Welfare Reform Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Freud
Main Page: Lord Freud (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Freud's debates with the Department for Work and Pensions
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, this is one of three amendments about capital. I shall start by explaining our intentions for the capital rules and universal credit. I will then be able to be briefer on that context and background when we come to the next two groups. The rules for the current income-rated benefits will be carried forward into universal credit. We intend to limit eligibility for universal credit to claimants who have less than £16,000 of capital. Claimants may save up to £6,000 before there is any impact whatever on their entitlement to universal credit. If they have between £6,000 and £16,000, we would assume a tariff income from this capital. These rules ensure that support is focused on those who really need it rather than on people who have significant resources on which they can draw. This is an important principle, which is essential to ensure that the system remains affordable. As noble Lords have pointed out, there is a slightly opaque area here in the sense that capital can be deferred income and vice versa. It is important to have some rules around the appropriate capital.
In order to be fair to the taxpayer, we have assessed how much families typically save. While nearly one in three pensioner households have savings in excess of £16,000, only 13 per cent of households with a working age adult in them have this much savings. A typical working age household has only £300 in savings. On the point about importing the tax credit system to universal credit, the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, asked why it is this way around. The answer is simply that it would be unaffordable.
The first group of amendments seek to amend the financial conditions for universal credit by requiring capital derived from the sale of the claimant’s primary home to be excluded from the calculation of capital for up to 12 months when held in a deposit or a prescribed account. However, it is already our intention to provide claimants who have capital from the recent sale of their main home with a significant level of protection. This is clear from the illustrative draft regulations on capital and income recently shared with Peers. The illustrative schedule on capital to be disregarded sets out our intentions on this point.
Capital from the sale of the claimant’s main home received within the previous 26 weeks will be disregarded, which is to be used for the purchase of their new home. That period may be extended where the decision-maker determines that it will be reasonable to do so in the circumstances of the case. An example would be where accommodation suitable for a disabled member of the family has not yet been found. We believe that this approach balances our duty to be fair to the claimant with the need to safeguard universal credit.
Turning to the power in Schedule 1 to treat a claimant as having or not having capital, this is simply taken in order to replicate the notional capital rules that existed in the current benefits system and that guard against claimants deliberately depriving themselves of capital. The exemptions for types of capital covered by the rules in the existing benefits system will be maintained. Some types of payments cited by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, are classed as income. It is not necessary to add a specific power taken by Amendment 52A. As I have said, the illustrative draft regulations demonstrate that we already have the power to limit the time period for which claimants are treated as having or not having capital where we choose to do so. I hope that this account has clarified the Government’s proposals for protecting the capital of claimants who have recently sold their main home and therefore explains why we could not support Amendments 22A, 22E and 52A.
Perhaps the noble Lord can help me a little on some of the practicalities of that. We are saying that the existing exemption operates when someone has disposed of their main residence and reapplies it within a 26-week period. Is it a requirement that it is wholly reapplied for the purchase of a property? My noble friend Lady Turner made a point about someone who wanted to save some of that because they were downsizing for carers. Is this looked at retrospectively? Will someone look after the event and see as a matter of fact that it was so applied and, if it was not, what the ramifications are for the application of the universal credit?
Yes, my Lords. The way it works is that the amount of money that is being reserved for the purchase of a new house is the amount of capital that would be exempted. Other capital would not be exempted. We are currently working on the exact workings of the system and getting these regulations—the next iteration—right. Therefore, I am not currently in a position to lay down clearly, as the noble Lord rightly says, the practical applications and fine tuning of how we apply this. That will come at the appropriate time.
My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord can help me with some stats. It was interesting that in his reply he told us that the current percentage of people who have savings above £16,000 is 13 per cent. However, when you start netting the figure and taking into account the notional income derived from that tariff, and given that something like 85 per cent of people on JSA expect to get back to work within nine months to a year, what does he think the real savings, or loss of savings, would be were he in a broader sense to accept that, with the integration of the two benefits, one should go for the tax credit system rather than the JSA system? Can he help us on that? In the light of that, we can perhaps press him further, but what real savings is he expecting to generate, given that most people who come on to JSA will be back in work within the year? In their first six months their benefit is contributory, so they are not affected and they will go back to work very quickly within the next six months. Therefore, if they have those savings and you say that because they are over £16,000 they will get not a penny of JSA, in real terms what net savings do you expect to garner? I would like to press the Minister on a further point, if I may.
My Lords, I have to confess to the noble Baroness that I do not have my hands on that particular figure. I am not sure that I can find it out. We have other figures around the costs, but I am not convinced that I have that particular figure readily to hand. Can I leave it that I will try to find it out and supply it in the fullness of time?
My Lords, I do not want “the fullness of time”; I want very soon, just as with childcare—the day after, if the Minister would be so kind. This is the key figure. The key stat is the real net cost of going for the more generous alignment with tax credits rather than bringing people down to the harsher alignment with JSA. That is the pivotal figure. I am surprised that this has not been brought into play in the Minister’s response. People coming out of work on to JSA are desperate to get back into work. Anything we do to make it difficult for them to get back into work is counterproductive. Anything that runs down their savings and that they are worried about, or anything that risks them when they go from work to benefit as opposed to from benefit to work is surely to be deplored. I suggest to the Minister that this is very unwise social policy.
My Lords, I withdraw my previous reluctance to provide a figure. In much less time than I thought, I am now in a position to let noble Lords know that if we removed the cap limit entirely, the cost would be £500 million per annum.
Forgive me, but that is the net cost. If you removed the cap entirely and instead took into account notional income from those savings, given the stat of 13 per cent being over £16,000, as the noble Lord said, as well as people being in a range of between £6,000 and £16,000, and taking into account that they will have their benefit cut by virtue of their notional income, I take it that the £500 million includes that figure. It seems unlikely on the face of it, but it may well be the case. I suspect that it is a gross figure, not a net figure. I could be wrong, but we need to know the cost in effect of substituting one system over the other, not simply the cost of not having any savings rules at all.
My Lords, I can clarify. That is a gross figure. Behavioural changes, clearly—
My Lords, I will complete my response to the questions. If we were to take a £50,000 limit with the tariff rules—in other words, starting at £6,000 and moving up on the tariff rules from £1 for every £250—the cost would be £90 million; so if we were to take the cap off completely, it would be a little, but probably not a lot, more. The £16,000 cap that we propose will affect 200,000 people in total. However, currently only 100,000 are on tax credits. That is the universe that we are talking about. I point out the political choices that we are making. We are designing universal credit to be for the poorest people and putting constraints higher up the income scale. That is entirely deliberate.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving us the figures. Perhaps he could make it clear that embedded in them is the scatter of JSA claimants who will return to work at different intervals. The first six months will be contributory. Thereafter, most of those coming on to JSA for the first time in that year will be back to work within three months or so on average after their contributory benefit has ended. Has the distributional factor of how long people stay on JSA been taken into account? I am talking not about existing JSA claimants but new claimants. What will the implications be?
Yes, my Lords, a careful assessment has been done of how it will work in practice, which incorporates those kinds of effects.
My Lords, I hope that the Minister will forgive me if I ask his help on a point of detail. It may come up during fine-tuning, but it might be helpful to flag it up now. I refer to young people who leave the local authority care system and win an award against their authority because in their time in care they were not properly cared for. Therefore, they have a capital sum that they might need to use for education, therapy or something else. What circumstance will they find themselves in under these arrangements?
My Lords, I will have to write to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, with precise information on that.
My Lords, on the point about people who sell their houses and have capital from that, current rules allow the discretion to extend to 12 months. The provision is already there, so I do not see why one could not have efficiencies in the system since the cost of applying discretion is reduced to the difference between six and 12 months and people are given greater clarity in what is a complicated market for buying and selling houses. Also, the rules are being applied to a population that would not previously have been subjected to them. Millions of people will be impacted over time, and this is not a difficult alteration to make in the rules.
On the definitive set of rules setting out what capital or earned and unearned income is or is not going to be taken into account, the exchange with my noble friends has indicated why people are concerned to see and understand the list as soon as possible—again, particularly the application of those rules to the in-work population. For the moment, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I would like to add one final word. Could the Minister reflect for us briefly on one of the wider consequences of this move? When tax credits were set up, they were, as he will know, designed to replicate work in many ways and to replicate the tax system, so it is not the case that having savings is not taken into account at all. Under tax credits, genuine income from savings is taken into account, and that is the way it should be, but under this new system it is not just the very richest who are affected. Once people reach £6,000 worth of savings, they will face, as my noble friend Lady Drake described, a heavily punitive rate of effective taxation on that. I wonder what the effect of that is on the marginal deduction rates as they move into work.
I ask the noble Lord to do two things. One is to comment on how he has factored that into the effective incentives to move into work in a whole variety of situations. Secondly, could he say whether he is not worried at all that it might push people back into an approach of dependency on the state as opposed to their trying to share that responsibility between themselves and the state, which the tax credits system encourages them to do?
My Lords, Amendments 22B and 22F would exclude from the calculation of capital any savings placed into an individual savings account or other prescribed accounts of a claimant who is in work, or who has been in work in the past 12 months, up to a maximum limit to be set no lower than £50,000. It begs a really very simple question: should the taxpayer support someone who has savings of £50,000? That is the question that is being asked here, and I think it is a question about amounts. The figures we are using were taken over from the existing benefits system, and they were raised a little over five years ago in April 2006. Those figures were doubled from £8,000 at the top to £16,000, and the starting rate from £3,000 to £6,000, so those figures do move around. I accept that determining what the right figure is here is not an exact science. Indeed, one of the things I am keen to have is a responsive system that starts to get research and understand judgments such as what the right figure is here.
I understand exactly the motivation of the two amendments, which is to encourage low-income workers to save. The argument comes down to how much we and the taxpayer can afford. I gave some figures when we debated the previous group of amendments. I will remind noble Lords that if we had an upper capital limit of £50,000, it would cost £90 million a year, which we simply do not have. Under our proposals, only when a claimant, or joint claimants, has £16,000 or more will the entitlement to universal credit cease; and only 13 per cent of households have this much in savings. That is why the figure is not as arbitrary as some noble Lords indicated.
I was asked a series of questions. I will have to add to my letter to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, to get right the position of children leaving care. Clearly, a child's income and capital are wholly disregarded in the system. The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, asked about the treatment of ISA interest. Universal credit will replicate the capital rules for means-tested benefits by using a tariff income. It is not possible to read across from the tax credit system. As noble Lords know, tariff income is not—and is not meant to be—the equivalent of the actual income that you might earn on that amount of capital. The figure includes an estimate of how much you should be prepared to run down your capital while you look for support from the state.
Will the Minister confirm that tax credits and ISA income are not included but are exempt? Is that right or not?
I will have to write to the noble Lord on ISA income in tax credits. I do not know the exact position. I hope that that explains why we cannot support Amendments 22B and 22F. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, the noble Lord started off with a question that I suspect was meant to be rhetorical, but I think he is entitled to an answer. Is it right for the taxpayer to support someone who has £50,000 in savings? That was the noble Lord’s opening sentence. I agree with him that that is the key question. However, given the responses that he has heard today, the answer should be, “Yes, in certain circumstances”. The key question is, “What are the circumstances?”. There is no absolute yes or no answer.
The circumstances mentioned so far include whether this will help sustain savings and the savings habit. The answer is yes. Would it help people get back to work earlier than they otherwise would, and therefore depend less on benefits? Possibly, yes. Would it help families avoid falling into debt and thus lose even the tariff income that they would otherwise expect to enjoy between £6,000 and £16,000? Possibly. Should it be for a limited time so that it is not an unending commitment? Certainly. That is surely the way in which we should approach the question. It should not be, “£50K or not?”, but, “What are the circumstances in which it is reasonable to support people?”. Otherwise, we will make short-term savings at the expense of longer-term losses, which will come from keeping people on benefits longer than they need to be because they have gone into debt by having run down their savings. Surely that is the right question to ask rather than the bald one that does not take into account the very different situation of people who are marginal, who are in and out of the labour market but who hope to stay there with the help of savings to smooth out these movements.
The Minister opened by asking whether the taxpayer should support someone with £50,000 in savings. My initial reaction to that is that the taxpayer supports people on £500,000 because there is 40 per cent to 50 per cent tax relief up to the value of £1.8 million and £50,000 per annum for pension savings. Actually, the taxpayer supports people on much higher levels of income, and we can think of lots of other incentivised examples. There is no limit on the ability to use the advantageous tax opportunities of ISAs year on year depending on what capital is held in other places. I am not sure that that would withstand the test of rigorous intellectual analysis.
I am sorry, but I cannot not respond to that because there is a difference. I think everyone in the Room will appreciate the difference between not taking someone’s own money away from them and giving them money from the taxpayer, which is the comparison that the noble Baroness has just made.
I do not accept that defence because tax relief on pension savings is not taking money away from people; it is giving them their tax back.
The other point is that even on ISAs, those who are well off can take every member of their family, their spouse and children, and give them ISAs, thus taking taxpayers’ money for the incentivised advantage that that brings. So the taxpayer supports all sorts of people, some of whom are more worthy than others. On that basis, if the exam question is whether the taxpayer should support someone who has £50,000, I should like to get the whole list of incentivised savings and do some comparative analysis.
The effect of this policy is that people in hard-working families will be disincentivised to save and will face greater risk in managing a labour market that the Government themselves want to deregulate further but do not want to support people in managing that deregulated labour market. As my noble friend Lady Sherlock has said, there is not just the issue of the £16,000. For all those low and moderate-income people who have more than £6,000—
I would like to make one brief point about the sums of money that are increasingly needed to save for a house. It was reported in the Guardian on 17 September this year that the average deposit has gone up tenfold in the last 20 years, from £6,793 in 1990 to over £65,000 now. The same article went on to quote a banker from First Direct, which I presume must know these things, who said:
“The average deposit … has actually risen more than twice as fast as house prices and almost four times as fast as income”.
Could the Minister therefore think for a moment about whether the inflation in the savings limit properly takes account of the specific house-related inflation, and within that the specific deposit-related inflation, that we are seeing?
My Lords, Amendments 22C and 22D would exclude from the calculation of capital prescribed amounts saved for a deposit on the purchase of accommodation for personal use where the claimant is in work or has been in work in the previous 12 months. I can of course see the benefits of encouraging low-earning families to become homeowners, but at present these amendments would be difficult if not impossible to implement efficiently in practice. As the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, pre-empted my argumentation, I will not go into this in depth, but I must say that one would need both the provision of a savings vehicle, which would in effect be exclusively for the purchase of a house, as well as adequate numbers of people wanting to save in this particular way, for that market to work. I do not think there is any necessary block on creating a vehicle like that at some stage in the future, and it would be up to a Government to look at that in the future. Right now, given our constraints, I do not think we are in a position to do it. As noble Lords have heard and as the noble Baroness suggested, these are not necessarily issues of principle; they are issues of affordability and the envelope that we have to introduce universal credit. I remind noble Lords that we have obtained an envelope of £4 billion per annum to give to people in receipt of universal credit. I am not netting it off against other changes, but that is what the universal credit does. Finding extra money for this, that and the other cannot be done just by a wave of the hand. It will be tough to get extra money for desirable things.
It is essential that we get the architecture of a structure that we can use to help and motivate people. If we cannot afford particular things or it would be desirable to develop particular processes, that is fine and we can do it, but right now we do not have those resources. For that core reason, I hope noble Lords will appreciate why we do not support these amendments, and I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
The noble Lord may need to write to us to flesh out some detail about the £4 billion, a figure that he has used on several occasions. I accept that it is probably a gross figure and that there are some nettings off. Presumably the baseline for that is after taking account of the previous two Budgets and the spending review, and all the hits that occurred there.
My Lords, I need not write to the noble Lord on this matter because I am trustful that the impact assessment that holds these figures will be on its way—
I was going to say today. In fact, I can say more. I have copies in the Room. I can do better; I can ceremoniously deliver the impact assessment to the noble Lord with that figure explained.
In response to the Minister, I am able to pre-empt his arguments because the quality of the DWP briefings is so good that I can see where he is likely to be coming from. The fact that I can anticipate is an indirect compliment. On the substance of his comments, he argues that it is important to get the architecture in. The problem is that the architecture has opted for a very harsh and anti-savings regime, and for applying it to those in work. I am not sure that I would want that element of the architecture to be in, but at least some of my amendments seek to say not, “Oh, let’s find bits of money”, but that if one chooses to take that harsh anti-savings regime—quite clearly, as I have quoted, I am supported in that view by the CSJ—some of the consequences are so perverse that you have to address them not as bits of money but as perverse outcomes of that choice of architecture.
We have dealt with one of the outcomes, but another is that when this comes in a population of people who are currently in work, who may be in work in the future, and who have got savings, are going to find that those hard-earned savings for a deposit on a house are now going to result in an adjustment of their benefit entitlement. That strikes me as unfair and perverse. If one is looking for fairness, one needs to have intergenerational sympathy for the combination of factors that young people face in the current market, which I have tried to spell out one by one. This, to me, becomes an even more compelling argument for saying, “Are you going to put this on their shoulders as well?”.
I accept that there may be process or product design challenges around this, but I have every faith in the creative ability of the Minister and the DWP team to find a process route through this and still urge them to allow all these people who are saving for their houses not to suddenly find that they have to draw down on their savings or lose benefit. I withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 23 and 24. Amendment 23 removes the power to make regulations for there to be no entitlement to universal credit in prescribed circumstances. Amendment 24 removes a power for regulations to be made for there to be exceptions to any limited entitlement or waiting day rules. It might be helpful if I indicate the types of circumstances in which we envisage these powers being used.
The regulation-making power in subsection 1(a) will provide that there is no entitlement to universal credit in certain cases where the usual conditions of entitlement are otherwise satisfied. As is the case now, a number of specified groups will not be able to access universal credit. These may include certain prisoners and children leaving full-time care who remain the responsibility of the local authority, where payment of universal credit would lead to duplication of provision. This may include people involved in trade disputes. Amendment 23 would prevent us being able to restrict entitlement to people in these circumstances. This would result in duplication of provision in some cases, which I am sure is not the intention.
I will address the questions of the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, about waiting days, which constituted the main thrust of his comments. Housing benefit is dependent on entitlement to means-tested benefit, which involves waiting days—for example, jobseeker’s allowance or employment and support allowance. There is also a waiting period in practice for housing benefits. In addition, where benefits such as housing benefit are paid for in complete weeks, there is no provision for short claims of a few days. In practice, when we move from the application of waiting days in the reality of the universal credit world, there will be far fewer instances of this start-up arrangement because people will go on to universal credit for their entire application and will stay on it.
The noble Lord asked about linking rules. Our intention is that people will work their way off the system—that would be a very good outcome—but would remain effectively known to the system for another two years. So that is effectively how the linking rules would work: you would come back onto your taper on an automatic basis. I have not actually thought this through. I imagine—I will check carefully now—that waiting days will not apply when you are on the system and it will be a kind of run-on effective link. I will double-check that waiting days will not apply in those circumstances because my understanding currently is that there is a run-on and that is the same effective claim. So the whole concern around waiting days would be very much diminished. In fact, I am reassured almost instantly that the intention is not to have waiting days as people move on and off the system in those circumstances. As to the question of when Clause 6(1)(b) would apply if not at the start of the claim, it would apply to the entire claim if it covered less than seven days.
Amendment 24 would prevent us having exceptions if we make provision for waiting days or to prevent very short periods of entitlement. We envisage that regulations under Clause 6(3) might be used in a claimant’s favour: for example, where there is only a short break between periods of entitlement, a claimant may not have to serve waiting days before becoming entitled again. I am sorry that I am repeating that point. Although we have made several changes moving from negative to affirmative resolutions, on this one we propose to stay with negative ones. Given this explanation, I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.
I am grateful to the Minister for that response on the issue of negative or affirmative, to which we may wish to return. In order to be clear, perhaps I may use the trade disputes issue as an example. Under current arrangements, there are certain trade disputes under which benefits can be withheld. Under the universal credit, there is an amalgam of benefits, including housing. As regards the sort of exemption that it is envisaged would apply under Clause 6, does it cover all the separate benefits that could give rise to similar exclusions now? For example, would housing being included in the universal credit still be subject to the same trade dispute rules, or will separate rules apply to that? That is not a very elegant way of phrasing the question.
My Lords, our intention is to have it broadly the same. We have to work through the exact detail of the regulations but our intention is not to change the main thrust of that set of regulations.
Specifically, if housing benefit were not currently subject to those rules, how would that be unpicked? Perhaps the answer is that it is.
We would wrap them together in the universal credit but maintain the same regime for trading disputes. That would be the intention. Clearly, we have not written this regulation in detail and we will have a chance to look at it in some detail before we do.
I am grateful again to the Minister. We should like to reflect and read the record on that issue, and it is something to which we may wish to return. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I support the amendment of my noble friend Lady Lister and congratulate her on an incredibly impressive first amendment. We look forward to many more. I hope that the Minister can see that we are here to help. He has heard not only the voice of experience today but particular proposals from my noble friend Lady Hollis to help him on housing benefit issues. I hope that this well of experience and good will will enable us to move forward on universal credit.
One thing that came across very clearly in the debate was the almost universal voice of experience, whether it was people’s own household experience or that of people such as my noble friend Lord McAvoy who worked with poor people and helped them claim their benefits in the existing maze of complexity. We have heard powerful voices warning of the risks of imposing on everyone the monthly payment basis, for all the reasons that have been heard.
There are particular issues for women. My noble friend Lady Lister said that it is largely mothers who manage poverty in the household. The noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, was on the same page on that. Studies show that by and large the male member of the household is more likely to be responsible for monthly bills, whereas women tend to do the weekly shop. Therefore, women are potentially particularly disadvantaged by these proposals.
A lot of work has gone into producing real-time data from HMRC. That is at the heart of delivering the universal credit project. Obviously, that is predicated on the formula of monthly payments. As a practical matter, how difficult would it be either to flex on to fortnightly payments or for people to have a choice? I am surprised by those who argue against choice. We all accept the benefits of simplicity, for the reasons that we have debated and will continue to debate. However, a balance must be struck. Simplicity can shut out fairness in a range of circumstances. That is perhaps the dilemma that the Minister faces today.
I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, who said that it would be a pity if we got this wrong and in doing so undermined the prize of the universal credit, and I very much agree with that. I hope that the Minister will listen to all those who have spoken. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, spoke about his particular experience of dealing with poor and disadvantaged, chaotic families, as did the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, and my noble friend Lady Sherlock. What would happen if one partner spent unwisely in that relationship? What would be the outcome, particularly for children? I hope that the Minister has heard a powerful message today and that it will genuinely influence him in looking at this again. If we want universal credit to work, this could be the key stumbling block.
My Lords, I start by congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on her first amendment, and I hope that she does not have too many like it. I was very impressed when she said that she was a conservative, which was obviously supported because my noble friend Lord Kirkwood called her his noble friend. Clearly we have some cross-dressing going on.
In the policy briefing note published on 12 September, we confirmed that the universal credit will be paid monthly. However, we do not intend to specify the payment frequency in primary legislation. As with all existing benefits, this will be dealt with in regulations made under the existing powers in the Social Security Administration Act 1992. That approach gave us the flexibility, for example, to increase payment periods from weekly to two-weekly for most out-of-work benefits. The amended provision would require the Government to pay universal credit more frequently than monthly. Amendment 27, for instance, goes on to provide that in some cases payments would be made twice monthly.
I need to make the point about the difference between assessment periods and payment periods, which is important to bear in mind. Currently, existing out-of-work benefits are made on an assessment period of a week, with a fortnightly payment cycle. That is fairly typical. The universal credit benefit represents a new approach focused clearly on work, which encourages out-of-work households to budget on a monthly rather than a fortnightly basis in the belief that it will better prepare people for the reality of working life. The figures have already been used. Currently, 75 per cent of all those in employment and 51 per cent of those earning less than £10,000 a year receive earnings monthly. In addition, monthly direct debits for household bills are often cheaper than more frequent billing options.
Many noble Lords raised the evidence base. As noble Lords know, we are conducting qualitative and quantitative research with claimants on many issues but particularly on the payment frequency issue. As some noble Lords have pointed out, on 7 October we published a report, Perceptions of welfare reform and Universal Credit. This outlines findings from research we conducted with claimants, the public, employers and staff in December 2010 and January 2011. There were critical findings in that piece of research that we are looking at with great attention.
I understand that many people on low incomes will be used to managing the fortnightly payment of benefits, and I am determined to ensure that there will be appropriate budgeting support to meet the needs of claimants. We want families to be able to manage their financial affairs in a manner that best reflects the demands of modern life, whether they are in work or out of work, and we are working with stakeholders and benefit experts to that end. We are setting up a series of demonstrator projects, as they are called, with housing associations and local authorities to look at how to structure the payment of rents to landlords. These demonstrator projects will look at a wide range of budgeting support. We need to make sure that budgeting advice and support is available for those who need it in order to help them manage the change.
We also need to consider those exceptional circumstances where more frequent payments will be required. To pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, people with mental health problems are an example of a group that may need an exceptional service. To pick up the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, where there is proven abuse or risk to other members of the family, one would have to look at the payment arrangements.
If you separate assessment from payment, the monthly assessment is intended to reduce the burden on claimants and reduce the risk of overpayments compared with a system where benefits are reassessed on a weekly basis, so there is a separation between the assessment period and the payment period. To pick up a question from my noble friend Lord Kirkwood on the impact assessment—
My Lords, the Minister suggested that payments for those with mental health problems, for example, could be looked at. Could he address how that might stigmatise a certain group; that is, when not everyone can choose to be paid fortnightly, just those with mental health problems?
My Lords, I was coming to this issue. The universal credit is a rather differently structured benefit system. We have talked in the past about much greater flexibility with earlier draw-downs and an automatic repayment system. We are looking at these kinds of structures. When I talk about budgeting support, I am not just talking about education, advisers and that kind of support, I am also talking about a degree of flexibility in the system that simply does not and cannot exist now. I do not think there would be any stigmatisation at all in how people use this system. We have not worked out all the detail of this, and noble Lords have given me personally quite a bit of food for thought. How we develop these regulations and get them right so that we do not run into the kind of problems which noble Lords have so powerfully raised today is something that we will look at very closely. On the stigmatisation point, my intention would be that it would be invisible, and within the universal credit system, it can be invisible.
Let me revert to the question put by my noble friend Lord Kirkwood about the impact assessment. I have to tell him that payment frequency is not one of the issues in the impact assessment. It was referred to in the equality impact assessment where we said we were carefully considering the claimant welfare implications of the options, so that is where it is.
May I clarify the point for the avoidance of doubt? Is there a technical issue about frequency of payments? I understand and am listening carefully to what he is saying about assessment periods versus payment periods. Are his new computers going to be agile enough to pay fortnightly rather than monthly?
I think the noble Lord, with his normal subtlety in his amendment, has made a distinction between bi-monthly and fortnightly. This is one of those issues, to be honest, where if you start delving into it, you will end up with daily rates because of the arbitrariness of both weeks and months. It is not a straightforward thing to do. Clearly, at one level all the utility systems are driven on a monthly basis, while other areas are driven on a weekly basis. With this system, we are one of the drivers of the way people behave and of social change. We should not forget that; how we do this will shape the norm, so it is not just a question of saying, “This is what everyone does. We must adapt to it”. There is an element of saying, “If we do it like this, we will shape the way people arrange their lives”.
My Lords, in the spirit of developing a system together, which we seem to have moved into, we can look at a greater amount of flexibility. Some things are not that expensive to do, but others are. Payment systems are not necessarily hugely difficult. I do not have my computer gurus sitting around me whispering how much things cost, but my feeling is that there are areas of flexibility here which we are going to explore in great detail in the next year or so in order to get this right. We can be flexible and make changes if we feel that things are not right.
I turn now to the series of questions raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, on the relationship with housing benefit. I will try to deal with them one by one. The universal credit will be an itemised statement. It is being developed and at the moment comprises three layers. You will see the summary on the top sheet, so to speak, and a somewhat more elaborated thing when you hit the button for the next level, and then you see pages of the stuff at the third level, which we do not think a lot of people will go to. However, we give them the option to do that. The statement is simple; it itemises the intention. The structure that we have arrived at has been the subject of a lot of toing and froing with the customer insight people. A couple of weeks ago I sat on one side of a piece of glass watching how people were using the system. That is where we have ended up in that particular bit.
I was asked whether this process would be slowed down to the rate of the slowest element. Where you have some decided elements, the JSA rate and so on, we should be able to get that going straight away without tying it up. We will be able to separate out elements with new claims involving big new changes rather than the whole claim waiting for the last little bit of evidence on, say, housing to come through. We are looking at tackling this matter much more flexibly.
I am very grateful for the care and attention that the Minister has given to the questions. However, oddly enough, if you can fragment that way, you can certainly fragment in terms of payment rhythms.
My Lords, I thought I had delicately hinted that there could be some flexibility around that. In future, I will be less delicate in making my points.
We have discussed the other elements. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, directed a bit of abuse at the Warrington call centre. We are developing the system in Warrington, but that does not mean that the call centre in Warrington will do it all. We will have a much more sophisticated system. Indeed, the noble Baroness’s thoughts on using ATLAS, and the experience of housing benefit staff around the country in that regard, are very good. We are talking to local authorities to get the detail of this right. It would not make sense to lose the expertise of housing benefit staff, so we are involving them as we develop the process. It is too early to describe the system because it is not yet developed. However, the noble Baroness’s advice chimes with the way we are going about this, and we are grateful for it.
Amendment 28 would require the Secretary of State to conduct an annual review into the impact on claimants of monthly payments. I have already set out our firm commitment to safeguards, such as providing budgeting support and the facility to make more frequent payments where necessary or appropriate. I can assure noble Lords that in addition to this we will continue to monitor the impact of these policies after they are introduced. I urge noble Lords not to press these amendments.
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friends and noble Lords for their support. I am struck by the extent to which noble Lords throughout the Committee share my concerns and have made important points in support of these amendments. There is perhaps a slight disagreement over whether we should be pushing for fortnightly payments or for choice. My preference would be for fortnightly payments, as argued for by the noble Lord, Lord Skelmersdale. However, I tabled a menu of amendments thinking that choice would probably be more acceptable to the department than what I prefer, which is the status quo. Perhaps that is the one way in which I am a conservative. But as I have argued, and according to the Financial Times, the panoply of flexibility and special assistance which the Minister talked about will bring in complexity if we go down the route of monthly payments, and we have not heard what the costs will be. I am very disappointed with the Minister's response because he has not really engaged with the arguments that I put. Therefore, my supposed flirtation with conservatism has been very short-lived indeed.
The Minister made great play of the distinction between the assessment period and the payment period, and I understand that. However, the argument seems to support my position rather than his because paying a benefit more frequently does not affect proposals to assess it on a monthly basis. One could have a monthly payment that is paid in two tranches, which would make it easier for people to manage. The only hope that I got from the Minister was the statement that we had given him food for thought. I hope that it will not be too indigestible for him—actually, I hope that it will be indigestible, because he will then think seriously about it.
He has not answered some of the most basic questions. I know that the special assistance will not only be budgeting advice. The papers have said that it will “include” budgeting advice. However, it is still not clear who is going to provide this. Will it be officials? If I were a claimant, I am not sure that I would want officials advising me on how to budget. Or will it be the poor old voluntary sector/big society, which will be on its knees anyway because of cuts, the effects of the legal aid Bill and so forth? I am not at all reassured by vague talk about flexibility and budgeting support.
The Minister said that the Government would look at areas of flexibility after the next year or so. I am sorry, but I want to know what the position is by the Report stage. While I have made clear that I realise it is not appropriate to write into the Bill itself the frequency of payments, given the strength of feeling that has been expressed on all sides, it is not good enough that we should have to wait a year; the Bill will be an Act by then. We want to know before the Bill goes back to the other place what is going to be done to ensure that the kind of problems that I and other noble Lords have raised will be adequately addressed. One of these amendments must be the way to do it.
My Lords, Amendment 29 specifies that deductions from the claimant’s maximum amount of universal credit should include an amount in respect of prescribed types of unearned income calculated in the same way as the deductions made in respect of earnings. As drafted, Clause 8 allows for a reduction in respect of unearned income to be calculated “in the prescribed manner”. The Bill therefore already allows for the manner of such reductions to be specified in regulations. This could include, where appropriate, the same calculation as for earnings.
As we set out in the White Paper, claimants will have their universal credit withdrawn according to a single taper rate after appropriate disregards. The latest assumptions on the earnings disregard have been set out in a new policy briefing note which was published today. Further analysis is provided in an updated version of the impact assessment for universal credit, which was published not very soon, but this afternoon.
With regard to income other than earnings, we have today released a new policy briefing note which confirms that statutory sick pay and statutory maternity, paternity and adoption pay will be treated as earnings. We do not intend to treat either ESA—or ESA equivalent—or maternity allowance as earnings. They are not treated as earnings in the current system; they are benefits and are treated as such. Nor do we propose to alter the current treatment of maternity allowance in the benefits system, where it is taken into account in full. This is because maternity allowance is one of a number of benefits which exist to replace income for people who are out of work. It therefore addresses the same need as universal credit for mothers who cannot work because they are giving birth to their children. We do not believe it is right for the Government to pay twice to meet the same need.
The income briefing note also explains our wider approach. In general, where a claimant has income at their disposal to meet their living costs, such as spousal maintenance or payouts from an occupational pension, these payments will be taken fully into account. However, we need to make exceptions to this general rule while ensuring that the system is kept as simple as possible. We will therefore disregard certain income types in full where they are paid due to additional costs or expenses that a claimant has. This would apply to additional payments due to being disabled, such as DLA or various local authority payments, or for looking after children, including child benefit and fostering allowances. We will also disregard in full certain payments which would be disproportionately costly to take into account. These will include the value of payments in kind or charitable payments.
I turn now to the proposed subsections in Amendment 30 which would require the Secretary of State to carry out and publish a review of the impact of a taper rate on universal credit claimants and their work incentives one year after the Act comes into force. As the revised impact assessment sets out, we expect the single taper together with the earnings disregards to improve work incentives significantly. With regard to the participation tax rate, the number of households who lose between 70 per cent and all their earnings through taxation and benefit withdrawal on moving into 10 hours of work will fall by 1.2 million under universal credit. Under the current system, around half a million individuals in low-paid work would lose more than 80 per cent of an increase in their earnings because of higher tax or withdrawn benefits. Virtually no households would lose 80 per cent under universal credit. On reasonable assumptions, the combined impact of take-up and entitlements will lift around 900,000 individuals out of poverty, including more than 350,000 children and 550,000 working-age adults.
These are significant outcomes and we will be monitoring and evaluating universal credit to confirm that they are achieved. However, this is an ongoing process and we expect that it will take longer than a year to develop a sufficient body of evidence on which to draw firm conclusions. As a result, we do not think it appropriate—
I thank the Minister. I am trying to look through the revised impact assessment, as I am sure will other noble Lords. I hope he has had the opportunity to read it before I have; I would be very disappointed if he had not. I wonder, therefore, if he would give us the benefit of that experience. Regarding the figure he has just cited of 200,000 children being lifted out of poverty by entitlement alone—and I see he has had to resort to modelling take-up which he has always previously refused to do on the grounds that it was not necessary—could he remind us what the previous estimate was of the number of children being lifted out of poverty?
Yes, I can help noble Lords. There is a small decline for adults in this impact assessment compared with the last one. It is down from 600,000 to 550,000. However, the figure for children is unchanged at 350,000.
Yes, for children lifted out of poverty, the figure 350,000 is unchanged. I am sorry; I can only tell noble Lords what is in the document, which I confirm that I did read over the weekend. Let me nail down the reason why I do not want a formal annual review process. I do not think that that is the right way to go when we have something as sophisticated as the universal credit, given the impact of the different delivery mechanisms, taper rates, disregards and conditionality. I will be talking to the Committee quite soon about how we could assess the system most effectively. I accept assessment and regular assessment, and I am looking for support from this Committee in that process.
I thank the Minister. I wanted to phrase my question more precisely because I think I may have confused him. The improvised impact assessment says on page 18 that changes in modelled entitlements will lift approximately 200,000 children out of poverty. The figure of 350,000 children that he quoted included take-up modelling. My understanding is that previously he has given us figures that did not include take-up modelling. I am trying to contrast the current steady state figure without any assumed change in take-up compared to the previous steady state figure.
I can absolutely confirm that the figures included take-up and are the same figures, so there is no change there.
I am so sorry. What was the previous figure, not including take-up modelling?
They are exactly the same—200,000 and 400,000 adults. Those figures have not changed. Let me come back to the issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, on the target rate of the taper. I do not think it is right to have a target rate of what the optimum figure is, and I will not talk about the iron triangle today. I will spare the Committee. A lot of factors are involved in what the optimum rate will be. We do not know, so it would be foolish to set a target, whether it is 55 or 65 per cent. If noble Lords want my opinion, I think 65 per cent is too high and a future Government—when they have some money—would be smart to lower it. But by then I would hope that we would know exactly what the optimum figures were. When we know that, a smart Government would move to it. It would be wrong to set a target when we do not know what the optimum figure is. I agree that we need to be very sophisticated in our understanding of how people behave and the impacts of universal credit. I take on board the spirit of this amendment in the sense that we do need to assess it. I do not think this is the right way and I hope to be able to discuss with this Committee better ways of assessing it. I am hoping for some real enthusiasm behind those ways as well.
I hope that these answers have helped to clarify our intentions in these areas. They are really important areas, and I urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.
My Lords, my noble friend will no doubt remember that many years ago I was the Minister for War Pensions in the days when war pensions were looked after by the then Department of Personal Health and Social Security, and then Social Security, since when they have been transferred to the MoD. Many local authorities provide a war pensioner’s discount on housing benefit. I wonder whether this will be added to his list of discounts, because he did not mention it.
I did not mention it for a very good reason. I am currently consulting across government on how best to recognise war pensions and other payments to veterans, war widows and dependants. The reason this is not straightforward is because the practice across all the different benefits varies wildly. When you create one single clean system, you have to go nap on one approach. What I am looking at doing is getting the right approach which recognises that someone in receipt of a war pension is owed an extra reward for that experience. We have to work out the optimum way of doing that. As I say, I am consulting on that.
Before my noble friend sits down, since this seems to be the time for Tory interventions, and his remarks just now seemed to lead straight into this one, if variation between local authorities in what they do in respect of Armed Forces pensions is a problem in the way that he described, although we are all no doubt very supportive, what will happen if we have 400 different council tax rebate social security systems all varying wildly between 400 local authorities? I have a lot of sympathy with his line of argument. He may even be sad to know—I hope that he will be pleased to know this—that I think he is right to resist these amendments. He is right to put the emphasis on assessing what happens once all this is in place. However, we will need to take into account the effect of what is happening as regards council tax benefit as well as all the other things.
My Lords, I will just have to take that point on board. After our previous session, I know that—