Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Goodhart Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, if your Lordships can bear a third lawyer in a row, I, too, would like to express my support for the amendment. I regret that I was not able to be present at Report stage, but if I had been I should certainly have spoken in favour of the amendment.

The Government’s fundamental concern, as described on Report by the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, is that there should be “proper lines of accountability”—a quotation already referred to by my noble and learned friend Lord Phillips. My noble and learned friend and my noble friend have already dealt with that argument effectively, so I shall say no more about it.

The noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, also said that he would not revisit the arguments that had been raised historically. It is here that I want to add just a few words, because I was more directly concerned with the terms on which the 2005 Act was passed than either my noble friend or my noble and learned friend. The main argument in favour of setting up the Supreme Court was of course the presence of the Law Lords in this place, which was said to be contrary to the principle of the separation of powers. I never accepted that argument. It seemed to me then, as it seems to me now, that the Law Lords were as independent of the Executive as the members of the Supreme Court are now—neither more nor less.

Whatever the theory of the separation of powers, the reality was that the separation was complete. The back-up argument in those days was based on perception. Although we in Parliament knew very well that the law Lords were independent of the Executive, that was not—so it was said—the perception of the public, or at least of some members of the public. However, there was never any evidence to suggest that that was the perception of the public except, if I remember correctly, a single piece of anecdotal evidence. This led the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth in a most memorable speech—I wish he was in his position to hear me say this—to describe the whole exercise as having been based on,

“the perception of a perception”.—[Official Report, 4/7/07; col. 1094.]

However, here we are—as the saying goes—and we must go on from here.

Having created the Supreme Court at a cost of £100 million, not to mention the huge increase in the annual cost of running it, we must now take it as it is and complete the job. I cannot imagine any provision more likely to create the impression of interference by the Executive in the affairs of the Supreme Court than that the chief executive should be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. If the Lord Chancellor was here, it would be no answer for him to say that in practice he would accept the nomination of a selection committee. The perception is there and, in this case, the reality is there.

I cannot remember whether we discussed Section 48(2) in the Select Committee that sat for many weeks. Nor can I remember why, in the end, we accepted the section as it stands, unless we perhaps had in mind the old style of Lord Chancellor before the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, rather than the new Lord Chancellor as he has become. Whatever thought processes went through our heads, I am now convinced that the section was a mistake, and therefore I am very glad to support the amendment.

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, I am going to take a rather unusual position on this and say that I am afraid I do not agree with Amendment 3. I was considerably involved in the drafting of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and I had no objection at that time to Sections 48 and 49, which are now objected to in this amendment. The reason why I do not welcome this amendment is that the chief executive is an administrator, not a judge. That being so, I see no serious reason why Lord Chancellors should not continue to be involved in the proceedings of Sections 48 and 49 as they now are. The administration of an issue which involves both those in charge of costs and those in charge of the law needs to recognise the real issues here because of the way in which the funds get to the Supreme Court.

I am in general a strong supporter of the two former judges who have put their names to this amendment and of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but in this case I fail to be able to agree with them as they would clearly like.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, although this may seem to be a technical point to some Members of the House, it is actually a matter of very considerable importance. It is wrong in law and it is constitutionally inappropriate. I am very surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, who is an excellent lawyer, has not picked up either of those points. I have to say that the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, got it wrong, and it is important to get it right. It is important to preserve the separation of the judiciary, and I speak as someone who is not a member of the Supreme Court and was not a member of the Judicial Committee. However, the separation of the judiciary from the Executive is crucial at every level, so to have the chief executive of the Supreme Court answerable to the Lord Chancellor and not to the president of the Supreme Court is, to say the least, an anomaly. Also, rather more seriously, it is incorrect. This needs to be put right, otherwise there really will be a perception that the Lord Chancellor not only controls the finances but controls the person who controls the financing of the Supreme Court. I strongly support this amendment.