Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill

Lord Cromwell Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 12th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Devon, for moving Amendment 19. I will speak to Amendment 20 in my name and that of the noble Earls, Lord Lytton and Lord Devon, and Amendment 21 in my name and that of the noble Earl, Lord Devon.

At the outset I welcome my noble friends Lord Kamall and Lord Harlech to their new positions. At the same time I thank my noble friend’s predecessor, my noble friend Lord Parkinson, for all his efforts and engagement with us at previous stages of the Bill. I wish him well as a Back-Bencher in this place; I think we probably have more fun.

I remind my noble friend Lord Kamall that in his previous life he was well aware of my interests in rural affairs, which colour my approach to the Bill. I would like to see improvements to broadband and mobile phone connectivity in rural areas, but I cannot take the fact that telephone poles and other infrastructure should be taken for granted, as appears to be the case in the Bill. That is my reason for presenting and speaking to Amendments 20 and 21, with the desired effect that they will remove provisions currently in the Bill that give operators the ability to calculate rent based on land value rather than market value when renewing tenancies to host digital infrastructure on private land. I believe that all interested parties, whether the operators, the landowners or those of us who use these infrastructure facilities, must be treated fairly, in the way that the landowners are currently compensated.

I assure my noble friend that good connectivity is key to increased productivity and growth for farms and the rural economy. I hope he will give a commitment today, just as the Prime Minister has said many times since she took her new position that we are signed up to productivity and growth, that this will apply as much to the rural economy, farms and others who have business in rural areas as it does to more industrial areas.

I confess that I am not a landowner or in receipt of a wayleave for a telegraph pole, although not so long ago I received a small payment, shared with my brother, who is now the sole recipient. I hope that these amendments can achieve a better balance between the rights of the operators, the landowners and those who use the infrastructure.

I regret that the 2017 Electronic Communications Code has changed the way in which the new sites are valued from market value to land value. I make a plea to my noble friend that we proceed under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 rather than the 2017 code, given that, as I mentioned earlier—and as the noble Earl, Lord Devon, so eloquently described—fewer new sites have been agreed over the last few years in which we have proceeded under the code.

I echo and strongly associate myself with the remarks of the noble Earl, Lord Devon, about this not being part of the original consultation under the Bill. I hope that my noble friend Lord Kamall will confirm that and say why it was not and yet we now have these two clauses in the Bill, because I have never quite understood why that was the case. If you are not going to give the landowners and other interested parties—or stakeholders, as we now call them—the right to comment, I do not see why they should be presented with a fait accompli. But, even more than that, the Law Commission strongly concluded that it was against the introduction of these provisions into the Bill because it thought that they would lead to fewer sites and fewer renewals of sites, which is precisely the position in which we find ourselves today.

Why is this going against the Government’s previous stated intention of allowing a transition for existing agreements into the ECC, or the code? It also means that the code valuation method will be applied retrospectively. I understood that we normally do not apply legislation retrospectively in this place, and I would like to understand the reasons for seeking to do so in relation to Clauses 61 and 62.

The Government’s own impact assessment of the 2017 reform concluded that rents would drop by 40% over a 20-year period. It was therefore not anticipated that levels would fall by so much and so quickly. However, the noble Earl, Lord Devon, clearly set out that, in some cases, rents have dropped by as much as 90%, which is inexplicable and unacceptable. Clauses 61 and 62 would simply exacerbate the situation and leave some businesses and individuals facing a cliff edge, without any time to adjust in what we understood would be a transition period. I repeat that this was not part of the 2021 consultation, and, in my view, it will no doubt be entirely counterproductive, with the effect of further disruption.

Given that we now know that the 2017 code has resulted in fewer new sites being agreed, due to the much lower rents being paid by operators, I urge the House to remove Clauses 61 and 62. I urge the Government to accept that they should proceed under the previous legislation, the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. I hope that the House will look favourably on my Amendments 20 and 21.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, in his opening remarks, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, said that some of us might not welcome him here. I am sure that that is not correct; I am sure that we all welcome him and his colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Harlech. I certainly do.

First, I apologise to the House for not participating in the earlier stages of the Bill due to circumstances elsewhere—but I have read and watched them. Secondly, I should declare that I am an unpaid director of a small farming company that has a single telecoms mast on its premises. Normally, I would not speak on a subject when I have an interest even as modest as this, and I know that a number of other noble Lords have not participated and remained silent for the same reason. However, having seen how one-sided and damaging this part of the Bill is in so many ways, including to the Government’s own objectives for rollout, and having seen how resistant the Government have apparently been to efforts to address its faults, I feel that I must speak out critically but constructively. I support all the amendments in this group but, to my mind, Amendments 20 and 21, which would leave out Clauses 61 and 62, are the starting point, with the other amendments seeking to achieve damage limitation.

There are two parties to any agreement on a site: the site owners and those who seek to occupy and operate them. Not only is this Bill crudely unjust in its valuation basis but it is already creating a breakdown of trust and co-operation between the parties. It will create and intensify conflict between them, leading to a delay in rollout—the direct opposite of what the Government intend. We, therefore, need to find a better middle ground between these two parties.

As has already been mentioned, Clauses 61and 62 would have land valued as if it were not to be used for a mast site. This is as bizarre as anything in a Gogol short story. Who would, for example, value a building plot, knowing that it is imminently going to be built on, on the basis that it would never be built on? I am sure that HMRC would never countenance that approach for tax purposes.

Amendments 20 and 21 reflect the need to remove these counterproductive and illogical clauses—but how did we get here? We need to be fair about this: previously, some owners, due to the rules of supply and demand, had a bargaining position that may have enabled rents that are higher than they would otherwise have accepted. In seeking to accelerate rollout, the Government have decided to rebalance things—so far so good. However, this Bill would swing the pendulum to completely the opposite extreme. It would strip the site owners of their legally long-established property rights—something I find astonishing from a Conservative Government—and deny small enterprises, sports clubs, hospitals and others of a vital source of income. This was raised by Labour at an earlier Bill stage, and I was astonished when the then Minister—so rightly admired in other respects, as many have said—pretty glibly told them in his reply that they should simply seek other sources of income.

These clauses will take a situation where sites were coming forward voluntarily and replace it with one of zero trust—in either the operating companies or the Government—whereby both potential and actual site owners will seek to avoid, and indeed resist, providing sites for this use. It will enable the operating and mast companies to pay peppercorn rents and thereby enrich themselves and their shareholders—with no evidence of trickle down, or even dribble down, to consumers.

When I see all this, combined with powers elsewhere in the Bill for operators to reclaim rents retrospectively from site owners—tearing up existing contracts freely agreed and entered into by professional commercial companies and site owners—I can only gasp in disbelief. So I have been asking myself how on earth we got into this situation and what could explain it. I have been urged by some of my colleagues to be temperate in my remarks, so I will not indulge in conspiracy theories, but we need to focus on encouraging sites to come forward to achieve faster rollout—something which I think we are all agreed on.

Let me therefore offer a valuation solution that is indeed in the middle ground between the past and the extortionate future foreseen in this Bill. There is a tried and tested middle ground that uses a practical and already widely accepted approach used to set rents and values for other commercial sites. I ask the House’s indulgence in describing this very briefly and simply with an illustration from another commercial activity: mineral quarrying. Where a quarry operator wants to lease land to set up a processing plant, there is a well-established valuation method whereby the database of local industrial rents is assessed and a percentage of that rent—say 70%—is paid to the site owner. There are clear advantages here. First, land agents and valuers on both sides are well accustomed to such discussions, which can therefore be swift. In the very unlikely event that they do not reach agreement, binding expert determination is available as standard. Secondly, it is based on a well-established dataset that reflects regional differences and will adjust over time to reflect the regional economic context. Thirdly, there are suitably qualified practitioners on hand across the country to carry it out.

Crucially, this would produce a balanced result and would get there using a transparent, objective and logical method. To be clear, the resulting rents would be set below what some site owners currently receive, but not as counterproductively or extortionately low as the unjust free hand that the Bill, as currently drafted, would give commercial operators. I therefore urge the Minister and the Government to think again.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lady McIntosh for those questions. I will come to them—I am sorry, maybe I am not going as fast as noble Lords would hope me to, but I wanted to consider carefully the various points made by noble Lords, and I still have specific responses to come to. If noble Lords will allow me to talk to Amendment 24, I will come back to the contributions made during the debate.

Amendment 24, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, but spoken to by the noble Earl, Lord Devon, looks to prevent interim rent being backdated where an agreement is renewed under the 1954 Act, and is similar to the amendment tabled by the noble Earl in Committee. One of the fundamental aims of the Bill is to ensure that the approach to renewing agreements across part 5 of the code, the 1954 Act and the 1996 order is as consistent as possible. As my noble friend Lord Sharpe said in Committee, this form of amendment serves only to increase inconsistency. It would create inconsistency within the 1954 Act itself, preventing backdated payments of interim rent where a site provider gives notice under Section 25 of the Act, yet would allow interim rent to be backdated where an operator serves notice under Section 26 of the Act.

The ability to backdate rent is not a new concept. It is not being introduced into the 1954 Act by this Bill, nor was it introduced in the 2017 reforms. When parties entered into these agreements, there was always a risk that the market could change between the time it was entered into and the time of its renewal and that the amount of rent could decrease. However, the Government have listened to stakeholders representing the interests of site providers and understand the potential consequences of applying the code valuation framework to the 1954 Act and the 1996 order agreements in relation to backdated interim rent. This is something that is being carefully considered in developing an implementation strategy, including such transitional provisions as may be needed to bring the different provisions of the Bill into force in a timely and responsible manner.

Let me now talk to some of the points made by noble Lords. A number of noble Lords said that the evaluation regime is not fair. The Government see the pricing regime as being closely aligned to utilities such as water, electricity and gas. The Government maintain that this the correct position. Landowners should still receive fair payments that take into account, among other things, alternative uses that the land may have and any losses or damages that may be incurred.

It should be noted that, in many of the examples of unfair rent or large percentage reductions that have been raised by campaign groups, reference is made only to the rental payment itself. These examples fail to take into account any compensation payments which the landowner may have received under the agreement. They may also have failed to take into account any capital payment which the landowner may have received upfront as part of the terms of the agreement. There have been some paid studies of raised examples of poor negotiations or rent reductions. It would not be appropriate for me to comment on ongoing negotiations in specific terms, but the Government say generally that rent is often only one part of the overall financial terms agreed, as I said earlier. As regards behaviour during negotiations and the respective bargaining positions of the parties, the Government have recognised site provider concerns and are introducing measures to encourage greater collaboration.

The noble Earl, Lord Devon, and other noble Lords mentioned the reluctance to enter into new agreements. We have been told that the amounts offered by some operators are so drastically reduced that landowners are less willing to come forward and allow their land to be used. However, I have been advised that, so far in 2022, at least 107 agreements have been reached in relation to new sites, with heads of terms agreed on a further 66 sites. This is in addition to 533 renewal agreements which have been concluded this year, along with heads of terms agreed on a further 119 renewals. The Government maintain that the 2017 valuation provision created the right balance, and they are aware that the valuation framework would have resulted in some reductions, as I said earlier.

I think it was the noble Earl, Lord Devon, who talked about middlemen who take profits overseas. The benefits of independent infrastructure provision are globally acknowledged. An Ernst & Young report in February this year, produced by a European-wide infrastructure association, highlighted the many benefits which independent infrastructure providers bring to both the industry and consumers. It talked about sharing towers and costs and enabling cheaper rollout. The report concluded that the scope of independent infrastructure providers overcharging for the use of the infrastructure would be constrained by continued competition between tower companies.

Government policy introduced in the 2017 valuation framework to reflect the public interest in digital infrastructure and encourage investment while driving costs down remained unaltered. That is not to say that we approached our pre-consultation engagement with a closed mind, but that engagement with stakeholders did not indicate that the valuation framework is incapable of delivering both our policy objectives and fairer outcomes for landowners. It did highlight difficulties with communication and negotiations, hindering the framework from working as intended. We hope that the Bill and the non-legislative initiatives we are taking forward will tackle this.

There have been some claims that rents would reduce by more than 40%. In the impact assessments in 2016, the Government specifically said that they did not know what effect the reforms would have on rental payments. There is reference in the impact assessment to independent analysis which predicted a 40% decrease. Some lobby groups have asserted that this figure demonstrates that the Government committed that rent reductions would be no more than 40%. The Government maintain that this was not a government commitment, but it did appear in the impact assessment and we expected the market to adjust.

As I said, rent is only one element and other variations occur in practice. We understand the various things that have been said by various companies. A number of noble Lords reflected on the CEBR research. The Government have problems with the report from the CEBR. First, the picture the report paints of government policy is incomplete and partial. Secondly, the alternative changes the report proposes do not account for key challenges, which in our view means that they would not deliver the results the CEBR suggests. The report focuses excessively on the prospective interests of landowners and we are trying to get the right balance.

On the Institute of Economic Affairs, I should be very clear and have to declare my interests. I am the former academic and research director of the institute, so I would not wish to comment one way or the other on its report, but I know that it used as its source some of the work from the CEBR’s and other reports. My successor, Dr James Forder, is an excellent analyst and economist. Indeed, he is the economics tutor at Balliol College in Oxford—I digress.

I am afraid that, while I completely understand the arguments—I have had conversations with a number of noble Lords and am very grateful to those who have come to meetings and heard the Government’s perspective—we cannot accept these amendments. Perhaps in vain, or in aspiration, I ask noble Lords to consider not pressing them.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

Before the Minister sits down, I make the point that, in my experience, the rent is the key factor, certainly over a period of time. Frequently no or minor payments are made, and it is simply that an agreement is struck for the rent. Trying to diminish the importance of the rent in the way the Minister has is something I find hard to swallow.

The Minister prays in aid consistency. If the valuation method is unfair, what this Bill does is ensure that a consistent unfairness is imposed, so I find that slightly tautologous. Does the Minister accept, agree and support the idea that a valuation based on a site that is known to be imminently the site of a mast should be done as if there was no mast site?

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his question. I am interested in the point he makes about the amount or proportion of rent in the overall agreement. Whatever happens in this debate, I would be very happy to continue that conversation with him and my officials to make sure that we can close any gap in understanding.

The noble Lord will recognise that I have to defend the Government’s position as the Minister, so I continue to say that the Government cannot accept these amendments, but we hope, perhaps vainly, that the noble Lords who tabled them will consider not pressing them.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Devon (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly support these amendments, to which I have added my name. As I have said, I am a litigator, and it is a tremendous help to get parties together in some form of alternative dispute resolution before a matter is litigated. Compelling ADR as step 1 in an escalating dispute is common, and indeed is often to be found within contractual obligations themselves, particularly between parties of disparate size and resource. Given all that has been said about the fractious and broken market, and the huge number of disputes that are occurring, the more that can be done to head these off before litigation costs escalate, the better.

I was referred to a decision this morning of the Lands Tribunal where a lease negotiation had been settled at the door of court: the decision focused only on the issue of costs. The tribunal awarded £5,000 in costs, but the total bill was over £100,000. Litigation costs can be huge and, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has indicated, that can keep small site owners out of litigation: they have to just roll over. ADR can occur in the form of mediation, arbitration or simply expert determination on a specific technical or legal issue in contention. It is key to greasing the wheels of these challenging transactions and, given the difference in size and resource between site owners and telecoms operators, it would be most helpful.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, I was in two minds about these amendments, but I will support them in the final analysis. ADR is of course a good thing if it avoids lengthy and costly court proceedings. My concern is that it can also become a token activity, backed by the threat of subsequent court action to intimidate site owners, reflected in the inequality of arms between the parties, which others have already referred to.

I would greatly prefer an outcome where disputes can be resolved between the parties, and perhaps their respective agents, where the balance of negotiation is fair. I made a proposal in my earlier remarks on this, to which I have received no response.

The Bill, as drafted, sets site owners and operators needlessly on a collision path. No disputes will be resolved; they will simply be won by brutal compulsion that will lead to delay and protracted proceedings. If the Bill goes ahead as is, ADR should be mandatory as a first step in at least seeking some resolution. I therefore support the amendments in this group.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

The view of these Benches is that throughout the passage of the Bill it has been clear that a strong case has been made for better protection for landowners against the power of telecoms operators. However, the ADR process that the Government are providing under Clause 68 is non-binding. Telecoms companies need to show only that they have considered it to avoid costs. This will not make them engage with the spirit of the process, and we expect telecoms companies to take matters to court as quickly as possible instead, with all the consequences that entails of costs on both sides.

As the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, stated, to address this the Government should make ADR compulsory for any dispute and issue guidance about reasonable terms. Properly enforced, we believe it would reduce operators’ reliance on litigation through the courts, which sometimes takes the rather oppressive form of threats, and encourage better behaviour by both parties. Given the potential benefits to both parties and the wider public interest, it is difficult to see the case for this process remaining advisory. In principle, we very much support Amendments 25, 26 and 27, so well advocated by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, and the noble Earl, Lord Devon.

Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill

Lord Cromwell Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 22nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome Amendment 17, which had not even made it to the internet section of the Bill when I looked an hour ago. I also welcome the Minister’s mention of the national connectivity alliance as a good co-operation between site providers and operators.

The reforms in the Digital Economy Act 2017 have resulted in lengthy legal disputes, causing significant delays to rollout. Small businesses and local sports clubs, many of which host telecoms infrastructure on their land, have lost thousands of pounds in income, with no commensurate boost to digital connectivity. This was foreseen by the current Prime Minister during the debate on the Digital Economy Bill in 2016, when he warned:

“Interfering with property rights, as the code does, is a major step for this House to endorse. I therefore urge the Government to ensure that the Bill benefits not just the network operators’ balance sheets, but the public interest.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/9/16; col. 828.]


Overall, I am disappointed at the lack of compromise elsewhere by the Government and the absence of rigorous evidence for the Bill. It appears that its policy development has been entirely reliant on the telecoms operators. It is vital that the Government use all the tools still at their disposal to limit the most egregious effects of this legislation, including through the use of transitional arrangements.

On preventing backdated payments, the Bill as drafted will allow the courts to impose lower rents on site providers—I meant to declare an interest as a site provider—and this can be dated to years before the court issues its order. This will have the effect of courts imposing backdated payments of thousands of pounds on site providers, despite those rent levels having been agreed between partners in good faith. The Government have promised to consider addressing this issue through transitional provisions, and it is vital that they do so and consult properly with affected parties to ensure that their measures are effective.

The Government have not heeded the significant disquiet on transitional relief on valuation throughout the Bill’s passage through Parliament. I would like to put on the record the significant damage that will be caused to the market by extending the “no scheme” valuation into the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. If the Government are set on not revisiting them, the changes to the regulatory framework and expansion of the 2017 reforms proposed by the PSTI Bill should be brought in gradually to avoid significant financial shocks for site providers.

I turn to the government evidence base. The impact assessment for the legislation at the time showed that the Government anticipated a reduction in rents of 40%. I have heard stories from site providers who have seen rent reductions of more than 90%, but even the operators accept that the rent reductions have been 63%. Although this is an unsourced and untested figure, it is still a huge reduction.

It is also concerning that the Government have refused to accept other sources of evidence. Last week, following a very useful meeting with the Minister, I received a document from DCMS expressing its concerns over a report produced by the CEBR, an independent and well-respected economic analysis organisation. It made a number of assertions which I believe are incorrect. First, it states that the CEBR report over-emphasises the interests of landowners. This is not borne out by the evidence cited in the Government’s report, which includes research funded or written directly by operators themselves. Secondly, it states that the CEBR report assumes that HMG’s policy will not reduce the number of delayed negotiations. This misses the point of the CEBR critique: the Government’s purpose should not be to expedite disputes but to prevent them arising. The view of the CEBR and the Law Society is that the PSTI Bill does not address this.

Thirdly, the document states that the CEBR assumes that reverting to the pre-2017 regime will not impact operator behaviour. This is based on the false assumption that the CEBR recommended a reversion to the pre-2017 status quo. It does not. Instead, it suggests an alternative code based on the Law Commission’s 2013 report. Finally, it states that delays to code reform will slow the shared rural network rollout. The post-2017 code reforms were already available to operators on all existing sites, and money saved from reduced rents has not been reinvested into the rural rollout. There is no reason to think that the savings from the PSTI Bill will be reinvested, and therefore rent reductions—or their absence—are not linked to the pace of rollout.

I am concerned that the Government are willing to dismiss independent evidence on spurious grounds simply because it does not align with what appears to be a pre-cooked policy direction. It is even more concerning that the Government describe their evidence as uncontested when there has been such widespread and cross-party opposition to this policy. During its consultation on the reforms that would become the PSTI Bill, the Government received over 1,000 responses, and later admitted that the vast majority related to the valuation regime. It is therefore highly inaccurate to suggest that their evidence has not been challenged, or that their position is widely accepted.

Ministers have also disputed factual evidence of the sheer scale of cases being taken to court, asserting instead that, as the Minister has just said, the market is settling and consensual renewal numbers are increasing. It is concerning that the Government see hundreds of court cases each year as the market settling; certainly, in my dealings with the operators, it was not a very calm operation. The lack of proper evidence has created unnecessary risks for the future of this market. I hope that, through Amendment 17, the Government will be open-minded and display more responsiveness to all available evidence in future.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

First, I thank the Minister and his officials for corresponding and meeting with me to discuss the Bill. That said, it is a shame that the Government in Motion A have set their face against Amendment 17, which is seeking a review of the Bill within three months, particularly as the festering problem at the heart of the Bill is the valuation method, which was not even a subject of consultation in preparing the Bill.

This legislation legalises extortion. It allows operators to strip site owners of their property rights and to confiscate their incomes, in some cases even retrospectively clawing back site rents paid under legally binding agreements. The Digital Economy Act 2017 has not led to the market being “settled down”, as the Government claim; it has, in fact, produced a steep rise in long and expensive tribunal cases. That rise would be far steeper but for the inequality of rights and resources between telecoms companies and the site owners, meaning that very few can afford to fight their cases. The Government’s claims that agreements are consensual, or can be solved by voluntary alternative dispute resolution, ring hollow when the law is so one-sided and the site owner is threatened by operators throughout any so-called negotiation with expensive court action. The fact is that the pendulum of power has swung way too far in favour of the operators.