(2 weeks, 4 days ago)
Lords ChamberWith the greatest respect, I do not know if the noble Lord has read my amendment, but that is exactly the point. The point is that before the Bill is passed there should be consultation on these proposals, but there is no opportunity for consultation because they are implemented at Royal Assent. The Government keep telling us that there will be a consultation, but how can there possibly be consultation if the measures come in at Royal Assent?
Still, I am grateful to the noble Lord for that interruption because it proves the point. It also allows me to explain to him another payment from the Unite political fund, which he may not be aware of, to the Marx Memorial Library. I kid you not—you could not make it up. I am sure the members of Unite are thrilled to know that their hard-earned wages are going to support the Marx Memorial Library, but when the Bill becomes an Act, in a matter of months, they will no longer have the right to see that disbursement.
If that is what Unite wants to do then that is up to Unite, but surely it should not be covered up. All I am asking at this time is that proper consultation on the effects of Parts 4 and 6 should take place before this is ramrodded through on the statute book without any proper consultation and discussion with, as the Government like to call them, “relevant stakeholders”. It is on Amendment 106 that I will probably be seeking to test the opinion of the House today.
My Lords, I rise to support these amendments and declare my interests, as recorded in the register, as the chairman of three businesses that would undoubtedly qualify as small enterprises.
I was provoked into intervening in this debate by an observation made by the Minister when she replied to the last debate. She said to your Lordships that if an employer dismissed an employee for cause, as set out in the Bill, the employer would have nothing to worry about because the tribunal would find in their favour. Very long ago I practised in the field of employment law, and I saw at first hand the consequences—often very damaging, sometimes disastrous—for a small business of having to spend the time, trouble and expense involved in contesting a case at the tribunal, even if ultimately, it was successful. In the real world, faced with that predicament, employers often find themselves obliged to settle these cases, again at considerable expense, even if the application is completely unmeritorious and would stand scant chance of success, were it ever to come before the tribunal. That factor ought to be taken into account.
My question to the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Leong, is this. Attention has been drawn today to the impact assessment, particularly by my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, who pointed to the increase in the number of tribunal cases that would be a consequence of the Bill. To what extent did that impact assessment take into account disputes that were not actually taken to the tribunal and were settled by the employer, who could not afford the consequences of contesting the case at the tribunal, but which would nevertheless involve substantial, damaging and sometimes disastrous consequences for the employer?
Given that the noble Lord, Lord Howard, and I practised in employment tribunals, does he agree with me that there are now strong procedures by which employment tribunals can strike out vexatious claims without there being a full hearing? I had the pleasure, of course, of appearing against the noble Lord in the Employment Appeal Tribunal, I think it must be 40 years ago—it was a delight—but the mechanisms have developed over those decades and tribunals now do not hear vexatious claims. They strike them out before they get there.
I do not know if the noble Lord’s memory extends to which of us won on that occasion. It is true that there has been an improvement, but it would be a mistake to assume that those provisions would cover all the cases to which I drew attention in my remarks.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne and indeed all noble Lords who have made such compelling arguments for the amendments in this group. I rise to support Amendment 107 in the name of my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, to which I have added my name. I again refer the House to my registered interests, particularly as a dairy and livestock farmer and as a forester.
The farming community needs help after the run of negative actions taken by this Government: the slashing of delinked payments, followed swiftly by the cut-off in sustainable farming incentives with no notice, contrary to previous promises. That leaves a large number of farms with negligible environmental payments, incentivising the intensification of their farming operations, undermining their businesses and undermining nature restoration. To that is added the more general burden placed on all businesses of increased employer national insurance contributions.
Farmers’ long-term planning has been thrown into chaos by the reduction in inheritance tax reliefs on agricultural and business property. It is a burden that farming businesses simply cannot afford and will lead to the sale and break-up of many of these on the death of a family member, with families also losing their homes and businesses as a result.
In the run-up to the introduction of the reduced reliefs in April 2026, the financial incentive for elderly or terminally ill farmers and business owners to take their own lives increases. In Committee, I was grateful to the Minister, who is again in his place today, for his promise to speak to his ministerial colleagues at Defra and the ONS about keeping accurate and timely data on farmer and business-owner suicides. I ask him again today: what has been the result of those discussions? How can the Government assess the impact of this measure on suicide rates if they simply rely on out-of-date and insufficiently granular ONS data?
On Amendment 107, the arguments in favour of granting farming an exemption from these Bill provisions have been well made in Committee, and I will hit only the headlines. Farming is almost uniquely exposed to seasonality in its harvesting operations, as well as the weather variability in the timing of those operations. Livestock farmers have to look after their animals every day and rely on casual labour to fill in gaps due to illness or scheduling issues. That requires flexibility in its engagement with seasonal and part-time or casual staff. There are penalties enough in weather unpredictability without introducing more through compensating staff for changing hours at short notice or having to compensate for sickness from day one. These obligations are simply unaffordable for farmers and unworkable in practice.
Farming operates on cycles that are unknown in other businesses. It is easy enough to assess the quality of work and the suitability of staff in retail, offices and manufacturing, even after the first day or so. However, most farming workloads are solitary, with little oversight. We know whether a new employee has drilled a field correctly, looked after animal hygiene effectively, checked weed growth around new trees without damaging the trees, or ensured that livestock is back in calf in the necessary window, only months after those operations are performed. Reducing probationary periods and leaving farmers exposed to human resource and litigation risks, potentially from day one, is simply not acceptable or workable.
As my noble friend Lord Deben highlighted in Committee, this is not a Government who have a background or experience in the farming or rural economy. That lack of experience is often evident, and I urge the House and the Government to listen to those of us who have that experience and to support this critical amendment. I hope to hear encouragement from the Minister that the Government are listening.
(1 year ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, with whom I had many jousts in the past. We often found —speaking for myself at least—that we agreed with each other far more extensively than we cared to admit, and that goes for much of what he said this afternoon.
I congratulate the Government on their election victory and the Minister on his appointment and maiden speech. I echo the warm words of tribute which have rightly been paid to him for his astonishing work on the rehabilitation of offenders—an objective which we all share. I wish the Government well. As my right honourable friend, the leader of the Opposition, whose premiership will I think be treated kindly by history, has said, their successes will be our successes; we all want our country to succeed. It is in that spirit that I intend to offer the Government, respectfully, some advice.
One of the most intractable challenges that the new Government faces is that posed by illegal immigration, and it is to that that I intend to devote my remarks. All we have seen so far is the Prime Minister’s commitment of £84 million to help what is often referred to as tackling the matter at source. I welcome that. It was under my leadership that the Conservative Party first committed to the 0.7% target, so I support the measure and hope that, together with other sources of development assistance, it helps to improve living conditions in some of those countries which are much less well off than we are. But we must be realistic: those countries will, whatever happens, remain for the foreseeable future much less well off than we are, so there will continue to be people who want a better life and who are prepared to take terrible risks to reach our country. Rebadging the Border Force will not stop them, but there is one way which would, and I speak from experience.
In 1995, as Home Secretary, I reached an agreement with France, under which we undertook to return to each other those who illegally entered one of our countries from the other. It worked, even though the number returned to France was, of course, far greater than the number returned to the UK. What, you may ask, did we give France in return? Nothing. We were able to reach this agreement because I persuaded my French opposite numbers that it was in their interest to come to it. Why? Because no French Government could take pride in the number of migrants congregating on their northern coastline or the numbers making their way through France to Calais to get to the UK. I suggested, and they agreed, that if it became clear that getting to Calais was no longer a way of getting into the UK, there would be no incentive for these migrants to come to France in the first place.
The agreement worked; it worked for the two remaining years of my time as Home Secretary, but it had a wrinkle: it applied to those who claimed asylum and to those who did not. It contained a provision that it would not apply to asylum seekers once the Dublin convention came into force. The Dublin convention, which came into force after I left office in 1997, provided that asylum seekers should apply for asylum in the first European member state they reached, and if they did not, they would be returned to that member state. Here I was guilty of naivety: I thought the Dublin convention would work, but it did not. In 2018, for example, 1,215 asylum seekers were transferred into the UK but only 209 out of it, despite the fact there were far more cases where the first country they reached was not the UK. The Dublin convention did not preclude bilateral agreement, and one was reached between Germany and Demark. My Labour successors could have sought to revive the application of my agreement to asylum seekers once it became clear that the convention was not working, but they did not.
I respectfully suggest that the Government might look at this agreement again. As far as I know, it has never been revoked, but the arguments that persuaded my opposite numbers in 1995 are as valid and strong now as they were then. There is no reason why the original terms could not be restored. It seems quite likely that the new Prime Minister of France will be a socialist. I think it was Clement Attlee who coined the phrase, “Let left talk to left”, so there may well be an opportunity—to use a phrase currently much in vogue—for a reset in our relations with France on this issue. I commend it to the Government.
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am puzzled by this amendment. For 18 years, between 2004 and 2022, we had on the statute book an Act of Parliament which said there was an irrebuttable presumption that certain countries on a list were and would always be safe. I do not recall any Member of this Chamber, or anyone in the other Chamber when I was there, demurring. We had on the statute book an Act of Parliament that had no provision for a monitoring committee, and I do not remember any Member of this Chamber or that Chamber complaining about that. For 18 years, we had provisions which had none of the safeguards that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, wants to include—and I do not recall him or any other Member of this Chamber demurring.
As I understand it, the only difference was that we were required to have that list by our membership of the European Union and still would have that list now if we had not left the European Union—and I do not recall anybody in this House saying it was wrong that that situation should persist or using it as an argument for leaving the European Union, so that we could then get rid of it, as we did. So, I think we are now making a bit too much of the lack of provisions and safeguards around one black country when we had no concerns about a list of white countries.
Is it not the case that that legislation did not simply lack the controls advocated by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope? It did not have the controls that are in this Bill. There was no monitoring committee. It simply did not have these controls in that legislation.
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I wish to make a point which I hope may be taken into account by honourable Members in another place, though I fear it is unlikely to find favour with most of your Lordships. I cast no aspersions on the motivation which has led to the amendments your Lordships have passed. An undeniable consequence of most of these amendments would be delay in dealing with an issue which is regarded as important and urgent by very many people in our country—an issue to which no alternative remedy has been advanced. I hope that this point may be taken into account by honourable Members in another place, even if not by most of your Lordships.
My Lords, mine is a different point. I am not sympathetic to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Howard, has just made. On Report, I raised the question of representations by the Government of Jersey and our Government’s failure to consult before including a provision in the Bill. I do not know whether this also represents the view of Guernsey and the Isle of Man, but the Government of Jersey said that they were not happy about it. I asked the Minister if he could clarify the position at Third Reading. Can he do so?
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we support all the amendments in this group. It is absolutely critical that domestic and international law is complied with. This should not be up for debate. It is who we are. It is what we stand for. If we seek to deviate from our domestic and international legal obligations, our role on the world stage and our ability to have influence globally is significantly diminished. We cannot shy away from the consequential impact this will have on other countries choosing to follow suit. As the United Nations Human Rights Council put it last Friday,
“international standards on the independence of the judiciary are closely linked to the rule of law and the separation of powers. ‘Provisions of the Rwanda Bill could undermine the principles of the separation of powers and the rule of law in the United Kingdom’”.
That is sufficient for us to support all these amendments.
My Lords, I begin by associating myself with the remarks of my noble friend Lord Hailsham about the late Lord Cormack. I cannot add anything to what my noble friend said, but it is entirely true that Lord Cormack is a great loss and we shall all miss him tremendously.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and my noble friend for their references to my earlier intervention in these debates. I am not sure that the further interpretation that they place on my intervention is entirely justified or that I would entirely go along with it, but that is perhaps a matter for debate at a later stage.
The amendments in this group are all based on respect for the rule of law. A critical part of respect for the rule of law is the separation of powers, something much referred to in our earlier debates, and it is to that subject that I propose to address these remarks. As Anthony Speaight KC reminds us in his recent Politeia pamphlet, there is no such thing as the absolute separation of legislature, executive and judicial powers in our constitutional arrangements. Our Executive are rooted in our legislature and in any event, as Mr Speaight and others have pointed out, there are precedents for this legislation—for the proposition that Parliament can deem certain countries to be safe—including the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, passed under the Blair Government. The principle in that legislation was challenged in the case of Nasseri but was upheld by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. That, of course, is essentially what this Bill does: it deems Rwanda to be a safe country.
However, there is an even broader principle that is relevant here and is at the root of why this legislation is necessary. We have traditionally recognised the separation of powers between the Executive and the judiciary. That principle can be expressed in the proposition that decision-making is the responsibility of the Executive, but that the courts have the responsibility to review the lawfulness of those decisions.
That responsibility of the courts is what we know as judicial review. Its scope has been expanded greatly in recent years in ways which have not found universal approval but its principle is accepted as an important part of our constitutional arrangements. However, judicial review does not involve the courts substituting their own decisions for those of the Executive. It involves, in essence, an assessment of whether it was reasonable for the Executive to make the decision in question.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, has my noble friend seen the recent, extremely sensible suggestion that, since the boats which are used in such dangerous circumstances to cross the channel do not comply with the safety requirements of the European Union, France and other member states have the power—and, indeed, the responsibility—to confiscate those boats? What representations are His Majesty’s Government making to France and the other countries to exercise these powers?
My noble friend makes an important point. It is right that Home Office officials and National Crime Agency officers are working closely with the French to try to disrupt the supply of small boats. We now have many of the boats used in the crossings which have been confiscated following the journeys across the channel. By and large, they are not ones which are sold on the French market; most of these vessels are constructed for the purpose. I have seen them myself, and they are incredibly dangerous and not fit for crossing an area of open water such as the English Channel. I can reassure my noble friend that, from what I have been told, the practice of the French, when they disrupt a launch, is to destroy the effectiveness of the boat and to confiscate what remains of the boat. This is something the French authorities have been handling. We are working, as ever, with them to disrupt the maritime side, and further work to disrupt the upstream provision of both boats and engines is ongoing.
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI wonder whether I could suggest to the House that we have to think a little beyond the precise legal issues we have been concentrating on. First, I was drawn into this discussion by a previous speaker—the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—but I would remind him of my constant demand that we should take seriously the words of the Green vice-Chancellor of Germany, who made it absolutely clear that behaviour which meant that ambulances could not get to hospitals and suchlike was unacceptable as well as counterproductive. I do not think anybody would suggest that I have ever been a supporter of that kind of thing, and I do not think the noble Lord would have said that.
However, the Government have to face two very important questions. The first is on the point referring to the march of a million people, which of its nature is bound to discommode large numbers of other people. But as somebody who voted against a three-line Whip and against the Iraq war, it seems to me that unless you can accept that something so appallingly wrong can result in large numbers of people saying, “Not in my name”, you really cannot run a democracy. That is absolutely essential, so I need to know from the Government how they would explain that their particular way of looking at this would not have made illegal a march against the Iraq war. If that is not covered, then it seems that any of us who happen to believe in some fundamental issues will find it very difficult to support the Government.
The second thing the Government have to explain is how they see the position in which this puts the police. I have to say this carefully, but the truth is that the police’s reputation is practically at its lowest ever. We have to ask whether this is the right moment, in any way, to put them in the small “p” political position of making these kinds of decisions. That is why I voted against that ludicrous thing we introduced, which was that you could be prevented from making a noise. The concept was that, somehow or other, the police were going to say that if your protest was too noisy, they could stop it before it was started. I have never been on a protest that was not noisy and meant to be so; its noisiness was essential. But we passed that provision, which was and is nonsense. It will never be imposed but the Government argued for it, so they are in a slight difficulty here. The argument I used against that was not only that it was barmy, which was obvious, but that it would put the police in an embarrassing position at a time when the police are themselves—
If I can just finish that sentence—when the police are themselves in a difficult position. I give way to my long-lasting jouster.
Does my noble friend not agree that the insertion of the words in this amendment would place upon the police the initial duty of deciding what is or is not a reasonable excuse?
I do not disagree, since that is what it says. I am merely saying that I want the Government to be clear about what they are doing by involving the police at what may not be the most sensible time.
The last thing I want to say to the Government is this. There are many serious issues which, in a democracy, we have to ask the Government and the Opposition to deal with. Some of those serious issues are not being satisfactorily dealt with and, in a democracy, there comes a moment when a Government have to say to themselves, “We are so unable to deal with this that we will have to accept that there will be a significant increase in the public demonstration against where we are”.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too welcome my noble friend to his responsibilities. Does he recognise the inconvenient truth that it is almost impossible—perhaps entirely so—to deal with this issue without agreement with France going far beyond the level of co-operation to which he referred? Will he draw the attention of his ministerial colleagues to the agreement reached with France in 1995, under which it agreed to take back those who illegally entered the United Kingdom from France—they enter illegally, even if they subsequently claim asylum—and which it honoured?
I thank the noble Lord for reminding me and my department of that very valuable agreement. Certainly, the best solution to this problem would be an agreement with France under which it accepted the return of everyone who crosses the channel. There could be no stronger deterrent to crossing it. I will of course encourage officials to look at the agreement made in 1995 and see what steps can be taken to revive it.
(10 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberIn moving Amendment 10 and speaking to Amendment 11, I am returning to an unimplemented recommendation made in his March 2014 report by the independent reviewer about which I spoke at Second Reading and in Committee. These are the only amendments which relate to Part 2 on TPIMs. I want to make just five points.
First, the main and certainly the most contentious change in the TPIM regime brought about by Part 2 is the provision for internal relocation orders—internal exile, as it is being called. In short, it gives the Secretary of State power to require someone who is suspected of involvement in terrorism to move as far as 200 miles away from their present home. Not surprisingly, these highly disruptive kinds of order—which, in years past, used occasionally and contentiously to be made in control order cases—are deeply resented. Occasionally, however, I accept that they are a regrettable necessity.
Secondly, one of the conditions to be satisfied before any TPIM order can be made is that the individual in question is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity, which is known as condition A. Under the present legislation, the 2011 Act, that condition is met if the Secretary of State “reasonably believes” that that is the situation. Clause 20(1) of the Bill would substitute for the requirement of reasonable belief on the part of the Secretary of State the requirement that he be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the person is involved in terrorism.
Thirdly, to my mind there is no practical difference between those two tests, hence the effect of Amendment 10 would simply be to leave out Clause 20(1), which substitutes one for the other. But far, far more important than Amendment 10 is Amendment 11, which is directed to the court’s oversight powers with regard to TPIM orders. Under the 2011 Act as it stands there is provision for initial review hearings of these orders and later for appeals by the High Court in each case. However, for reviews and appeals, the 2011 Act expressly provides that:
“The court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review”.
Amendment 11 would widen the court’s jurisdiction so that it would be for the court to decide for itself whether the person in question was probably involved in terrorism and not merely for the court, as now, to ask itself whether the Secretary of State’s conclusion about that was one that he could reasonably arrive at or whether it was, on the contrary, perverse.
Fourthly, this strengthening of the court’s oversight powers was specifically recommended by Mr David Anderson, the independent reviewer, in his report of last year. In his recent oral evidence that he gave in November and December respectively to the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, he expressly regretted that his recommendation had not been implemented. In fact, Amendment 11 is more limited than Mr Anderson recommended. He recommended that in all TPIM cases the final decision on whether the person is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity should be one for the court rather than for the Secretary of State, subject only to judicial review. My amendment would secure that this is so only in those most troubling of cases that I have already mentioned where the suspect is to be relocated far away from his own home.
Fifthly and finally, I should note with gratitude that last Thursday, after the debate in Committee at which widespread support was shown for my amendment, the Minister was kind enough to see me to discuss this question. Essentially, as I understand it—he will correct me if I am wrong—the Government’s position is that this amendment is not necessary because case law shows that the court interprets and applies its review powers in such a way as to suggest that in effect the court already takes the final decision itself. If that remains the Government’s view, I would challenge it for these reasons.
First, it postulates, necessarily, that the court is disobeying the express statutory prohibition placed on it by the 2011 Act against exercising any fuller or wider jurisdiction than that of judicial review. Secondly, I must ask rhetorically why the independent reviewer would make this recommendation and, indeed, regret its rejection if in truth it is quite unnecessary. Thirdly, given that the Government accept that what they suggest is the court’s actual present approach to these cases—namely, that of deciding the question for itself— why on earth not write that into the statute and thereby, as Mr Anderson himself put it in his report,
“help reinforce the legitimacy of TPIMs”,
and reassure a sceptical public and a worried minority community that the court is indeed playing its full part in safeguarding those at risk of these orders against the inappropriate use of this draconian power?
Amendment 11 is the important one. Amendment 10, as I indicated in Committee, is really an optional extra. I beg to move.
My Lords, I oppose Amendment 11. I shall be brief, but I appreciate that what I am about to say runs the risk of disturbing the relative tranquillity of this afternoon’s proceedings. Amendment 11 seeks to transfer the responsibility for the making of a crucial decision in this process from the Secretary of State to the courts. It is but another skirmish in the turf war between some judges on the one hand and Ministers and Parliament on the other hand which has featured so extensively in recent debates in your Lordships’ House, not least in the context of judicial review. It is my contention that decisions as important as the one we are currently contemplating should be made by the Secretary of State and not by the courts, so I hope that the view which was ascribed by the noble and learned Lord to the Minister about who is to take the final decision is based on a misapprehension. That is because I am firmly of the view that it is the Secretary of State who should take the decision.
My reason is very simple. It is the Secretary of State who has the responsibility of protecting the people of our country from terrorism and terrorism-related activities, and it is the Secretary of State who is accountable to the people of our country for the exercise of that responsibility: accountable to the electorate both in their capacity as an individual Member of Parliament and in their capacity as a member of the Government of the day.
It is right, as the noble and learned Lord has acknowledged, that the decision of the Secretary of State should be subject to the normal processes of judicial review. That is a feature of the current proposals. But it is the Secretary of State whose decision it should be, not a decision of the courts.
I take the noble Lord’s point but I want to make it clear to the House—I apologise if I gave a misleading impression earlier—that I did not see an all singing, all dancing final draft of a revised Bill. However, I saw some very important revised clauses which went to the heart of the matter we are discussing. I do not believe that the Home Office can legitimately hand over those clauses now because the Government and their coalition partner do not have full agreement on everything that needs to be in the Bill and we have not seen David Anderson’s report. David Anderson may have some key points to make which will require the Home Office to rewrite the measure again. Therefore, I do not think that we can take forward some new clauses, bash them into this Bill with two months to go and bounce them into the Commons.
About half the criticisms that I have just listed apply to the proposed new clauses before us today. Nothing has changed. Indeed, the Home Secretary has confirmed that we got it about right in our Joint Committee report and she wants to bring forward a new data Bill incorporating our recommendations. I say to my noble friend Lord Carlile that the Home Secretary did not say that she wanted the old draft data communications Bill with all its flaws, warts and all; she has made it constantly clear in her statements that she wants a new data communications Bill, but incorporating many of the amendments suggested in our report.
In those circumstances, I think that this House would be committing a grave error of judgment if it accepted these 18 proposed new clauses, which everyone agrees are thoroughly flawed. Of course, there is an imperative for new legislation in this area, but it has to be the best legislation which government and Parliament can invent. The risk of a terrorist attack is severe, but that is no justification for bad law, even if we had a sunset clause of just six months, or one month for that matter.
I am glad that my noble friend is not going to push this to a vote. I hope that other noble Lords will accept that. When we return to this matter in the new Parliament we will need a fully redrafted Bill that takes onboard Mr Anderson’s recommendations, which has had full consultation with the communication service providers that will have to implement it, and which has had a detailed Second Reading debate in the other place and in your Lordships’ House. The Home Secretary has made it clear that she wants new legislation but better than the clauses we have before us today. If we try to take any other shortcut, rather than new, properly worked out legislation, we will be seen to be acting in bad faith. That will make it infinitely more politically difficult for a new Government to bring in balanced measures that give the police and the security services the additional powers they need while protecting the fundamental privacy of the 60 million UK citizens who are not a terrorist threat. If it comes to a vote I reluctantly urge the House to vote against the amendments.
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Blencathra, with whom I worked so closely and for so long in government. I am afraid that on this occasion I have to disagree with the contents of his speech. It seems to me that the answer to the points that he made was given by the noble Lord, Lord West, during his intervention. These amendments are not meant to be the last word on the provisions that the final Bill should contain; they are meant to give the other place an opportunity to reconsider these matters.
I am afraid that I was unable to be present at the debate in Committee, but I was able to listen to an exchange on the radio a few mornings ago between the noble Lord, Lord West, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I found the arguments put forward during that exchange by the noble Lord, Lord West, wholly persuasive. That is why I came along this afternoon ready to support the amendment in his name and in the names of his co-sponsors. I have to confess to your Lordships that my determination to do so was reinforced in some measure by the belief—it is still not clear to me to what extent it was well founded—that the Conservative limb of the coalition was anxious to proceed with these proposals but were being prevented from doing so only by the pesky Lib Dems—I am so sorry, by my noble friends who sit on the Liberal Democrat Benches. That remains not entirely clear.
It seems to me that the case made by the four noble Lords who have sponsored this amendment is very compelling. It is clear from what my noble friend Lord King has said that we cannot take the matter further today and that, sadly, this legislation will not be put on the statute book before the general election. However, I join with those who have urged the Government and both of the major parties that might form the Government after that election to proceed with these measures with all possible haste.
My Lords, to address the comments made by my noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater and other noble Lords, in my opinion there is no doubt that we all face a very serious threat of terrorism. There is also no doubt at all that, because of the way that technology has moved on, there is a gap that means that the police and the security services cannot now get the information on mobile phone communication that they used to, due to changes in the way that people communicate via the internet. The first issue is: where does the balance lie between measures that would close that gap and the freedoms and civil liberties that we all enjoy? The second is: how do we fill that gap technologically?
Noble Lords will be pleased to hear that I have done some homework over the weekend. Obviously, I am not a technology expert, but this is what I have been told by technology experts. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blair, for saying that he has no issue with people who argue on the basis of principle. One of the effects of these amendments, as my noble friend Lord Blencathra alluded to, would be to require communications service providers to store 12 months of web logs—the history of every website visited by everyone who uses the internet in the UK. The Joint Committee that my noble friend Lord Blencathra chaired said that this has considerable implications for the privacy of everybody who lives in this country and who uses the internet. I am sure that that is immediately obvious to noble Lords across the House.
What has not been mentioned is what I have learnt since we were in Committee. When people use web-based means of communication such as WhatsApp—according to my noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater, ISIL is one of the groups that uses this means of communicating —Facebook Messenger or any others, all these communications are encrypted. The vital data that the police and the security services need are held on servers that are mainly in the United States of America. Even if these amendments were agreed to, and even if these web logs were kept, there are serious doubts as to whether the American companies would comply with the UK legislation.
Another aspect of these amendments, and of the draft data communications Bill, would require United Kingdom communications service providers to skim off the encrypted data transmitted to and from the secure servers in the United States, in case the Americans decided that they were not going to play ball. This would cost in excess of £1 billion, and it is unlikely that the UK-based communications service providers would do so. Because of the levels of encryption, and because companies such as Facebook are constantly reviewing their encryption and making it more and more difficult to decipher, even if that data were captured there is serious doubt that the UK communications service providers would be able to make head or tail of it. Plus, they would not be able to decide what part of that encrypted data was the content of messages or Facebook pages and how much was simply who sent the message to whom, from where and at what time—that is what these amendments and what the draft data communications Bill was about. The noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, talked at length about intercept evidence. These amendments and the draft data communications Bill have nothing to do with interception. They are about only what is on the envelope of the message, if you like, not its contents.
So what do we do? Obviously, something has to be done to try to get that data. That is why the coalition Government have appointed Sir Nigel Sheinwald as special envoy on international data sharing to sit down with the US Government and US companies to identify ways to overcome legal jurisdictions so that we can tackle crime and terrorism without compromising the privacy of the law-abiding majority. This is not a situation where these servers in the United States are beyond our reach. In 2013, US companies processed around 30,000 requests for “envelope” data from UK authorities. There is already consultation and collaboration and it is producing results.
These amendments are disproportionate, are likely to cost billions of pounds and certainly cannot be implemented immediately. Almost all communications service providers in the UK do not currently keep this data and have no storage capacity and capability to store it. That would be a long-term project; nothing of use would come out of it in the six months that my noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater talked about as a stop-gap measure. These amendments are likely to jeopardise the collaboration that we already have with the Americans, which is serving the police and the security services reasonably well.
Mention has been made of a debate that the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, and I had on BBC Radio 4 at the weekend on “Week in Westminster”. During that programme, the noble Lord said that the amendments tabled last week were too broad and that, if it had come to a vote last week, he certainly would not have voted for them. As these amendments have been changed hardly at all since last week, I assume that the noble Lord, Lord West, will not vote for his own amendments.
(11 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we are talking about what the Secretary of State considers. I wonder whether the difficulty could be resolved if the Minister were to state formally, on the record in Hansard, that the Secretary of State must consider that,
“for objective reasons the requirement is strictly”
necessary.
My Lords, I rise with some temerity to disagree with the views expressed from the Benches opposite, but it seems to me, as a matter of principle, that when the Government and the Parliament of the United Kingdom consider how to introduce legislation consistent with a decision of the European Court of Justice, it is the substance of what the Government and the Parliament of the United Kingdom are providing which is important. It should not be necessary, and it would not be a healthy precedent, if Parliament took the view that every time we had to amend our legislation in order to comply with a judgment of the European Court of Justice, it was incumbent upon us to adopt language identical to that found in the judgment. So there is at least the vestige of a point of principle here, and that point of principle leads me to support the view expressed by the Minister.
My Lords, I support what has just been said by my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne. I speak not as a judge but as someone who has drafted many skeleton arguments to take before senior courts, and given a phrase such as “strictly necessary”, I would spend my time in preparing a case by looking for authorities decided by the courts in which there was a difference between the terms “necessary” and “strictly necessary”. I have spent some time doing so this morning, and I have failed to find such a case so far—although of course I will defer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, if he can find one for me. Judges are often so much better informed than those who appear before them, and I feel a little as if I am in that situation now.
However, speaking for those of us who are paid, sometimes a great deal of money, to create a difference where none exists between a phrase such as “strictly necessary” and the mere word “necessary”, I would say to the Minister: please avoid tautology. It is expensive, and not terribly helpful.