Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Howard of Lympne Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, we commence the vital work of this Committee with amendments that address a fundamental dispute of fact: that the Government’s attitude to checks, balances and the rule of law now threatens our unwritten constitutional settlement. Having failed to convince our highest court that the Republic of Rwanda is currently safe for asylum seekers and refugees, the Executive seek to overturn the Supreme Court’s recent factual determination, ousting the jurisdiction of domestic courts to reconsider those facts in the light of further developments, including the Rwanda treaty on which the Government rely. The Government further purport to take powers to ignore interim orders of the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, they threaten both the domestic rule of law, especially the separation of powers, and the international rules-based order.

I remind noble Lords not just of the Supreme Court’s decision of 15 November last year but of subsequent reports of your Lordships’ International Agreements Committee, endorsed by an overwhelming vote in your Lordships’ House; of the Constitution Committee, including three former Conservative Ministers and a former No. 10 chief of staff; and now the majority report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I will assume that some members of those committees will speak, so I will leave them fully to outline the clear results of their deliberations.

None the less, as your Lordships overwhelmingly decided to give this Bill a Second Reading, I will approach the task of amendment in the spirit of constitutional compromise, seeking to amend the Bill in line with the Government’s desired policy of offshoring asylum decisions while also seeking to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision and the unequivocal advice of your Lordships’ International Agreements Committee and Constitution Committee—this notwithstanding my personal objection to transporting human beings for processing, which will no doubt be subject to further political and legal scrutiny in the months and years ahead.

For present purposes, I take the Government at their word—even if that word has been put rather belligerently to the Supreme Court and your Lordships’ House. I will assume that the Government do not want to put the Executive of the United Kingdom on a collision course with our Supreme Court or our international legal obligations, so amendments in this group seek to offer a way through the stalemate for people of good will from all sides of your Lordships’ House. Amendments 1, 2, 5 and 34 in my name are supported by the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I have signed Amendments 3 and 7 tabled by the noble Viscount. The noble Lord, Lord German, has Amendments 11 and 12.

Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee warned of a number of concerning trends in the present Government’s approach to our constitution and our courts, which seeks, for example, to disapply the Human Rights Act for particular unpopular groups rather than repeal it wholesale for everyone. I observe another new fashion in adding a lengthy introduction to a relatively short Bill that deems facts changed, making its purposes so clear that the courts should be wary of interpreting the legislation as they might otherwise do. However, since the arrival of this Bill in your Lordships’ House, the Prime Minister has stated—by a press conference, but stated—that his Rwanda Bill was designed to assuage the concerns of the Supreme Court.

Therefore, Amendments 1 and 2 add a secondary but essential purpose to the primary purpose of preventing and deterring what the Government see as unlawful migration. This purpose is to

“ensure compliance with the domestic and international rule of law by providing that no person will be removed to the Republic of Rwanda by or under such provision”

unless two conditions are met. The first condition is that there is advice from the UNHCR that Rwanda is now safe; for example, as a result of the successful implementation of promised reforms and safeguards to the asylum system there. The second condition is that this advice has been laid before both Houses of Parliament.

Now, some may balk at what they regard as a foreign body having any role whatever in the assessment of facts on the ground in Rwanda. However, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights noted, our Supreme Court’s concerns about the lack of safety there were in no small part in the light of unequivocal expert evidence from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, with its special expertise and role under the refugee convention.

If the Executive is now asking Parliament to become complicit in overturning findings of fact by our Supreme Court—this is made explicit by Amendments 3 and 4 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham—it should at the very least allow Parliament to hear advice from the expert body that the Supreme Court found so authoritative before allowing facts to be deemed as having changed. Accordingly, Amendment 5 replaces the edict that Rwanda “is” safe with that belief that it “may become” so, because it should be our unanimous aspiration that the whole world becomes a safer place for persecuted and displaced people.

Further, as even an independent expert body should never usurp the fact-finding jurisdiction of our courts, especially in dangerous and fast-changing times, Amendment 34 makes it clear that even clear and positive advice from the UNHCR would create only a “rebuttable presumption” that Rwanda is safe. In keeping with earlier legislation, as observed by the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House, it would not hobble our courts with an absolute conclusion. Yet, if the Government are really so confident that that Rwanda treaty, unlike the refugee convention so long before it, will be implemented so as convincingly to render that country safe, they have nothing to fear from either these amendments or our courts. I beg to move.

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

My Lords, I must begin by apologising for the fact that I was abroad at the time of Second Reading and was therefore not in my place at that time. Much was made at Second Reading of the notion that the Bill in some way contravenes our constitutional principles, is an affront to the separation of powers, and infringes on the power of the judiciary. Those allegations are thoroughly misconceived but they are highly relevant to this amendment.

The plain fact is that we are a parliamentary democracy. That means that Parliament is sovereign and the reason why so many of us cherish that overarching principle is that we attach high importance to something called accountability. Accountability was not a word which featured very large in your Lordships’ debate at Second Reading. The courts are accountable to no one; they proudly proclaim that fact. Many of the bodies to which Parliament has in recent years outsourced some of its responsibilities have little, if any, accountability. But Parliament itself, or at least the other place—the House of Commons, in which I was privileged to serve for 27 years—is truly accountable. It is answerable to the British people at regular intervals and its Members can be summarily dismissed.

There are those who seem uncomfortable with our system and it is indeed true that there has been something of a whittling away at it in recent years. The courts have extended their power. Parliament itself has contributed to it by the outsourcing to which I referred. I often think it is a pity that those who praise these developments failed to come up with some suggested alternatives to parliamentary democracy, but there it is.

These amendments, if passed, would mark a new jump in this process. I ask those who support them to address the question of accountability. To whom is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees accountable? They might say to the General Assembly of the United Nations, perhaps. To whom is that body accountable? Neither the high commissioner nor the General Assembly have any responsibility for securing our borders. They have no responsibility for the safety of those who make the perilous channel crossing. They have no duty to take into account the resentment felt by so many against the sheer unfairness of illegal immigration and the way in which it gives preference not to the most deserving, but merely to those who can afford to pay the people smugglers.

Our elected Government and this Parliament bear those responsibilities, and the House of Commons is directly accountable to the electorate for the way in which those responsibilities are discharged. These amendments would prevent our Government and Parliament discharging those responsibilities. They seek to outsource those responsibilities to an unelected body with no accountability. The acceptance of these amendments would constitute nothing less than an abdication of the responsibilities of government. I note without surprise—

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I do not understand the argument that the noble Lord is making. As I understand the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the responsibility laid on the UN High Commissioner for Refugees would be to advise the Secretary of State. I do not see how that makes him accountable; it would remain the Secretary of State, surely, who was accountable to this Parliament for the decisions that he decided to take in the light of the advice he received.

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

I fear not. The easiest way of replying to the noble Lord is to read from the Member’s explanatory statement on the amendment:

“The amendments require positive UNHCR advice on the safety of Rwanda to be laid before Parliament before claims for asylum in the UK may be processed in Rwanda”.


If there is no positive advice from the UNHCR, those claims cannot be processed in Rwanda. I think that will aid the noble Lord’s understanding of what I am saying.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I was referring to the text of the amendment.

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

I think it is perfectly reasonable, if one wants to know the intention of the amendment, to look at the Member’s explanatory statement. That is, indeed, the purpose of the explanatory statement.

I note with interest, but not with surprise, that none of these amendments is signed by any member of the Opposition Front Bench. I am not surprised because no party that aspires to government could support the abdication of the responsibilities of government, which these amendments would achieve.

I will just say a word about Amendment 7 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hailsham and others. It asserts that the decision of the Supreme Court was a “finding of fact”. But it was not; it was a finding of opinion—the Supreme Court’s opinion that the removal of asylum seekers to Rwanda would expose them to the risk of refoulement. It is an opinion on which men of good faith and true can disagree. Indeed, it is an opinion on which distinguished judges disagreed.

The Divisional Court, one of whose two members was a Lord Justice of Appeal, came to the conclusion that what the Government were proposing was entirely lawful. The Court of Appeal, by majority, disagreed, but the then Lord Chief Justice dissented. In my view, when the Supreme Court reaches a conclusion on a matter of opinion, it is entirely legitimate and proper constitutionally for Parliament—the House of Commons is democratically accountable to the people, and the Supreme Court is not—to substitute its own opinion. That is what the Bill does, and that is why I support it.

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[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

As I said in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, it is not simply a question of seeking advice from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The amendments clearly state that, unless positive advice is obtained, no one can be removed to Rwanda. So the decision will no longer be the decision of the Secretary of State; it will be the decision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. That is the point. It is not just advice; it is advice which would be binding, according to these amendments, on the Government.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I thank the noble Lord for that point. He interrupted me before I got to the answer to his question—but that is fine. I had been going to say that the doctrine, according to the noble Lord, Lord Howard, is that every member that has signed the refugee convention—well over 150, I think—and ratified it, including our sovereign Parliament, has the right to reinterpret the convention as it wishes. You have only to stop and think for one minute what that implies to realise that it implies complete chaos and the law of the jungle. If all 150-plus members of the United Nations refugee convention are able to stand up and say, “Well, actually, this is what I think the convention means, and I don’t care a damn what the High Commissioner for Refugees says”, then we are living in chaos. It is to avoid that that these amendments are being put forward.

I strongly support the arguments of the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, who expressed extremely eloquently the reason this country has a real interest in paying attention to these matters.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to all Members of the Committee from around the Chamber for the constructive manner and tone with which these proceedings on the first group have been conducted. Noble Lords will forgive me if I do not mention every excellent contribution; they will understand that is not a discourtesy to Members of the Committee, but, I hope, a bit of kindness to those who have amendments to follow this evening.

I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, for following immediately, because he was able to crystallise some key issues between us, on my suite of amendments as well as on all the others in the first group. In essence, he had two points: one that I can embrace to some extent, and another that I cannot. I think that he was the first to point out that, in the way that I have formulated my suite of amendments, I have given perhaps too determinative a role for the UNHCR. I explained the reason for that: it was because the Prime Minister said that he was going to assuage the concerns of the Supreme Court. None the less, I take the noble Lord’s point—which was echoed by subsequent speakers, if less robustly—so I hope not to create a determinative role for the UNHCR in the next stage of proceedings, although I also note that many Members of the Committee, including the Minister, referred to the important part that the UNHCR plays in the world on refugees and the convention.

However, the second crucial point—

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

Before the noble Baroness goes to the point where she disagrees with me, I thank her for her response to the first point I made. Of course, I do not speak for the Government, but no doubt we will consider the matter further when we get to Report.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am again grateful to the noble Lord. However, his second central point was the big constitutional one: that Parliament is sovereign—that is pretty much it—and that the Supreme Court’s decision on 15 November was mere opinion rather than a determinative finding of fact in our system. I am afraid that I must disagree with him on that, in essence for the reasons outlined later in the debate by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer. He in turn echoed some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham, at Second Reading about the dangers that lie in the future should it be possible, in our country, for Governments with large majorities, of whatever stripe, to use legislation to change not only any old finding of fact but a finding of fact that was made recently by our highest court. That is not only silly, to echo the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, but very dangerous in a democracy that is built, fundamentally and first, on the rule of law. Parliamentary sovereignty follows, but Parliament, and the Executive in particular, must have a little respect for the independent referees of our democratic system.

I was grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, for making the international point that follows from that: that the domestic rule of law is the bedrock of our system, but a quarter of the way into the 21st century, so is the international rule of law. All sorts of terrible consequences come when we do not respect that. She cited wars of aggression and war crimes that, in turn, drive a displacement of people that is leading to the refugee crisis that Governments around the world are trying to respond to. Therefore, she is a great proponent of the international rules-based order, as we know from her other work.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am very interested in the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German. On one view, it is saying that the Secretary of State makes his or her decision only after properly considering all the relevant factors. It may be that what he has in mind is that, thereafter, there can be appropriate review of that by the courts. I assume that he has in mind judicial review. Therefore, it would be the decision of the Secretary of State that was judicially reviewable. It is worth thinking about whether, once that decision had been made and then upheld by the courts because there was a proper basis on which a Secretary of State could reach that decision, in general terms the question of whether the country was safe would not thereafter be open to consideration by the immigration office.

I would not be in favour of that as a matter of principle, but if one is looking for a compromise—this is something that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, touched upon, and it may be dealt with in later amendments—I would be very interested to hear what the view of the Government is in relation to a situation where, in effect, the Secretary of State had to make a proper decision addressing the proper considerations and that decision was then open to judicial review. Could that be a compromise?

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak on this group, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has just raised an extremely interesting point. He suggested that a decision by the Secretary of State, having considered the factors referred to by the noble Lord, Lord German, should be subject to judicial review. The principles of judicial review are clear: the court does not substitute its own view of matters; it assesses whether the Secretary of State came to a reasonable decision.

Departing somewhat from the Government’s view, one of the problems that I have with the Supreme Court decision is that it was not based on the principles of judicial review. The Divisional Court did approach it on that basis and the Supreme Court said that that was wrong. The Supreme Court, relying on precedents that had never received the authority of Parliament or statute, decided that it should not apply the principles of judicial review, but should decide these matters for itself. That is a very important distinction between what happened in this case, which gave rise to this legislation, and the procedure now being proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise with some hesitancy, in the middle of a rather technical debate, but I would like to make a couple of points on this group. The Committee has already heard from my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb who, in her inimitable way, made it very clear that the Green Party remains utterly opposed to the entire Bill and greatly regrets that we gave it a Second Reading—but we are where we are.

From listening to the debate on the first group, a word that came up again and again, which might be surprising to people listening from outside the Committee, was “silly”. Of course, what we are talking about is deadly serious, but the definitions of “silly” are interesting, if you look them up. One is “showing a lack of common sense or judgment”. Common sense and judgment are two things that this group of amendments seeks to introduce to the Bill, so I commend the noble Lord, Lord German, for introducing it so clearly and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for his excellent assistance in presenting the argument.

It is a statement of the obvious that Parliament, and certainly your Lordships’ House after our vote on the Rwanda treaty, does not believe that what the Bill states is common sense. It is not based on the evidence and has been disproved. More than that, these amendments are making a person, the Secretary of State, responsible for making a judgment. If we are to have the rule of law, a person has to be identified and held responsible for making that judgment. We are introducing a sense of responsibility and evidence here, which would at least be a step forward.

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

As I say, this is now a matter of a treaty commitment by that country. We surely accept the possibility that countries have changed. We know the trauma Rwanda has gone through in the comparatively recent past, and we support and acknowledge the work it is attempting to do as a forward-looking African country, looking to provide solutions as opposed to exporting problems.

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

These questions have ranged far and wide, but was not the one issue, as I understand it, on which the Supreme Court came to its decision the risk of refoulement? That is covered in the treaty, and anybody would be able to see and know whether anyone was refouled in breach of international law and the concern expressed by the Supreme Court.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. The matter is entirely patent on the Supreme Court’s decision. It is about refoulement. We now have a treaty commitment preventing that happening.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Howard of Lympne Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

The noble Lord is well aware that the Strasbourg court has decided to pass various reforms and the anonymity of the judge is a thing of the past. I am not an expert on the Strasbourg court. However, I am a believer that if we maintain that we believe in the rule of law, we cannot pick and choose which bits of international law we comply with. That is a point I put forward at Second Reading and one I feel very strongly about. I do not see how we can, in good conscience, pass Clauses 5(2) and 5(3), which is why I added my name to Amendments 57 and 59 as moved by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven.

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

My Lords, the words that I am about to utter are largely not mine. They are the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, who I am delighted to see in his place, in the preface he wrote to a paper on Rule 39 written by Professor Richard Ekins, professor of law and constitutional government at Oxford, and published by Policy Exchange last year.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann said:

“A ruling of a court such as the European Court of Justice”—


though I think he probably meant, if noble Lords will forgive me, the European Court of Human Rights as his words certainly apply to it—

“is binding upon the parties only if the court had jurisdiction to make it. If it did, a party must comply and cannot complain that it was wrong. If the court did not have jurisdiction, the parties can ignore it.

The European Convention on Human Rights confers upon the Strasbourg Court jurisdiction in all matters ‘concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention’: article 32. It exercises this jurisdiction by the judgments of its Chambers, which, after submissions and argument by the parties, become final in accordance with articles 42 and 44. In this paper, Professor Ekins demonstrates that the Convention does not confer upon the Court, still less upon one of its judges, a power to make orders binding upon a Member State which require it to do or refrain from doing something on the ground that it might at a later stage be held to have been an infringement of the Convention. Not only is there nothing in the language of the Convention which expressly confers such a power but the usual aids to the construction of a treaty – the travaux preparatoires, the subsequent practice of the court – reflect a clear understanding that no such power exists.


What has happened is that one of the rules which the Court has itself made to regulate its own procedures has included a power to ‘bring to the attention of the Parties any interim measure the adoption of which seems desirable’ to avoid a violation of the Convention. The existence of a power to fire such a shot across the bows is practical and sensible. It does not involve the assertion of any jurisdiction to impose a legal obligation. But what has happened in the court’s recent jurisprudence is that this advisory power has been assumed to be a power to grant legally binding interlocutory relief. As Professor Ekins demonstrates, a court cannot in this way enlarge its jurisdiction by its own bootstraps. And if the Court had no jurisdiction to make such an order, Member States are free to ignore it”.


The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, referred to Article 32, which gives the court the power to interpret and apply the convention. It does not, however, give the court the power to add something to the convention which simply is not there. As Professor Ekins said in the concluding words of his paper:

“In rejecting the Strasbourg Court’s actions in excess of jurisdiction, the UK … would not be failing to honour its international legal obligations; it would be inviting the Court to honour its own legal obligations”.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to follow those who have supported some of this group of amendments. I do not want to follow on to the territory of the European Court of Human Rights. A number of previous speakers, though not the most recent one, have expressed my views perfectly well.

I take issue, briefly, with the lamentable use of the phrase “foreign court” by the Prime Minister, which I regard as an extraordinary breach of British diplomatic history and practice. When he winds up, I would like the Minister to answer the following questions. We accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. We have no member of that court at the moment, lamentably, due to diplomatic ineptitude. Is that a foreign court? We accept the International Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, do we not? We are delighted when the International Criminal Court indicts Mr Putin for abducting Ukrainian children. Do we accept it? Is it a foreign court? We are pretty pleased when the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea rules that the Chinese are ultra vires in seizing large chunks of the South China Sea. Is that a foreign court? I could go on. We have been trying to sustain the dispute settlement procedure of the World Trade Organization against the worst efforts of our closest ally, the United States. Is that a foreign court? We accept its jurisdiction. Could we please stop talking about “foreign courts”, and realise that it is in the interests of this country to stick with the obligations it has undertaken to obey such tribunals?

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[The Lord Bishop of Chelmsford]

My Lords, I cannot speak on behalf of the Church of England. We are not whipped on these Benches, and I speak for myself. I do not know for certain whether Rwanda is safe or not, and our courts seem to think they cannot state whether it is safe or not. I suggest that we need to review that in two years when we have more evidence.

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry to detain your Lordships at this late hour. I shall try to be very brief. This amendment, particularly proposed new subsection (6), is remarkably similar to an amendment put forward earlier in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which I characterised as outsourcing decision-making to the UNHCR. I had a little spat with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, about that and the right reverend Prelate, who spoke in favour of the amendment, denied that it was outsourcing. Very graciously, the noble Baroness intervened to say that that was the effect of her amendment and that she would consider making it, in her words, less rich when she brought it forward on Report.

This amendment falls into exactly the same trap. In proposed new subsection (6), on the renewal of the Act after two years, the decision is again outsourced to the UNHCR. I will not go through all the reasons I gave in my earlier speech as to why that is entirely inappropriate but, for those same reasons, this amendment is also completely inappropriate.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will briefly comment on the relationship between Rwanda and the United Kingdom contained in the treaty. A lot has been said about the treaty being inadequate and how it depends on what happens in future. The noble and learned Lord took a certain amount of flak during earlier debates in Committee when he was asked what the treaty is doing if Rwanda is safe. He suggested that it might make it safer. The rather scornful response to this observation was somewhat unfair. The treaty contains a number of obligations and is entirely typical of treaties in that respect. These obligations use the word “shall” and are directed to future activity.

The general principle of international law is that a treaty is binding on the parties and must be performed in good faith. That principle is embodied in the maxim “pacta sunt servanda”. We take that very seriously. If a party breaks the terms of a treaty, provided there has been a fundamental change of circumstances, as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes clear, the treaty in effect comes to an end. The noble Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham, spoke of the possibility of a coup and seemed to suggest, as the proposer of this amendment did, that because Parliament had determined that Rwanda was safe, we would be stuck with that determination.

I respectfully disagree. The treaty bears close reading. I will not refer to it at this stage of proceedings, but Clause 8(1) makes its nature clear, Articles 14, 15 and 16 concern the arrangements for monitoring and Article 22 provides a dispute mechanism. Further, the treaty will end on 13 April 2027 in any event. These seem to me to be sufficient safeguards built into the treaty, but if there is a coup or a fundamental change of circumstances, or any Government think that Rwanda is unsafe, the treaty can be brought to an end, at least until a subsequent agreement has been reached. To suggest that Parliament must somehow not be satisfied that there are obligations in international law seems to me unreal.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Howard of Lympne Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 4th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, we support all the amendments in this group. It is absolutely critical that domestic and international law is complied with. This should not be up for debate. It is who we are. It is what we stand for. If we seek to deviate from our domestic and international legal obligations, our role on the world stage and our ability to have influence globally is significantly diminished. We cannot shy away from the consequential impact this will have on other countries choosing to follow suit. As the United Nations Human Rights Council put it last Friday,

“international standards on the independence of the judiciary are closely linked to the rule of law and the separation of powers. ‘Provisions of the Rwanda Bill could undermine the principles of the separation of powers and the rule of law in the United Kingdom’”.

That is sufficient for us to support all these amendments.

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by associating myself with the remarks of my noble friend Lord Hailsham about the late Lord Cormack. I cannot add anything to what my noble friend said, but it is entirely true that Lord Cormack is a great loss and we shall all miss him tremendously.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and my noble friend for their references to my earlier intervention in these debates. I am not sure that the further interpretation that they place on my intervention is entirely justified or that I would entirely go along with it, but that is perhaps a matter for debate at a later stage.

The amendments in this group are all based on respect for the rule of law. A critical part of respect for the rule of law is the separation of powers, something much referred to in our earlier debates, and it is to that subject that I propose to address these remarks. As Anthony Speaight KC reminds us in his recent Politeia pamphlet, there is no such thing as the absolute separation of legislature, executive and judicial powers in our constitutional arrangements. Our Executive are rooted in our legislature and in any event, as Mr Speaight and others have pointed out, there are precedents for this legislation—for the proposition that Parliament can deem certain countries to be safe—including the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, passed under the Blair Government. The principle in that legislation was challenged in the case of Nasseri but was upheld by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. That, of course, is essentially what this Bill does: it deems Rwanda to be a safe country.

However, there is an even broader principle that is relevant here and is at the root of why this legislation is necessary. We have traditionally recognised the separation of powers between the Executive and the judiciary. That principle can be expressed in the proposition that decision-making is the responsibility of the Executive, but that the courts have the responsibility to review the lawfulness of those decisions.

That responsibility of the courts is what we know as judicial review. Its scope has been expanded greatly in recent years in ways which have not found universal approval but its principle is accepted as an important part of our constitutional arrangements. However, judicial review does not involve the courts substituting their own decisions for those of the Executive. It involves, in essence, an assessment of whether it was reasonable for the Executive to make the decision in question.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Howard of Lympne Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 6th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—this is not the time to go back over the arguments we previously had. However, will the noble Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, not accept that the one ground on which they cannot rely in support of their arguments is what Winston Churchill and the founding fathers of the convention said? They specifically considered whether the court should have the right to make an interim ruling, and they decided that it should not have that right.

[Lord German (LD)]

I deal with matters which are within my lifespan, I am afraid. It is certainly the case that the court—at present, the ECHR—operates on the basis of the decisions taken jointly by the range of countries within it. That is where we stand. We are being asked, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, just said, to give permission to the Government to flout the legislation of which we have been a part, and the court of which we have been a part in making it.

Let us look very briefly at our record. The United Kingdom has always complied with Rule 39 interim measures and has publicly declared the need for other states to comply with them. In 2023, the court received 61 requests to make an emergency intervention against the United Kingdom, only one of which was granted as a genuinely necessary intervention. In 2021, it was the United Kingdom that urged Moscow to comply with one of the court’s Rule 39 orders, demanding the release of the now deceased jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny—which was absolutely the right thing to do. Last year, another order helped to save the lives of two British fighters in Ukraine who had been taken captive by Russian forces. Those measures are important to us. We stand by them, and giving permission to the Government to ignore them runs counter to the principles under which we operate.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Howard of Lympne Excerpts

3rd reading
Tuesday 12th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Bill do now pass.

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to make a point which I hope may be taken into account by honourable Members in another place, though I fear it is unlikely to find favour with most of your Lordships. I cast no aspersions on the motivation which has led to the amendments your Lordships have passed. An undeniable consequence of most of these amendments would be delay in dealing with an issue which is regarded as important and urgent by very many people in our country—an issue to which no alternative remedy has been advanced. I hope that this point may be taken into account by honourable Members in another place, even if not by most of your Lordships.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, mine is a different point. I am not sympathetic to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Howard, has just made. On Report, I raised the question of representations by the Government of Jersey and our Government’s failure to consult before including a provision in the Bill. I do not know whether this also represents the view of Guernsey and the Isle of Man, but the Government of Jersey said that they were not happy about it. I asked the Minister if he could clarify the position at Third Reading. Can he do so?

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Howard of Lympne Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 20th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I am puzzled by this amendment. For 18 years, between 2004 and 2022, we had on the statute book an Act of Parliament which said there was an irrebuttable presumption that certain countries on a list were and would always be safe. I do not recall any Member of this Chamber, or anyone in the other Chamber when I was there, demurring. We had on the statute book an Act of Parliament that had no provision for a monitoring committee, and I do not remember any Member of this Chamber or that Chamber complaining about that. For 18 years, we had provisions which had none of the safeguards that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, wants to include—and I do not recall him or any other Member of this Chamber demurring.

As I understand it, the only difference was that we were required to have that list by our membership of the European Union and still would have that list now if we had not left the European Union—and I do not recall anybody in this House saying it was wrong that that situation should persist or using it as an argument for leaving the European Union, so that we could then get rid of it, as we did. So, I think we are now making a bit too much of the lack of provisions and safeguards around one black country when we had no concerns about a list of white countries.

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

Is it not the case that that legislation did not simply lack the controls advocated by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope? It did not have the controls that are in this Bill. There was no monitoring committee. It simply did not have these controls in that legislation.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My noble friend is absolutely right, as he always is.