Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Baroness Harris of Richmond

Wednesday 20th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, we come to a matter which has been discussed both in Committee and on Report. This relates to the proposal in the Bill that, if for whatever reason the police and crime commissioner has to give up office or is indisposed, the police and crime panel can appoint an acting police and crime commissioner who shall be a member of the staff of the police and crime commissioner. Noble Lords will know that I have been very concerned about the possibility of a staff member of the police and crime commissioner assuming such great responsibility. The noble Baroness said that she was still considering this matter, and that we could bring it back at Third Reading. I am hopeful that she will be able to accept my amendment, which ensures that the acting police and crime commissioner has to be a member of the panel and an elected politician. This follows on from the amendment that the noble Baroness moved at Report, which allows for independents to be appointed to police and crime panels. I do not think it appropriate for those people to become acting police and crime commissioners, which is why I have drafted the amendment in this way.

If I may say so, this is meant as a helpful amendment, to find a way through. I have detected some considerable support around the House for my view that it is not right for a staff member to assume such great responsibilities, including issues around the hire and fire of chief constables, in my understanding, and the precept. Surely it is better that an elected politician member of a police and crime panel fulfils that role. I beg to move.

[Baroness Harris of Richmond]

My Lords, I want to say a few words in support of this amendment. I find it completely incomprehensible that anyone would think that it was acceptable to put a politically restricted person in charge of making political decisions, which is the effect of the current proposals relating to deputy and acting PCCs in this Bill. Quite apart from the fact that this would give such a person an impossible technical conundrum to resolve—because a politically restricted person must be politically neutral, and therefore cannot by definition make political decisions—it completely undermines the Government’s own arguments about greater public accountability. It is particularly important that an acting PCC must be able to make decisions as if he or she were the PCC. This includes the key decision about what precept to set if the PCC is absent at that particular time of the year. The PCC’s office cannot not make a decision about this, whether or not the PCC is present, because the police service would be missing up to half its funding the following year if this was so. Not for the first time, I have thought that we were creating an Alice in Wonderland world in this Bill—it is all somehow upside-down.

It is clear to me that an acting PCC cannot be politically restricted. That means that an acting PCC cannot be drawn from the members of the PCC’s staff—which bizarrely now include the deputy PCC, although that is another issue. The obvious place to look is therefore among the members of the police and crime panel, and particularly among the elected members of the panel, if we are serious about a commitment to democracy and accountability. This is exactly what the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, stipulates, and I am very happy to support it.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Baroness Harris of Richmond

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Harris of Richmond]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 236, 237 and 238 which were tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig. We are being asked to support nothing less than a revolution in policing governance in the absence of any evidence base on which the benefits of such drastic changes are set and in the absence of any public clamour for costly reform—indeed, the opposite. We are being told that these changes will not be piloted or introduced in stages since reform is urgent and cannot possibly wait. I beg to differ on all those counts.

However, if we are to press ahead with such an untried system, I am absolutely determined that we should do our duty to ensure that all means possible are employed to insert safeguards into the Bill. HMIC inspections seem to me to be a bedrock of any such safeguards against potential pitfalls and I share the high regard in which Sir Denis O’Connor, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, is held, together with his extremely able team.

In short, HMIC inspections are at times a difficult and challenging process for those undergoing them and they have repeatedly yielded the improvement across policing, which is at the heart of HMIC’s mission. So I am left, frankly, bemused when the Government propose not to expand but to constrict the use of this valuable tool for improvement. It makes no sense at all effectively to exclude these completely new systems of oversight from an inspection regime when that regime has already helped the current system to improve.

Next, I shall draw out the intention of Amendment 238, which removes the proposed new obligation on the local policing body to reimburse HMIC for the costs of its inspection. We have heard what the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, thinks of that. We have sought to replace this with a statement that the panel may request that HMIC conducts an inspection if its concerns warrant such an intervention. I am unaware of any other inspection regime in which those delivering a public service, or who invite in or are made the subject of an inspection in the interests of public trust and confidence in their work, are expected directly to cover the costs of their inspection. Surely, in some cases an inspection will be called amidst quite serious financial issues or challenges. This idea that those opening themselves up to scrutiny in the public interest must pay for the cost of such transparency seems decidedly odd to me, even bearing in mind the parlous state of Home Office finances at the present time.

It also seems to me to be the most bizarre disincentive to those on the panel or on the commissioner’s staff who are considering whistleblowing on what might be significant issues of public interest or concern. A whistleblower or concerned panel member or local policing body member would have to gain pre-emptive approval for the costs of a possible investigation from someone who might be implicated in the very dubious activity that necessitates the inspection.

This parcelling of costs on to the petitioner for an inspection feels wrong to me on a very instinctive, but also on a very practical, level. Surely the Home Office should be seeing fit that the costs of HMIC’s absolutely essential work should be met by a Home Office grant. It would seem to be neglect approaching a dereliction of the Government’s duty to do otherwise. We have proposed that this apparently ill suited new subsection (2BB) should be replaced by a positive power for the panel that it should be able at any time to request that HMIC carry out an inspection of the PCC.

No one will be more aware of the PCC’s action or inaction in some areas than the police and crime panel since it is designed as her or his safeguard and strict check and balance. However, while the panel will be equipped to oversee the PCC in most areas, it may feel that there are issues on which it lacks a professional operational judgment on a matter of controversy. In such circumstances, it may not be appropriate to pull the chief constable into what could amount to a difference of opinion with the PCC. Who then can the panel turn to for that necessary professional advice and impartial opinion?

Finally, there should be a direct and clear ability, and a responsibility on the panel, to be able to involve HMIC appropriately. HMIC could, of course, take a view that it was being asked to get involved in a petty or irrelevant matter and could decline the invitation. However, we anticipate that this referral mechanism to HMIC will provide a helpful bridge to practical improvement for many forces facing difficulty in the future, as it so often has in the past.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, all I would like to say on the amendment is that we have discussed in previous debates the inconsistency between different parts of government in relation to inspection. I must declare my interest again as chair of an NHS foundation trust and as a consultant trainer in the NHS. NHS foundation trusts, which the Government support, were meant to be given much more freedom than other NHS bodies but they are still subject to the tender mercies of a regulator called Monitor. For the life of me, I cannot see why the Government have taken such a light-rein approach to the construct in the Bill when we have such an excellent inspectorate in the form of HMIC. These amendments seem wholly constructive. By the grace of the usual channels, we have been given a little extra time—a day—to consider these matters. Is this not a matter which the Government might take back and consider?

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Baroness Harris of Richmond

Monday 11th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Harris of Richmond]

My Lords, I have a couple of brief points to make about Amendment 102, and particularly Amendment 104 to which I have added my name. First, I welcome the fact that the Government have shown that they are willing to listen to some of the concerns expressed in Committee and I am genuinely pleased that they have moved to two-thirds the majority required to exercise a veto. I am inclined to agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, that a simple majority might be even better. It would certainly strengthen the role of the police and crime panel, which I think we all agree is essential. Hopefully, when taken in conjunction with earlier amendments about a more collaborative approach, this would guard against too capricious an attitude by the panel, having helped develop the proposals in the first place. I support this amendment but I am concerned about the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, about the relationship between this Bill and the Localism Bill in relation to the precept and referendum arrangements. I agree that this needs to be clarified. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will be able to provide reassurance on this point.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, we have had a series of debates during the passage of this Bill about the role of the police and crime panel in scrutinising the performance of the police and crime commissioner. The Minister herself has emphasised on a number of occasions the importance of the panel in doing that.

For these panels to do their jobs effectively, they surely have to have a certain amount of leverage. This Bill in effect gives them only two levers; they can veto the appointment of a chief constable, and they can veto the precept that the police and crime commissioner wishes to set. Of course, on other matters it can be consulted and there can be dialogue, but it is very clear from the Bill that the elected party political commissioner can ignore completely any input from the panel unless it exercises the veto. In the past few days we have seen one of the products of a weak regulator, the Press Complaints Commission. That surely shows the problem of having of weak regulators with very few levers. My concern with these new arrangements is that we are establishing police and crime panels inevitably to fail because their influence over elected police commissioners is likely to be limited. The veto in the original Bill was set at a very high level indeed, with a 75 per cent requirement of the members to vote in favour of veto. The Government hinted in the other place that they would be prepared to reduce it and we now see the product of that in the amendment that I am sure the noble Baroness will speak to in a moment.

The question is whether a two-thirds veto is sufficient. Like my noble friends, I do not think it is. To be effective, the police and crime commissioner must surely feel or fear that if he or she were to go too far there would be a risk that the panel would veto his or her proposals. I am speaking here about the precept.

To get a two-thirds majority of the members still places the bar at an impossibly high level. That is why I very strongly support my noble friend and I have tabled an amendment along the same lines calling for a simple majority of those present and voting. The phrase “of those present and voting” is well known to all noble Lords who have taken part in public life. Remarkably, it is not to be found in the Bill. The veto requirement refers to the members of the panel. I very much support my noble friend Lady Henig in wishing to ensure not only that a simple majority is required but that it should be of the members present at such a meeting. I have also laid an amendment to Amendment 103 of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, so even if the House settles on two-thirds as the majority figure, it ought to be of those members present and voting.

Maybe I have confused the wording of the amendment because I see the noble Baroness perhaps assuming that that is what it says. My reading is that it is two-thirds of the membership.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Baroness Harris of Richmond

Monday 4th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Harris of Richmond]

My Lords, I speak in support of the amendments, to some of which my name is added, which deal with delegation.

The amendments are all about ensuring that all senior police force appointments at and above the rank of assistant chief constable will remain with the governing body, as is currently the case. I envisage that as being the PCC but with a strong role for the police and crime panel from the interview stage onwards. In the case of senior officer appointments other than the chief officer, they specify that the chief officer of the force must be included on the interview panel, and therefore have a role in appointing his or her senior team. I certainly agree that the chief officer alone should not be able to appoint senior members of the team.

Moving on, the amendments state that the responsibility for senior officer conduct and complaints should rest with the governing body, the PCC, with the PCP taking a strong role. It is absolutely unacceptable that police officers decide whether to investigate their close colleagues. That is neither transparent nor proper.

During my time as chair of my police authority, I had to deal with some serious matters touching on the conduct of a chief constable. I could not possibly have dealt with the matter on my own. Even with legal help and support, we needed to work together as a body to come to a reasoned conclusion. As it happened, the legal advice that we were given was wrong, so imagine how I would have felt if I had had to take sole responsibility for making such a decision. Having the panel being supportive—indeed, helping to come to difficult decisions—will be by far the best way to deal with often tricky circumstances. I support the noble Baroness’s amendments.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I am conscious of the hour and the fact that our Benches are filled to hear this debate, but this is a very important group of amendments. My noble friend Lady Henig and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, have raised some important points about that come back, really, to the consequences of having a corporation sole, in which one person has enormous power and responsibility.

My amendments relate to the powers exercised by the police and crime commissioner. Under Clause 39, “Appointment, suspension and removal of chief constables”, huge authority is given to the police and crime commissioner to appoint a chief constable and to require their suspension, resignation or retirement. When it comes to the appointment, there are some safeguards, because the police and crime panel has a veto power on the appointment. We may disagree about the number of the panel voting in favour, but it has a veto power. When it comes to suspension, retirement or requirement to retire, the safeguard is much less. Although the police and crime panel can undertake a scrutiny process, as set out in Schedule 8, in the end, the police and crime commissioner can ignore the panel's recommendation.

My worry is that the police and crime commissioner who is seeking re-election when year two or year three is coming up and who is in some trouble may well consider sacking the chief constable as a visible sign to the public that he or she is doing something. There are circumstances—my noble friends have hinted at them—where that would be a jolly good thing to do, but at other times it will not; it will be a political action by a police and crime commissioner. Where are the safeguards? In the end, there are none because, whatever the panel says, the police and crime commissioner can ignore it.

I have a series of amendments which relate not only to the chief constable but to the circumstances where the same may be required of other chief officers and also to the situation in London. Essentially, this provision should apply only where it can be shown: that there is good reason—in other words, that it is in the interests of the force, for reasons of efficiency or effectiveness; that there has been appropriate consultation with the chair of the police and crime panel; that there has been proper investigation of the circumstances leading up to such an action; and that the approval of the Secretary of State is given. If Ministers consider that that gives the Secretary of State overweening powers, I must say that I have not been persuaded that the essential nature of the tripartite arrangement—the role of the Home Secretary, the police authority and the chief constable—should be so torn up that there are no safeguards to be undertaken by the Home Secretary if the police and crime commissioner decides to take such an action where, as I said, there is virtually no effective scrutiny other than the PCP recommendations.

This is a very important group of amendments. There is unease about the power to be exercised both by the police and crime commissioner in relation to the chief constable and other senior officers and then by the chief constable in relation to those employed by him as a corporation sole. We would look to the Government to recognise those concerns and to give some reassurance.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Baroness Harris of Richmond

Monday 4th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Harris of Richmond]

I speak briefly in support of Amendments 108 and 111 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig. I must say that it is without much hope of any movement, as we have seen most of the evening from the Government. Much of the debate and many of the negotiations between the Government and Peers who have expressed concern in Committee have been focused on checks and balances and getting the role of the panels right. I am grateful that the Government have accepted that a more co-operative approach is needed through the amendment that the Minister is about to put forward, which I welcome.

However, I agree that some greater description needs to be included in the Bill about what a co-operative relationship looks like in practice. I therefore support the more detailed amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig. The proposal that the panel should be involved in some of the really key functions brings some important clarity to what this might involve, particularly around shaping the police and crime plan, the budget that will help to deliver it and the precept that will need to be raised locally to support it.

I also welcome the role envisaged for panel members at a more local level in helping to engage with communities and monitor force performance. This, of course, goes back to concerns that the PCC is too big a job to be able to engage in detail at very local level on a consistent basis; and I think it is helpful to suggest that the panel should do so. This would enable it to bring concerns and issues to the attention of the governing body, as well as adding to the sources of information available to the panel to assist in its scrutiny of the PCC. I believe that these are helpful suggestions to assist in drawing out how the role of the panel can be strengthened, and I support them.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate with slightly curious groupings. I think I should take out my Amendment 109A, which relates to a review by the panel of the police and crime commissioner’s human resources policy. I do not think it belongs here. It might be better taken when we reach Schedule 15.

There is a theme in relation to most of the other amendments in this grouping around the role of the panel in relation both to the public and to the precept. My noble friend Lord Beecham is absolutely right. The precept is a significant proportion—between about 11 and 13 per cent—of the total council tax. We debated this in Committee and I know that when we get our council tax information, we have different leaflets in relation to different bodies. However, my noble friend is right: because of the significance and the fact that this is made by one person, it should be completely separate and completely separately identified. That would discharge more effective public accountability.

In previous amendments, we have debated the role of the PCC, and noble Lords on the government Front Bench have rejected many amendments because, for instance, when it comes to requiring chief constables to appear before the police and crime panel or the equivalent in London, it is argued that that blurs the line of accountability. I think that unless you have completely separate precepts, that also blurs the line of accountability when it comes to raising resources from council tax payers.

My Amendment 96A reinforces the requirement for openness in relation to the precept. I think it quite extraordinary that local authorities are not going to be consulted formally on the precept that the police and crime commissioner proposes to make. The Minister will no doubt say that that can be done through the panel. Of course the panel exists to provide scrutiny, but given the importance of the precept, I think there is a strong argument that each individual authority ought to be consulted as well. I hope the Minister will be sympathetic to that.

My noble friend Lady Henig made some very important points in relation to the panels and the question of public meetings. Her amendments link the panel to local areas. West Midlands Police force, which covers the area from Coventry to Wolverhampton, will have one person to be elected the PCC. There is a risk that some of the great work that has recently been undertaken by the police force to develop links at the local level will be dissipated, and the role of the panel to reinforce those links would be very valuable indeed.

The government amendment essentially states that the responsibilities of the panels must be exercised with a view to supporting the effective exercise of the functions of PCCs. It is a tribute to the draftsmanship of parliamentary counsel that such an anodyne amendment could be put forward. It is, of course, completely meaningless because who is to say whether what a PCP does is exercised with a view to supporting the effective exercise of the functions of PCCs? Unless we find ourselves in judicial review territory, I presume that this will never be tested. If I were a panel chair, I would, of course, always argue that everything I did was about ensuring the effective exercise of the functions of the PCC. I think we should congratulate the Government on their ingenuity, but I hope the Minister will confirm that it is meaningless.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Baroness Harris of Richmond

Monday 6th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Harris of Richmond]

I support the amendments put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig. If many of us in the Committee are concerned about the unfamiliar concept of corporations sole and giving this status to chief officers, it makes absolute sense to look at alternative approaches. I would support an amendment that allowed a PCC to delegate certain functions for the management of police budgets and related issues to a chief officer.

I have been concerned in the past about the way in which collaboration agreements and arrangements work. I fondly recall putting forward some amendments about exactly that while the House was considering the then Policing and Crime Bill two or three years ago. They suggested that a police authority should be allowed to delegate certain responsibilities for managing collaboration agreements to another police authority, which is currently prevented. I complained at the time that this made managing better collaboration unnecessarily bureaucratic and burdensome. The same argument applies to PCC functions for managing collaboration agreements. I strongly support the amendments.

I also congratulate the noble Baroness on her amendments to the interpretation part. They are exactly the sort of thing that is required to give force to the more collaborative approach to police governance that I intended by my amendment creating police commissions. Amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, suggest that a PCC and a panel should share responsibility for handling of force complaints and conduct matters. I support that, but the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, goes just that little bit further.

I am also happy to support the other amendments in this group to which the noble Baroness has spoken. However, as many of them relate to ACPO-rank appointments and complaints, and a later grouping deals with these matters, I shall speak in more detail at that stage.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I am indebted to my noble friend Lady Henig for her amendments. As she said, some are consequential and some help with interpretation, particularly in relation to the vote on day one in Committee. I also share her concern about the corporation sole concept and delegation to chief officers and I welcome her proposal to streamline collaborative processes.

My amendment in this group, Amendment 211ZB, returns us to a matter that I have raised a couple of times before. It relates to one of the most bizarre provisions in legislation that I have ever seen before your Lordships’ House. Clause 62(2) states:

“The police and crime panel may appoint a person as acting commissioner only if the person is a member of the police and crime commissioner’s staff at the time of the appointment”.

Clause 62(1) states that the police and crime panel must appoint a person as an acting commissioner if,

“no person holds the office of police and crime commissioner … the police and crime commissioner for that area is incapacitated, or … the police and crime commissioner for that area is suspended in accordance with section 30”.

If we track back to Clause 30, we find the circumstances in which a police and crime panel may suspend the relevant police and crime commissioner. They relate mainly to whether a commissioner has been charged with an offence that carries a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding two years. We shall come back to the issue of whether two years should be reduced to six months, which it ought to be.

In essence, in circumstances where the commissioner is either incapacitated in one way or another or has been charged under the provisions of Clause 30, the panel is to appoint an acting commissioner who will be a member of the staff of that commissioner. This is extraordinary. Who will the people appointed be? I do not want to repeat what I said on our last day in Committee, but who will they be? Who will the commissioners appoint? They will be media people, because the commissioners will want to be re-elected and so a great deal of their focus will be on communications. We should look at the staffing. There is no control over the police and crime commissioners. There is no corporate governance and there are no non-executives; it is solely up to the commissioners whom they appoint. Clearly they are going to appoint people who will help them in their political endeavours—and yet it is suggested that, if the police and crime commissioner is no longer able to carry on in the job, a member of their staff will be appointed.

What would happen if a police and crime commissioner was charged with corruption and the sentence carried more than two years? What would happen if the senior members of the commissioner’s staff were also charged with corruption? Who then would the panel turn to? Even if it was only the police and crime commissioner who was charged with corruption—and, as we are giving so much power to one individual, with very few checks and balances, it is not impossible that one of the PCCs may find themselves in that situation—are we saying that the public would have confidence if a member of the staff of the person so charged were then to become the police and crime commissioner?

So far, apart from the issue of the memorandum of understanding and the clear hint that the Government are prepared to reduce the veto requirement on the precepts from 75 per cent to two-thirds, we have had very little give from them about recognising some of the serious concerns being put forward. On this one, surely the Government must think again.