Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 9th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests. This is important and welcome legislation, which rightly we want to see pass through the House as a matter of urgency. But it must have teeth. As someone who, I confess, until recently held a solicitor’s practising certificate for 45 years, I say that it is toothless in a major respect, which has been touched on all around the House today. Whether under the beneficial owner register requirement, the unexplained wealth orders or the sanctions regime, there is a lack of provisions which comprehensively tackle enablers—the professionals used by those seeking to evade the impact of these provisions. A number of noble Lords, starting with the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, have raised this.

As Edward Lucas put it in the Times last week:

“Putin’s ‘enablers’ live and work among us. They include bankers, lawyers, accountants, fixers and political bigwigs. Seemingly the epitome of respectability, for three decades they have prospered mightily, laundering Kremlin cronies’ fortunes and reputations.”


We have heard from my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford how they try to gag brave journalists, such as Catherine Belton, the author of Putin’s People, through what are called strategic lawsuits against public participation, also mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell. But it goes much further than that. These professional advisers provide nominee and shell companies to hide disclosure of beneficial ownership of property and other assets; help to shelter unexplained wealth and freezing orders; and evade other tax, money laundering and economic crime legislation. They intimidate regulators with a mounting burden of costs if they are challenged.

As the OECD report Ending the Shell Game: Cracking Down on the Professionals who Enable Tax and White Collar Crimes, published last year, puts it:

“Over the last decades, the world has witnessed increasingly sophisticated financial crimes being perpetrated across borders—and the public interest in addressing such issues has also grown, as has been evidenced in the media through widely publicised leaks such as the Panama and Paradise Papers … These crimes are often facilitated by lawyers, accountants, financial institutions and other professionals who help engineer the legal and financial structures seen in complex tax evasion and financial crimes. The small segment of professionals that generate opportunities to facilitate the commission and/ or concealment of such crimes undermine not only the rule of law, but their own profession, public confidence in the legal and financial system, as well as the level playing field between compliant and non-compliant taxpayers.”


The report makes a very clear call to OECD countries to adopt strategies to address these issues in relation to professional enablers. But I see very little sign that such a strategy is being adopted by our Government. Last December’s Chatham House paper, The UK’s Kleptocracy Problem, makes very similar points. Where are the legal sanctions for professional enablers? Where are the measures to prevent abuse? Where are the mandatory disclosure rules? Where are the penalties for false statements? Where is the necessary whole-of-government approach that is recommended in this respect? The Prime Minister seems to think that regulation by the Solicitors Regulation Authority is a sufficient deterrent.

What is in the Bill as regards legal costs is fairly feeble too. We should be limiting costs payable by law enforcement bodies and regulators acting in the public interest in all civil cases under the Proceeds of Crime Act, as with criminal proceedings. These can represent a severe detriment to enforcement action, and I am very grateful to Spotlight on Corruption for pointing out, for instance, that the costs order against the NCA was in the region of £1.5 million in the case of the Aliyev unexplained wealth order—that is £1.5 million out of the total annual anti-corruption budget of £4 million. It is totally unacceptable. The courts should, of course, still be able to award costs against a law enforcement body or regulator where it has acted unreasonably in bringing or defending proceedings and the interests of justice or fairness would be offended, so there will still be some protection.

I will be tabling amendments in Committee which I hope noble Lords will support. We must tighten the net around these enablers. If not now, when?

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

This is what we are attempting to address in this legislation. We are trying to make the system as transparent as possible, to improve the action on unexplained wealth orders, et cetera.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord has contradicted himself. He said that there was a robust system in place, but he has just talked about money laundering for enablers.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I said there was a robust system in place under the money laundering regulations in response to the various points that were made about financial services professionals, estate agents, et cetera. That is not to say that we cannot improve the system; we certainly look to do that. Providing information and transparency on property ownership, unexplained wealth orders and the sanctions regime, which is what we are doing, will help to supplement that system.

In July 2021, the CPS amended its legal guidance on money laundering offences for prosecutors to make it clear that it is possible to charge someone under Section 330 of POCA, which relates to the failure to disclose money laundering in the regulated sector. This closes a long-standing gap in law enforcement’s toolkit, which will better enable us to tackle the small minority of complicit professional enablers.

In addition, the Solicitors Regulation Authority—the largest legal PBS which supervises approximately 75% of regulated legal service providers in the UK—undertook a broad range of enforcement action in 2021. This included issuing 14 fines totalling £163,000, suspending membership three times and cancelling membership 13 times, effectively preventing an individual conducting regulated activity.

To take another example, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales—the largest accountancy PBS—undertook a broad range of enforcement action. This included issuing 59 fines, totalling £178,000, and cancelling the membership of firms six times—again, effectively preventing an individual conducting regulated activity.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, suggested that we should consider how we can make legal professionals report matters relating to national security in a structured way and without the benefit of legal professional privilege. This is a complicated matter and not for this Bill, but I certainly welcome his contribution and his engagement, and we will certainly look at that.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, raised an important point on protecting whistleblowers. We recognise how valuable it is that whistleblowers are prepared to shine a light on wrongdoing and believe that they should be able to do so without fear of recriminations. The whistleblowing regime enables workers to seek redress if they are dismissed or suffer detriment because they have made a so-called protective disclosure about wrongdoing. It is right and proper that the Government review the whistleblowing framework once we have had sufficient time to build the necessary evidence of impact of the most recent reforms. We are considering the scope and timing of a review.

A number of noble Lords—the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, in particular— raised an important point concerning the wording “knowingly and recklessly”. The wording is drafted on precedent, coming from the Companies Act. This clause is intended to provide a necessary and proportionate deterrent to those who may otherwise provide inaccurate or misleading information on the register of overseas entities. This was debated at length in the other place and the Government have already made a commitment to reconsider the drafting. I also welcome the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, on the sanctions proposals.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, asked about the issue of the register and trusts. If the assets are owned via an overseas legal entity, then this entity is within the scope of the draft Bill and will be required to register the trustees as beneficial owners with Companies House and state the reason that they are the beneficial owner—that is, because they are the trustees of that trust.

Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs introduced a register of trusts in 2017. Trustees of trusts that acquire UK land or property are required to register and provide information on the beneficial ownership of the trust. The information on the register can be shared with law enforcement authorities and enables them to access information on the trustees and beneficiaries of all trusts. Reforms to unexplained wealth orders will also allow law enforcement to investigate the origin of any property held via trusts.

I now turn to the points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Eatwell, on verification. Clause 16 requires the Secretary of State to make regulations requiring the verification of information before an overseas entity makes an application for registration, complies with the updating duty or makes an application to be removed from the live register. To ensure that regulations are laid in a timely way, we have added a requirement for regulations to be made before applications may be made for registration in the register of overseas entities. We expect that UK anti-money laundering supervised professionals may have a part to play in this, and we will set out details on the verification scheme in regulations. Overseas entities will be required to update their information annually, and Companies House will be given broad powers to query information it holds via the further legislation to come later in the year. Also, the very public nature of the register means that there will be many eyes viewing the data, which will of course aid in identifying any inaccuracies. I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier for his comments on whether we are capturing the ultimate beneficiaries of property. This is an important point.

Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 14th March 2022 Lords Chamber

Amendments 16, 26, 27, 31 and 32 are consequential on other amendments to ensure that the new amendments are consistent. I hope that is helpful to noble Lords. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 17. I am delighted that it has also been signed by the noble Lord, Lord Agnew. This would extend the definition of a registerable beneficial owner of an overseas entity to include anyone who is the beneficial owner of land or property held by the entity.

Why does this matter? Let me give an example. Mr X wants to buy a house in London and sets up an overseas company to own the land. In this scenario, he meets the conditions for being a beneficial owner of a company; the Bill works as intended. However, assume our Mr X rather likes his anonymity, so he approaches a Panama law firm which, after a payment, buys the house for him using its general nominee company which holds legal title to many such properties all beneficially owned by different people. The nominee company issues a declaration to Mr X that it is holding the land as his nominee and that he is the beneficial owner of the property.

In this scenario, the nominee company is the overseas entity owning the property and its beneficial owner is the law firm which set it up. Depending on its ownership structure, the partners at the law firm may or may not appear on the register. However, that is not the point. They may be the beneficial owners of the nominee company but are not the beneficial owners of any of the properties owned by the company. Mr X and the other beneficial owners of the properties held by the nominee company do not tick any of the boxes for being a beneficial owner of that company. The declaration issued by the nominee company is private, so in this scenario they remain anonymous.

Is this what the Government intend? Opening the Second Reading debate last week, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, said that the Bill would

“require anonymous foreign owners of UK property to reveal their real identity, ensuring that they can no longer hide behind secretive chains of shell companies.”—[Official Report, 9/3/22; col. 1484.]

That suggests that this is not what the Government intended, and this is where Amendment 17 comes in. By extending the definition of a beneficial owner of an overseas entity holding UK property to include anyone who is the beneficial owner of land or property held by the entity, we would be giving this Bill the scope the Government appear to intend for it.

Responding to last week’s debate in the other House, the Minister there said that if nominee companies were “directed by someone else”—the beneficial owner of the land—then the person doing the directing would be “caught by condition 4” in the definition of a beneficial owner: significant influence or control. But that would only be the case if a separate nominee company is set up for the particular beneficial owner. If a general nominee company is used and this acts for hundreds of different clients, then it is difficult to see that any one of them exercises significant influence or control over the nominee company. That is why Amendment 17 is needed.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the theme of what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, just said, which is the general weakness of the definition of beneficial ownership in this Bill. It is very striking that in other jurisdictions within the British Isles that hold registers of beneficial ownership and have done for some years, the beneficial owner is always defined as an individual and never as a firm or a trust. An individual who ultimately owns or controls the entity must be identified. The Bill as currently constructed has significant weaknesses, which will prevent the identification of individual beneficial owners in the way that the Government apparently intend but have not as yet achieved.

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[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, I think that everybody in this House, as was the case last week, is on the same page, and we do not want to be seen to be arguing amongst ourselves until the early hours of the morning about something that is so significant. But can I ask the Minister if he and his colleagues in his department will keep a rolling review of this going, even if the gap between this legislation and the next piece of legislation is comparatively short? The last thing we would want is to see some oligarch on the front page of a national newspaper smirking that he or she had circumvented and found some way of actually getting around the will of Parliament and humiliating us. It would be seen, I think, as a failure of policy. I am sure that the Minister is very conscious of that, but it would be helpful if he could tell us that his department will monitor this on an ongoing basis, and not deal with this as a one-off and just leave it to the next piece of legislation.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, perhaps I could just add to what the noble Lord has just said. The Minister mentioned the regulations which are possible post the passing of the Bill. Will he undertake to review some of the points made during the passage of this Bill and consider whether or not regulations might be needed to fill certain gaps?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Indeed, I am happy to provide the reassurances that both noble Lords have asked for—in the case of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in terms of the regulations, and in the case of the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that we see this as an iterative process. As I mentioned, this is fairly unique legislation in the world; we are aware of only one other country, possibly, that has attempted to do something similar. When we introduced the provisions on PSCs—persons with significant control—in relation to UK companies, we had to make some iterative changes to that, as it became evident over time that aspects were not working as effectively as we had hoped. I hope that we have thought of everything on this one, and I hope that we have all of the details correct, but a lot of it—some of it anyway—has been drafted in haste and it is possible that we will have missed one or two complicated international devices. But, the noble Lord can be assured that we will keep it regularly under review, and if there are—I hesitate to use the word “loopholes”, although it is probably appropriate—devices that clever lawyers, of which there are several in this House, find to get around the provisions, we will not hesitate to close them if we need to.

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[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, there is clearly a great deal we can learn from Jersey and I am very happy to follow the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell.

I will speak to Amendment 24, to which I have added my name, and will also make a couple of comments on Amendment 53—there may be a slight sense of déjà vu, as my noble friend Lord Vaux has done the same.

In relation to Amendment 24, on page 3 of his very helpful all-Peers letter of 11 March, the Minister explains that Companies House would not know if a legal entity registered abroad was compliant with the 14-day rule. Likewise, this would not be visible to a third party, whereas that third party could be confident that, if an annual date had passed, the register would be up to date.

I am not convinced that that is so clear-cut or indeed helpful. This approach means that, for up to 12 months, an entity could keep hidden its change in ownership structure. Only at that point would it be in breach if it had not disclosed the change—or possibly multiple changes. Assuming—which may be a bold assumption given some of the entities—that the entity indeed complied with a 12-month date to reveal changes, this would still leave the third party in the dark for up to 12 months and the entity under no obligation to register the changes and having that as a defence. In short, it is possible for entities to game the system by carefully timing their changes. Twelve months, or even one month, can be a long time in business.

This also makes it possible for an entity to waste the time and resources of the acquirer and the regulatory and enforcement agencies if, for example, it becomes subject to sanctions based on its ownership but can claim, at a time to suit itself, that the affected owner or owners actually no longer own it. A 14-day limit greatly tightens the ability of both the registrar and any third party to see, at least in the case of compliant entities, any registered changes in as close to real time as is practicable.

Where entities are not compliant and fail to declare changes in this timely way, should this emerge in due course, it should give the third-party acquirer grounds for withdrawal and the authorities grounds for pursuit. This does leave an obligation on the registrar to ensure that entries are kept up to date, but that is a technological and resourcing issue perhaps better addressed in other amendments. For these reasons, I added my name to Amendment 24 and support it. I urge the Minister to rethink the 14-day requirement.

I shall now make a few comments on Amendment 53. In paragraph 4 on page 2 of the same letter, in relation to the purpose of the Bill, the Minister acknowledges that there will be those who seek to exploit opportunities to avoid it—he also referred to this earlier today. I raised at Second Reading the issue that there are enablers whose approach to reporting suspicions is light-touch or simply to turn a blind eye. I also advocated the idea put forward very eloquently by my noble friend Lord Vaux a few moments ago of having a named senior official on the hook. Simply saying that existing regulations cover this is to deny the evidence that there are entities and enablers in the area addressed by this Bill that have been skirting round existing regulations too easily by claiming ignorance or that suspicion was only mild. I think this may be more specifically reflected in the reference in paragraph 5 on page 5 of the Minister’s letter of 11 March, which says in relation to verification of information that:

“We expect that this will include a role for professionals regulated in the UK by the Money Laundering Regulations.”


This amendment, by including suspicion rather than certain knowledge, covers the loophole by which enablers can claim not to have had certain knowledge even if they should have had reasonable suspicion. This makes it considerably more difficult for enablers and others to look the other way and strengthens the hand of those seeking to hold them better to account. I support this amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 53. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Cromwell and Lord Vaux, for their support, although I understand that they would like to see this tweaked to go further. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for his supportive comments.

The Bill needs to be comprehensively amended to close the loopholes that currently allow professional enablers to undermine the effectiveness of, and even circumvent, the checks aimed at detecting, disrupting and deterring economic crime. One of the key ways this can be done is by imposing a positive duty on professional enablers to disclose knowledge or reasonable suspicion that misleading, false or deceptive information has been provided to the registrar of overseas entities.

As I set out on Second Reading, professional enablers, such as lawyers, accountants and bankers, are the gatekeepers of economic crime and the Government need to adopt a comprehensive strategy towards them. Given the nature of their work, there is an inherently high risk that these professionals may unwittingly enable economic crime, but there are also enablers that specialise in services aimed at concealing the source of wealth or ownership so as to frustrate the objectives of the law.

This poses a particularly acute challenge in the context of the Bill’s attempt to tighten the checks around the beneficial ownership of property by overseas entities. The UK’s 2017 national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing revealed that 50% of suspicious activity reports related to the legal sector in 2016 were linked to the property market, illustrating that real estate transactions are especially susceptible to money laundering.

As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, very eloquently deconstructed, the Minister prayed in aid regulation by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales on Second Reading. Does the Minister really believe that these regulators are the way to tackle these professional enablers? The current model for supervising professional enablers is fragmented and weak. In the legal and accountancy sectors alone, there are 22 different professional body supervisors, or PBSs. In its 2021 report, the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision found that the vast majority—some 81%—of these legal and accounting PBSs do not implement an effective risk-based approach to supervising their members as required by the money laundering regulations. Where is the evidence that they can do the kind of job needed to root out corrupt behaviour in sanctions avoidance or as envisaged by this Bill?

In summary, it is critical that the Bill addresses the heightened risk that professional enablers, particularly conveyancers and lawyers, will frustrate the objectives of the register of overseas entities. Beyond this modest amendment, urgent reform is needed—I hope it will take place in the second Bill—to ensure that there is effective, comprehensive supervision of professional enablers. This should be fully addressed when we come to the second economic crime Bill.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak today. I came to learn and listen to the experts on areas I do not know much about. But listening to the noble Lords, Lord Cromwell and Lord Clement-Jones, I am reminded of an example. I know this would not be classed as money laundering, but the well-known spiv, Aaron Banks, was responsible for what is, I think, the biggest political donation in British history—I think it was £8 million—during the Brexit referendum period. When it came to investigation by the Electoral Commission, which had the responsibility for doing this, he was not an unwitting enabler. His conclusion was, “We’re cleverer than the regulator.” The Minister does not want to be faced with that during the passage of this Bill and its actions, so he would be very wise to accept the spirit of some of these amendments.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Yes, that provides the required legal certainty to the third party that is buying it, at the expense of, perhaps, a certain amount of transparency for that 11.5-month period. So, yes, I accept that.

The annual update already requires an overseas entity to provide information about its current beneficial owners, as well as any changes since its last update. This latter information was added as a result of the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, providing a complete picture of an overseas entity’s beneficial owners. For these reasons we do not believe a change in the updating period is necessary or desirable, and I therefore encourage noble Lords not to press their amendments.

Turning to government Amendments 49, 50, 51 and 52, the Government have listened to the concerns raised about the need to deal effectively with anyone seeking to file false or misleading information or those who know or suspect that they may be filing false information, and we have taken on board those concerns. I thank all noble Lords who raised these concerns with me. They made the point that the evidential threshold to prove intent or recklessness is too high in the clauses as drafted. I have therefore tabled these government amendments to ensure that those who provide false or misleading information “without reasonable excuse”—in other words, a lower legal barrier—can be prosecuted and are subject on conviction to an unlimited fine. This will catch those who seek to facilitate and enable money launderers and the corrupt.

Furthermore, we have amended the threshold for what, under our amendments, constitutes an aggravated offence. This removes the reference to the word “recklessly”, which caused a lot of concern in the other place and to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and others in this place. It also retains the potential for imprisonment and an unlimited fine if convicted of the aggravated offence of knowingly filing false, misleading or deceptive information. I hope this addresses the concerns.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for Amendment 53, which would create a criminal offence of failing to disclose to the registrar certain information when a professional knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that misleading, false, or otherwise deceptive information was provided to them in their professional capacity. Again, I understand the noble Lord’s motive for proposing this new clause, but I hope that he will agree that his aims can be met by the existing provisions in the legislation regarding offences for the provision of false information, as developed in the way I have just set out by the Government’s amendments to lower the threshold needed for prosecution. We are confident that this will ensure that enforcement agencies have sufficient capacity to tackle those who seek to subvert the integrity of the register through the provision of misleading information.

I also take this opportunity to reassure the noble Lord—

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am afraid I do not agree with the Minister; I am amazed that he thought that I would. The Government need a strategy to catch these enablers in the way that they currently operate. What strategy do the Government have? The Minister was just about to pass on to other things. He has prayed in aid the professional regulators, such as the SRA and the ICAEW, and he has more or less said that the legislation is absolutely fine: it will catch the enablers properly. But does the Government not need a proper strategy for dealing with enablers? They cannot gloss this over. Is the Minister prepared to look at this carefully before the next Bill?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Of course, we are constantly looking at these matters. The Treasury is implicitly engaged in pursuing crackdowns on the so-called enablers that the noble Lord has mentioned, and the anti-money laundering regulations exist. This register, which is a transparency measure, is designed to provide information to the public, HMRC and other law enforcement agencies that can then take the appropriate action under the other provisions. However—before the noble Lord, Lord Fox, gets up—I totally agree with the noble Lord that we need to look again at whether the anti-money laundering statutes are appropriate. It is not for this legislation, but I am sure it is something we will want to look at in detail before we get to the next Bill, because it is a complicated area of law. If we do not, I am sure the noble Lord will wish to table his amendments again then.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I am happy to agree with the noble Lord. If there is one firm of accountants or one legal practice that is turning a blind eye to these provisions, there is a problem with which we need to deal. Nobody wants to see that; we want to give the UK a reputation as the best place in the world to do business and to crack down on the small minority of the legal profession that are abusing their position and facilities—of course we would want to do that.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the Minister and slow the proceedings but, on that point, the Minister began to move, gradually, towards thinking about the enablers, and mentioned anti-money laundering legislation. But it is wider than that: it is about sanctions, economic crime in general and the provisions of this Bill. Is the Minister prepared to undertake to look more broadly across the piece?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Yes. Obviously, a number of different government departments would be involved in doing this, but a number have been involved in putting the provisions into this Bill, and a number will be involved in the provisions of the next economic crime Bill. Of course, we want to take action against lawyers and accountants who abuse their positions to benefit some of these oligarchs and others. We have all seen the press reports and we all know the people that we are concerned about. I would not seek to defend them in the slightest, and I hope that we will be able to put the appropriate sanctions in place to deal with them.

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Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

90: Clause 47, leave out Clause 47 and insert the following new Clause—
“Civil recovery: costs of proceedings
After section 316 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 insert—“Civil recovery: costs of proceedings<strong>316A </strong> Costs orders(1) This section applies to proceedings brought by an enforcement authority under part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.(2) The court may not make an order that any costs of proceedings relating to a case to which this section applies (including appeal proceedings) are payable by an enforcement authority to a respondent or a specified responsible officer in respect of the involvement of the respondent or the officer in those proceedings, unless—(a) the authority acted unreasonably in making or opposing the application to which the proceedings relate, or in supporting or opposing the making of the order to which the proceedings relate, or(b) the authority acted dishonestly or improperly in the course of the proceedings.””

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

This amendment would provide limits on costs orders in relation to all civil recovery proceedings brought by an enforcement authority under Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which enables law enforcement authorities to recover property obtained through unlawful conduct without the evidentiary difficulties of securing a criminal conviction. The effective exercise of these powers is essential if civil recovery is to fulfil its purpose of deterring criminals who are as concerned, if not more concerned, with losing their assets than they are with losing their liberty.

The current costs regime for civil recovery is fragmented, with different rules applicable in different courts. I am very well aware that on the other side of the aisle are some of the experts in this area. Civil Procedure Rules apply in the High Court, the Court of Appeal and county courts. Rule 44.2 of the CPR sets out the general principles in civil proceedings that costs follow the result—that is, the winner pays the loser’s costs, but the court retains discretion to make a different order and determine the amount of costs to be paid. The principles relevant to the exercise of judicial discretion to award costs in civil proceedings in the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts have evolved over time through case law.

In civil proceedings brought by public authorities in the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts, the approach to costs is reflected in the so-called Perinpanathan principle. This includes civil recovery proceedings brought under Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. In the Perinpanathan case, the Court of Appeal held that, where a public authority is unsuccessful in bringing an application, the default position or starting point is that no order for costs is made. However, a successful private party may be awarded costs if the conduct of the public authority justifies it. As a result, enforcement authorities will rarely have to pay costs when pursuing civil recovery in the magistrates’ court, but are exposed to significant costs in High Court proceedings, where the general rule is that the unsuccessful party pays the legal costs of the successful party.

Clauses 47 and 48 reflect a recognition that significant and deterring costs have made enforcement authorities reluctant to utilise unexplained wealth orders in their current iteration. Only nine UWOs, relating to four cases, have been obtained by the National Crime Agency since this investigative tool was introduced in January 2018. The unsuccessful UWO application in the Aliyev case, which I mentioned at Second Reading, left the NCA facing £1.5 million in legal costs.

Limiting the liability of enforcement authorities to pay costs in UWO proceedings is a welcome step, but it is a piecemeal intervention which does not address the chilling effect of adverse costs orders in civil recovery proceedings more broadly. This proposed amendment seeks to ensure consistency of approach in civil recovery proceedings so that adequate cost protections encourage enforcement authorities to put their economic crime-fighting tools to effective use. At present, the prospect of prohibitively expensive legal costs effectively renders certain assets out of the reach of underresourced law enforcement agencies. We need a new, consistent cost protection regime for law enforcement agencies and regulators under the Proceeds of Crime Act as a whole.

I am very grateful to Spotlight on Corruption for raising this issue and laying the grounds for this amendment. The starting point should be that a law enforcement body or regulator should not be ordered to pay costs where it is unsuccessful in bringing or defending civil proceedings. This would have the effect of each party bearing its own costs. However, the court should retain discretion to depart from this default rule in cases where there is good reason. This could include where the law enforcement body or regulator has acted unreasonably in bringing or defending proceedings and where the interests of justice and fairness would be offended, including where substantial financial hardship is likely to be suffered by the successful party if a costs order is not made.

I very much hope that the Government see the merits of Amendment 90 and of applying it in the same way to Scotland—the notice to oppose the Question that Clause 48 stand part of the Bill would have exactly that effect. I beg to move.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be brief. I have listened very careful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my understanding is that the Government are seeking to protect the enforcement bodies, such as the National Crime Agency, from the costs of legal action. Clearly, it is important to provide these agencies with an element of cover from being pursued for costs, as they must be free to investigate activities as they see fit and not fear the potential costs of bringing what they believe to be a legitimate case. As we have heard already tonight, the resources available to those being investigated is often hugely significant.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is proposing a much broader approach on this than in the government clauses, applying the principle to all civil recovery proceedings under Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, not just to unexplained wealth orders. The Bill is quite narrow in scope, and the Government may not see fit to put this into this legislation, but I hope that there is an opportunity to debate this further. I would be grateful if the Minister could say something not just on whether it fits into this Bill but on the Government’s general approach to the issue.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

Yes, I think I was clear in my opening remarks that I am not at odds with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, at all. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, is absolutely right that, in the longer term, we should look across the whole cost landscape. What I am trying to say is that, in protecting agencies incurring costs in Part 5, it unintentionally removes the current clauses relating to Part 8. I am trying to differentiate between Part 8 and Part 5 of POCA. It is utterly unintentional, I am sure, but I hope that helps the noble Lord.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister is speaking the language I understand now—if it is technically flawed, then of course it is ripe for withdrawal. I welcome what the Minister said about getting consistency across the landscape, because that is clearly important. There is absolutely no reason why it should not be across the whole of the proceeds of crime landscape.

Perhaps I can squeeze a commitment out of the Minister. We managed to get the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, to commit to looking at certain aspects of enablers in the second economic crime Bill—I think we need to call it the ECB 2 now. If the Minister could give us a commitment that the Government will look at this question of the cost landscape as part of the second round, when we can consider these issues in much greater detail and at greater length, then I would be entirely satisfied.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I am very happy to explore the cost landscape after this Bill because, as I said, I am principally not at odds with the noble Lord at all.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I share the sentiment of my noble friend that they will not be a niche activity. The measures in this Bill, particularly in terms of costs, will make it far easier for our law enforcement agencies to not be stymied by costs in bringing these things forward.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her responses. As she understands, one of my main motives is to bring pleasure to the Treasury. Given that the NCA’s budget—we talked about its budget—for crime prevention is, I think, something like £4 million and there was £1.5 million in costs in the Aliyev case, we would clearly all be winners if this review takes place. I thank the Minister for that commitment and, in the meantime, beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 90 withdrawn.