AUKUS

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 29th February 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, while the events in Ukraine and the Middle East have understandably engrossed the world’s attention, we have seen developments in the Indo-Pacific that signal its increasing geopolitical centrality: in 2022, China struck a security pact with the Solomon Islands; in January, Nauru switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China; and, a month ago, Papua New Guinea confirmed early-stage talks with Beijing on a security and policing agreement. Post AUKUS, Chinese-driven media activity across several Pacific island nations demonstrates that China regards the agreement as a major impediment to its geopolitical ambitions, as does its concerted diplomatic pressure on smaller nations across the region.

I do not question the aims of AUKUS, but I have three questions about our approach to realising those aims and our capacity so to do. The first is about the future of submarine warfare. The last two years have seen advances in uncrewed submarine capabilities by our allies and our strategic adversaries. In Russia, the K-329 Belgorod submarines emerged—unmanned nuclear-powered submarines that purportedly offer nuclear-strike capabilities, as well as deterrence support. Last year, North Korea unveiled its first nuclear-armed unmanned submarine.

While encouraged by our own Project Cetus, I ask whether any assessment has been made of the extent, if any, that crewed, nuclear-strike submarines will have been superseded by the time Australia is building SSN-AUKUS boats. Given the rapidity of relevant technology advances, it would be useful to know if any such work has been or is likely to be commissioned.

Secondly, on our industrial capacity, can we meet our obligations under the AUKUS agreement’s optimal pathway? Each of the last Astute-class submarines under commission took around 130 months to complete. We are told that HMS “Agincourt” will commission after a 99-month build. Why does the MoD believe that we will be able to complete work on HMS “Agincourt” 31 months more rapidly than we did for the previous four submarines in the class and 13 months faster than BAE Systems has ever built an Astute?

Lastly, on the reliability of the MoD’s financial estimates, on 7 December I asked why the three services have different approaches to cost forecasting, with the Navy and RAF including predicted costs for the capabilities planned while the Army includes only what it can afford. The noble Earl the Minister said that he was in “entire agreement” on the question of consistency and conceded that in 40 years of looking at budgets he had

“never seen a budget that resembles anything like this one”.—[Official Report, 7/12/23; col. 1570.]

On top of this supervening inconsistency, we have seen the NAO describe the MoD’s equipment plan to 2033 as “unaffordable”; the MoD’s own worst-case forecast concedes a funding gap of almost £30 billion. What financial contingencies has the Minister’s department instituted or considered to ensure that we meet all our pillar 1 and 2 AUKUS obligations? Any assurance in the Minister’s answers to these questions would be extremely welcome.