Lord Clement-Jones
Main Page: Lord Clement-Jones (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Clement-Jones's debates with the Scotland Office
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I would like to support my noble friend in his amendment. Algorithms are basically mathematical. The power of computers is used to record, classify, summarise and project actions that indicate what is happening in the world around about us. Algorithms can be applied in particular to social media, which other noble Lords have referred to, and to normal internet usage and browsing. They reach decisions about public interest, about you and about me.
According to a recent radio programme, algorithms are used to make individual decisions in the fields of employment, housing, health, justice, credit and insurance. I had heard that employers are increasingly studying social media to find out more about job applicants. I had not realised that an algorithm, programmed by an engineer, can, for example, take the decision to bin an application. If that is true, that is absolutely unacceptable. It certainly explains why so many jobseekers do not receive a response of any kind. There is a very real danger that a person could also be refused a mortgage or a better interest rate as the result of an algorithmic decision. Even now some companies use algorithms based on phone numbers to decide whether a caller is high or low value. Highs get to speak to a person: lows are left holding on until they hang up. Algorithm designers refuse to answer any questions, I understand, about the data that are used or their application on grounds of commercial confidentiality. There are real concerns that if we continue to allow such liberties, there will be an increasing risk of discrimination—intentional or accidental—against people of certain races, religions or ages. One example of algorithm use cited in the programme was that of differential pricing by Uber.
The EU intends that by July 2018 citizens will have the right to an explanation of decisions affected by the workings of these algorithms, such as the online rejection of a bank loan. I do not feel that we should wait until then, and although my noble friend’s amendment might not be perfect, I am really grateful that he has tabled it today and that we are having this worthwhile debate.
My Lords, I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, for putting down this amendment. Indeed, this amendment has many good aspects to it, but I will adopt a phrase which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, used the other day, which is, “It doesn’t go nearly far enough”. It really highlights—and I declare an interest as the co-chair of the new All-Party Parliamentary Group on Artificial Intelligence—some of the issues that this Bill simply does not deal with. This does need huge consideration: all the ethics involved not only with artificial intelligence, but with the internet of things and the great many regulatory issues which spring from the new technologies. Algorithms are a part of it, of course they are, but we need further consideration.
I agree with those who have said that perhaps Ofcom is not necessarily the best regulator for this—I do not know—and it may be that we need to construct a purpose-built regulator for the world of artificial intelligence and the internet of things in ethical terms. I am not quite sure that Ofcom has got the necessary tools in terms of the ethics aspect of it.
I am very much in spirit with the noble Lord and I am delighted that he has raised it, but we are at the very beginning of a really important debate on a lot of these areas. The essence of all this is trust. We had a continuous debate through Part 5 about the government sharing of data. This is about the private sector and its use of a lot of our data and the way it sorts them and places them in the search engines. Trust is the overwhelming issue of our age, and we are not there yet. If we are going to reassure people who want to use these new technologies, we really do need to come up with a proper regulatory system. I do not think that this new clause quite provides it.
Before the noble Lord sits down, may I just ask him: is it not dangerous to make perfection the enemy of better? In other words, the amendment may not be perfect, but it is moving in the right direction, and to say, “Do nothing”, because it is not perfect is surely very unwise, given all the other stuff that he has said.
My Lords, I know that the noble Earl himself is perfect in almost every way, so I would very much hesitate to argue with him. Still, I feel we need something rather broader than this proposal would provide.
My Lords, I share the view that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has expressed, that the amendment probably is not the way to go about this. Algorithms are too ubiquitous, useful and powerful in this case. I do not know what we could do instead, but I note that one of the things we are looking at, together with the problem that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has identified, is that the internet service providers and the big media companies are supposedly platforms, not publishers, and they do not have the responsibilities of publishers for that reason. Facebook will say that it merely hosts the material that individuals post. When individuals post material, they ought to think that it reaches an indefinite number of people because the algorithm spreads it through the echo chambers. It is the cyber silos that we are going to have to think about. With the greatest regret, I do not think the amendment would do that, but I very much support the principle of looking into this matter.
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 216.
It is common ground that anyone affected by Ofcom’s decisions should have the right to appeal if they consider that Ofcom has got something wrong. Ofcom itself makes the point that there needs to be an appropriate balance between properly holding it to account and enabling it to make timely and effective decisions in the interests of citizens and consumers and the wider UK economy. But in the brief for this debate, it goes on to say that,
“the current merits system for appealing Ofcom’s decisions does not achieve that balance. It results in some appellants effectively asking the courts to become the primary decision-maker in place of Ofcom rather than conduct an appeal which focusses on errors which Ofcom is alleged to have made. This is particularly the case in price control appeals, where appellants have consistently used the system as a second attempt to run arguments they have already made to Ofcom during its extensive consultation processes”.
Those propositions are hotly disputed not only by many telecoms and internet service providers but also by others such as the CBI and techUK. Their position was made clear on this matter as far back as September 2013, when the Government published their summary of stakeholder views on the appeals system.
I will take the House through the fundamentals of Ofcom’s case for the change embodied in Clause 75. First, it says:
“Almost every single decision by Ofcom is promptly appealed in the courts”.
Roughly one in eight decisions have been appealed over the past decade, and this has been declining significantly over the past five years. The potential for merits-based appeals is an incentive for high-quality regulation. Here is another claim:
“This has resulted in lengthy delays in putting through quite important measures”.
Almost invariably, Ofcom’s decisions take effect immediately and stay in place while an appeal is heard. In the case of price controls, no Ofcom decision has ever been delayed in its application while an appeal is heard. Here is another proposition:
“This change will bring Ofcom into line with other regulators”.
Virtually every other economic regulator faces scrutiny of its decisions to establish whether it is in error under regimes not limited to judicial review. I could take your Lordships through energy, water, post, the NHS, aviation, rail, but I will not go into great detail unless I need to respond to the Minister at the end of the debate.
The new approach in Clause 75 would therefore not be in line with almost all other comparable public authorities—that is, the economic regulators. The standard of appeal is not much lower in telecoms than in other sectors. All the UK’s major economic regulators have a form of statutory review that is in law or in practice merits review. All EU telecoms national regulatory authorities make decisions that must stand on their merits.
Here is a further proposition: Clause 75,
“should also free up Ofcom resource to deliver better outcomes for citizens and consumers”.
Far from being good for the consumer, Clause 75 would have denied the court’s ability to implement corrections to bad decisions which have resulted in something like £350 million to £400 million of direct consumer benefit over the past decade. Over a number of cases in the past 10 years—again, I can give the Minister references if he needs them—the tribunal’s decision was that Ofcom’s decision had not gone far enough in the consumer’s favour. This would not have been fixed through judicial review.
A further proposition:
“The big incumbents will no longer be able to use the process to hold-up regulatory decisions through aggressive use of the appeals process”.
Opponents of the change in fact represent the vast majority of the investing industries—small and large, ex-incumbent and insurgent. BT was joined by other industry appellants on most of the cases it appealed. Merits-based appeals work pretty well for SMEs, too, and are disproportionately used by them.
Here is another proposition:
“If material error is present it can be addressed in judicial review”.
Judicial review tests generally relate to illegality, procedural impropriety, irrational behaviour—in other words, has the decision-maker taken leave of their senses? To repeat, JR would have denied consumers benefits of something of the order of £400 million in value. Here is another proposition:
“JRs will be fewer in number and take less time”.
Increased uncertainty for this procedure could be likely to result in an increase in appeals. On average, judicial review takes 10 months from start to finish, versus 11 months on average for a merits appeal. Judicial review requires the decision to go back to the regulator, which can add years to the process, while a merits-based appeal provides powers to the appeals body to fix the problem.
Its final proposition is that:
“Ofcom wins 85% of cases”.
That is rather misleading. Ofcom wins just over 60% of appeals and in the rest it is found to have erred in some material respect. Ofcom’s statistics only tell us that in 15% of cases it lost absolutely every point in an appeal. That is the true 85% figure.
For all the above reasons, the vast majority of telecoms communications providers of the UK’s fastest-growing new fibre networks, the UK’s premier business organisation, the UK’s trade association, providers of internet services and the body which represents the UK’s technology sector, strongly oppose the proposed change. They fear the change will mean that regulation will become unpredictable and prone to risk, with no corrections for inconsistency, error, or lack of rigour in approach.
In summary, a move to judicial review will leave wrong decisions standing. Judicial review, as I said earlier, is solely concerned with whether the decision is unlawful in a technical sense—that is, was the correct process followed? The decision itself is not reviewed. Many decisions that have been found in merits appeals to be clearly wrong and that harm the interests of consumers would have been allowed to stand under judicial review. As I have emphasised above, the existing appeal regime protects the interests of consumers. Ofcom can and does make mistakes, and in the vast majority of cases, these mistakes have meant higher prices for consumers. Correcting those mistakes has delivered benefits of hundreds of millions of pounds.
These amendments steer a different and compromise course. We accept that there may have been some gold-plating of the original framework directive, and have tried to meet some of the criticism through these amendments. Amendment 215 is a direct copy of the European framework directive wording, without any gold-plating. As I have said, this is followed by all other national regulatory authorities in the EU. The tribunal must decide the appeal,
“by reference to the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of appeal and taking due account of the merits of the case”.
This version no longer requires the appeal to be decided on the merits but with “due account” of the merits being taken.
Amendment 216 is an alternative, focused on specific grounds used in appeals in other sectors. The tribunal must decide an appeal by reference to the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of appeal only to the extent that it is satisfied that the decision appealed against was wrong on one or more of the grounds set out in proposed new paragraphs (a) to (f). This version has a narrower scope than the current approach but allows for an assessment of whether the substantive decision is correct, not simply whether the correct decision-making process has been followed.
Clause 75 is a serious change to make to the telecoms regulatory regime. I very much hope that, in the face of these arguments, the Government will change their mind. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will not disguise the fact that I am not happy with the Minister’s reply. But I would like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, for his support and I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Lester, who himself is a master of judicial review. I take very seriously what he has to say on the subject. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, who raised a number of pertinent points. He is obviously a very good client when taken to Chambers. I was hoping that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, was going to take part in the debate, as then a ruffle or a jabot of QCs would have emerged; I do not know what the collective noun for QCs is.
Quite seriously, I am afraid that the Minister and the Government have bought not just the Ofcom line, but the hook and the sinker as well. We have an interesting conjugation: “I make my case, you lobby”. That seems to be the construction put on Ofcom’s behaviour. So Ofcom’s decisions are entitled to respect and “a margin of appreciation”. We are talking about the appeals process for an immensely powerful regulator. I do not think that that is an appropriate form of words. Of course, decisions are entitled to respect, but the rights of those who are investing in the telecoms industry are entitled to respect as well. This is an argument about the appropriate form of appeal.
I did not touch on whether this new clause is in line with European law. It may be academic because we might be out of the stable, so to speak, before we have to test the proposition as to whether the use of JR in these circumstances conforms to the framework directive. But that is an important matter. Ofcom has clearly been vigorous in its lobbying and certainly vigorous in its lobbying of noble Lords. I am glad to say that many of them have resisted in the circumstances. The Minister went through the nature of the amendments in a perfectly proper fashion, but he did not really make a particularly good case about why they were not appropriate. He did not really address my argument about other regulators. At the outset, I took the Minister through a number of economic regulators, none of which have JR as the fundamental point of appeal, so that requires an answer.
My purpose in tabling the amendment is to make sure that there is an effective challenge to Ofcom. We have swung way too far with Clause 75. We are serving the interests of the regulator far too much. I do not believe that all the propositions that Ofcom has put forward are valid and we need to keep kicking the tyres further on this particular clause until we find a better solution. We may have to make express reference in Clause 75 to the EU framework directive, which might be one way of dealing with this. But I guarantee that we will return to this at a future date. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I declare my interests in the register, and as a trustee for more than 20 years of the Ewing Foundation for deaf children. It is a great charity which works in schools to help deaf children make the most of their education; partly by helping the teachers to ensure that their hearing aids and cochlear implants are working well and by giving teachers advice on how to get the most out of the equipment and how to help the children.
Many trends are apparent in the field of deafness, not least the rapid rise of cochlear implants, the rise in literacy rates in children and, of course, the rise in late-onset deafness as the population generally ages. The vast majority of deaf people speak and read perfectly, as most are elderly people who learned their language and how to read as children. I thank Action on Hearing Loss and the Bill team in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport for their help in drafting this amendment and their support in its passage. They have helped to clarify my thinking on this important issue.
This is an enabling amendment, permitting the Secretary of State to bring forward statutory instruments to require those who transmit television programmes to provide subtitles, then audio description for viewers with poor eyesight and, lastly, British Sign Language interpretation for people who find that easier. I am told that all terrestrial television programmes now carry subtitles and a growing number of pay-to-view programmes are already having subtitles added. Sky has told me that about 60% of its entire output will carry subtitles by September this year; it should be applauded for voluntarily doing the right thing. Thank you. However, the advance of audio description and sign language does not seem so good. The latter two aids to understanding are far more expensive than subtitling and it is possible that technological advances will play a part in solving the problem of deaf people who can communicate only with other sign language users.
Already, in America, I have seen demonstrations of software that will enable simultaneous translation from American Sign Language to text. If that is available, translation from text to British Sign Language on an iPhone will not be far behind. When the statutory instruments come through, we must bear in mind the speed of technological change and not be too prescriptive in the manner in which subtitles are delivered. We should instead seek a statutory instrument that merely says that subtitles should be available on all programmes. A swift statutory instrument will serve as encouragement to the broadcasters to continue and expand their good work. If we are in a position where the broadcasters and the Government are competing with one another to seek the broadest and quickest implementation of subtitles across channels and services, I would say that that is great.
We should remember that TV companies are simply responding to demand. It is not just the hard of hearing: think of TVs in noisy venues, football fans who want to read the half-time match analysis over the din in the pub, or people watching television in a noisy gym. All will appreciate this change. This sort of measure will also help to solve the biggest problem of sensory deprivation: that of isolation. If subtitles enable a deaf person to be on an equal footing with those in the hearing world, then we and the Government will have done one more thing to put disabled people in a position to thrive in society. I beg to move.
My Lords, I think that many of us responding to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Borwick, find ourselves in something of a cleft stick. He has introduced the subject matter superbly, and in principle the amendment is entirely correct. The noble Lord has a very good track record on physical access for the disabled and this is a continuation of that, in a sense, in a different sphere. He also has the courage to wear a House of Lords tie, so he cannot be all bad. The trouble is that this amendment does have flaws. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, if he speaks on this, will pick up on them. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has commented on this.
All of us want the amendment to succeed but it does need a further look. We have all had briefings from the public service broadcasters and the platforms, including Sky, who say that they can live with this in principle but are rather concerned about the fact that there is no parliamentary approval built in. There are a number of flaws; they recommend that the affirmative procedure should be applied to the first regulations; they recommend that the appropriate regulatory authority is specified; and they recommend that the Secretary of State should have a duty, before making the regulations, to consult on-demand service providers and other stakeholders—which, of course, would be the platforms. So I am very much in sympathy in spirit, but I hope that we will have a chance before Report to perfect the amendment so that the campaign of the noble Lord, Lord Borwick, will proceed as intended in due course.
My Lords, I support these two amendments. As the noble Lord knows, they have been the subject of considerable discussion and debate in the past. We all share the objective of allowing family-friendly filters to remain on internet services and mobile networks in the UK. As the noble Lord set out, the arrangements we currently have in the UK were brought into question by the EU net neutrality rules introduced last year, which appeared to ban individual countries from restricting access in this way. Since then, there have been a number of different interpretations of how the EU rules would affect the UK—perhaps complicated by the fact the Ministers themselves were not able to clarify the situation with their usual adeptness. Indeed, it still appears that the EU open access regulations and our commitment to family friendly filters are in some ways in contradiction.
The Minister will know that many of the internet companies have taken the view that the less said about this issue the better. Their argument is that if attention is not drawn to the contradiction, they can carry on with the previous practice—under the wire, so to speak. Of course, for a lot of reasons this is not a very attractive proposition, and we accept that it would make the status of family-friendly filters more vulnerable as time went on.
So, instead we have the amendments tabled by the Minister today. When I asked at a previous meeting with the Minister whether the amendments had been checked out legally, I was assured that this was the case. We have not seen that legal advice and therefore have to take it on trust that what is before us today is legally watertight and does not contravene EU rules.
To some extent we are taking all of this on trust. While it would be easy to demand more evidence, I accept that it would not help the case of those committed to family-friendly filters—I suspect that the more we probe, the more the robustness of the proposals before us could unravel. We support the intent behind these amendments and it is certainly not our intention to bring them into question in any way. I hope that they achieve the outcome to which we are all committed. I hope therefore that noble Lords will support the amendment.
My Lords, both my noble friend Lady Benjamin and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, are far more authoritative on this subject than I could possibly be. I just want to add our support from the Front Bench for these two amendments. The noble Baroness made an important point, which is that we very much hope that the amendments are effective in clarifying the situation. There is no absolute guarantee of that but they have a fair wind because of the nature of the voluntary system of family-friendly filters that they underpin. I very much hope we do not do too much “probing”—I think that is the word that the noble Baroness used—as we are just happy that we can continue with the same system as we had before. I also think my noble friend Lady Benjamin asked an important question regarding where the gaps are in terms of the smaller players.
My Lords, I am grateful for the support from all noble Lords on this. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that I feel well and truly probed after this Committee stage.
We have a voluntary system that is going well, but I accept that the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, has a point in asking about the remaining amounts that are not covered. We might query the numbers that she is talking about. My information is that the latest figures from Ofcom and the industry indicate that around 95% of the UK fixed broadband market offers free network-level or device-level parental filters to their customers. The numbers are important but the principle is there—what are we doing about the providers that are not covered?
The remaining 5% are generally small internet service providers offering business-to-business or niche specialist services to more tech-savvy customers. Some small ISPs have a business model based very transparently on not filtering, for open-rights reasons. However, many of them already provide guidance to customers where appropriate on free device-based or network-level filter tools. Still, we recognise the concern to do everything we can to protect children online, and I am happy to say that after discussions with my officials last week or the week before, the Internet Services Providers’ Association has agreed to take further action to encourage its smaller members to consider online safety and filters. It is updating its code of practice and new member sign-up process to ensure that members consider offering filters to their customers, and issuing a guidance note to members on filters, signposting them to further help and support. So we have addressed that point. It is still on a voluntary basis so far, and we will continue to monitor how that is going.
My Lords, Amendment 228 introduces a new clause with a regulation-making power that will enable the police and the National Crime Agency to apply to the courts for an order compelling communication providers to take whatever action the order specifies to prevent communication devices being used in connection with drug-dealing offences. Such action may include blocking mobile phone handsets and SIM cards and preventing particular phone numbers from porting between networks, as well as preventing access to wi-fi networks. This is an enabling provision that provides for the Secretary of State to set out in regulations details of how applications are to be made and dealt with in the courts. The amendment broadly mirrors Section 80 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which provides for a similar power to prevent the use of mobile phones in prison.
The amendment responds to an operational requirement of the police, who require support in tackling the issue of county lines—the police term used to describe gangs in large urban areas who supply drugs, especially class A drugs, to suburban areas and market and coastal towns. To support their market expansion, gangs recruit and exploit children and vulnerable adults through deception, intimidation, violence, debt bondage and/or grooming. They are used to carry drugs and money.
County lines gangs’ criminality relies on the unrelenting recruitment, coercion and systematic exploitation of the most vulnerable including looked-after children, young people reported as missing and children from broken homes. Vulnerable adults are also exploited and can lose control of their home to gangs who use it as a base to distribute drugs, in a practice known as cuckooing.
The phone line is central to this model and to the gangs’ ability to deal drugs out of area in this way. When establishing a new county lines market, gangs will promote a number locally as the number to call to buy drugs. That “deal line” is therefore at the very core of this criminal model. Dealing drugs is a serious criminal offence and the police are committed to securing prosecutions wherever possible. However, as the deal line is held well away from local street-level drug-dealing activity and it will be an anonymous pay-as-you-go line, both those factors make it hard for the police to achieve prosecutions against an individual for the activity on that line.
Each deal line has the potential to interact with hundreds of customers and facilitate thousands of deals 24 hours a day. Disrupting these lines will have a significant impact in disrupting the gang-related drug supply and associated exploitation. There is currently no legal power in place to compel communication providers to disconnect phones used in county lines drug-dealing activity. We must ensure that the police have the powers they need to tackle this issue.
This legislation is part of a wider ongoing multiagency response, including safeguarding partners, to tackle county lines gangs, but this new order is a critical tool that will render this operating model ineffective and unattractive through the disruption of it. Amendments 236 and 241 are consequential. I beg to move.
My Lords, we are broadly supportive of the amendment. We want to put on record that we have our doubts about the efficacy of the provisions, but obviously if they work then we will be thoroughly delighted. We are slightly doubtful about whether these measures will ultimately be effective, though, and I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Paddick is not here to add his experience to the debate.