Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Excerpts

Friday 14th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.

[Lord Shinkwin (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise, but I rise to raise a procedural issue crucial to the reputation of your Lordships’ House. When I blocked out my diary for the Fridays scheduled for Committee on this Bill, I did so in good faith. I assumed not only that your Lordships’ House would recognise the value of the views of Members with lifelong lived experience of disability, but that steps would be taken to ensure that those views were heard on an equal and non-discriminatory basis. That would be entirely in keeping with the Equality Act 2010, which placed on organisations a legal duty to make reasonable adjustments on account of disability in, among other things, the way in which they work.

In the belief that your Lordships’ House and the Government will appreciate the crucial importance of our being seen to set an example and uphold the law, which we passed and which we expect others to abide by, I emailed the Government Chief Whip and wrote to the Prime Minister to explain that, because of my disability, I need to leave by 3 pm in order to catch my flight home. I requested an assurance that the House would not sit beyond 3 pm, which is of course the time by when the House normally rises on a sitting Friday. Regrettably, I have been given no such assurance. Instead, the Government are using a procedural technicality as a feeble fig leaf for discrimination against me as one of the House’s Members—one of its few Members—with lifelong disability. I do not believe it is beyond the wit or the will of the Government, or indeed your Lordships’ House, to ensure that we rise by 3 pm so that I can participate today and on other sitting Fridays on an equal and non-discriminatory basis. Given that not one organisation of or for disabled people supports this Bill, surely it is right that all of us—every one of us—are enabled to do our duty of subjecting this monumentally significant Bill to the forensic scrutiny it requires.

In conclusion, do we really want to send the message to those who are following our proceedings today, “Do as we say, not as we do”? That would be shameful and it would be unworthy of your Lordships’ House. For our own sake, I urge the House not to discriminate against me as one of the very few Members born disabled. I therefore ask that the House rises by 3pm.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am sure it would be expected that safety is absolutely paramount. The point I am making—and I look forward to hearing from my noble and learned friend—is that our position in government here is not to deal with matters of policy. As I have said, we are restricted to areas to which any Government would be restricted.

We will absolutely work with the Welsh Government, NHS England and the NHS in Wales to understand the impact of any changes to the law and the provision of healthcare services in Wales, during the coming stages of the Bill.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I make a declaration of interest: I have an assistant who is funded by Mr Bernard Lewis and who helps me on this Bill. I make a declaration that Dignity in Dying paid for the printing of the material that was circulated to Peers in my name before this process commenced.

I compliment the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, on the short way that she introduced the important issue. I very much hope that I can put to rest most of the misconceptions that were expressed during this debate.

As everybody agrees, criminal law is not devolved to the Welsh Senedd. Therefore, any change in criminal law has to come from the UK Parliament. You cannot proceed with assisted dying without changing the criminal law. Therefore, the UK Parliament has to provide a legislative change for that.

Healthcare is rightly devolved to the Welsh Ministers and the Senedd. The Bill makes provision in England for Ministers to produce regulations on how assisted dying will be implemented and regulated in England. Clause 42 requires Ministers to produce such regulations. It is wrong, as part of the devolution settlement, to require Welsh Ministers who are responsible for health in Wales to do that. It is for the Welsh Government to decide what provision to make. Unlike Clause 41, which relates to England, Welsh Ministers are given the option to introduce such regulations as they see fit. Those regulations will permit the assisted dying process to be introduced in Wales, in the National Health Service, and for Welsh Ministers and the Welsh Government to provide whatever provision for it in regulations that they see fit.

The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, asked why we are legislating for England and Wales but not Scotland at the same time. It is because we are doing exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Gove, asked me to do—and I am so glad he did—which is to respect the devolution settlement. Will the noble Lord let me finish? Then I will come back to him.

The way this structure works is that, first, we in this Parliament determine whether the criminal law should be changed. Secondly, the Welsh Government are given the power to introduce regulations. That power should normally be given to Welsh Ministers by an Act of the Senedd. Therefore, a legislative consent Motion has been proffered by the Welsh Government for the Senedd to decide whether it would be willing to give us consent to legislate in an area that would normally be legislated for in the Senedd.

The LCM—legislative consent Motion—in the Welsh Senedd covers the following. I give these details for noble Lords to consider them at their leisure: Clause 40, which gives Welsh Ministers power to issue guidance; Clause 42, which gives Welsh Ministers power to regulate how this is to be introduced in the health service in Wales and with what regulations; Clause 51, which gives the Welsh Government power to talk about and make regulations about the Welsh language; Clause 54, which gives them a general power to make regulations; and Clause 58, which gives the Welsh Ministers and the Welsh Government power to introduce certain of the provisions.

The sponsor in the other place and I have discussed this arrangement with the Welsh Government, and by that I mean Welsh Ministers and Welsh officials. We have done what the Welsh Government would wish us to do to respect devolution. We have taken these powers in the Bill, subject to Parliament, so that there is not a position where, after this Bill is passed, Welsh Ministers lack the power to introduce regulations if they choose to do so.

I have listened to this torrent of points about Wales saying it has not been thought out. I say with suitable humility that we have thought it out and sought to reflect what good devolution practice would require. I do not invite people to come back, but please think about what I have said and consider—

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Hold on. Consider whether it represents the right position.

Can I just deal with two other points? First, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, in a very clear speech, said maybe one should amend the Bill to give the Welsh Senedd the power to make a decision about the criminal law in relation to assisted dying. It was a point I thought the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, was sort of flirting with. We have not taken that view. We have taken the view that the right way to deal with this is in accordance with the existing devolution settlement.

If the noble Lord, Lord Gove, has not been satisfied with my answer so far, he may continue with his question.

[Lord Gove (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for the clarity there. As a broad point, the devolution settlement encompasses not just inter-governmental relations but respect for devolved legislatures and their committees. With respect to that, the Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee of the Senedd has expressed concern that the Welsh Government have said that only a narrow number of clauses in the Bill should be subject to commencement by Welsh Ministers in the Senedd alone and has expressed concern about the lack of detail from the Welsh Government on these matters. I would be very interested in the noble and learned Lord’s views about the adequacy of both the Welsh Government and the UK Government’s sharing of information. More broadly, the committee also pointed out that there is dubiety at the very least about whether Clauses 42(1), 42(2), 51(2) and 51(3) of the Bill will be implemented only by regulation of Welsh Ministers or will be subject to automatic commencement through the automatic commencement backstop in due course.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

In relation to the noble Lord’s first point, the Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee’s point about the width of the legislative consent Motion is that it wants the LCM to extend not just to the health provisions but also to those that relate to the change in the criminal law and the safeguards. It argues that those changes in the criminal law should also be subject to it. My view—and it is a view I think shared by the Welsh Government—is that, no, you do not need a legislative consent Motion for the UK Parliament to do that which it is entitled to do, which is to change the criminal law. I give way to the noble Lord, Lord Harper.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I am very grateful—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Sorry, the noble Lord, Lord Gove, asked a second question which I did not answer.

[Lord Gove (Con)]

I am very grateful for that clarity, because it is clear that as a result of that, even though Westminster will be operating within its own legislative competence, it will be doing so in a way that violates the expressed wish of the committee. Again, as I pointed out in the previous section of this debate, it is also the expressed wish of many within Welsh Labour to see criminal justice devolved, but put that to one side.

The other key question was: can Welsh Ministers commence Clauses 42(1), 42(2), 51(2) and 51(3) of the Bill by their regulations only, or might the automatic commencement backstop apply in those cases?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

It will depend on the decision made by the Welsh Ministers. I give way to the noble Lord, Lord Harper.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. I have listened very carefully to what he said, and I absolutely accept that he has conducted extensive engagement with Welsh Ministers based, perfectly understandably, on the framework of the Bill as he and the sponsor in the Commons have drafted it.

The noble and learned Lord will know that one of the concerns of many in your Lordships’ House is the extent of Ministers’ powers and the extent to which some of the regulations should be put in the legislation. I am sure, as Committee progresses, we will have those debates. If it ends up being the wish of this Parliament that more of the detail about how the legislation will be implemented is put in primary legislation, how will we do that in a way that satisfies the desires perhaps of this Parliament but does not trespass, given the way he has chosen to set out the framework, over the devolution framework? Therefore, did he consider just devolving the power to the Welsh Senedd to change the criminal law in this narrow case? Then the Senedd, as the noble Baroness said, would have the full power to change the law and implement it. I accept that what he has done makes sense in the way he has drafted the Bill, but if we significantly change the Bill, I think that will cause a real problem with how it is implemented.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am not sure I understood the question. As far as devolution is concerned, I do not think the question of regulations on the face of the Bill is the right issue. The right issue is who has power to produce those regulations and does that offend against the devolution settlement. If he has a question about there being not enough detail in relation to other areas, I am happy to answer that, but this is not for this group. Those are my submissions.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Let me ask him the question.

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[Lord Harper (Con)]

He said he did not really understand my question. If we set out in the Bill some of the details he currently envisages are in regulations and therefore the House decides on them as opposed to them being for Ministers in either the UK Government or the Welsh Government, that will cause a problem for the approach to devolution that he has conducted. I just wondered whether he had thought about that. That was my question, and I am sorry for not expressing it clearly.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am not sure the noble Lord has quite understood what I have said. It is for the regulations in so far as they deal with the Welsh health service to be delivered by Welsh Ministers, so it is quite inappropriate for us to put them in this Bill.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I was brief at the start because I wanted to give the Minister the chance to be transparent for the benefit of this House. I am sorry to say that I hope that the letter will give that, but I am concerned that it will not. The reason I say that has been well explained in the discussions in the Welsh Senedd. In the supplementary to the latest legislative consent memorandum, it says:

“The UKG has not confirmed their position as to whether they believe the consent of the Senedd is required for this Bill as amended at the House of Commons Report stage but have acknowledged that some clauses do”.


When will the Government share with this House what they think is devolved and what is reserved? Why are they reluctant to do so? This is what I am struggling to understand. I have been asked outside this Chamber why am I bothered about Wales. I care about Wales anyway. It may not be widely known, but I went to school in Wales, I have family in Wales and both my parents are buried in Wales. But I would say that I am also here as a legislator.

Having been an MP, a Minister and a Cabinet Minister, I am used to being taken to court on details of legislation, and to the back and forth with devolved Administrations. I am not doing this simply to try to be awkward; we are trying to define the legislation. The Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee in the Welsh Senedd believes that Clause 1 should be devolved. To give another example, people might be aware of the issue of smacking. Basically, Wales was able to use its child welfare powers and then made a request. We will come on to this later in the debate about amending the Government of Wales Act, I think. If we recognise that the only context under this Bill in which there can be help with assisted death—assisted suicide—has to be healthcare settings then surely there is something there about the Welsh Senedd having the opportunity, through later amendments, to make that determination in the first place.

I mention that now because my noble friend Lord Markham and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said we should be deciding the principle of whether this Bill should be seen in that regard. Actually, recognising the whole, I am strongly of the view that this should be taken out of this Bill through an amendment to the Government of Wales Act. That is to some extent why I put tabled this. Will the Minister confirm the Government’s position on Clause 1? I would be very happy to have an answer from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, on whether he believes that. The Welsh Parliament certainly does.

Further, will the Minister put in the Library the minutes of the meetings so we can understand what is happening between the two Governments about the practicality and legality of this aspect of the Bill? I know that Ministers will, understandably, often say that it is all legally privileged. Those of us who have been in government know that you tend to get small aspects of legal privilege and lots of policy content in regarding and summarising, which is not legally privileged. That is where I hope that we can get this transparency from the Minister and, if necessary, the sponsor—I do not quite understand this; it is one of the most complicated Private Members’ Bills I have ever seen—and, actually, just an answer to whether Clause 1 is reserved or not.

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[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

I was hoping to get an answer; we can speak more than once in Committee, because we are trying to understand. Otherwise, later days in Committee and Report could become quite painful. I hope to get an answer from the Minister today.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I have been absolutely clear that, in so far as Clause 1 affects a change to the criminal law, it is reserved. In so far as implementation of it by the health service is concerned, that is a matter for the Welsh Government, not the Bill. If there is any lack of clarity in that answer, let me know.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

I would be grateful if any advice that has been given to the noble and learned Lord by officials is shared with the Committee. It is helpful, when determining legislation, to understand that, and it would be especially helpful if the Government, who have said they are getting involved only on legality and practicality, were to express their view. They will not even tell the Welsh Government what their view is, and that is very concerning.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the insightful contributions that have been made to this debate. I will be very concise on the point. In summary, it is our view that workability concerns are less significant, although the Government are unable to confirm at this stage that the current drafting is fully workable, effective or enforceable. As noble Lords will understand, the amendment has not had technical drafting support from officials.

On this point, if the amendment is passed in isolation, it is likely to have minimal legal effect, as Clause 1 is essentially declaratory rather than operative. The remainder of the Bill would refer to the capacity to make a decision, which, as noble Lords will be aware from the Bill, is to be read in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.

I anticipate coming later to discussions on amendments to Clause 3, as noble Lords have referred to, as those amendments would change the operation of the Bill. I will comment on proposals when we come to the relevant debate. These issues are, of course, rightly a matter for noble Lords to consider, deciding which test is to be used.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I will deal first with the central issue in this debate, which is the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. The wording currently mentions:

“A terminally ill person in England or Wales who … has the capacity to make a decision”.


The noble Baroness proposes that “capacity” should be changed to “ability”. From what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, says, I understand that we should read that with Amendment 115, although there is another amendment that the noble Baroness proposes in relation to Clause 3. But I accept what the noble Lord says in relation to Amendment 2.

With the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, she is suggesting that we remove “capacity” and replace it with “ability”. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, put his finger on it when he said that “capacity” is well known to the law. You could not possibly have a Bill that did not refer to capacity because what it means, in the eyes of the law and of people in practice, is the ability to make the decision. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, if you do not have capacity, you cannot make the decision. That applies right across the doings of human beings, and the law recognises that. If, therefore, you replace “capacity”—

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

On a point of clarification, I thought that the idea of adding both words was very helpful, but when the noble and learned Lord says that you cannot make the decision without capacity, it is not any decision but this particular decision in this Bill. Can he reflect on a point that was made very well by one of his noble friends on something that happened in my family as well? Somebody with dementia was said to have capacity for a particular decision, but I would not have wanted my mother to have been trusted as having the capacity to decide whether to ask for assisted death.

The Mental Capacity Act is fantastically important, but is it appropriate for this decision—not any old decision but this decision—which is a bit more challenging than some of the decisions that the Mental Capacity Act is used to decide on?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

That is very well put and is exactly the question. Is it appropriate to bring the Mental Capacity Act into this Bill? I understand that whether you have an assisted death is an incredibly important decision. You cannot remove the word “capacity”, so you have to reject the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay.

Her Amendment 115 effectively draws on how the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is currently drafted, except it adds two things. It removes the presumption of capacity and, separately, it requires the person making the decision to be aware of a variety of things that are connected with their illness. To summarise, the way the Mental Capacity Act operates at the moment is that if you are unable to understand information relevant to the decision, to retain that information, to use and weigh that information or to communicate your decision, you do not have capacity under the current Mental Capacity Act. The extent to which the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has referred to in her amendment would be relevant would have to be weighed in the context of the decision that has to be made.

I am more than happy to debate whether we need to make the changes to the Mental Capacity Act that she is suggesting. For my part, I do not think we do. One thing that is absolutely clear is that the amendment proposed, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, identified, is completely ridiculous. You cannot remove the question of capacity from this choice. Putting aside some detail hurdles, there are two hurdles that need to be overcome in how this Bill is constructed. You have to be capable of making the decision, as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, said, and—completely separately—you have to make that decision completely voluntarily. It has to be your own decision, not the product of pressure.

We have had—and I say this with warmth and respect—a rambling debate going over a whole range of issues, miles away from the question of whether one should remove the word “capacity” and put in the word “ability”. If this House wants to make the law completely confused in this area, either put in the word “ability” or put in “capacity and ability”. I echo the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, when she says we have to approach this in a grown-up manner, and to remove the word “capacity” is not a sensible way to deal with this.

I also echo those who have said that the idea of running two systems at the same time—the Mental Capacity Act system and the separate system proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay—is wrong and confusing. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for spotting what the right decision is. Of course, under the Mental Capacity Act some unimportant decisions are taken, but a decision such as whether to have the ventilation removed from you if you have motor neurone disease, that will almost certainly lead to your death, is without a shimmer of a shadow of doubt a life and death decision.

The Chief Medical Officer of England and Wales, in evidence to the Lords Select Committee, said:

“it is far better to use systems that people are used to and that are tested both in practice and, where necessary, in law”.

He went on to say:

“I have a concern that you could have a conversation in one bed in a hospital where someone is talking about, for example, an operation where they might well lose their life, because they are frail and there is the operative risk, done under the Mental Capacity Act, and, in the next-door bed, someone is trying to do the same process of having a difficult conversation about someone who might die, or could definitely die, as a result of that decision, but using a different legal framework. The risks that that could lead to confusion are not trivial”.


I also echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, who sadly is not in her place, said. There are problems about practically every aspect of how various parts of the health service work, but she was part of a process that considered how the Mental Capacity Act worked. The broad conclusion was that it was a good, workable Act, and we should not stray from it in this particular case. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I just make it absolutely plain that I said that capacity was necessary but not sufficient. I am not stuck with whether it should be “and ability”, but I was absolutely plain in my very short speech that capacity was necessary but not sufficient.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I was picking up on the word necessary. What the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is suggesting is that we remove the word “capacity”. I do not know if I misunderstood the noble Lord, but that is what I thought he was saying.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

I wanted to make it plain because some people listening to the noble and learned Lord might have thought I had not said that.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

Before the noble and learned Lord finishes, can he clarify for the Committee that a person who can grasp only a diluted amount of information, or who cannot retain the information in any real sense that would be intelligible to us, can be deemed to have capacity for the purposes of the Mental Capacity Act, but for this Bill, which is designed to give people agency and allow an individual as much choice as possible to choose treatment or have agency over medical and palliative care decisions and so on, an entirely different threshold should, quite rightly, be expected for such a serious measure as this?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I respect the noble Baroness for repeating her speech. Section 3 of the Mental Capacity Act says that if a person is unable to

“understand the information relevant to the decision … to retain that information … to use or weigh that information ... or … to communicate his decision”,

then they do not have capacity. I am content that that should be the approach under the Bill.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

I want very briefly to put on record that Professor Sir Chris Whitty is not the Chief Medical Officer for England and Wales, but for England only. I will wait for another time for the answer to the question I asked about power of attorney to be given, ideally by the Minister.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I will answer that one. No, you cannot do it by power of attorney. You have to do it yourself.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, given this very long debate, I will try to respond briefly. I declare that I had the privilege of being the first chair of the National Mental Capacity Forum, which was set up following the post-legislative scrutiny of the Mental Capacity Act precisely because of the problems with its implementation. I worked in that role all through Covid. As the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, said, unfortunately, although it is a fantastically good piece of legislation, its implementation depends on the person who is implementing it. Although there has been training, and we worked very hard to get training in, it has unfortunately not always improved things as much as one might hope.

The other thing I draw to your Lordships’ attention is Section 62 of the Mental Capacity Act, which concerns the scope of the Act. It says:

“For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that nothing in this Act is to be taken to affect the law relating to murder or manslaughter or the operation of section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (c. 60) (assisting suicide)”.


It was with that background that I became concerned that the quality of the information the person has depends on the knowledge of the person giving that information, as well as the ability of the person to retain it. I spoke about choice at the beginning of my speech. I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is not in her place, because choice is essential if we are giving patients opportunities to make decisions, but we have to have real choices. That is why I spoke about the black holes where there is no adequately provided palliative care.

Unfortunately, although the Bill has had a money resolution—forgive me if that is the wrong phrase, but there has been a commitment to fund the provision of a service if the Bill becomes an Act—it has not been matched by concurrent funding in the long term for specialist palliative care. That is a concern, but we will come back to it later.

There is another very small point that I want to make: can we please avoid using the term “commit suicide”? It is not a crime to take your own life, and “commit” is a deeply offensive term. We are talking about people who, for whatever reason, decide to take their own lives and end their lives early. We should remember that as we go forward in our debates, out of respect for everybody who has been bereaved by the tragedy of suicide or attempted suicide.

When it comes to life and death decisions, though, I suggest to the Committee that it is fundamentally different to have the decision of accepting that your disease process is going on, that your dying is inevitable and that you wish to withdraw your dialysis or ventilation. Those are decisions in which I have been involved with patients for decades. We can now take people off ventilators very gently and calmly without any of the distress that was previously associated with that, and they die of their underlying disease.

What we are talking about is suicide prevention versus suicide assistance and the point at which you decide, as a clinician with a patient in front of you, whether you are going to be working with suicide prevention, improving quality of life, or whether you are going to stop that because you are going down a different route, and some of the evidence we had was to that effect. However, because of time and the way that things have gone on, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.