is not being complied with will the joint committee of the two Governments be prevented from giving the advice that it wants to give. I have no idea how this monitoring committee will work. It will presumably be 50:50 on each side. If it is paralysed, I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord’s proposed requirements would then be satisfied. If the joint committee was not getting positive advice one way or the other, it would still be able to give the assurance that one gives. Could that be dealt with by a number of tweaks? It might well be possible.
Subject to those points, I can see attraction in what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is saying. The only other point I have on his proposal is that the Minister appears to escape any duty at all. Should we not have it so that the Minister is subject to judicial review on the decision he takes about whether to implement the treaty?