Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Monday 17th January 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for the opportunity for this short debate. I reassure her that, although I am a landlubber, the importance of the nuclear enterprise transcends single service interests. Indeed, in common with most former defence chiefs, I maintain a close interest in the nation’s nuclear enterprise. This is not always easy since many of the Government’s formal publications and announcements on nuclear issues, such as last October’s annual update to Parliament, are, perhaps by design, somewhat opaque.

A consistent set of features of the nuclear enterprise is, however, clearly discernible. The enterprise is vital, expensive, fragile and, wholly understandably, beset with various risks. One area of that risk is the future propulsion system of our nuclear submarines, and one category of that fragility is the quality and future availability of suitably qualified nuclear personnel. The fragility is fully recognised, though it is, to be honest, far less obvious that it is being successfully ameliorated.

The recently announced AUKUS agreement is in many respects hugely welcome, as we have heard. It aligns the interests of three like-minded Governments in an increasingly important part of the world and against a commonly agreed threat. The genesis of agreement, however, is less obvious. It appears, anecdotally, to have been the opportunistic exploitation of a military-to-military inquiry about the challenges of adopting nuclear propulsion in a submarine enterprise. It certainly does not seem to be an initiative that spent years of cautious marinading in policy consideration. Rather, it was an opportunity to give substance to rhetoric. There may well be nothing wrong in that at all, but my concern is that a major foreign policy initiative that necessitates any dilution of the UK national effort, any diversion of our nuclear expertise or anything that has the potential to add fragility or risk to our own nuclear enterprise must be contemplated and embarked upon with extreme caution. I would welcome the Minister’s assurance that this risk is fully recognised and will be properly ameliorated.