Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Campbell-Savours
Main Page: Lord Campbell-Savours (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Campbell-Savours's debates with the Department for Transport
(4 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this too is a probing amendment, as it does not fully capture the intention behind the issue that I raised during Second Reading on confiscation of equipment. The Minister at the time led me to believe that she would seek to answer in correspondence the issue that I raised, but the letter that Members have received does not refer to it. I do not blame her; perhaps she might deal with it today.
I have carefully read the Explanatory Memorandum and the Bill, and the only reference to confiscation is paragraph 2(6) of Schedule 8, which states:
“A constable may seize anything that the constable discovers in the course of a search under this paragraph if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that it is evidence in relation to a relevant ANO offence or a relevant prison offence.”
That part of the Bill seems to relate only to condition C under paragraph 2(5) of Schedule 8; in other words, it relates only to prison intervention by drone-related offences. My Amendment 25 would add only a right of appeal for restoration of property. I am worried that I see no reference to confiscation under any other schedules to the Bill. I will concentrate my remarks on the links between Schedules 8 and 10, which is the subject of a later reference in this group—or it was until this morning, when I came here and found that there had been a regrouping.
Before doing so, I will make a few general comments. First, have we any estimate of the numbers of drones available for use in the United Kingdom, of all types, commercial and recreational? We have an estimate of 530,000 drone sales in 2014—that came out of one of these documents; I found it very hard to believe—and a further estimate of 1.5 million to be sold in subsequent years. Again, I do not know where this information comes from, but it is in one of the publications. Do the Government have any real stats on the availability of this equipment?
Secondly, I am not too worried about commercial operators. They will, generally speaking, keep within the rules and the law—although there is some evidence of the need for some commercial operators to be more knowledgeable, and for some airport operators to be more flexible and understanding about charging and issues of access, in particular regarding the size of restriction zones. My primary concern is the rogue operator, using sub-250-gram UAVs, and large equipment used privately by individuals, whether they are plain stupid in the way they use this equipment, or are drug dealers arranging for the carrying of drugs, crime gangs involved in illicit surveillance, potential terrorists who may wish to deploy weapons even in very small quantities or using small drones, or those who breach personal security where privacy is involved. Mr Geoffrey Hirst, a drone user, told a Commons committee recently that even a proportion of the recreational drone community are reckless, whether intentionally or not. We know that these small, sub-250-gram drones can be dangerous. When a joint test between the Military Aviation Authority and BALPA was recently undertaken, it was concluded that in a mid-air collision significant damage could be caused to a helicopter or aircraft.
I return to Schedule 10—subject to what has happened, but that was beyond my control. Under “Fixed penalties for certain offences relating to unmanned aircraft”, it states:
“The constable may give … a fixed penalty notice in respect of the fixed penalty offence if Condition A and Condition B are met.”
Condition A states that that includes: endangering another aircraft; causing any harm, harassment or alarm or distress; causing nuisance or annoyance; disturbing public order; or damaging property, all of which the accused could very easily deny. The only one that may be provable could be the undermining of good order in a prison, which is why we have the paragraph 2(6) of Schedule 8 confiscation provisions which I have already referred to. Nearly all the others can be denied by the accused, and it will be very hard for anyone to prove otherwise. If the police officer gives the offender within the zone the benefit of the doubt, the offender will receive only a fixed penalty notice. Furthermore, if the person is under 18, they will not even receive a fixed penalty notice—effectively, an open invitation for the adult offender to lay responsibility on minors to hide their guilt and penalty. In other words, “Not me guv, it was the kids that did it”. They will effectively run rings round the drone code, with its hyped registration, responsibility and distance control requirements.
Yes, it includes all unmanned aircraft. Various bulk uploads will come from model aircraft clubs, so we expect that number to climb. Over the course of this Bill, perhaps when we get to Report, I am happy to look for an update on that and to give some indication of where we think more people registering their drones will come from.
Setting out the background to this, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, mentioned a number of offences to which he assumed a fixed penalty notice could be attached. I believe they may not be given for those more serious offences to which he referred. Subsequent to this, I hope to be able to set out precisely what will be given to each level of offence, because there is perhaps a little confusion. I will go through my explanation, because there are opportunities for confiscation and forfeiture, which I hope will mean that the noble Lords are content to withdraw their amendments. Let us just see how we go.
Amendment 25 would give the police the power to confiscate an unmanned aircraft if a constable has required it to be grounded. Amendments 27 and 30 would require somebody to forfeit the unmanned aircraft as the penalty for unlawful use. I reiterate that my department has worked closely with the Home Office to ensure that the powers in this Bill are proportionate—that is an important word here—because we do not want to stifle a nascent, growing and potentially very useful drone industry. We do not want to discourage or alienate those who seek to use the unmanned aircraft sector lawfully, because it should be very useful as we go forward. We have also worked with the police, who are confident that they have the powers in this Bill to provide effective enforcement.
The amendment on confiscation, Amendment 25, would provide a potentially disproportionate power to the police, in addition to the existing powers in the Bill for them to require an unmanned aircraft, rather than an unmanned vehicle, to be grounded.
Why should a drone that goes into one of these restricted zones, which could potentially cause huge damage, not be confiscated?
If the noble Lord will bear with me, that drone would probably be confiscated by a constable for a different reason.
In our opinion, the amendment on forfeiture would also provide a potentially disproportionate penalty for those who commit most likely very minor offences of failing to ground an unmanned aircraft when asked to do so by police, or failing to comply with a constable’s request to inspect that small unmanned aircraft. While we feel that it would be disproportionate to insert these powers of confiscation and forfeiture regarding these two offences, it should be noted that the police have powers of confiscation elsewhere in the Bill and already in law.
Under the Bill, the police will have the power to stop and search a person or vehicle where they have reasonable grounds to suspect they will find an unmanned aircraft that is or has been involved in the commission of one of the offences specified in paragraph 2 of Schedule 8. This is for more serious offences, such as interfering with aircraft. This stop and search power gives the police constable the power to seize anything they discover in the course of a search if they have reasonable grounds to believe it is evidence relating to one of those offences.
The summary of all the stop and search offences was given out at the all-Peers meeting and I am very happy to send round this ready reckoner, which shows which offences fall under stop and search if there is suspicion of them. They are, for example, flying above 400 feet or within an exclusion zone of an airport. If there was a stop and search in that case, that item could be seized as evidence. Similarly, when entering and searching a premises under warrant using the powers in the Bill, a constable might seize an unmanned aircraft or any article associated with it if they have reason to believe it has been involved in the commission of one of the offences set out in paragraph 7 of Schedule 8.
The noble and gallant Lord makes a very interesting and valid point about deterrence, which is probably quite separate from the line I sought to convince him of. Noble Lords have mentioned that a very good drone might cost, say, £500, but the penalties we are talking about for some of the offences that could have been committed are fines up to a maximum of £2,500.
If, indeed, they are paid, which I will come on to—perhaps in the letter—because there are some very significant deterrents. If we are after a deterrent, we have those deterrents. Do we feel it is proportionate for property to be forfeited for fairly minor contraventions? We do not.
I shall say just one or two words. The Minister has offered to write us a letter. It is not a letter we want. We want it in the law. The letter will interpret the law in a way that she believes will satisfy the concerns we have expressed. I am worried about the guy out there with a drone. He is not going to read the law. He wants very simple principles established that he can understand. In the light of the interpretation that the Minister has put on the law during the interventions, I do not understand the law, and the other day I spent more than an hour going through these clauses to try to work out what was applicable in what circumstances. I put it to the Minister that the law is badly drafted. I have never said that in this House before. It is badly drafted, and we need far greater clarity in the clauses that Parliament is required to clear.
I predict that in the Commons, when MPs with airports in their constituency get their hands on the Bill, they will rubbish this clause because they will be dissatisfied with the provisions as explained to us. I say to the civil servants now that they should think in advance, before the Bill gets to the Commons, about how they will deal with the objections that will inevitably arise.
The Minister says that the role of government is to be proportionate. I agree. However, a small drone of 250 grams within a restricted zone can bring down a jumbo jet, with hundreds of lives lost. I think I am being proportionate and the Government are not in not understanding that that is the danger we are considering. The Minister has laid words on the record today that, in the event of a disaster, people will pore over and wonder what the hell she was talking about. I shall no doubt come back to this on Report, but I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for introducing this group of amendments, which gives us the opportunity to discuss the stop and search powers and the resourcing of police, and to dip our first toe in the water on delegated powers.
We recognise that stop and search is a significant power and that it is essential that we use it appropriately and proportionately. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, rightly recognised that the consultation on the use of stop and search for drones reported before Gatwick. Therefore, the powers in this Bill were included as a result of a significant amount of consultation after Gatwick to make sure that we got it right. Since that consultation concluded, officials have had various meetings with stakeholders to discuss the consultation response both within and outside government. Those consulted include the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice and BEIS, as well as the National Police Chiefs’ Council and CT Policing. The Department for Transport has also met groups such as BALPA and the Guild of Air Traffic Control Officers, who in general support the police powers proposed in the Bill.
It is important that the powers be used only where proportionate, so there are a number of limits in the Bill. In the first instance, a constable must have grounds for suspecting that they will find an unmanned aircraft or something associated with an unmanned aircraft, such as a controller, and that the unmanned aircraft or article has been involved in the commission of one of the offences specified in the Bill. I shall send the schedule to noble Lords.
The Minister referred to BALPA. Is she saying that BALPA has expressed no reservations whatever about the police powers?
I am not aware that BALPA has any reservations about the stop and search powers under discussion.
I am afraid that I cannot recall exactly what BALPA’s reservations are—whether it has reservations about other police powers—but it was certainly one of the stakeholders that we spoke to regarding stop and search. As a consequence of the conversations that we had, we believe that introducing the powers in this Bill is proportionate and appropriate.
The more serious offences that could be liable to stop and search go towards the higher end of the penalty range and might involve transferring articles into or out of prisons et cetera. The Bill also sets out further conditions that need to be met. For offences that could be considered less serious, the conditions are more stringent. For example, in relation to Article 95 of the Air Navigation Order, flying a small unmanned surveillance aircraft too close to people, or Article 239(4), flying within a prohibited area, where it is more likely that somebody has committed an offence unintentionally —which again goes back to proportionality—stop and search can be used only where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the commission of an offence using an unmanned aircraft or associated article was for one of the following purposes: endangering an aircraft, which I think noble Lords would all agree should be top of the list; causing any person harm, harassment, alarm or distress; undermining security, good order or discipline in any prison or institution where people are lawfully detained; damaging property, or threatening national security. So, there are many offences where stop and search does not apply—for example, Article 94, including flying beyond visual line of sight without permission and flying commercially without permission. Here, stop and search would not be applicable.
We also recognise that it is very important to minimise the potential for discrimination in the exercise of police powers. In addition to the limitations written into the Bill, the conduct and recording of the Bill powers will be subject to Sections 2 and 3 of PACE, for which there is already guidance for police in Code A, the code of practice for police in the exercise of statutory powers of stop and search. Code A will apply to the Bill powers to ensure that they are being exercised appropriately.
My Lords, I only wish that the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, had been here during earlier proceedings on the Bill because we dealt with the issues that he referred to.
I wonder whether Ministers have considered the 22nd report of the Commons Select Committee, entitled Commercial and Recreational Drone Use in the UK, and its recommendation. I want to read that recommendation out because it is at the heart of the amendment moved by the noble Baroness from the Liberal Democrat Benches. The committee said that they are
“concerned that there are differing accounts within the aviation community about the likely severity of damage of a drone collision with an airplane. Furthermore, there are differing accounts of the number of near misses and the reliability of airprox reports has been disputed. The Committee is concerned that there is no agreed position on the likely consequences of a drone-airplane impact. The Government should complete a substantive risk assessment”—
exactly what the noble Baroness said—
“by the end of 2020.”
That is the end of this year. The report went on:
“If it is not possible to publish the result of this assessment due to security concerns, the Government must provide this Committee with evidential assurances that this work has been done.”
Well, it has not been done. The Select Committee recommendation has been ignored.
To go back further in the committee’s evidence, the CAA said that
“It is considered unlikely that a small drone would cause significant damage to a modern turbo-fan jet engine”.
I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, will be interested in what the report then states because he was a BALPA airline pilot, if I recall correctly:
“Captain Tim Pottage, representing BALPA, voiced caution about the CAA’s position. Captain Pottage said that he was … ‘Concerned that the CAA had that view. There has been no testing of a drone against a large commercial high bypass jet engine—none at all. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it would cause a catastrophic failure, causing a blade to shed and not to be contained within the engine cell.’”
That is what is worrying us in the House. We will have a lot of people telling us not to worry about it and that it will not happen, but if it does happen, who will be held to blame? I believe that it will be this Government.
My Lords, the House should thank the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, for introducing her amendment and enabling a discussion about, essentially, attempting to future-proof this legislation, which is extremely difficult to do.
I am afraid that I follow my noble friend Lord Tebbit’s analysis of the situation. We have to draw the line somewhere. It is important to move ahead with the legislation more or less as drafted—that is, as it appears before the Committee. It is difficult to legislate for future technical solutions, such as geofencing and reliable, low-cost, low-weight but high-power transponders that would have to be developed to be included in every single drone. Lightweight transponders exist at the moment—light enough to be put into gliders, for example—but they have relatively high power requirements. There is also the requirement for them to have very high integrity. If these drones are carrying a transponder and giving false information because the transponder costs £5, for example, air traffic control could be disrupted perhaps worse than by the original offence relating to where the device is being flown.
While I welcome the debate that the noble Baroness has facilitated through her amendment, I am sympathetic with my noble friend the Minister in trying to produce legislation that, as far as technologically we can, tackles the situation as it prevails at the moment while attempting to future-proof—often through the use of Henry VIII powers, which was the subject of the previous debate on Schedule 10. We need that flexibility. Some compromise is required to achieve that, and I suggest that that compromise is the use of delegated powers. It seems entirely clear that we will have to revisit this in the not too distant future, even after this Bill becomes law.
The noble Baroness makes a couple of very interesting points, including that in many cases, people do not intend to commit these offences and if given a slap on the wrist and a fixed-penalty notice, they probably would not do it again. When the noble Baroness asked if I wanted to make an intervention, I was listening intently because I want to hear ideas about what we should be doing that we have not done already, and where the deficiencies are.
Let me address some of the ideas of noble Lords; others we will take away and look at further. My noble friend Lord Naseby said that there must be a minimum age. There is a minimum age: you must be over 18 to operate a drone. You must also pass a competency test to be a remote pilot, but the operator of the drone is the person responsible. I think we can agree that the minimum age issue has been dealt with.
On remote ID and electronic conspicuity, the delegated Act is in UK law. The noble Baroness suggested demanding that every drone has electronic conspicuity. We do not want to favour one drone manufacturer over another. We want to ensure that the technology we receive can develop naturally. It was agreed among EU members that a three-year transition period would be appropriate, but electronic conspicuity is in British law. It will be coming over the transition period, as we agreed with our colleagues in the EU.
The noble Baroness also asked why the process is not like car registration. It already is. One must register a drone, and it has a number on it, like a car number plate. So we already have registration and competency testing; these things are already part of UK law. I am therefore still looking for what it is we should be doing better. Geo-awareness and geo-fencing, like electronic conspicuity, are in the EU delegated Act, so they are in UK law.
Forgive me—I cannot recall which noble Lord mentioned BVLOS, but we already have drones that can fly beyond the visual line of sight. It is illegal to do so; that is already within our legislation. It cannot be done without permission.
I am slightly at a loss as to where we can take this further. Noble Lords mentioned areas that stray into other parts of the law, but on privacy, for example, which the Government take extremely seriously, we want to stop invasions of people’s privacy, but we consider the existing legislation sufficient. Article 95 of the air navigation order specifies that equipment must not be flown over or within 150 metres of a congested areas or an organised open area assembly of more than 1,000 people, within 50 metres of any third person, or within 30 metres during take-off and landing. The 50-metre limit also applies to structures, including houses. Capturing an image from over 50 metres away is possible, I suppose, but then the GDPR regulations and the Data Protection Act come in to protect people’s privacy. Other criminal legislation which noble Lords considered more recently around voyeurism includes the Sexual Offences Act 2003. So, there is existing legislation which protects privacy. Again, I am happy to listen to opinions on where the legislation is deficient and how it specifically relates to drones, rather than just general privacy information.
Perhaps I can answer the Minister’s question. She asked what can be done. Very simply—if she has listened to the debate she will know—confiscate any drone that enters one of these zones.
I am aware that that is the noble Lord’s position, but I am not sure that evidence exists that if confiscation becomes part of the Bill, it automatically means that nothing bad will ever happen to drones—or that it will make any difference at all—given that the penalties are already far higher than the cost of a drone.
I thank my noble friend for that good example. I am not against this; I just wonder what the evidence is. I shall ask my officials to look for more examples and to see whether it is likely to be proportionate and a deterrent, and whether the existing penalty system is sufficient to deter not only minor offences but the most serious.
The noble Viscount referred to seizure as against confiscation. Perhaps we should simply substitute confiscation for seizure.
Perhaps I may be of help. It was pointed out to me that if I did not re-licence my shotgun within the statutory time limit I was given, the gun would be taken away from my premises. I do not know whether that would be for ever, but it would certainly be taken away for a long time.