Health Service Medical Supplies (Costs) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Hunt of Kings Heath
Main Page: Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Hunt of Kings Heath's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, first, as we are entering Report, I declare my interests as president of the Healthcare Supplies Association and of GS1, the barcoding organisation.
Like the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, and the noble Lord, Lord Warner, I make it clear that in supporting the amendment, the Opposition support the core purpose of the Bill. The recent fines imposed by the Competition and Markets Authority on two companies, which essentially exposed a loophole, left the Government with no option but to act—we agree with that. I have to say that it is interesting to note that the powers that the Government have taken upon themselves in the Bill will give them draconian influence over drug prices in future.
The Bill allows the Government to institute price controls. It states that the Government may have reached a voluntary agreement with industry over pricing but can none the less come in and impose price controls over that agreement. To cap it all, it massively extends the Government’s powers to ask for information about any health service product sold to the NHS. Such information could cover prices, discounts, rebates, revenues and profits, and could apply to millions of products every year.
It is a socialist dream of state intervention. Speaking here as a great believer in central state intervention, my heart warms to the Minister’s vigour and enthusiasm for regulation. It gives an idea of the nirvana of post-Brexit, light-touch regulation from this Government. Perhaps we should dream of EU directives in future, because this Government are so bent on their home-grown regulation.
We will come to the issue of proportionality, because many of our later amendments involve whether the Government have been proportionate. For me, this amendment is essentially about access, because I do not think you can talk about price controls on drugs without talking about patient access to innovative drugs and treatments. At the moment we are seeing an unprecedented level of rationing, both locally and nationally. Locally, clinical commissioning groups are making some really perverse decisions, ranging from cutting out health promotion programmes to being incredibly restrictive on operations and restricting access to innovative drugs.
A fairly recent report that I read by leading charities Breast Cancer Now and Prostate Cancer UK, for instance, showed that NHS cancer patients are missing out on innovative treatments that are available in any comparable country to the UK. One example is the PrEP drug. The reluctance of NHS England to fund the use of this extraordinary preventive drug in relation to the treatment of HIV is another example of the problem that we have. When the previous Labour Government set up NICE, it was designed to speed up the introduction of innovative new treatments. But since 2010, access to new drugs approved by NICE has been increasingly impeded, which has culminated in the current consultation that if a NICE-approved treatment is expected to exceed a cost of £20 million in any of the first three years of its use, NHS England can ask for a longer period for its introduction.
We also have a consultation on the introduction of a QALY threshold of £100,000 for evaluating highly specialised technologies. My understanding is that no other country in the world uses such a threshold in evaluating ultra-rare disease treatment. The almost universal view is that this form of assessment is not appropriate and would effectively stop the flow of new medicines reaching patients with rare and complex processes.
Of course, the noble Lord, Lord Warner, is right that the drugs budget cannot be open ended and that the NHS must achieve value for money—and I, too, have engaged with industry over the years in seeking to get the drug budget down. We all understand that. The tragedy is that a ground-breaking agreement reached by the last Government in 2014 with drug companies could have led to many new drugs being introduced. The pharmaceutical industry guaranteed to hold down drug costs for a five-year period and, if the costs went over the agreed limit, the industry would pay back a rebate every quarter. To date, £1.5 billion has been handed over.
I know how irritating it is to point to Scotland and Wales and say that they are doing something better—but something like the Scottish fund that has been established from the rebates to fund the introduction of new medicines would have been a preferable way in which to go forward in the situation that we have in England, where restriction after restriction is taking place in the use of better drugs for patients.
You then have to link the issue to our investment in R&D and life sciences. Sir John Bell, regius professor of medicine at the University of Oxford and chair of the Office for Strategic Coordination of Health Research, who is playing an absolutely pivotal role in this area, spelled this out recently. As he said, the last 30 years have witnessed an unprecedented number of major innovations in healthcare that have resulted in significant extensions in life expectancy and quality of life. The problem is that the National Health Service has been unable to adopt this new innovation effectively and, as a result, many improvements in healthcare have been put in jeopardy.
This is not an easy issue. Sir John Bell says—and I agree—that one problem is that our current model too often layers the cost of supporting the innovation needed to help discover new healthcare innovations on top of existing practice. So, unlike in other sectors, in the health service innovation always seems to cost money. This is a very important issue when it comes to thinking about how we can afford the kind of changes that will fall to health and social care in future.
I will also quote Keir Woods, head of oncology at the major pharmaceutical company Merck. He points to that company’s investment in the UK—20% of its global venture capital is invested in the UK—and he celebrates the UK’s position as a global power in health, with our world-class universities, centres of excellence in clinical research and some of the top medical journals, which has a positive impact on investment. We are home to 4,800 life science companies, with the largest pipeline of new discoveries in Europe. That is something to celebrate. Dr Woods says that we can build on that, but there are two provisos. First, we have to be able to secure the cream of international talent. The discussions around Brexit are very important in relation to that. Secondly, we have to increase the uptake of these new innovations in the UK.
The frustration that I and many others have is that the UK is a wonderful place for innovative and ground-breaking new treatments and drugs, but the fruits are increasingly being enjoyed by patients in other parts of the world. Currently, the UK has developed around 14% of the top 100 global medicines. That is something to celebrate—but 20 years ago we were responsible for about one-quarter of the global medicines that had been developed. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, referred to the £4 billion invested by pharma R&D. However, up to 2011 it was £5 billion—so we are seeing a deinvestment that is very much linked to the hopelessly poor record of adoption of new medicines in this country.
I know that the Minister will talk about some of the initiatives he is taking and I am sure that he will mention the accelerated access review, which aims to make the UK the fastest place for the design, development and widespread adoption of innovations. This is entirely laudable, but the problem is that this approach will take a few items and accelerate access while the NHS goes about crudely rationing a whole host of other innovations and putting at risk our life sciences, R&D investment and, of course, the quality of patient care.
That is why this amendment is so important. We support the Bill and its aims, but what has been lacking so far is any recognition by the Government that there are three planks to this. The first is better value for money in terms of drugs and health service products; the second is the quality, range and health of our life sciences and R&D investment; and the third is access to treatment by patients. So far the Government have not been prepared to grip this last issue. That is why the amendment is so important and I support it.
My Lords, I will speak briefly on this amendment, although there are later ones in my name which will allow me to say more about the way in which the Bill proposes that the Secretary of State exercises his or her duties. The idea that it is not part of government strategy—back in 2014 or now—to promote the life sciences sector through the structure of the PPRS is absurd. It is self-evidently the Government’s intention, and was in 2014. The structure of a negotiated, voluntary PPRS was designed to achieve that. The issue that has emerged since 2014 and the application of the new voluntary scheme is that the industry was looking for stability for the Government in terms of the budget; freedom to price at introduction, and action on access to new medicines. It is in that third area that there has been a lack of progress. In many ways, I agree with what noble Lords have been saying about the desirability of achieving that access. It has not been restricted since 2010, although the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, tended to construct it that way. For example, we introduced the cancer drugs fund in 2010 precisely because prior research by Mike Richards had demonstrated that patients in this country were failing to have access to new cancer medicines at the time when patients in other European countries did. It is not a new problem: it has been around a long time. The cancer drugs fund was intended to meet that gap by 2014 and the PPRS should have taken over, but it did not. After Innovation, Health and Wealth in December 2011, and the accelerated access review now, we are now seeing efforts to try to make that happen and they should be thoroughly supported.
The second limb of the amendment does not help, because it is just about access for patients to those new treatments which have been approved and recommended by NICE. That is only one part of a much wider issue about the adoption and diffusion of new technologies across the NHS more generally, often in circumstances where NICE has not been involved. I find the new consultation proposal on NHS England’s budget impact threshold something of a double-edged sword. The measure could erect another hurdle to be cleared before patients can access new medicines, and we have to avoid that. However, it may have the positive effect of encouraging NHS England, as the budget holder, and NICE, as its pharmacoeconomic evaluation mechanism, to work together with companies at an early stage to arrive at a negotiated price at an early point. That would be much to the benefit of the industry and the NHS given that we are aiming, through this legislation and beyond, to obtain patient access to medicines on reasonable terms that the NHS can afford. If the measure were used in that way, it would have the right benefit. However, I fear that this amendment, particularly its latter limb, does not take us any further in that direction.
The treatments become available throughout the NHS from three months after the appraisal.
My Lords, given that I took the order through Parliament many years ago, I can confirm that the whole intention was that the NHS had 90 days to prepare for funding a medicine that had been designated by NICE as both clinically and cost effective. The problem is that, subsequently, in particular over the past few years, clinical commissioning groups have done everything they can to avoid this responsibility. Alongside that, the purity of the 90-day rule is being eaten into, and that is at the heart of the concern of this amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to all my colleagues for the powerful support they have given to the amendment. I do not doubt the Government’s commitment to the life sciences, which I acknowledge from what they have put in the industrial strategy and the person they put in charge of leading that work. However, they have not convinced the industry with the Bill. They seem to be sending out separate messages.
The amendment is meant to tackle the two issues of supporting a flourishing life sciences industry and guaranteeing patient access to drugs that have been approved by NICE. It is very clear that that second part is not working well and is getting worse. It does no harm whatever to reinforce that message in the Bill with this amendment.
On life sciences, I say to the Minister that it is a funny way to show he is supporting that industry, at a critical time for this country, by bringing along a Bill that, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, made very clear, overdoses on regulatory requirements, price control and information requirements. This is a pretty strange message to say to a load of international companies when you want them to settle here and do your research.
I have listened to the Minister very carefully. I am much more persuaded by my colleagues’ supportive speeches, for which I am grateful. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, even though the House has just divided, the Bill has been characterised by a substantial measure of agreement on the purposes we are trying to achieve and I am sure that will be reflected in the further amendments that are to be discussed. I neglected earlier to draw attention to the register of interests and, in particular, to my position as an adviser to MAP BioPharma, which is not itself a participant in the PPRS in any way.
Let me make the purpose of Amendment 4 clear to noble Lords. The Government, in bringing this legislation, were prompted in part by the fact that expenditure on medicines was rising somewhat faster than the Government had anticipated, the amount of the rebate being achieved by way of payment back to the Government was less than was anticipated, and the difference was, in part, explicable by virtue of the transfer of certain products into the statutory scheme. In the statutory scheme they had a price cut applicable but no rebate scheme applicable and the Government did not feel that they had the necessary power to amend the statutory scheme to make a rebate apply.
The purpose of the legislation is to make the two schemes broadly equivalent. As the Minister told the Committee, the Government’s intention was to make the revenues being rebated back to the Government from the two schemes broadly equivalent. However, in my view that would potentially have the perverse impact that certain products in the statutory scheme would end up with a much higher rebate percentage being applied to them as a consequence—or, alternatively, that products outwith the price control under the voluntary scheme, because they were introduced after December 2013, would have the price control applied to them under the statutory scheme. So a discontinuity would apply, potentially either way, by applying the broadly equivalent proportion of cost of sales being returned to the Government in the form of a rebate.
I have therefore suggested that it is a perfectly reasonable principle on the Government’s part, as we explored in Committee, to try to make the two schemes equivalent so that there cannot be gaming, as it were, by moving into one scheme rather than the other. That should be applied, as the amendment specifies, by means of asking the Government, wherever a voluntary scheme is in place—which is an important caveat—to ensure that a statutory scheme should seek, so far as is practicable and relevant, and it will not be precise, so I do not think it can be regarded as too rigid, to make it so that the equivalent effect is applied at a product level: not at a company level or a whole-scheme level, but in relation to the individual products. Individual products, whether they are in the voluntary scheme or the statutory scheme, should expect to have broadly the same overall treatment applied to them. The net effect would therefore be that the schemes will become equivalent and the scope for gaming will be reduced. I hope that explains the amendment and I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has raised a very important point. For me, the question is: what is the future of the voluntary scheme? Over the years it has clearly served its purpose well. In Committee, the noble Lord acknowledged the benefit of the PPRS, which is the voluntary scheme, and said that it showed how Government and industry could work together to develop solutions. I draw the noble Lord’s attention to a piece written by Sir John Bell recently. When talking about what we have just discussed, the dynamic between access, cost and life-science investment and the problem the NHS has in investing in innovation, he said:
“A solution for both parties is necessary and must come from healthcare systems and innovators working more closely together, sharing risk and cost and attempting to use innovation to take cost out of health systems wherever possible”.
This is a wider issue than drug costs and PPRS, but it would be good to hear about the context in which the Minister thinks a potential new PPRS is going to be agreed. Many in industry think that the Government are not really committed to a new PPRS. It would be interesting to get some sense from the Minister as to where he thinks things are going.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lansley for bringing this amendment and for the opportunity to talk about the intentions of the Bill. He is quite right to highlight that the reason for bringing the Bill forward is to stop the behaviour of switching between schemes in order to reduce liabilities. That has characterised behaviour in the past few years and has had an impact on the successful operation of the PPRS. I will discuss the PPRS towards the end of my speech.
Amendment 4 is about the relationship between the voluntary and statutory schemes. I thank noble Lords for their views in this area. This amendment would require us to secure that, for any given product, the voluntary and statutory schemes would have an equivalent impact. It presents a slightly different approach to securing equivalence between the voluntary and statutory schemes, but I understand that, fundamentally, equivalence is what the amendment is seeking to achieve. I gave my views on this matter in Committee and I am happy to respond in similar terms on this occasion.
The Government’s intention is for the two schemes to deliver a broadly equivalent level of savings as a proportion of the total sales covered by each scheme. However, to require the terms of each scheme to be the same, in so far as possible, is inappropriate and would restrict the scope of the two schemes to operate in a complementary manner. Requiring equivalence to operate at product level, as the amendment suggests, would be even more restrictive.
The voluntary scheme is a matter for negotiation with industry. As such, there is scope to have a range of measures included that reflect the priorities of both sides at any point. It may be helpful to the House if I reiterate some of the examples I set out in Committee. The current voluntary scheme, the PPRS, includes a range of provisions, developed through negotiation with industry, that sit alongside the payment mechanism. This includes price modulation, which enables companies to put prices up and down as long as the overall effect across their portfolio is neutral. This has commercial value to companies, which may be willing to accept a higher payment percentage as a result.
In another example, while new medicines in the PPRS are excluded from PPRS payments, the PPRS payment percentage level itself is set at a level to achieve the agreed level of savings across both new and older medicines. This means that each company’s share of the income due to government will vary depending on the balance of new and old products in their portfolio, with companies that have mainly new products paying less than companies with mainly old products. However, it would be very challenging to replicate this model in the statutory scheme, as many fewer companies are affected by the statutory scheme regulations than are members of the PPRS. As a result, there is a much smaller pool of companies with older products. To achieve the same level of savings overall from the statutory scheme as from the PPRS while exempting newer products would require an extremely high payment percentage. This provides an example of where minor differences in terms may be required in order to deliver an equivalent level of savings across the two schemes overall. As noble Lords know, as we discussed in Committee and as I now repeat, the detail of how any future statutory scheme will work will be subject to further consultation.
As was discussed here and in the Commons, the freedom to negotiate the voluntary scheme has been valued greatly by both industry and government. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, reminded us, I said as much in Committee. Our intention for the future of the PPRS is to work collaboratively and constructively with industry on future medicines pricing arrangements when the current PPRS comes to an end.
This time, will NHS England be a full partner in the discussions and negotiations? Clearly, unless it owns the solution as well, you have the problem that an agreement can be reached but it does not quite translate itself into action on the ground. I realise that this is traditionally a negotiation between the Department of Health and the industry but it would be useful if NHS England were fully part of that.
The noble Lord makes an excellent point. Clearly, as the budget holder, NHS England ultimately must be a key part of negotiations for any future schemes. We intend that any future voluntary scheme should be established through negotiation in this way, but linking the payment mechanisms would inevitably place a restriction on that freedom.
I am grateful to my noble friend for raising this issue and I hope I have reassured him on equivalence, while also explaining why I believe the amendment goes too far by focusing specifically on products. On that basis, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, as I mentioned in the debate on Amendment 3, I support this amendment because it gives the Secretary of State a bit more flexibility to take account of the specific circumstances of a company with very high fixed costs, in the interest of making sure that we have security of supply and patient access to the particular products that it produces. I do not think it undermines any of the objectives of the Bill in any way, and because of that, I hope that we will hear something encouraging from the Minister.
My Lords, in Committee the noble Lord said that he did not think that biosimilars should be excluded from the voluntary or statutory pricing schemes, as competitive tendering would not generate sufficient levels of price reductions. I had a note from one of the companies involved, Sandoz, which says that one of the issues here, alongside the fact that fierce competition is already driving significant price reductions for the NHS, is that development costs of generic medicines do not compare with those of biosimilars. Those costs can be up to 100 times those of generic medicines, partly because of the licensing process and the time needed for development. I hope the noble Lord will be able to address that and explain how the Bill aligns with recent NHS policy, which has expressed support for the uptake of biosimilar medicines, particularly through the intention for specialised services commissioning. The noble Lord’s comments in Committee on biosimilars caused some disappointment, and if he could respond more positively now that would be helpful.
My Lords, from time to time I have been approached by plasma companies and vaccine companies about supply issues, particularly where there have been changes in the structure of the industry and a reduction in the number of producers of some of these products, and sometimes on the point of whether British companies may start to go out of business because of some of those structural changes. My question to the Minister is whether the amendment would actually help enable the Secretary of State to deal with some of those supply problems when this becomes an issue. It becomes an issue for those patients who really need that particular product when no other will do. Is this the kind of amendment that would help with these supply problem areas, which to my knowledge have been experienced from time to time, particularly in plasma and vaccine areas?
My Lords, I will speak very briefly to Amendment 8 and then allow the Minister to explain his amendments. I can then perhaps come back at wind-up to refer to my own Amendment 12 to his Amendment 11.
We have discussed whether the Bill is proportionate, and this is particularly apposite in relation to this clause. There is concern that the powers may be too intrusive in requiring companies to submit profit-level information on individual products, which I understand from many of the companies involved that they consider complex and onerous to provide, and not necessary routinely for the Government. My amendment attempts to deal with this in a way which I think is proportionate and not intrusive, but which should provide the kind of information the Government want. I will be very interested to hear what the Minister says about his amendments. I beg to move.
My Lords, my name is on this amendment and I support it. I want to emphasise the point about the UK, which is in this amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. Members of the industry are concerned that they will be brought into a conflict between them and their headquarters over the pricing of particular products in the UK. The point that the noble Lord has made in his amendment about specifying the UK is extremely important.
My Lords, I reciprocate my noble friend’s thanks. In Committee he said he was going to think very carefully about the subject of information and the circumstances in which it is required from companies. Having done so and engaged us in a conversation about it, he has come forward with an amendment that seems specifically designed to meet the concerns raised in Committee. From my point of view, and this is very simply put, there must be a general scheme to acquire information, but when one goes beyond it the company has a right to expect that the information notice must be specific, itemised and additional, and that, as is now provided for, there should be a right of appeal in relation to that. My noble friend has very kindly listened and brought forward an amendment to do in substance the things that we were looking for, so I am grateful to him.
My Lords, I thank the Minister. I am grateful for his amendments, because he clearly listened to the debate. I just want to encourage him to go that little bit further. I am glad that we have a government amendment on Third Reading, because that means that we can continue this debate: his amendment is amendable, which is always the issue for noble Lords on Third Reading.
The Minister said on my Amendment 12 that he was anxious not to put particular conditions into the Bill, but my reading of his Amendment 11 is that he imposes particular conditions. Its first four lines state:
“Regulations under this section must require the Secretary of State to give a UK producer an information notice if information is required in respect of the costs incurred by the producer in connection with the manufacturing, distribution or supply”.
All I want to do in my amendment is add the word “access”. I am just taking his elegant drafting and adding a bit to it. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 8.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the way he responded to Amendment 14 in my name. I am satisfied that the Government will consult closely on the list of bodies.