(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat the House do now resolve itself into Committee.
My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into a Committee upon the Bill.
My Lords, there is a remarkable similarity between the discussions on this amendment and the discussions we have had over the years on self-driving, autonomous cars. The only difference is that this is three-dimensional and the other one is generally two. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, and the noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, both gave examples of a question I have long had. The noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, mentioned two drones meeting over a pipeline or something, but the problem remains: how does a constable identify the person who is in control, or whatever? He is sitting in his car with his machine—or however he is going to do it—but how will he identify that? He cannot really arrest either the drone or the person unless he can identify them first. I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to explain this rather simple bit of logic which has escaped me so far.
My Lords, I thank the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, for introducing this small group of amendments and giving us the opportunity to probe this wording, because it is incredibly important that we understand that the wording is fit for purpose. While I understand the intention behind his amendments, after careful consideration the Government believe that the existing wording in paragraph 1 of Schedule 8 regarding a person or persons controlling an unmanned aircraft is fit for purpose in relation to both manual and pre-programmed operations.
On Amendment 24, regarding the power for a constable to require a person to ground a UA—unmanned aircraft—a constable could exercise this power in relation to a UA performing a manual or pre-programmed operation if they had reasonable grounds for believing a person or small group of persons to be controlling that aircraft. Where this reasonable belief exists, the constable could require a person to ground the UA regardless of whether it was pre-programmed or not— hence the existing wording is sufficient for the power to be effective in the circumstances envisaged by the noble and gallant Lord.
A similar issue arises in Amendment 26; again, “controlling” refers to the UA when it is being flown either manually or in a pre-programmed mode if it is capable of that. It is therefore our view that the distinction that the amendment seeks to make would have no discernible benefit, since the description implies a person controlling a UA in line with the existing wording in the Bill. However, the Government recognise that UA technology is constantly evolving, and we will continue to keep our policies under review to ensure that they remain fit for purpose.
On the point made by my noble friend Lord Glenarthur about helicopters and pipelines, he is quite right that unmanned aircraft will increasingly be used for tasks such as patrolling pipelines, railways and all sorts of other things. However, under the current regulations drones should not fly over 400 feet and must remain within line of sight—to go beyond line of sight is against the regulations. They must have permission to do either of those two things. To get that permission, one would assume that those operating the helicopter would be aware that there might be drones operating in that area.
On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, about identifying the person, the constable must have a reasonable suspicion that the person is controlling the unmanned aircraft. That is not infallible, but a reasonable suspicion is not certainty. Therefore, given that the drone must remain within line of sight, a person will probably be able to be seen.
I hope that, based on this explanation, the noble and gallant Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister for her reply, which I shall obviously want to look at. I am still left very unclear about the depth of thought that has been given to this. She talks about situations where somebody is obeying the law and this does not matter, but I am concerned about the individual who is not obeying the law—who is flying above 500 feet and beyond sight of their drone. It seems to me that more is required than is presently available in the Bill—but at the moment I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
This, again, is an aspect of the Bill where there is unanimity across all sides of the House—we are all trying to achieve the same purpose. The question is how best to do so, especially in an environment where technology is moving extremely fast. I am certainly sympathetic to the sentiments expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and other Members of the Committee.
When the Minister comes to reply to this very interesting debate, perhaps she might describe the other sanctions that a rogue operator may be subject to in addition to the fixed penalties outlined in Schedule 10. We are talking about a broad variety of potential consequences, from annoying the neighbours on a sunny summer’s afternoon to deliberately trying to destroy an aircraft containing hundreds of passengers over central London. What sanctions could have faced the operator or the person in control—to use the phraseology of the noble and gallant Lord—who caused the disruption to Gatwick only a short while ago whose extremely irresponsible actions could have resulted in a high degree of disruption to the whole travel system of the United Kingdom?
It may be more convenient to discuss my second point in a later group of amendments, but there is a real issue around promulgation of the law. Because these devices can be bought over the internet and from shops by people who I suggest may not be familiar with the Air Navigation Order, they are probably not aware of the rules and how dangerous this activity can be and its consequences. I look forward to my noble friend’s response.
My Lords, I am eternally grateful for this thought-provoking debate on confiscation and forfeiture. A number of issues have been raised. I will endeavour to cover as many as I possibly can, but I am aware that a number of noble Lords have made some very thoughtful points, so I will go away and read Hansard to make sure I have covered everything. At times, some very good points that I think we can address were made. At other times, there may have been some slight misconceptions as to the different types of offences and penalties being placed on people.
Does that include all drones—commercial and recreational?
Yes, it includes all unmanned aircraft. Various bulk uploads will come from model aircraft clubs, so we expect that number to climb. Over the course of this Bill, perhaps when we get to Report, I am happy to look for an update on that and to give some indication of where we think more people registering their drones will come from.
Setting out the background to this, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, mentioned a number of offences to which he assumed a fixed penalty notice could be attached. I believe they may not be given for those more serious offences to which he referred. Subsequent to this, I hope to be able to set out precisely what will be given to each level of offence, because there is perhaps a little confusion. I will go through my explanation, because there are opportunities for confiscation and forfeiture, which I hope will mean that the noble Lords are content to withdraw their amendments. Let us just see how we go.
Amendment 25 would give the police the power to confiscate an unmanned aircraft if a constable has required it to be grounded. Amendments 27 and 30 would require somebody to forfeit the unmanned aircraft as the penalty for unlawful use. I reiterate that my department has worked closely with the Home Office to ensure that the powers in this Bill are proportionate—that is an important word here—because we do not want to stifle a nascent, growing and potentially very useful drone industry. We do not want to discourage or alienate those who seek to use the unmanned aircraft sector lawfully, because it should be very useful as we go forward. We have also worked with the police, who are confident that they have the powers in this Bill to provide effective enforcement.
The amendment on confiscation, Amendment 25, would provide a potentially disproportionate power to the police, in addition to the existing powers in the Bill for them to require an unmanned aircraft, rather than an unmanned vehicle, to be grounded.
Why should a drone that goes into one of these restricted zones, which could potentially cause huge damage, not be confiscated?
If the noble Lord will bear with me, that drone would probably be confiscated by a constable for a different reason.
In our opinion, the amendment on forfeiture would also provide a potentially disproportionate penalty for those who commit most likely very minor offences of failing to ground an unmanned aircraft when asked to do so by police, or failing to comply with a constable’s request to inspect that small unmanned aircraft. While we feel that it would be disproportionate to insert these powers of confiscation and forfeiture regarding these two offences, it should be noted that the police have powers of confiscation elsewhere in the Bill and already in law.
Under the Bill, the police will have the power to stop and search a person or vehicle where they have reasonable grounds to suspect they will find an unmanned aircraft that is or has been involved in the commission of one of the offences specified in paragraph 2 of Schedule 8. This is for more serious offences, such as interfering with aircraft. This stop and search power gives the police constable the power to seize anything they discover in the course of a search if they have reasonable grounds to believe it is evidence relating to one of those offences.
The summary of all the stop and search offences was given out at the all-Peers meeting and I am very happy to send round this ready reckoner, which shows which offences fall under stop and search if there is suspicion of them. They are, for example, flying above 400 feet or within an exclusion zone of an airport. If there was a stop and search in that case, that item could be seized as evidence. Similarly, when entering and searching a premises under warrant using the powers in the Bill, a constable might seize an unmanned aircraft or any article associated with it if they have reason to believe it has been involved in the commission of one of the offences set out in paragraph 7 of Schedule 8.
The noble Baroness said the constable has the power to seize, but has he powers to retain and make forfeit, or would it be just a temporary seizure until such time as the courts had dealt with the circumstances? The point of my amendment, and I believe that of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, is that of a deterrent for illegal use. Seizure or forfeiture would be a very good deterrent. As we mentioned earlier, we are dealing not with people who are behaving and who we are trying to encourage to grow their legal use of drones, but with people who might be or are operating them illegally. Those are the people I want to deter.
The noble and gallant Lord makes a very interesting and valid point about deterrence, which is probably quite separate from the line I sought to convince him of. Noble Lords have mentioned that a very good drone might cost, say, £500, but the penalties we are talking about for some of the offences that could have been committed are fines up to a maximum of £2,500.
If, indeed, they are paid, which I will come on to—perhaps in the letter—because there are some very significant deterrents. If we are after a deterrent, we have those deterrents. Do we feel it is proportionate for property to be forfeited for fairly minor contraventions? We do not.
I am sorry to interrupt again, but on a minor thing, as I said in my opening remarks a single misbehaviour under what would be a fixed penalty notice would not be a cause for forfeiture, but repeated misbehaviour that might individually be at the level of the fixed penalty notice should be taken into account. That is why I suggest that, under those circumstances, forfeiture, at least for a period if not completely, should be part of that penalty.
The noble Lord makes an interesting point. I suspect that in those circumstances, the person would just go out and buy another drone. We are between a rock and a hard place: drones are not so expensive that forfeiture is a huge issue, versus a fixed penalty notice, which may also be significant. We do not feel that forfeiture would make a significant difference to the deterrents. The penalties already in place are good ones. However, for the sake of completeness, I will mention that under current law, if a person has refused to ground their unmanned aircraft and has been arrested for an offence, the police officer has the power, under Section 32 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, to search the arrested person and to seize anything that is evidence.
I understand where my noble friend is coming from, but what she perhaps does not fully comprehend is that to those of us who have been involved in this industry for years, this is a highly dangerous area—far worse than motorbikes. The Government have the opportunity to lay down clearly that anybody who transgresses will be hit hard. This does not affect the genuine operators, who will take great care. However, quite frankly, listening to my noble friend, I can see this being abused. I see drones every weekend where I live. Half of them, perhaps, are being flown correctly, but a significant proportion are not, hence the two in my shed that crashed in the last six months.
My noble friend makes a very interesting statement. This Government recognise that in certain circumstances, when drones are not being flown correctly, it is literally a life and death situation. This is why the penalty for the most significant offences—recklessly or negligently acting in a manner likely to endanger an aircraft or any person in an aircraft—is an unlimited fine or up to five years in prison.
My noble friend suggested that only half of those drones are flying within the rules. That is why we have introduced the competency and registration system. People are taking the competency test. If the Bill is passed and the police have the powers, they will be able to stand in my noble friend’s garden, identify those who may not be operating within the law and do something about it. Without the Bill, they could not.
I am aware that my noble friend supports the Bill, and I appreciate his support. The Government are just saying “proportionality”. The Government’s role is not to come down hard across the entire sector, but to be proportionate. Those guilty of a minor contravention will get a fixed penalty notice; for something more serious, it is up to five years’ imprisonment and an unlimited fine.
Turning to a couple of points I have not covered, my noble friend Lord Glenarthur made an important point about electronic conspicuity, or remote ID. This is being introduced into drones. Although it is not ubiquitous at the moment, electronic conspicuity for all aircraft was consulted on in the Aviation 2050 consultation. We will be looking at how we take that forward but, as part of EU retained law, the EU-delegated Act is already within domestic law. It contains remote identification requirements. This delegated Act came into force on 1 July 2019. We are currently in a transition period; within three years, electronic conspicuity and remote ID will be a requirement for all drones.
I am afraid I do not have that information to hand. I would be remiss if I tried to remember, so I will write to the noble Baroness. I think that was a consultation for all aircraft. She will be aware that the Government are looking at general aviation and, as we move forward, the interplay between unmanned and manned aircraft in a unified traffic management system. That is some way off but we have to start thinking about it now. The electronic conspicuity of drones comes from EU regulation and is now in domestic law. We are in the three-year period during which all drones will have to have conspicuity.
My noble friend Lord Goschen mentioned other penalties and I hope I have given him some idea of their level. I will send this note around because it is useful in setting out exactly what happens if you contravene certain of the regulations.
As for getting people to understand what is required of them, we work with the retailers and the manufacturers—the CAA has the drone code—to make sure that we get the message out as much as possible. This is particularly important around Christmas, when there is a great deal of activity, so that when people get a drone—are given one or buy one—they know that it is not a responsibility-free activity and exactly what their rights and responsibilities are.
I feel a letter coming on on this one. There is quite a bit to cover about proportionality, deterrence and the different levels of penalty for different offences.
I am pleased that the noble Baroness will write a letter. It might be a long one, but that is good. In this debate we have swung between saying, “Most people are just doing it in the garden. They might have the drone under their bed. If they go up, they do not fly hard, it is not going high and it won’t hurt anyone much,” to the other extreme when it could bring down an aeroplane or worse. My noble friend and others commented on the number of drones that may be flying and wondered how many will be flying illegally—in other words, without notification, without a licence or whatever. The question of proportionality is therefore quite serious; for some offences confiscation may be too strong a penalty and for others nothing like enough. In her letter, will the Minister give us some idea of how many constables or whatever we are to call them—the enforcement agency—will be trained to do this work and how many offences might they have to follow up each year? I have not a clue. You can think of every policeman in the country being able to do this—which is stupid—or of it all being done centrally. However, it would be good to have some idea of how enforcement might take place so that people like me, who have no great experience of this, can compare it to what happens on the roads or anywhere else. I will be glad to hear the Minister’s comments.
I thank the noble Lord for that intervention. I hope he will be able to stick around until we get on to later amendments dealing with police resourcing and how the training will work.
Let me go back to first principles. The Bill is about giving the police the powers they need to put in place the penalties that already exist. It is very much about filling in that gap. We are working closely with the police and this is what they have asked us to do to give them the powers to clamp down on illegal drone use. The situation is in flux as people register but, for people who have not registered and are flying illegally, the police now have these powers. Without the Bill, they would not have the powers. With that, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, will my noble friend please include me in the list of addressees for the important letter she is going to write?
I shall say just one or two words. The Minister has offered to write us a letter. It is not a letter we want. We want it in the law. The letter will interpret the law in a way that she believes will satisfy the concerns we have expressed. I am worried about the guy out there with a drone. He is not going to read the law. He wants very simple principles established that he can understand. In the light of the interpretation that the Minister has put on the law during the interventions, I do not understand the law, and the other day I spent more than an hour going through these clauses to try to work out what was applicable in what circumstances. I put it to the Minister that the law is badly drafted. I have never said that in this House before. It is badly drafted, and we need far greater clarity in the clauses that Parliament is required to clear.
I predict that in the Commons, when MPs with airports in their constituency get their hands on the Bill, they will rubbish this clause because they will be dissatisfied with the provisions as explained to us. I say to the civil servants now that they should think in advance, before the Bill gets to the Commons, about how they will deal with the objections that will inevitably arise.
The Minister says that the role of government is to be proportionate. I agree. However, a small drone of 250 grams within a restricted zone can bring down a jumbo jet, with hundreds of lives lost. I think I am being proportionate and the Government are not in not understanding that that is the danger we are considering. The Minister has laid words on the record today that, in the event of a disaster, people will pore over and wonder what the hell she was talking about. I shall no doubt come back to this on Report, but I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for introducing this group of amendments, which gives us the opportunity to discuss the stop and search powers and the resourcing of police, and to dip our first toe in the water on delegated powers.
We recognise that stop and search is a significant power and that it is essential that we use it appropriately and proportionately. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, rightly recognised that the consultation on the use of stop and search for drones reported before Gatwick. Therefore, the powers in this Bill were included as a result of a significant amount of consultation after Gatwick to make sure that we got it right. Since that consultation concluded, officials have had various meetings with stakeholders to discuss the consultation response both within and outside government. Those consulted include the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice and BEIS, as well as the National Police Chiefs’ Council and CT Policing. The Department for Transport has also met groups such as BALPA and the Guild of Air Traffic Control Officers, who in general support the police powers proposed in the Bill.
It is important that the powers be used only where proportionate, so there are a number of limits in the Bill. In the first instance, a constable must have grounds for suspecting that they will find an unmanned aircraft or something associated with an unmanned aircraft, such as a controller, and that the unmanned aircraft or article has been involved in the commission of one of the offences specified in the Bill. I shall send the schedule to noble Lords.
The Minister referred to BALPA. Is she saying that BALPA has expressed no reservations whatever about the police powers?
I am not aware that BALPA has any reservations about the stop and search powers under discussion.
I am afraid that I cannot recall exactly what BALPA’s reservations are—whether it has reservations about other police powers—but it was certainly one of the stakeholders that we spoke to regarding stop and search. As a consequence of the conversations that we had, we believe that introducing the powers in this Bill is proportionate and appropriate.
The more serious offences that could be liable to stop and search go towards the higher end of the penalty range and might involve transferring articles into or out of prisons et cetera. The Bill also sets out further conditions that need to be met. For offences that could be considered less serious, the conditions are more stringent. For example, in relation to Article 95 of the Air Navigation Order, flying a small unmanned surveillance aircraft too close to people, or Article 239(4), flying within a prohibited area, where it is more likely that somebody has committed an offence unintentionally —which again goes back to proportionality—stop and search can be used only where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the commission of an offence using an unmanned aircraft or associated article was for one of the following purposes: endangering an aircraft, which I think noble Lords would all agree should be top of the list; causing any person harm, harassment, alarm or distress; undermining security, good order or discipline in any prison or institution where people are lawfully detained; damaging property, or threatening national security. So, there are many offences where stop and search does not apply—for example, Article 94, including flying beyond visual line of sight without permission and flying commercially without permission. Here, stop and search would not be applicable.
We also recognise that it is very important to minimise the potential for discrimination in the exercise of police powers. In addition to the limitations written into the Bill, the conduct and recording of the Bill powers will be subject to Sections 2 and 3 of PACE, for which there is already guidance for police in Code A, the code of practice for police in the exercise of statutory powers of stop and search. Code A will apply to the Bill powers to ensure that they are being exercised appropriately.
I have written down an item about Schedule 10 and I will speak in particular to paragraph 6 of Schedule 10, which allows for supplementary provision to be made by regulations with respect to fixed penalty notices, including to the extent of amending or repealing provisions by an Act of Parliament. Paragraph 6(1)(b) of Schedule 10 also states that the Secretary of State may by regulations make
“provision about the consequences of providing false statements in connection with fixed penalty notices, including provision creating criminal offences.”
In their memorandum to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, the Government’s justification for this power to create criminal offences through regulations, which cannot be subject to amendment, appears to be at least in part that there is a precedent in Section 54 of the Space Industry Act 2018. That Act was in essence a skeleton Act, which the Government told us was needed on the statute book before it could be properly fleshed out—hence so much being left to subsequent regulations—to provide assurance or comfort to the emerging UK space industry that the Government were prepared to give it the legislative backing and certainty it required. I suggest that the same consideration hardly applies here in relation to fixed penalty notices and the creation of criminal offences.
The Government say that the powers in paragraph 6(1)(b) to create criminal offences are needed to ensure that provision can be made for the consequences of providing full statements in connection with fixed penalty notices. But what kind of criminal offences are we talking about which are apparently so unique that the Government cannot formulate them now and put them in the Bill? Alternatively, since the Government refer only to the
“possibility of creating criminal offences in relation to false statements,”
why not first determine what those new criminal offences are that need creating and then include them in the next suitable Bill, where they can be fully debated and amended?
The Government clearly regard this Henry VIII power to be of some significance, since they state in their memorandum to the DPRR Committee that
“the regulations may create criminal offences and make provision about the process around appeals, and there is therefore the potential for significant impact to the public, police and judicial system.”
However, despite that potential for significant impact, the Government think it appropriate to use Henry VIII powers and regulations rather than primary legislation, which is invariably more fully debated and which, unlike regulations, can be amended. So can the Government give a somewhat fuller explanation of why having the powers to which I have referred in Schedule 10 is so crucial and, in their view, unavoidable, as opposed to them being powers, frankly, of administrative convenience to the Government?
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for introducing a specific part of Schedule 10: notably, paragraph 6, which gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations for the provisions about fixed penalty notices, the form of and the information included, and the consequences of providing false statements in connection with fixed penalty notices, including the provision of creating criminal offences, as the noble Lord noted. It is important to note that within all this there is the affirmative resolution, and the consequences need to be proportionate and appropriate to the fixed penalty notices themselves. So proportionality will certainly come into this.
Should the regulations be used in future, the key consideration will be whether they are proportionate. The noble Lord mentioned that the consequences could be put in other legislation, but there could be no other suitable legislation coming down the track. As he noted, there is precedent for making regulations in the manner set out in the Bill. This would be a perfectly reasonable way to provide the flexibility that the Government need in this area as the entire sector develops. We need the flexibility not only for the information required in fixed penalty notices; it must therefore be the case that the consequences of providing false statements in relation to fixed penalty notices must also be needed. That is why we have taken this power in the Bill.
I hope that, with that explanation, the noble Lord will feel able not to oppose the schedule.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to what has been a very interesting debate. It has been more wide-ranging than I anticipated.
The Government are listening to everybody contributing to this debate—within this Chamber and beyond—about what they should be doing. Something needs to be done, but there is no silver bullet. Standing here now, I can absolutely say that there is no magic bullet, no single solution. We cannot legislate our way out of the issue facing us unless we completely ban drones. There was mention that perhaps we should have had a registration system at the outset, but we have had model aircraft for years. They have not had anything, and they too have been involved in incursions over airports. We cannot lull ourselves into a false sense of security. We cannot say that the Government are not doing enough, that something must be done and that this is all so terrible, because what in this Bill would have prevented Gatwick, for example?
Potentially, a transponder, but we knew where the drones were. We could see them flashing above the runway. What could we do about it? All the legislation in the world could not have done anything about that. It comes down to technology, and the work that we are doing with the CPNI to develop the counter-UAV technology. That is what we need to spend money on, and we intend to. The legislation before us is a series of things that have already been put in place under the air navigation order. The noble Baroness may criticise the approach as piecemeal, but essentially, it is keeping up with technology.
Does the Minister accept that Gatwick was an outlier in a range of events, and that it would have been caught by noticing that, “They’ve switched off their electronic ID, so we have a real problem here”? That would not have caught the drones but it would have alerted the authorities. Does she accept that most of these potentially dangerous incursions are accidental or careless, and that having some form of compulsory electronic ID would enable the authorities to act quickly and easily? We are not talking about new technology that is way over the horizon. It is here now.
The noble Baroness makes a couple of very interesting points, including that in many cases, people do not intend to commit these offences and if given a slap on the wrist and a fixed-penalty notice, they probably would not do it again. When the noble Baroness asked if I wanted to make an intervention, I was listening intently because I want to hear ideas about what we should be doing that we have not done already, and where the deficiencies are.
Let me address some of the ideas of noble Lords; others we will take away and look at further. My noble friend Lord Naseby said that there must be a minimum age. There is a minimum age: you must be over 18 to operate a drone. You must also pass a competency test to be a remote pilot, but the operator of the drone is the person responsible. I think we can agree that the minimum age issue has been dealt with.
On remote ID and electronic conspicuity, the delegated Act is in UK law. The noble Baroness suggested demanding that every drone has electronic conspicuity. We do not want to favour one drone manufacturer over another. We want to ensure that the technology we receive can develop naturally. It was agreed among EU members that a three-year transition period would be appropriate, but electronic conspicuity is in British law. It will be coming over the transition period, as we agreed with our colleagues in the EU.
The noble Baroness also asked why the process is not like car registration. It already is. One must register a drone, and it has a number on it, like a car number plate. So we already have registration and competency testing; these things are already part of UK law. I am therefore still looking for what it is we should be doing better. Geo-awareness and geo-fencing, like electronic conspicuity, are in the EU delegated Act, so they are in UK law.
Forgive me—I cannot recall which noble Lord mentioned BVLOS, but we already have drones that can fly beyond the visual line of sight. It is illegal to do so; that is already within our legislation. It cannot be done without permission.
I am slightly at a loss as to where we can take this further. Noble Lords mentioned areas that stray into other parts of the law, but on privacy, for example, which the Government take extremely seriously, we want to stop invasions of people’s privacy, but we consider the existing legislation sufficient. Article 95 of the air navigation order specifies that equipment must not be flown over or within 150 metres of a congested areas or an organised open area assembly of more than 1,000 people, within 50 metres of any third person, or within 30 metres during take-off and landing. The 50-metre limit also applies to structures, including houses. Capturing an image from over 50 metres away is possible, I suppose, but then the GDPR regulations and the Data Protection Act come in to protect people’s privacy. Other criminal legislation which noble Lords considered more recently around voyeurism includes the Sexual Offences Act 2003. So, there is existing legislation which protects privacy. Again, I am happy to listen to opinions on where the legislation is deficient and how it specifically relates to drones, rather than just general privacy information.
Perhaps I can answer the Minister’s question. She asked what can be done. Very simply—if she has listened to the debate she will know—confiscate any drone that enters one of these zones.
I am aware that that is the noble Lord’s position, but I am not sure that evidence exists that if confiscation becomes part of the Bill, it automatically means that nothing bad will ever happen to drones—or that it will make any difference at all—given that the penalties are already far higher than the cost of a drone.
I come back to the point that the purpose is its deterrent value. It would also have a public relations value. Rather than telling the owner of a drone that he or she may not fly it in a particular way, confiscation would have a deterrent value. This would encourage good behaviour and be a public relations exercise to show that the Government are taking seriously the possibility of a catastrophic accident if a drone were to hit a civilian airliner.
I agree with the noble and gallant Lord. The Government obviously take seriously the potential of a catastrophic accident. For those kinds of offences, the deterrent is far greater than having one’s drone taken away: it is a lengthy prison sentence and an unlimited fine. I remain unconvinced at this time that the confiscation or forfeiture of a drone is an additional means of deterrent.
I am trying to think of an example of an item being forfeited purely to provide that kind of deterrent effect. I will ask my officials to look at the issue and perhaps that will produce more convincing evidence.
One can think of the example of the seizure and destruction of untaxed vehicles by public authorities. The specific deterrent is the loss of the vehicle in addition to any financial penalty.
I thank my noble friend for that good example. I am not against this; I just wonder what the evidence is. I shall ask my officials to look for more examples and to see whether it is likely to be proportionate and a deterrent, and whether the existing penalty system is sufficient to deter not only minor offences but the most serious.
The noble Viscount referred to seizure as against confiscation. Perhaps we should simply substitute confiscation for seizure.
Perhaps I may be of help. It was pointed out to me that if I did not re-licence my shotgun within the statutory time limit I was given, the gun would be taken away from my premises. I do not know whether that would be for ever, but it would certainly be taken away for a long time.
I thank my noble friend for his additional data, to be added to the information I will be collecting before too long.
It is a sobering thought that, as I understand it, the Government have said that no legislation could prevent what happened at Gatwick happening again or even reduce its likelihood. That seems to be the Government’s stance. I apologise for my ignorance in advance, but can the Minister confirm that there is a report into the incident at Gatwick Airport in December 2018, and can it be made available?
What I said about Gatwick is that there is no silver bullet; there was not one piece of legislation that would have stopped Gatwick.
As a result of what happened at Gatwick, steps have been taken. So, it is not a case of just legislation stopping or not stopping it. Additional measures have been taken which make it less likely that the problems at Gatwick will arise again. At least, I hope that is the intention of the steps that have been taken.
The noble and gallant Lord is right; a number of steps have been taken. On the legislative side, we have looked carefully at what we can include. One of the steps taken as a result of Gatwick is that we asked CPNI to step up its work on counter-UAV technology and it has been carrying out tests. It did a call-out to industry; industry sent it whatever it had in detect, track and identify technology; and CPNI has been methodically working its way through it to see whether the technology works. Some of it does not.
We are looking carefully at providing a catalogue for airports to say to them, “This is the technology that works. We at CPNI, since Gatwick, have checked this technology and it works.” Those are the kinds of things we have been doing.
Looking at what would make us safer, when the Minister has had the opportunity to read the record, will she write to us to clarify the position? I believe she said to us categorically that you have to be 18 to operate a drone. The CAA has pages and pages about how to register as the flyer of a drone if you are under 13. An operator of a drone has to be 18-plus, but it is quite clear that an operator of a drone is not a flyer. The CAA states that you are an operator if
“you’re the adult responsible for an under 18 who owns a drone”—
under-18s cannot just fly a drone or a model aircraft, they can own them too—
“you’re responsible for a drone that someone else will fly”
or
“you already have a flyer ID, or an exemption, and you only need an operator ID at the moment.”
It is very lax. The point I am making is that there are things the Government can do—with all due respect, my amendment asks only for a review—without breaking new ground. The idea of registration is pretty straightforward and well established in other situations.
The noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, has just repeated back to me what I have already said. There is a registration system. It is in existence and it is very straightforward. There are two types of people who can use the registration system. The first is a person who is over 18 and is the operator of the drone. That person is responsible. The second person might be, but does not have to be, a remote pilot. Why did we do this? Why does the remote pilot thing exist? It is to make sure that people aged under 18 can fly drones. How are we going to get our young people interested in aviation and in flying model aircraft? This is not just about drones.
Sometimes I am very struck. The Liberal Democrats sometimes come across as being very illiberal and on other points they come across as being very liberal indeed. I am slightly confused because the noble Baroness has literally just said back to me what I said to her earlier: that is already in place. The operator of a drone is the person who is responsible for it. That person has to register that drone, just like a car, with the CAA. I do not want to stop young people who are competent. Every young person has to take the test. I took the test; they have to take the test. At that point, they can fly a drone.
I do not want to prolong the discussion today, but perhaps afterwards the noble Baroness will describe to me exactly what she thinks is missing from that system, because it comes from the EU regulations. I believe the Liberal Democrats like the EU. Those are the EU regulations. They are agreed with the EU and therefore they are consistent across Europe. They make sure that there is responsibility for the drone and that young people can fly if somebody else is responsible. The noble Baroness shakes her head and says no, but I really do not want to detain the Committee any longer on something which is not wholly relevant to this amendment. We can perhaps discuss it in later groups.
I believe that I have gone into some of the details, and I hope I have been able to demonstrate that we are listening. We want to hear about what specifically we can do to make things better. The noble Baroness mentioned DJI. We, too, have been in touch with DJI and I believe it has sent a briefing to several noble Lords. It is very clear that the Bill should remain a means of ensuring safety and compliance with existing regulation because that regulation includes the EU’s implementing and delegated regulations, which UK officials helped shape. These have come into force and are in UK law.
The Government will continue to review the effectiveness of all the legislation on unmanned aircraft. It is critical to us. We will always listen to new ideas from noble Lords and stakeholders. It is important.
The Science and Technology Committee’s report Commercial and Recreational Drone Use in the UK was mentioned. I note for the record that my department stands ready to provide a response to the report—we have not yet responded—which will include references to the applicability of legislation. We will do that once the committee is reappointed.
On the basis of that explanation I hope that the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I emphasise that my amendment simply asks for a review of the current situation. While the debate has been going on, I have looked through the specifications of modern drones; they include geofencing, altitude limits, return to home, sensor-avoid technology and ADSB in all drones weighing more than 250 grams. There are various ways of controlling them, including not just an app or traditional remote controllers but even hand gestures. We are at a very important point in the development of drones.
On the analogy with registering a car, which I initiated and the Minister took me up on, looking through the CAA’s pages there does not appear to be a requirement for the registered operator to be present when a drone is flown by a child. With all due respect, larger drones, as the noble Lord said earlier, are not toys and have a huge potential impact. I think the Government are guilty of some complacency; they are certainly guilty of being behind the curve. A review would provide a good opportunity for them to come up to speed. However, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I have an almost identical amendment to that moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson. I am sure that nobody wishes to hear me deliver virtually the same speech as the one delivered by the noble Baroness. I support what she has said and hope we will find that the Government do too.
I am very pleased that this group came immediately after the previous one because I too will probably be saying pretty much what I said before. Obviously, geo-awareness and electronic conspicuity are important parts of the delegated regulation. Even though the noble Baroness would perhaps like these to be introduced sooner, I am sure she would accept that, while we are in our transition period, we have to follow EU law. The two items identified in this amendment are already in UK law; there is a three-year transition period in which they will come into effect. The noble Baroness mentioned that new drones can be purchased with all these things. There are people in the model aircraft community who will be very quick to write to all noble Lords to tell them why the transition period of three years is required. I have been at the receiving end of one their campaigns; it involves a lot of letters.
There are many reasons for the three-year transition period. While we were a member of the EU we could not change it, as the noble Baroness, being a Liberal Democrat, well knows. Those two requirements are already there so, from the point of view of the amendments, we can put them to one side. I have been through the registration issue several times: there is an operator and there is a remote pilot; the remote pilot is under the responsibility of the operator and can be under 18. It is nobody’s interest to stop people under 18—a 16 year-old, for example—flying these vehicles.
On remote identification, once electronic conspicuity is ubiquitous, we will be able to link the identifier to the registration system. At the moment, there is literally a physical number on a drone; that will change over to electronic conspicuity once the transition period is over. The model aircraft people will have put electronic conspicuity into all their aircraft by then and the entire system should be ready to go. I hope that, given this explanation, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, for tabling these important safety amendments. I will take a moment to rebut the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, who seems to imply that, for some reason, the Government do not care about safety. Continually her remarks seem to imply, “Well, we see the danger and the Government do not.” The Government do see the danger and are looking at all ways to mitigate it, while not crushing an industry that could be incredibly important to our nation and its future.
I shall address in detail the three amendments tabled by the noble Lord, but I want to reassure him and noble friends on the Benches behind me that the Government feel that maintaining the highest standards of safety is a top priority, in relation to both manned and unmanned aircraft. That is why failing to meet requirements such as being reasonably satisfied that a flight can safely be made are already offences under the Air Navigation Order. More serious offences such as endangering the safety of an aircraft could also apply.
For example, Amendment 33A refers to “inbuilt safety features”. They are not necessarily defined, but I take it that we should talk about the thrust of the amendment rather than the detail. As has been covered several times today, the EU regulations being transposed into UK law cover much of what is covered by the noble Lord’s first amendment. The inbuilt safety features to which I think he is referring, such as electronic conspicuity, are within that. The noble Lord mentioned that they could not be turned off—indeed they cannot, because should they be turned off that would be illegal, as the devices would then not have electronic conspicuity. Under the regulations in place—we are in the transition period—those things would have to be on and functioning. Turning them off would not be an option, because that would then be illegal.
On being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, again, this is a really important area. Under the Air Navigation Order, for any remote pilot—that is, the person flying it rather than the person who takes responsibility for it or owns it—who flies a small unmanned aircraft without being reasonably satisfied that the flight can safely be made, perhaps because they are under the influence of drugs or alcohol, there is a potential fine on conviction of up to £2,500. For further, more serious cases of unsafe flying, a pilot found guilty of recklessly or negligently causing an aircraft to endanger a property or person could be sentenced to up to two years in prison, which is quite a significant sentence for being over the limit.
However, I want to bring to noble Lords’ attention more specific regulation: that is, the implementing regulations. I have talked a lot today about delegated regulation today; there is also the implementing regulation, which is also coming from the EU. That states specifically that a remote pilot must not fly an unmanned aircraft when under the influence of psychoactive substances or alcohol.
Therefore, while I accept that the noble Lord’s intention is to make safety changes—and safety is our highest priority—I hope that I have been able to convince the noble Lord, at least for the time being, that we already cover the issues that he hoped to raise.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her support for the intention of the amendments. On the third amendment, on alcohol and drugs, whether or not the matter is covered by EU regulations in one sense, it is important that operators of drones understand that they should be under the same degree of discipline and self-control as pilots. It is therefore important that it appears in the same place in primary legislation. I am grateful to the Minister for spelling out that there is implementing legislation as well as the initial transposed EU legislation, which may make that clearer—but, even so, it is important that people on the ground do not regard themselves as being in a different category from those in control of aircraft in the air. I do not therefore completely accept that the matter is already covered.
On the first amendment, I say in reply to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, that, clearly, we are talking about the legally required safety regulations. Again, I hope that the Minister’s assurance that this matter is already covered stands up and I would welcome that being spelled out in letters that I could share with my colleagues. We will see whether we need to come back on that.
On single operatives, I accept, as I said in opening, that technology may get us to a situation where, for certain specific purposes, there is a single controller of a number of machines. I think that that should be dealt with as an exception, however, so that if an inspection company for a pipeline or a navigation, or for land management purposes, wants to use a single controller for several drones that are all doing the same task, or different aspects of the same task, that should probably be dealt with under an exceptional licence.
The principle should be that there should be one pilot for one machine, which is what this would require. The Minister did not comment in great detail on that: no doubt she can have another look at it. I am pleased that there seems to be general support for the principle, even if some of it may already be indirectly on the statute book through European legislation. I am very grateful, of course, for the Government’s endorsement of retaining that European legislation, in this field at least. For the moment, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for raising this very important point. Certainly, the Government are well aware of a wide range of risks relating to unmanned aircraft and the fact that they may, in due course, be operated from overseas. That is one of the risks we are considering.
The Government published the UK Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy in October 2019. That strategy aims to safeguard the potential benefits of unmanned aircraft—because they can bring substantial benefits to the UK—by setting out our approach for countering the threat posed by their malicious or negligent use. I stress that this is very much work in progress. As all noble Lords have commented today, this technology moves very quickly, but the focus of this strategy is on keeping the UK public safe and protecting our critical national infrastructure, prisons and crowded places, irrespective of where the threat originates, in the UK or externally. It is therefore not necessary to prepare and publish an additional strategy specifically for managing a threat from overseas; it is something that is under consideration and was considered as we prepared the strategy.
As I have said many times today, the strategy recognises that there is no silver bullet: we must look at all the threats and at mitigating them all, both through the Bill before your Lordships today and through more practical elements, such as training the police, making sure that airports have access to the technology, as I explained earlier, and making sure that everybody using the technology or putting these powers in place has the training and guidance needed to respond effectively to the threat. I hope that, based on that explanation, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister for her response, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for giving me the opportunity to share as much information as I have with him. I will certainly share more if he is still yet to be convinced. As to whether there is a report on Gatwick—my apologies for not covering this earlier—I do not know but will investigate and return to it in a letter to him.
This amendment is on consultation. Ministers and officials from the Department for Transport and the Home Office have engaged with a range of stakeholders throughout the development of this Bill, including but not exclusively those listed in the amendment, and will continue to do so to make sure that our legislation remains fit for purpose, ensuring that lessons learned from those directly involved in responding to unmanned aircraft incidents, whether Gatwick or others, are considered and acted upon.
In the aftermath of the Gatwick incident, the Government worked with the police, the airport and other relevant organisations to learn lessons from the response. There were debriefs, workshops and future planning meetings so that we could look at and extrapolate from the event. Since Gatwick, the counter-drone community has moved forward at pace. We have a broader understanding of the threat posed by drones—hence our work with the CPNI on detecting, tracking and identifying equipment and how that might be deployed. We also continue to consult widely. For example, the UK Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy, our main focus following Gatwick and prior to this Bill, was published in October 2019 and followed ongoing engagement with both those on and not on the list because we wanted the widest input we could get.
I turn to some of the specific bodies: first, the police. For the first few months after the Gatwick incident, the counter-drone unit in the Home Office, which worked jointly with my department on this Bill, had an embed in its team from Sussex Police who was involved with Gatwick. That was extremely helpful. Since May 2019, a chief inspector from the National Police Chiefs’ Council has been embedded in this team with the national police lead for counter-drone systems, providing operational advice on how the provisions in the Bill will be put to use on the ground.
We see Gatwick Airport regularly and seek regular input from all airports because it is often the case that the larger airports will be able to react in a very different way to the smaller airports—something we have not really touched on today.
At the time, a key issue revealed by Gatwick was the question of who was responsible for the operation of equipment. That has been clarified, as the Minister has indicated, in relation to the larger airports. Have the Government yet reached agreement with smaller airports, police services and the Army throughout Britain on who is responsible for ensuring that appropriate equipment will be deployed at smaller airports if such an incident happens there?
The noble Baroness has hit a particular nail on the head. That is why the catalogue of equipment is being developed by the CPNI. It is encouraging the leasing of equipment. Airports are responsible for safety and security within their boundaries, so they are being encouraged, where they feel it is appropriate, to lease appropriate equipment. Not all airports are the same, because of different sized sites and all sorts of different reasons. There is always ongoing engagement with the Ministry of Defence and the police. Every incident is dealt with on a case-by-case basis because, interestingly, no two incursions are the same. Some can be dealt with extremely easily and others require a different approach. We are well aware of the difference.
It is not just the different sizes of airports. There are various other bits of critical national infrastructure that fall under this entire threat picture. We are cognisant of that; it is part of the work on the strategy to make sure that we have the appropriately flexible response to make sure that we can deploy resources in the best way.
We have also been engaging with the Ministry of Defence. Along with the Home Office, my department works closely with the Ministry of Defence to share learning from its military work overseas and how best to work with the counter-drone industry. We work closely with the Civil Aviation Authority, including on the development of the drone code and drone registration scheme. Since Gatwick, the code has been reviewed and the drone registration scheme has come into existence.
We have regular meetings with BALPA, which is always a pleasure, and we are very interested in what it has to say. We also see a wide range of other bodies, either regularly or on an ad hoc basis, which includes the drone and counter-drone industries, regulatory bodies, airports and other critical national infrastructure sites, academia, and in particular international partners— this is not just a UK issue, and we speak to our international colleagues about it. I had a meeting with people from the States just a couple of weeks ago; they are facing the same problems, and we should not think that we are behind the curve, because we are certainly not.
I hope that, based on that explanation, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister for her response, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.