Northern Ireland Protocol Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Dodds of Duncairn
Main Page: Lord Dodds of Duncairn (Democratic Unionist Party - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Dodds of Duncairn's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is correct. I agree that history tells us that a vacuum will be filled, and it will not be filled by people who are committed to the democratic process. That is well established. There is no legitimacy for joint authority. The manifesto of the Government was clear in 2019 that it was explicitly excluded, although it was interesting that at this weekend’s Sinn Féin conference, its plan B was specifically aimed at some form of jointery. That is why I say we can see where the road is leading us.
I come back to the Minister and ask him to prevail on his colleagues to open the door to the people of Northern Ireland and the elected Members, so that they can participate in the process of negotiations; they will not be sitting in the front row, but they can be in the room, they can be advising Ministers, they can be contributing and they can feed that back to their supporters. It will have a calming effect if they can see that, and if the people who have to implement the thing on the ground are part of the solution. Surely that makes common sense. What is the point of having devolution if the people who have responsibility for delivering parts of this are not even at the table?
My Lords, we have ranged once again, in a debate on one of the amendments, far and wide across the whole gamut of the protocol Bill and the protocol itself. In that context, I want to follow up on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who talked about the state of the negotiations, the technical talks, the discussions, the conversations or whatever they may be. As he rightly said, we are not au fait with the detail, and those of us whom the noble Lord, Lord Empey, referenced who deal with politics in Northern Ireland and represent people in Northern Ireland are not privy to the details either.
I think that it is correct, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr said, that there appears to be no difference in the negotiating mandate of Commissioner Vice-President Šefčovič so far as the EU side of the negotiations is concerned. Indeed, that has been confirmed to me and, I am sure, to other noble Lords informally by people who are closer to the talks than many of us are. Of course, the Government’s position has been set out in the Command Paper, published in July 2021, and in the Bill, but so long as the negotiating mandate of the European Union negotiator is not changed, there can be little prospect for any positive outcome from the discussions, certainly not in the short term.
We can all agree that we need to solve this problem, and there are only two ways that it can be solved. It is either by negotiation or by action on the part of His Majesty’s Government. The danger of saying, “We’re not going to get anywhere in the discussions and we should pull or pause the Bill” is in what happens in Northern Ireland. What happens to the Belfast agreement as amended by the St Andrews agreement? What happens to the institutions? I have heard very little reference thus far from noble Lords who do not have a direct connection with Northern Ireland about the implications on the political and peace process in Northern Ireland.
The longer we do not have any outcome from negotiations, and if nothing is happening on the Government’s side on legislation, then the institutions will not be reformed, because there is not the basis for power sharing, when you have trashed one of the main strands of the agreement—strand 3, the east-west dimension—and when you have undermined the Northern Ireland Assembly through the removal of the cross-community consent principle. We have to address these matters.
While people may focus on what the outcome may be in terms of the withdrawal agreement and the trade and co-operation agreement—I entirely understand that—we also have to examine the implications on the Belfast agreement, on the St Andrews agreement, and on the peace and political process in Northern Ireland, which is in a very fragile state. The noble Lord, Lord Kilclooney, highlighted a recent example of where these things can go.
I urge your Lordships to examine and bear in mind the implications, if we do not get a negotiated outcome which is satisfactory. I share the analysis of noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that it does not look as if that is going to happen—certainly any time soon—and if we at the same time do not proceed with the Bill, where on earth does that leave the political process in Northern Ireland? It leaves it in a continuing state of limbo, which we have all agreed can be filled only by dangerous people—men of violence. We need to address these matters urgently.
May I clarify something? My position is that there will be no progress with these talks until there is the involvement of high-level politicians from this country. I remember in the 1990s the attempt to move Congress from its support of the wrong side—in the British Government’s view—in Northern Ireland. I was ambassador and made a certain amount of progress, but the real progress was made only when Prime Minister Major and the then Minister of State, now the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, took an active involvement in helping me to see the people one had to convince on the Hill. We need the involvement of senior British Ministers. I strongly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that we need the involvement of people from Northern Ireland. This must not be an agreement, if one is achieved, that is imposed on Northern Ireland. It has to be one that is owned by Northern Ireland.
However, my view is that there is no chance of persuading the Council of the European Union that it should modify Mr Šefčovič’s mandate while technical talks are going nowhere and there are no signs of any movement, or even active involvement, by the highest levels of the British political establishment. I do not mean that I think the talks are bound to fail; I mean that, at present, they are not succeeding.
My Lords, like the noble Baroness, I hope to be able to be present for the unveiling of the portrait of the late John Hume. It is a pity that our recently departed colleague Lord Trimble is not able to be there for that extraordinary occasion.
It seems to me that what the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, said was wholly in tune with what the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said earlier in our debates: how important it is to involve the politicians in Northern Ireland. It is also important to do something else, which was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, in his speech just half an hour ago. I am very glad that the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, is in the Chamber at the moment, because the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, talked about the crucial importance of involvement at the highest possible level. We would never have had any agreement without John Major and Albert Reynolds, built upon by Sir Tony Blair, the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, and others. It is very important indeed.
No one appreciates more than I do, I hope, the tremendous tasks facing our new Prime Minister, and I wish him every possible success. However, as soon as it is possible, he should involve himself. He should go over to Belfast and meet the Northern Ireland politicians, the Taoiseach and others, because there has to be involvement at the highest level. The success of such talks would be increased if this wretched Bill were at the very least paused.
My Lords, I want to make a brief comment on Amendment 40, which is about approval by a resolution of the Northern Ireland Assembly. In support of this amendment, it has been stated that adherence to the spirit and intention of the Belfast agreement is vital. But if we are to be faithful to that agreement as amended by the St Andrews agreement, and to its spirit and intention, then the amendment is defective in that it does not include cross-community consent. Is this a resolution by cross-community consent?
The point that I have made—and as other noble Lords who are aware of the details of the Belfast agreement will know—is that every major decision in the Northern Ireland Assembly is made on a cross-community consent basis. That means a majority of nationalists, a majority of designated unionists and a majority overall. Anything that is not specifically a cross-community vote is capable of being turned into one by a petition of concern. If you are using the argument that you are defending the Belfast agreement, as amended, then why is the cross-community element of resolutions in the Northern Ireland Assembly left out? Why is that the case? Why is it not required to have the support of unionists and nationalists? That is the basis on which the Belfast agreement was written.
My second point is about the involvement of Northern Ireland parties. I have a lot of sympathy there, but it is worth bearing in mind that in the run-up, between 2018 and 2020, when we had all the discussions about the backstop and negotiations overall, the Irish Government made it clear on a number of occasions to us that they did not wish to have any engagement directly with political parties in Northern Ireland on the issue of Brexit. They did not see a role. Nor did Michel Barnier see any role for the political parties in Northern Ireland; I put that point to him directly in his office in Brussels.
Lest we move to the position that the British Government have prevented this or not done enough, I say that the Irish Government and the Brussels Commission were very clear: “This is a matter on which the EU is represented by Monsieur Barnier. He speaks for the EU.” Leo Varadkar was very clear when we met him in Belfast and urged him to encourage a more imaginative approach that would involve the Northern Ireland political parties and the Irish Government talking directly to political parties about Brexit—and the UK Government, of course. That was rejected: “No, Michel Barnier speaks for the EU. It is between Her Majesty’s Government”, as it then was, “and the EU. There is no role for anyone else.” That was spelled out explicitly.
While I have a lot of sympathy with the proposition, this is not as straightforward as it would appear. I think some of the problems we have seen might well have been made easier to resolve had there been more flexibility on the part of the EU and the Irish Government, but it needs to be put on record that it was and, as far as I understand it, remains, the position both of the Dublin Government and Brussels. It would be very interesting to see whether Leo Varadkar maintains that position when he takes over as Taoiseach in a few weeks’ time. It would be worth exploring that with the Irish Government, because the portrayal that this has been a one-sided exclusion is not accurate.
My Lords, I did not intend to come in at this stage—there are further amendments later that I am interested in making a contribution to—but I agree with an awful lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, has said. Over the last year or two, I have been complaining that the real difficulty in this negotiation, if that is the right word to use for it—and I do not think that it is, by the way—lies in the way the protocol was born. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the protocol, or of the Bill—and I think there is an awful lot wrong with it—I am not at all convinced it is doing what it set out to do: in fact, it has failed to do that, because the DUP has not moved considerably because of the nature of the Bill. One reason is that the negotiations have been almost exclusively between the European Union on one hand and the British Government on the other, as the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, said. That is a fundamental problem.
I understand why the Irish Government feel that way. They are part of the European Union; the European Union negotiates on their behalf. I thought it would be a good idea if that were reversed: the Irish Government could have negotiated on behalf of the European Union because, as we have heard a number of times this evening, the issues we are dealing with reflect two international agreements. The first and overriding one is the Good Friday agreement. That is an international agreement lodged at the United Nations and it overrides everything, so far as we can see, with regard to the future of Northern Ireland. How on earth can officials from the European Union understand the issues facing Northern Ireland in the way that the Irish Government could?
That reflects too, of course, on how you involve the Northern Ireland parties. If anybody thinks that this whole issue is going to be resolved in Brussels, that is for the birds. The issue is to be resolved in Belfast: that is where the impasse is. The impasse is: why have we not got the institutions of the Good Friday agreement up and running? It is simple. It is because people have not talked to each other. There have not been proper negotiations.
I spent five years of my life negotiating in Northern Ireland so I know how intense those negotiations have to be. There were negotiations involving the European Union at some stage, but nothing like the negotiations between, on the one hand, the two Governments—the British Government and the Irish Government—and, critically, the Northern Ireland political parties on the other. In the end, they will have to decide this.
One of the great tragedies of all this—it was not the fault of the DUP; it was the fault of Sinn Féin, in this case—is that the Assembly and the Executive were brought down over the then Irish language Bill. The result was that there was no proper Executive comprised of the parties in Northern Ireland, who could have discussed all the issues we have been discussing for the past three weeks. Had there been a proper Executive and Assembly up and running, we would not—I hope—be here in the way we are. I have a lot of sympathy for what the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, said.
I still hope that, over the next few months, the Irish Government can discuss meaningfully with the British Government. I particularly hope that there are proper, meaningful negotiations involving the political parties in Northern Ireland. By that, I mean negotiations; I do not mean going to Belfast for a couple of hours, meeting the political leaders, and then coming back again. That is not going to work. You have to get people around a table. You have to involve all the political parties in Northern Ireland. You have to do the things that we have done over the past 10 or 20 years to achieve a real, lasting solution to this issue. What we are doing now is a sham. It will not solve anything at all. The only way we can do it is through negotiations that involve the Governments and the political parties in Northern Ireland.
My Lords, I wish to add for a moment or two to what has been some pretty powerful gunfire from those who are eminently qualified in making the serious submissions they have made.
My attention has been caught by Clause 22(6), which seeks to interfere, one might say, with devolved authorities. Looking at my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, it occurred to me that, were he part of a devolved authority in Northern Ireland and there was the exercise of a power under subsection (6), he would take pretty short shrift with it, I am sure.
To introduce perhaps a rather vulgar political point, we in Scotland are concerned constantly with the movement towards independence. Part of that movement is, often by fiction, offered to the potential electors in a referendum on the basis that Westminster wants to interfere with Scotland. It seems to me that subsection (6) might provide rather more substantial evidence of an intention of that kind.
I know that there are honourable men sitting on the Government Front Bench, but do they really believe in their hearts that it is right to urge upon this Committee the contents of this particular subsection? Surely they must realise that it is inimical to every principle upon which Parliament is founded and this House operates. If I may be forgiven for my impropriety, it is time for the Front Bench to fess up.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord. I take the point that he made about Clause 22(6). As a Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly for many years, I know how much Members of the Assembly value their right to make laws in the areas that are devolved to it. However, I must say gently to your Lordships that, in recent times, there have been a number of examples of this House and the other place interfering in the devolved settlement in Northern Ireland. Although some of us have pointed that out, it has been with your Lordships’ positive assent and approval that the overriding of the devolved settlement in Northern Ireland has taken place in a number of areas. I would like to see a consistent approach to the devolved settlement in Northern Ireland, not this pick-and-choose approach where something being okay appears to depend on the issue of the day but, if you do not like what the Assembly has done, you can interfere—as seems to have happened on a number of recent occasions in this Parliament.
I want to highlight Clause 22(3). On the face of it, it appears—I am open to correction by those who are much more learned and have more legal expertise in these matters than me—to put some kind of restriction on the wide Henry VIII powers that are given under this particular clause. The one thing that it is apparently not possible for regulations under the Bill to do is
“create or facilitate border arrangements between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland which feature at the border … physical infrastructure (including border posts), or … checks and controls, which did not exist before exit day.”
Having listened to the debate, I think that may well be able to be swept aside at any point. However, why is emphasis put on the one thing that is mentioned? I look to the Government Front Bench as to why it is mentioned, given that it really has no effect. Of course, we do not want any extra infrastructure at the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic and it has never been the desire or wish of anyone in the Northern Ireland political parties, or the Irish Government, the British Government or the EU, to have such infrastructure. But it would be quite helpful and an acknowledgement of unionist concerns if there were a similar provision which acknowledged—under strand 2, the north-south approach in the Belfast agreement and the importance of that relationship, but also strand 3, the east-west dimension—that regulations may not create or facilitate border arrangements between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom.
I am following the noble Lord closely on this point. Does he realise that today Maroš Šefčovič talked about the need for fewer border checks and, in fact, that they could be invisible on the Irish Sea border. Does the noble Lord agree that if they can be invisible on the Irish Sea border, they can be invisible at the frontier, where of course checks should happen between one country and another independent country?
Of course. It appears that things may have moved on, because once all these ideas were dismissed as completely fanciful. Indeed, “unicorns” were brought into play and all sorts of dismissive language was used. I am glad that now there is at least an acknowledgement that some of these checks can be done in the way that the noble Baroness has described Maroš Šefčovič as talking about.
The important point here is that we have been told throughout the Brexit process that there cannot be a single check or single piece of infrastructure on the Irish border because otherwise that will lead to violence—it will be attacked and that will undermine the Belfast agreement—without anyone, hardly, making the obvious point that, if that is unacceptable north-south, then it is doubly unacceptable between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. What does that say to the unionist population?
One of the reasons we have the alienation of people in Northern Ireland is the one-sided approach and interpretation of the Belfast agreement. I would just like an explanation. Whatever its actual import or ability to be enforced, or the fact that it can be superseded by a ministerial direction, why do the Government highlight that issue and not the fact that the reason why we have such a problem in Northern Ireland with the political institutions is that we have this similar kind of infrastructure and checks between one part of the United Kingdom and the other?
On the point that has been raised very powerfully by noble Lords on the legal issue, I fully understand why they take the position they do and, as has been said, it has been raised in relation to other Bills and Acts. I would love to see the same outrage and anger expressed more widely; it may well have been during the passage of the then Bill, before my time in your Lordships’ House.
You can imagine therefore that if there is such outrage about powers being given by Parliament to the Executive and UK Ministers, how citizens of Northern Ireland—British citizens, fully part of the United Kingdom—feel about powers being not just taken from Parliament and given to Ministers but given to foreign officials of the European Commission to propose law. They are totally unaccountable to anyone in the United Kingdom. They do not have to answer to anyone or answer any questions. There is no parliamentary process whatever within the United Kingdom that can even challenge the directives and regulations that cover 300 areas of law affecting the economy of Northern Ireland. Therefore, while accepting entirely the points made about delegated legislation and Henry VIII powers, I would like to see reflected some of the same concerns about how we in Northern Ireland feel about the way that laws are now made by a foreign polity in its own interest. It is not in our interest; it is made in its own interest.
The Bill is part of an effort to try to remedy that problem. People have said we will have negotiations. But given that we have already had communicated to us that the EU is not open at this stage to changing the mandate of its main negotiator, certainly, how else are we going to get to a situation where that outrageous situation in Northern Ireland is remedied?
My Lords, I thank—I think—all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. There were some highlights. I have to go home and explain to Lady Ahmad that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, dreamt about me over the weekend. That is a moment to ponder and reflect on, as any good Minister would, from the Dispatch Box.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I have the opportunity to travel, although I was asked today as I came into your Lordships’ House, “Tariq, why aren’t you in Sharm el-Sheikh?”. I said three words—“Northern Ireland protocol”—which put that colleague in their place. I heard what the noble Lord said about international law and the rule of law. Notwithstanding the challenges, it is right that we have this level of scrutiny. I listened very carefully to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and I agree with her. We are all talking about time in Parliament, et cetera. The other day, I was informed that I am now second only to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, in term of my time on the Front Bench. Let us watch that space as well. With the nature of reshuffles, you never know what will happen when.
In all seriousness, we have a lot of respect internationally. That is why, in successive elections in the ICC, three major positions have been held by the UK. Again, in the ILC, a successful campaign was run. I feel very strongly that, irrespective of the nature of the discussions we are having, the United Kingdom has a very strong reputation internationally and I, for one, am very proud to be not just a British parliamentarian but a British Minister representing these interests abroad.
I come to the specifics now, the nitty-gritty of the amendments themselves. I first say again that on the issue of the Henry VIII clause—specifically on this clause, but more generally across the Bill—of course the Government are listening very carefully to the contributions being made. We have had legislation in the past where we have equally had this level of scrutiny. It is a reflection of our democracy that it allows us to have these challenges to the Government.
I turn to Amendment 44. The Bill provides specific powers to make new law in certain areas, as noble Lords have pointed out, including where we are disapplying the EU regime in domestic law and where such laws are required to make our new regime work. To give effect to the new regime set out in the Bill, amendments to domestic legislation may be required, including Acts of Parliament where appropriate.
Moreover, certain sectors in Great Britain are currently also regulated by retained EU regulations which have protected status under Section 7 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and cannot be modified except by an Act of Parliament or certain specified subordinate legislation. An example is retained EU regulation 2016/425, which currently regulates personal protective equipment in Great Britain. It may be appropriate to amend such legislation for the purposes of the dual regulatory regime to ensure that the UK regime applies appropriately also to all of the UK and appropriately to Northern Ireland.
We recognise, of course—and I have heard it again today—the seriousness of amending legislation, and also proposing new legislation. The noble and learned Baroness pointed to legislation already passed, where Henry VIII clauses have been included. I will not challenge the fact we have had quite challenging discussions in this respect as well, but Parliament has already considered and put on the statute book these particular issues of amending legislation. While it might be somewhat of a small recognition of the powers, these particular powers to amend Acts of Parliament will be subject to the affirmative procedure, allowing Parliament to scrutinise and review any changes to existing legislation, even where these changes are consequential, or technical. I recognise, of course, the depth of the challenge that has been put to the Government and, in all respects, respect the seriousness of the contributions that have been made.
I shall of course cover the specific point the noble Lord has highlighted, as well. I appreciate that it is for the Government to make the case on the specific provision contained in the Bill to ensure that we can, as far as possible, satisfy the issues and the questions being raised.
Clause 22 sets out the general scope and nature of the powers contained in the Bill. This will ensure the powers have the appropriate scope to implement the aims of the Bill. The clause sets out that regulations made under the defined purpose of the powers in this Bill can make any provision—this was a point noble Lords made—for that purpose that could be made by an Act of Parliament. This includes amending the Bill, as the noble Lord has just pointed out, or making retrospective provision.
As the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, said, the clause confirms that regulations under this Bill may not create or facilitate border arrangements between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland that feature, at the border, either physical infrastructure or checks and controls that did not exist before exit day.
Subsection (6) provides that a Minister can facilitate other powers under this Bill to be exercisable exclusively, concurrently or jointly with devolved Administrations. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised a specific point just now, which does require clarification on two elements within the clause. I will make sure that they are covered.
A concern was raised about the ability of the Government to work with the devolved Administrations. As I said on an earlier group, the former Foreign Secretary wrote to the devolved Administrations and we are engaging with them on the implementation and provisions of this Bill. It is the Government’s view that these new powers are necessary to make the regime work smoothly and to provide certainty to businesses.
While recommending in Committee that this clause stand part of the Bill, I recognise that, while we share moments of humour in Committee, it is right that these detailed concerns were tabled in the way they were. This allows the Government—
I am very grateful to the Minister before he sits down. He sort of glossed over Clause 22(3) by, in effect, reading out what it says. But I respectfully seek an explanation of why that subsection has been inserted when there is no similar provision on checks and infrastructure between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick. I have just a couple of small points before dealing with some of the wider issues raised by the amendments tabled in this group.
First, on the negotiations, I do not disagree with the involvement of Northern Ireland parties, as I said previously. It was suggested earlier—I think by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, who I regret is not in his place at the moment—that it did not matter what the EU thought as long as the British Government involved the Northern Ireland parties, but we are not talking about consultations; we are talking about negotiations. I think the noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, put his finger on it: it is about getting people around the table. If you are going to negotiate, you need the EU and the Irish Government to be on board. The fact is that, regrettably, they have not changed their position from their previous utterances, where they said that this is entirely a matter for the EU, not for regional parties or any individual member state Government; they have said it is for the European Commission, negotiating under the mandate given to it by the Council of Ministers.
My second point is on the issue that the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, raised about the joint First Minister nomination, which was also raised on the previous set of amendments. It should be remembered that the Saint Andrews agreement took place towards the end of the 2000s, in an effort to restore devolution after years in which it had been brought down—again, by Sinn Féin, given the fact that it was out murdering people in the streets, and had not decommissioned its weapons, despite promises that it would do so. There was the famous quote by the late Lord Trimble, who said, “We have jumped, now it is your turn.” Of course, Sinn Féin never did reciprocate. As a result, we had the Northern Bank robbery, and the institutions were down for three or four years. They were eventually restored as the result of Saint Andrews, and that was a cross-community agreement which made the arrangements in relation to the nomination of First and Deputy First Minister. That was the result of a cross-community agreement, so the idea that that is contrary to the principle is simply wrong.
I fully endorse what the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, said about her amendment. It is an important amendment which deals with an issue that has caused considerable concern and anxiety in Northern Ireland, which is the fact that thus far the courts have ruled that Northern Ireland’s constitutional position, Article 6 of the Act of Union, has been subjugated by the Northern Ireland protocol. That is a legal ruling. If we are paying such close scrutiny to the legal technicalities, the legal position set out in the Bill and all its intricacies—which is perfectly proper—we cannot then simply dismiss the ruling of the courts in relation to the Act of Union as neither here nor there. This is an important matter for unionists. It is the foundational constitutional document of Northern Ireland’s place within the United Kingdom, so this is no small matter. It is something that is being challenged by unionist political leaders right across the board, and it is therefore important that it is addressed.
That is why the Belfast agreement, as amended by St Andrews, is in some considerable difficulty, because the protocol has this effect on our constitutional position. The fact is that we have another series of amendments, tabled in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Ritchie and Lady Suttie, about “consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly”, which does not include the cross-community element—the cross-community vote. Again, this says to unionists that, while some are prepared to defend and speak up for the Belfast agreement, and say that this is all about protecting it, when it suits them they just change it. The Belfast agreement provides for votes like this on a cross-community basis, yet time and time again we see things being tabled in this House which undermine the agreement. We are told that we should respect the agreement and its spirit, yet here we have amendments that go against what is in the Belfast agreement—never mind the issues about the east-west relationship and strand three of the agreement, which are trashed by the protocol, and the removal of the democratic consent mechanism for the protocol itself, which means that the Assembly had absolutely no say at all before the protocol was introduced. So we are in a very difficult situation.
There is no doubt that unionists have lost a large degree of confidence in the institutions of the Belfast agreement. On what was agreed in 1998, many of us opposed those elements which released unrepentant murderers back on to the streets of Northern Ireland after serving only two years for some of the most heinous crimes imaginable of murder and depravity—people from both sides of the community were allowed to walk free from jail. The Royal Ulster Constabulary was consigned to history, and there were all sorts of issues about Sinn Féin being admitted into government while the Provisional IRA was still murdering people in the streets, as I said, and were still fully armed. Those of us who opposed these things were told, “You’ve got to accept all these things in the name of peace.” Many people did accept them; there was a referendum, it was passed, and the institutions were set up. But unionists had to accept into government people who parties here in Westminster—and, ironically, the parties Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil in the Irish Republic—would not accept into coalition with them. Northern Ireland is lectured all the time about democracy and accepting Sinn Féin into government—and we have accepted Sinn Féin into government, as per the votes of the people who gave them votes and demanded a coalition arrangement. However, the same people who lecture unionists refuse to have anything to do with them in terms of a coalition in the Irish Republic—and I imagine that neither the Labour Party nor the Conservative Party would admit them into a Government here.
We are seeing that the basis of the settlement in 1998 is now continually undermined. The principle of consent has been breached as a result of this protocol. We now have increasing clamour, including recently from the Irish Taoiseach, about changing the rules of the Belfast agreement and how the Assembly should operate. Indeed, I understand that the Taoiseach went so far as to say that it was a matter for the Irish Government, the British Government and the parties. I am sorry, but strand one is a matter for Northern Ireland parties and the UK Government; it is not a matter for the Irish Government. They are entitled to be involved in strand two and strand three issues, but not the internal government of Northern Ireland. This is causing real concern among unionists. We are in a dangerous situation, and not just because of the protocol but because we are seeing that the Belfast agreement is now going to be completely undermined if some people get their way. Majority rule, which, as we have heard, has not happened and has not been the case in Northern Ireland since the early 1970s, is something which has been railed against for over 100 years. However, as a result of boundary changes and the rest, as soon we have a non-unionist majority in the Assembly—it is not a nationalist majority; unionists are still the biggest designation—and because that now does not suit Sinn Féin, the SDLP or even the Alliance Party, some say, “Let’s change the rules.” If unionists had been suggesting such a thing in the late 1990s, during the 2000s or up until 2019, we would have been howled down as being in breach of the very fundamental principles of the Belfast agreement.
The more talk there is of that; the more talk there is about joint authority in the event of no devolution—something that, again, is entirely contrary to the Belfast agreement—the more talk there is about the protocol being rigorously implemented or not changing the protocol in the way it needs to be changed to get unionist consent; the more we are in danger of seeing the restoration of the Assembly and the institutions of the Belfast agreement receding further and further into the distance. That is the reality. We do not want that to happen. We need to get a grip. The more delay there is, either in negotiations or in the UK Government taking the action needed to restore unionist faith in the political process in Northern Ireland, the longer the institutions will be down. This Government cannot have a situation in which Northern Ireland is left in limbo, where no decisions are taken by anybody, where there are no Ministers and where civil servants do not even have the powers they had the last time. We need Northern Ireland to be governed. The UK Government, who have sovereign responsibility under the Belfast agreement and their constitutional responsibilities, need to take responsibility and act for the good government of Northern Ireland.
My Lords, I shall add a few remarks. The constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom is a very important issue for many people in Northern Ireland, and certainly for the unionist population. There is no doubt whatever that the protocol is undermining and has undermined Northern Ireland’s position. I believe it is a vehicle to continue to undermine the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. The protocol has brought a profound constitutional change to the very heart of the United Kingdom, because the courts have now ruled that the meaning of the Act of Union, the foundation of the union, has been changed by the protocol, courtesy of it being given direct effect in UK law through the withdrawal agreement Act, with the effect that this subjugates the meaning of Article VI of the Act of Union to the protocol.
I was asked this afternoon how many years I had been in public life in Northern Ireland. It is hard to believe, but in May next year, it will be 50 years: 37 years in the council, 25 years in the other House as a Member of Parliament, 16 years in the Northern Ireland Assembly—and so it goes on. And then in this place here. Now, over the years, I have seen and witnessed, sadly, Northern Ireland’s position being pushed on to the ledge of the union, as it were—pushed to the side. Our position in the United Kingdom has been undermined.
I have to say to your Lordships’ House that the unionist people are very suspicious of both Front Benches, and indeed other parties in this House. When it comes to defending positions, Dublin will defend the nationalist and republican position, but who will defend the unionist position? You would expect the United Kingdom Government to do that, but it is sad to say that successive Governments have not been very good at it. As my noble friend Lord Dodds mentioned a moment ago, certainly strands 2 and 3 give Dublin the right to have a say. But when it comes to strand 1—last week we had the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in conference with the Foreign Minister of the Irish Republic to talk about whether there should be a poll in Northern Ireland and an election for the Northern Ireland Assembly. Those are the internal affairs of Northern Ireland, yet the basis of the Belfast agreement was that Dublin has no right to a say on such matters. That once again makes people suspicious.
My Lords, I want to make it very clear to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that I love listening to him speak and I have no aspersions against him whatever. I was just pleased that perhaps he felt that my amendment was worth considering enough to not contribute.
On this, I know it is extremely difficult for the Minister to do so, but could he give us some idea of how long he visualises—he is smiling, so I think he knows what I am going to ask—the negotiations going on before someone actually says that this is not going to work? One of the reasons I am very keen to get this Bill through as quickly as possible is so that we have it there as a safeguard. It would be helpful to know if there are any discussions going on behind the scenes on timing and just how long we can keep negotiating if we are not getting anywhere.
My Lords, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, because I think I heard him say earlier that he returned from Buenos Aires this morning and then went straight into this debate on the Northern Ireland protocol. It is very appropriate that he is the proposer of the last two amendments. I commend him on his stamina. I agree with the idea that regulations should be published as quickly as possible.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this brief debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for combining the last two groups, which means that I cannot actually say I did 13 groups in total today. I am really grateful for the contributions that have been made.
To pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, about the time of negotiations, I would put my career as a Minister—and indeed that of any negotiator—on the line if I were to determine the length of negotiations. As I said, I have shared as much as I can. I have heard the desire to know more and I fully recognise that; if I were sitting anywhere else in the House but in this position, I would be pushing in the same manner for more details of the discussions and negotiations. I am pressing colleagues across the Government to see how much more we can share about discussions taking place both in Northern Ireland and, importantly, within the EU.