D-day: 75th Anniversary

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Tuesday 4th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome this debate, the opportunity to make a short contribution to it, and the noble Lord, Lord Judd, getting the energy back into it. I am still getting used to the customs of the House, but I think it is a shame the debate was subject to an interruption; I am sure it was for a good reason, but it is lost on me.

As the debate so far demonstrates, many want to recall the historic importance of D-day, the scale of the endeavour, the context of the time and particularly, as we have just heard, the bravery and fortitude of those who took part. I come from an old and proud regiment, the Green Howards—now part of the Yorkshire Regiment—and we featured significantly in the D-day story. The 6th Battalion that landed on Gold beach early on D-day itself made the most progress of any unit of any nation on that day, reaching the small village of Crépon. We have a fine regimental memorial in the middle of Crépon: a statue of a soldier sitting down, looking exhausted, having a smoke. It is a great place to go. En route to Crépon, the sergeant major of B Company, Stanley Hollis, earned the only Victoria Cross awarded on the day for repeated acts of bravery. He is still remembered as probably our greatest regimental hero, as much for his humility and quiet demeanour as for his remarkable example. He is also remembered because D-day does not feel so very long ago, particularly to the officers and men I grew up with, many of whom were, or served under, Normandy veterans and could tell first-hand tales.

My thoughts today are more about the lessons that D-day holds for us—particularly, why did so many countries have to pay so much in human terms to re-establish peace, stability and freedom? Do we take peace, stability and freedom too much for granted today? My strongly held view is that the United Kingdom has become somewhat complacent about its defence—not about its security; the two are different. Indeed, as a society, if anything we have become far more sensitive to the so-called novel threats of the age, which are, in truth, largely a reflection of the relative weakness of our enemies. These novel forms of conflict—so-called—such as cyberattack, disinformation, proxy-terrorism, hybrid war, political assassination and fake news are the asymmetric tactics of the weak; they do not represent existential threats. They are not the true wars of our time; they are security challenges which breed a wholly understandable societal anxiety.

To me, the lesson of D-day is that we should guard against complacency about our national defence—a complacency borne of the forgetfulness that peace and stability are not naturally occurring. They have to be earned, paid for and, occasionally, fought for. People need to remember that, to a large extent, armed forces are built on an expensive paradox: the better they are at fighting wars, the less likely it is they will have to. Most importantly, as many have said, the more like-minded friends you have, the safer you are far more likely to be. Security challenges, I fear, are the natural symptoms of a restless and dynamic planet. Strong and collective defence is what keeps them in that perspective. D-day should remind us of that.

Royal Navy: Type 31e Frigates

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Wednesday 6th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

The right reverend Prelate’s bid will not be lost on those of my colleagues who are responsible for decisions of this kind. However, I am afraid I can tell him that no decision has been taken as yet.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest in defence procurement issues, as reflected in the register. I wholly support the noble Lord’s aspiration to increase the size of the surface fleet—it must be expanded. The Minister will, however, recognise that the three principal trade-offs in a great military procurement exercise are performance, cost and time. Cost is fixed. Time is fixed. Performance must be traded down. Does the Minister agree that the best way to trade on performance is in some way to compromise on the exquisite nature of the platform to ensure that the combat and command systems on board are state of the art?

[Earl Howe]

The noble and gallant Lord speaks with great experience and he is right: we are consciously prescribing an adaptable but general-purpose specification for the Type 31e, as opposed to the more exquisite high-end specification of, for example, the Type 26. That is not to say—as I emphasised before—that the Type 31e will be in any way an inferior warship—quite the contrary, in terms of the capability that we will require of it.

Veterans Strategy

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Thursday 15th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I fear that my sandwiches are eaten, but my fox is only wounded so I will continue to make my points in my own way.

In my early 20s, as a young officer in the Army, I had the enormous good fortune to be sent up to Oxford to study history. To repay the MoD for its kindness, I felt it only appropriate to choose as my special subject military history and the theory of war. That special subject took me to All Souls College, where I attended tutorials by that great military historian Sir Michael Howard. The theory of war involved studying two set texts. The first was Sir Julian Corbett’s work on the principles of maritime strategy. I have to say that this did not prove of huge use in my subsequent career, other than giving me the ability, occasionally, to embarrass naval officers who had no idea that, in the age of sail, the art of a successful blockade wholly rested on an ability to create the illusion of dispersal, while maintaining the ability to concentrate at any given time.

The second text was Carl von Clausewitz’s classic work, On War. What I most remember from the many revelations that Sir Michael made from this work related to his explanation of the Clausewitzian trinity. That trinity identified that war was the realm of three separate things or ingredients. The first was the ingredient of probability, chance and friction. This was the domain of the Army at war. The second ingredient was that of reason. This was the domain of the Government, whose duty it is to give logic, purpose or sense to war. The third ingredient was that of passion. This is the domain of the people, for it is the people who supply the national motivating spirit that supports both the Government and the Armed Forces. According to the Clausewitzian theory, war most closely approaches its apogee when all three of these elements are mutually supporting and reinforcing. In historical terms, Clausewitz saw this as the situation enjoyed by Napoleon at his height.

In my more recent service life over the past 10 years or so, I have often reflected about the degree to which the Clausewitzian trinity has, to some extent, been fractured in our country. The last decade or so has been typified by government Ministers who occasionally suspect the motivation of their generals, admirals or air marshals; a society that is deeply concerned by the reasoning of their Government when it comes to committing Armed Forces to war; and generals who sense that the passion of the people manifests itself primarily in sympathy for, rather than informed support of, the Armed Forces.

This situation is a direct legacy of having to fight in both Iraq and Afghanistan—unpopular wars. It is a situation that forms a potentially distorting context for a policy on veterans, and it has created the most unfortunate context for successful recruiting. It does so because service life is seen by too many ill-informed people to be a brutalising experience; and too many charities in pursuit of funding contribute to the distorted illusion that service men and women are victims who, particularly in their post-service life, need to enjoy some form of permanent charitable status.

The truth is so very different. For the vast majority of service men and women, a career in the Armed Forces is both a life-changing and a life-enhancing experience. If you doubt me, let me offer you some of the MoD’s most recent statistics. How many people—not in this House but in wider society—recognise that the Armed Forces are the nation’s single biggest provider of apprenticeships, with 19,000 currently on apprenticeship schemes and a total of over 46,000 apprentice start-ups since 2015?

The most recent evidence on the employment of service leavers, mentioned earlier, shows that 82% of those exiting through the career transition workshop were in full-time employment within six months—that is higher than the 75% employment rate of the UK population in the round. The occupational groups that service leavers join are impressive: 22% into skilled trades; 20% into associate professional and technical trades; 14% as process plant and machine operatives; 11% into professional occupations such as teaching, health, media and public service; 8% as managers, directors and senior officials. What about the missing 18%? Forty per cent of those went back into education or the voluntary sector; 6% have retired; 12% are travelling abroad; 9% have medical problems; 8% are looking after their families; and we have lost track of the rest.

All the evidence suggests that employers hugely appreciate the transferable skills of leadership, problem solving, team working, communication skills and self-discipline that service leavers offer. Employers respect the vocational skills of service leavers in areas such as electronics, engineering and project management, and recognise their ability to conform to their companies’ rules, values, ethos and standards. Ex-service leavers are a unique pool of talent that offers many benefits to both society and the economy and they undoubtedly strengthen the workforce of all kinds of different civilian organisations.

Why do I say all this? I do so in an attempt to balance an ill-informed but popular view that service life inevitably leads to a situation that somehow presents a national social crisis. It most definitely does not. But I am hugely aware that a small percentage of service leavers, particularly the wounded, undoubtedly deserve some special consideration. We need a strategy for our veterans that ensures that that special consideration is afforded to a small number who at the end of service life need and deserve some specific help. I wholly applaud the Government’s strategy which recognises this, but I do not want that strategy to distort the reality that service life offers the vast majority of service men and women a life of betterment and advancement. I do not want the wholly justifiable interests of service charities to undermine that simple fact.

I want the passion of society and the reason of Government to support the needs of our veterans, but I also want that reason and passion to support the Armed Forces in being. We need to actively recalibrate society’s understanding of the remarkable benefits of service life. Those benefits are not just for the individuals but for wider society as well.

Trident

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Thursday 25th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

I am happy to confirm to the noble and gallant Lord that that is the Government’s policy. We reaffirmed the continuous at-sea deterrent posture in the 2015 strategic defence and security review and, as he rightly says, we have had a nuclear armed submarine on patrol for every minute of every day for nearly 50 years, including during the transition between the Resolution and Vanguard classes.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I would never publicly question the utility to our defence of the nuclear deterrent, nor the carrier programme, nor the F-35 programme. But it is eminently clear to me that for several years now, the balance of the conventional forces has been used as the financial regulator in order to afford these programmes. Does the noble Earl not agree that, unless the whole of the defence programme is made affordable, we will be presented with decisions that so hollow out our conventional forces that the sense of affording the nuclear deterrent will be seriously questioned?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I understand the noble and gallant Lord’s point. There is a £31 billion budget for the Dreadnought programme and we are currently confident that that estimate is robust. It is quite separate and distinct from other procurement budgets. We do not consider that it impacts upon them adversely—but we are conscious of the risks that he articulates.

Defence: Helicopters

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Thursday 14th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I shall do exactly that. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his suggestion. We are on track to share headline conclusions from the modernising defence programme by the NATO summit in July. At that stage we expect to describe what the changed strategic context means for defence policy and planning, including the area in which the noble Lord is interested; how our overall approach needs to evolve, as surely it must; and how we intend to pursue improved capability in the new domains of warfare.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, does the noble Earl not agree that, given both the size of our defence budget and the multiple challenges of affordability it faces, the idea that we can for all time sustain a whole range of sovereign defence capability is simply untenable?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I do not think that this Government or any preceding recent Government have pretended that we can maintain sovereign capability in every area of our defence requirements. We certainly consider maintaining sovereign capability where that is in the national interest but, in general, competition ensures best value for money, best capability and innovation.

National Security Situation

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Thursday 19th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I am delighted to contribute to this debate. Some of what I intended to say survives the crime of repetition, but I will dine selectively from my thoughts. I want to make two contributions to this debate: one operational and one perhaps more reflective and strategic in nature.

The operational point relates to the allied air action over Syria last weekend and the surrounding debate about the need for prior parliamentary approval. This has been well covered today. I want to emphasise the extreme complexity of co-ordinating an allied response against what are inevitably time-sensitive targets, through hostile air space, when the retention of speed, security and surprise are prerequisites to both mission success and personnel security. In circumstances where the Government are confident of the moral, legal and intelligence case for action, my firm belief—and I think that this is now widely shared—is that they should retain the ability to act without parliamentary consent, thereby enhancing the chances of a safe and successful mission. They can answer to Parliament subsequently.

However, I would be the first to counsel that, when different factors prevail—when Armed Forces might be committed at scale, when operations are likely to be enduring and at cost, both in lives and national treasure, and when strategic surprise is not an issue—the Armed Forces are far happier when they know that they have the support of Parliament and wider society. I fear that, in the company of many friends, I have spent too much of my recent life fighting unpopular wars. The Armed Forces want to enjoy the support, not the sympathy, of their nation.

My second contribution is more reflective and concerns the wider character of the global security situation that we currently live in. My reflections are not just those of an ex-Chief of the Defence Staff; I also stake my claim as the 160th Constable of the Tower of London—a place which has borne witness to nigh on 1,000 years of our national story and the conflict that sadly litters it.

My first reflection is that the sources of conflict over time bear remarkable similarities of origin. The three most obvious are the violent pursuit and abuse of political power; the continued maldistribution of wealth and opportunity, both within societies and between countries; and the frequent and often brutal misrepresentation of the morality of great religion. My second reflection would be to lay bare the false notion of the teleological certainty of human betterment, of greater mutual harmony, of enduring and peaceful co-existence and of universal submission to a single set of rules by which the peoples of the world should live. My third reflection is on the remarkably intoxicating power of history’s legacy, a legacy we are connected to both rationally and emotionally, and a legacy which is key to understanding the actions and ambitions of both nations and their leaders.

What conclusions do I draw from these reflections? First, inevitable change, often accompanied by violence, is a far better description of mankind’s likely future than some idealised and predetermined journey to a state of universal human harmony. Secondly, I think that many countries do not buy into the current rules-based order; indeed, they feel very emotionally that it denies them their sense of historic entitlement. I would certainly include both Russia and Iran in that. Thirdly, the grand strategic challenge of this age is how we accommodate the change which is inevitable while maintaining the stability on which the continued betterment of the human condition absolutely depends.

Finally, having established that peaceful coexistence and a rules-based order are not naturally occurring, we may conclude that they need to be imposed, primarily consensually through alliances of interested parties and occasionally through the willingness of those parties to threaten or use force, but always in the context of thoughtful leadership, wise policy and strong capability. As a nation, we need to decide how prominent a role we wish to play in all this, and in making that decision we need to be mindful of, but not seduced by, the intoxicating power of our own historic legacy. If this last point is a touch esoteric, let me make it more specific and clear.

As a nation, we dangerously congratulate ourselves on spending 2% of GDP on our nation’s defence. But, at the same time, we cling to the retention of the totemic military capability of a great power: a gold-standard nuclear deterrent and the two largest carriers we have ever built, soon to be populated by the latest fifth-generation stealth aircraft. Of course I want these things, but I fear that the balance of our military capability has become the financial regulator which makes such programmes affordable. In being such, that conventional force is both reduced and hollowed out. In the context of the current global security situation, as a nation we need to do much better than that.