Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 21st May 2024 Lords Chamber

Amendments 162A and 162AA agreed.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Beith) (LD)]

If Amendment 162B is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 163 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, by reason of pre-emption.

Amendment 162B

Moved by

Arbitration Bill [HL]

Lord Beith Excerpts

Second reading committee
Tuesday 19th December 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, it is a very good principle in the House of Lords to speak mainly on things of which you have a great deal of knowledge and experience. That principle has been followed in this debate admirably so far, and would have continued to be followed had my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames not been otherwise engaged today, leaving me with the task without that essential qualification.

What a fascinating debate it has been. We had the long sweep of history from the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, whose knowledge goes back even further than I had realised. The emphasis on the competitive market in arbitration, in which England is currently very successful, and its wider legal implications, which the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, mentioned, means it is important to keep the laws and procedures up to date so we can continue to get that benefit. It is indeed competitive: was it last year or the year before when Singapore equalled the amount of arbitration that England had been able to achieve?

In the course of the debate, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, initiated a discussion, in which others joined, of the additional subsection in Clause 6 of the 1996 Act. When I read it, I took it to mean that you could not automatically read across, from the contract being by English law, that the arbitration would necessarily be governed by the law of the seat unless it was expressly stated. It seems bizarre that you could conduct proceedings on a contract that was expressly stated to be of English law but you chose to do it by arbitration not under English law, but sometimes Bills have to prohibit bizarre things from happening. No doubt the Minister will be able to explain that to us.

I was helped by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who saved me the task of explaining the Nigerian case, the anxiety that it promotes about how corruption could be concealed within arbitration proceedings and what restraints there were on preventing that from happening by the clear, common-sense statement that if you discover serious corruption,  you should not allow it to be buttressed or assisted by the legal process that you are engaged in—that is, the process of arbitration. Arbitration takes place under commercial confidentiality, but it is not meant to be there as a means of allowing corrupt actions to be perpetrated. If the Minister could help us on what might be necessary to deal with that, I would certainly be very grateful. However, I recognise that amending the Bill at this stage, given the special procedure to which it is subject, is not necessarily an easy option even if we could agree on what that amendment should be.

The history of arbitration in England and Wales in recent years is a huge success. It is a major source of foreign earnings and, even more importantly, a great reputation support for our legal system in general and, consequently, for our commercial success. The 1996 Act has operated as a model of its kind and has worked extremely well. There are a huge number of commercial contracts, often nothing to do with England or English entities, that include English arbitration clauses, making England the seat of any arbitration and often subject to English law. A large number of such contracts make English law the law of the contract, not just the law of the arbitration. Undoubtedly significant in that success is the reputation of English arbitrators, including many well-known retired judges—some of them might be Members of this House—for legal incisiveness, incorruptibility, impartiality, courtesy and an unfussy and relatively informal style.

The Bill makes small changes to the Arbitration Act 1996 and introduces some reforms, all of which will be beneficial. It is a model of the Law Commission’s work and, welcome to say, a model of Parliament attending to the Law Commission’s work with due expedition, which has not always been the case. When I chaired the Justice Committee in the Commons, we were constantly complaining about the work that the Law Commission had done that was going nowhere because parliamentary opportunities had not been found to take it forward. This is a very good example of the Government taking it forward and using the fast track that is available. The work itself—two public consultations and thorough consideration of the responses —is also commendable.

The debate so far has identified most of the significant features of the Bill. Other things that I have not mentioned so far include the duty of disclosure, which may be important for parties from outside the UK who are not accustomed to the way in which normal practice would support disclosure in this country. Having an explicit provision may be helpful from that point of view.

Then there is the power to make awards on a summary basis, which reflects the power that courts have to make summary determinations where one party or the other has no real prospect of success. That does not have to be in relation to the whole claim but can relate to particular issues, and the benefit is to stop parties running hopeless points, often at the risk of running up costs for both sides that may not prove recoverable, and at further risk of delaying the proceedings.

Good case management by arbitrators, with the help of the parties in identifying and defining issues suitable for summary determination, could save time and costs. Importantly, it can encourage parties to settle proceedings where summary awards are given on particular issues.

Then we have in Clause 11 the streamlining of the procedure for determining challenges to the courts for awards on jurisdiction under Section 67. That, too, is a helpful improvement in the Bill.

This Bill has been carefully prepared. We spend a lot of time in this House looking at Bills which have been woefully or inadequately prepared, contain numerous unresolved issues or do not even give proper effect to their stated purposes. We cannot say that about this. It is a model of its kind, as is the way that it has been gone about, and I welcome it.

Legal Services Act 2007 (Approved Regulator) Order 2023

Lord Beith Excerpts

Tuesday 12th December 2023 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, I have to confess that I struggle to find anything interesting to say about this statutory instrument.

Under the Legal Services Act 2007, the Legal Services Board oversees various approved regulators for persons providing legal services. They are designated under Schedule 4 to the Act. In 2009, the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants—ACCA—was designated for the regulation of probate activities. It did not embark on any regulatory activities until 2018, when it found that the uptake was extremely low: it granted authorisations for probate to only 99 persons. At that point, the association discovered that the costs of regulating were very high and it therefore determined that it would withdraw from that activity. It applied to the Legal Services Board in October 2021 to cease to be designated as an approved regulator. The Legal Services Board approved that request on condition that the 99 persons already approved had either ceased to practise or been transferred to another regulator, mainly CILEx Regulation. That condition having been fulfilled, the Legal Services Board asked the Lord Chancellor to regulate the situation by removing the designation of the ACCA under the Act. This statutory instrument now rounds off that process and terminates its authorisation, which is to all intents and purposes redundant anyway. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, it is indeed difficult to find many interesting things to say about this instrument, except perhaps that it has taken more than two years to get to this point after the ACCA decided that its members did not want to be either engaged in or regulated in respect of probate work. However, I have a question about CILEX that puzzles me.

The transitional arrangement is that some people will be or have been transferred to CILEx Regulation. CILEx Regulation is itself the subject of a consultation, which ended in November, because it has been proposed that it should be transferred to the Solicitors Regulation Authority—a much larger body. What will that mean? Will accountants, or staff of accountants’ offices, be transferred to CILEx Regulation by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, or will some other transitional arrangement be made for them? The Minister is studying his papers; I hope he has an answer to the question.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I think I have only one question to deal with, on the transitional arrangements for the 99 persons with whom we are concerned. My understanding—I will write to the noble Lord if my understanding is wrong—is that these persons have already been or are being transferred, so they are subject to an appropriate regulatory structure.

There is an issue in that there is some kind of dispute between CILEX and CILEx Regulation, which regulates it. That is an ongoing matter that will be resolved in due course by the Legal Services Board, or perhaps it will recommend a solution to the Minister. As I understand it, it is not appropriate for the Government to comment at this stage on how that will be sorted out. CILEX wants to be transferred to the Solicitors Regulation Authority, whereas CILEx Regulation is resisting that. It is an unresolved, ongoing dispute that is separate from the issue we are discussing, but the Government’s position is to stand away from it while the regulatory bodies sort it out between themselves. I do not know whether I have managed to approach the noble Lord’s question—

[Lord Beith (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his helpful answer. It would be helpful to have reassurance from the Government that, in so far as there are still people from this background engaged in probate work, they will continue to be regulated and know by whom they are regulated.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

As far as I am aware, I can reassure the noble Lord that they will continue to be regulated appropriately. If there is any further information that I need to convey, I will write to noble Lords accordingly.

Sentencing Act 2020 (Amendment of Schedule 21) Regulations 2023

Lord Beith Excerpts

Tuesday 12th December 2023 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, around a quarter of homicides in this country are domestic homicides, where one spouse or partner, or ex-spouse or ex-partner, is killed by the other. In recent years, there has rightly been a considerable focus on these tragic cases. We have had a number of particularly tragic instances, such as when Poppy Waterhouse and Ellie Gould were killed by their ex-boyfriends in 2018 and 2019 respectively, and that of Sally Challen, who killed her husband after years of domestic abuse and whose conviction for murder was replaced by a conviction for manslaughter in 2019.

The law of murder in such cases is currently being reviewed by the Law Commission at the request of the Lord Chancellor. Today, we are concerned not with the law itself but with sentencing. The statutory framework for sentencing in murder cases is to be found in Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020, replacing earlier legislation, as supplemented by guidelines of the Sentencing Council. However, hitherto, nothing in Schedule 21 has specifically addressed domestic homicide.

In the light of all this background, in 2021 the Government asked Clare Wade KC to conduct an independent review of domestic homicide sentencing. The Wade review was published in March 2023, and the Government’s final response was published in July 2023. Today’s instrument takes forward Clare Wade’s recommendations 5 and 8.

Regulation 3 of this statutory instrument deals with a murder that has occurred where there is coercive and controlling behaviour in a domestic context by the offender. It provides that such behaviour will be an aggravating factor for the purposes of paragraph 9 of Schedule 21, which sets out the statutory framework for dealing with aggravating factors. The instrument further provides that, where the situation is the other way round, and the coercive and controlling behaviour has been on the victim’s part—typically, where it is the woman who has killed the man—the fact that the woman has killed having been subject to coercive and controlling behaviour shall be a statutory mitigating factor for the offender subject to such behaviour for the purposes of paragraph 10 of Schedule 21.

In addition, regulation 3 of the draft instrument implements recommendation 8 of the Wade report, which deals with a situation known in shorthand—and, I must say, completely inadequately described—as “overkill”. This arises in cases, particularly at the end of a relationship, where the offender, typically the man, kills the woman in circumstances of extreme violence, defined in the instrument as “sustained and excessive violence”. That too will be a statutory aggravating factor. As I understand it, some 40% of domestic homicide cases occur at the end of a relationship, when the rage and anger are so intense that these very unfortunate and excessive situations arise.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the Minister while he is introducing the regulations. I am slightly worried that there is confusion over the ending of a relationship, which was a separate recommendation of the Wade report that is not dealt with in these instruments.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for that intervention. There is a further aspect of information that I would like to share with the Committee to deal with the very point the noble Lord has raised, for which I thank him.

I have explained the statutory instrument before us, but I need to complete the picture for the Committee. In the Criminal Justice Bill, which is already before the other place, there is a provision that deals explicitly with murders committed at the end of a relationship, defining it as in itself an aggravating factor. Your Lordships may well ask whether it seems a little bit piecemeal that we have this statutory instrument and something in the forthcoming Bill. That point was quite understandably made by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in its consideration of this instrument. What happened was that the two recommendations that we are dealing with were accepted in the Government’s interim report by the previous Lord Chancellor, and when the present Lord Chancellor succeeded to the post he thought that we should go further. Therefore, it is in the forthcoming Bill.

However, that is not quite the end of the story—this is a continuing story—so I tell your Lordships for information and by way of background that there is another aspect of the sentencing exercise called the starting point: the level of the “tariff” at which you start. For these kinds of domestic murders, the Government commenced a consultation in November to consider the possible reform of the provisions dealing with the starting point in Schedule 21 to the 2020 Act. I should say that these developments are in response to continuing concerns by stakeholders, particularly victims and their families, about the response of the law to these very difficult cases. The Government are listening to those concerns and continuing to address the issue. However, as I indicated, the statutory instrument before us adopts the two recommendations of the Wade report. I therefore commend the instrument to the Committee and beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for his introduction and his helpful and illuminating response on the matters that I raised in my intervention. As he said, these regulations carry out the intention to address murder related to domestic violence and coercion. The intention was expressed in Schedule 23 to the Sentencing Act 2020 and follows the Clare Wade report. We support these provisions, which take into account the context of controlling and coercive behaviour in relationships, treating them as an aggravating factor in sentencing for murder or, in the case of a murder by a victim of a controlling relationship, as a mitigating factor.

The regulations introduce the concept of overkill—a word which bothers me as much as it did the Minister as being inadequate to describe the use of violence in excess of what would have been required to kill the victim—as an aggravating factor, not least because of the deeply distressing impact of some of these horrific murders on victims’ families.

However, I have some concerns. I begin with those raised by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, one of which has been referred to by the Minister. The reference to consultation with the Sentencing Council blandly and misleadingly fails to mention the council’s concerns, including about the wording of the overkill provision. The Explanatory Memorandum should explain using all the relevant facts. It should not obscure by omission. I presume the revised wording has met some of the council’s concerns, but I would be grateful for some clarification of that as it was raised quite forcefully by the scrutiny committee.

The scrutiny committee also questioned the failure to include other provisions proposed in the Government’s response to the Wade review. We had a helpful explanation from the Minister that things are moving on and that the new Lord Chancellor has indeed taken up the concerns and included them in draft legislation. Indeed, I was a bit surprised by the Government’s defence that the earlier omission of some of the recommendations was because these statutory instruments were an interim response, but I will not criticise further because there is obviously progress on that front. I rather agree with the committee that

“in general, it is better policymaking to make all related changes at the same time”.

More than that, I argue that it makes for more coherent legislation if you put things in the same piece of legislation.

In supporting these provisions, I must, however, make clear what they cannot do. In the first case, they cannot and should not remove the judge’s ability to take into account all the relevant circumstances of the case when passing sentence. Justice should not be blind or deaf to the many different issues that may emerge in evidence or in mitigation. The judge must justify deviation from the guidelines but must be free to do justice.

Secondly, we should not deceive ourselves or the public with the pretence that these provisions will have a powerful deterrent effect. Justice has many purposes, including punishment and rehabilitation, but deterrence is scarcely a major factor for this kind of crime. Someone who, having used enough violence to kill the victim, carries on to inflict more violence is not going to think, “Oh, I’ll get a slightly longer sentence, won’t I, because of that statutory instrument?” That is not the real world; it is not the mindset of those who would carry out such terrible and vengeful acts.

That brings me to my final point. For the murders we are talking about, the murderers need in many cases to be imprisoned for long periods for public safety, including the safety of other potential victims of the same kind of crime, but adding a few more years to the sentence may only marginally, if at all, add to public safety and will do nothing to protect safety when they are eventually released. The extra years are added to recognise the greater severity of the offence, and we add them because they are almost the only means we know of recognising that severity and marking it with a more severe penalty. It would appear ethically bland if we treated different murders in exactly the same way, but what we actually do is allocate significant resources to keeping somebody in prison for a bit longer in a hopelessly overcrowded prison system, in which resources are desperately needed for rehabilitation to reduce the risk of reoffending when offenders are released.

As a society, we need to look for more effective ways of recognising and challenging crimes of varying degree and asserting that they will not be tolerated, otherwise we are condemned to endless sentence inflation because sentences for one crime affect sentences for another. It will not be long before comparison is made between these crimes and some other crimes and an argument for longer sentences for them. We have a problem as a society in finding ways of recognising the greater severity of some crimes than others that do not simply commit resources in an ineffective way when those resources are needed to secure public safety.

As I said, we support these provisions, but room must be left for judicial discretion and there must be some recognition that we do not cure crimes simply by passing statutory instruments such as this.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument. The Labour Party supports these regulations.

As we have just had explained to us, the instrument introduces two additional statutory aggravating factors and one additional statutory mitigating factor in the determination of the minimum term relating to the mandatory life sentence for murder. The new aggravating factors are the fact that the offender had repeatedly or continuously engaged in behaviour towards the victim that was controlling or coercive and the use of sustained and excessive violence towards the victim. The new mitigating factor is the fact that the victim had repeatedly or continuously engaged in behaviour towards the offender that was controlling or coercive.

King’s Speech

Lord Beith Excerpts

Wednesday 8th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, today is a personal anniversary for me because it is 50 years since I entered Parliament—I did 42 years in the Commons and have done eight in the Lords—after I won a by-election in 1973. During that time, I have always tried to stand up for parliamentary scrutiny and the need to get legislation properly in order. However, my efforts pale into insignificance beside those of the late Lord Judge in his relatively shorter time in this House. He was so stalwart in ensuring that legislation was left open to parliamentary scrutiny and did not preclude it. We will have to continue that work in his memory.

I want to devote my time today to just two issues raised in the gracious Speech. The first is prisons and sentencing.

“A bill will be brought forward to ensure tougher sentences for the most serious offenders”,


but it does not work like that. Every time Ministers call for or legislate for tougher sentences, whatever specific offence is involved, they contribute to a ratcheting upwards of sentences for a wide range of other offences. It is a long-standing trend and the Government contribute to it on a regular basis—more or less every year. Often, it is applied to people who will not be improved by time in prison and really need a more appropriate sentence.

When I was elected in 1973, there were just short of 37,000 people in prison. There are now nearly 86,000 of them, with the possibility of that heading for 100,000. Promoting longer prison sentences is a huge commitment of resources to a system of punishment that does so little to advance rehabilitation and to change those involved. Even so, the resources are not sufficient to deal with a collapsing prison system that cannot cope with the number of people sent to it. Clearly, many offenders must be jailed for significant periods for the protection of the public. However, as anyone who visits prisons regularly will know, many imprisoned people suffer from mental health problems, are otherwise inadequate or lack basic education and could have been dealt with differently, in various ways, so that resources could have been used more effectively.

I support and commend the recent recommendation from the House of Commons Justice Committee, which I used to chair, that there should be an independent sentencing policy council to provide policy advice to Ministers. We might get some evidence-based policy then. I also look forward to the forthcoming report of this House’s Justice and Home Affairs Committee, which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett. We have had witnesses in front of us complaining about the fact that community sentences are underused, partly because of lack of information and partly because the Probation Service is so badly understaffed. We must end the weaponising of sentencing policy. Claims that one party will lock up more people than another really do not contribute to sensible, evidence-based policy.

My second point is about migration. The gracious Speech skates over the chaos of policy and administration in this area. Thankfully, it does not repeat the Home Secretary’s inflammatory language about multiculturalism. We are simply told that the Government will deliver on the Illegal Migration Act and stop illegal channel crossings. That is a triumph of hope over experience, particularly the experience of the Home Office. I fear that we are in real danger of losing our values and sense of proportion in all this. I mention our sense of proportion because the small-boat people represent a tiny fraction of the half a million net inward migrants we currently accept. We have to go after the criminal gangs who exploit desperate people, but those who take risks in search of a new life should not be treated as criminals. Their asylum claims may well be valid—currently, about 82% of claims are found by the Home Office to be valid in that category—and those who are economic migrants are simply seeking a better life for themselves and their families. Why do we deny asylum seekers the opportunity to work while their claims are considered, so that they can contribute to the society they want to join? Why do the Government disapprove of and disparage economic migrants?

For poor and desperate people to seek opportunities in another country used to be seen as a sign of initiative and enterprise, not a disqualification from welcome to a new country. The Prime Minister ought to know that from his own family experience. Like most developed nations, we need migrants, because we will not have enough younger people to care for our elderly, maintain our public services or expand our economy. That is why we have quite a high rate of net immigration. It is why we invited the Windrush generation to come to Britain and accepted substantial inward migration from the Indian subcontinent. From Britain, we populated large parts of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Population movement is not new. It has been part of the human condition throughout history. It will continue to be. We should manage it as far as we can, in harmony with our basic values. If we want to reduce the growth in population movement, we must address the problems of poverty, warfare and oppression in the countries with the greatest outflow. If we fail to address the problem of climate change, we will see even greater pressures where countries disappear underwater or can no longer support food production because of the effects of climate change.

This has already been said by noble Lords: the gracious Speech and the legislative programme within it are really all about the election. The Conservative Party will not be judged on the slender legislative programme of this gracious Speech but by what has gone before—the chaos of years of dysfunctional government under a bitterly divided party. I think they know that.

Sentencing Act 2020 (Special Procedures for Community and Suspended Sentence Orders) Regulations 2023

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 26th June 2023 Grand Committee

Broadly speaking, my view is not a million miles away from that of the noble Lord. In many respects, this is a lost opportunity—it could have been better. Ministers might want to go back and look again, because this is potentially a good-news project that would reflect well on the Government. It is cross-party, and I think any future Labour Government would take it on and probably expand it. I support it, but we probably could have done a little better.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for initiating this debate. I welcome his contribution and that of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. I am not a million miles from either of their views either, but I emphasise that I value the progress that we are making with the three courts on the aims of the White Paper. I want to give it a fair wind, because we need to carry out these experiments.

I share some of the reservations of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee about some of the problems: the inadequacy of the Explanatory Memorandum; the failure to identify the resources that are needed, which are spread across government, so this is a pretty important question; and the failure to set out a systematic means of evaluation. What is the point in an experiment if you do not evaluate it properly and independently? Those who operated the experiment should not be the judges of its success.

I have a long-term interest in the development of problem-solving courts as an alternative to periods of imprisonment for some offenders—periods of imprisonment that did nothing to change the lives of such offenders. When I was chair of the Justice Committee in the Commons, I had the opportunity to visit a number of such courts, including the North Liverpool Community Justice Centre. Why do we not have a proper evaluation of that yet? The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, mentioned that point. Reoffending rates alone do not explain why the full potential of that experiment was not realised. I could see certain things that were working well when I looked at it, including the access it gave offenders to services that they needed and that are physically located within the court complex. When a judge can send an offender off to someone who can provide an addiction service or help them with their housing problem, it facilitates progress towards an orderly life for people whose lives are chaotic. We need to know what was lacking or what more could have been done to make that experiment more successful.

I also observed the Red Hook court in New York and problem-solving courts in Seattle; Portland, Oregon; and Houston, Texas. Texas was really interesting, because Republicans and Democrats there both agreed that they were wasting the taxpayer’s dollar on periods of imprisonment for people whose lives were not being changed by that imprisonment. The political divide fell away as the two parties and the wings of those parties agreed that the taxpayer’s dollar should be used for something that might work better. Hence there was a real political investment in developing problem-solving courts.

In observing these various courts, I was struck by some general points that proved important. One I have already mentioned: access to services—such as addiction treatment, housing, education and employment—which offenders had found it difficult to access or had not even tried to access before they were convicted. That is crucial.

The second is a review process overseen by the same judge, who often became an important authority figure in offenders’ lives and had a capacity to hold them to account for the changes that they needed to make in their lives.

A feature that is not attempted in these proposals—I have some doubts about it, but it was interesting to observe it in Texas—is a court-room full of other offenders, who would applaud an offender who had got a clean bill of health, because he was clean of drugs and had not reoffended since the last time he came before the judge. All the people waiting for their cases to be heard would clap at that point and give him encouragement. Of course, if the reverse was true and the offender had failed, they might be sympathetic, but the Texas marshals were there to take the offender away for imprisonment, which was the consequence of not keeping up with requirements that the judge had set. The cultivation of a common feeling of “let’s try to make this work and change our lives” was really valuable.

Today, we are authorising more limited experiments in two courts for men and one for women. They will not deliver improvement unless there are adequate resources available from the Ministry of Justice through the Probation and Courts Services. Then, of course, there is the hope of an eventual shift in resources from prisons to probation, for example, but also from a wide range of other departments that will need to become involved in offenders’ lives if we are going to try to change them; that includes housing, education and health services.

All this is taking place against a background of declining confidence in the courts in community sentences. I sit on the House of Lords Justice and Home Affairs Committee, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, pointed out, is currently carrying out an inquiry. There has been a lot of public evidence already indicating that, as a proportion of sentences, there is a decline in the use of community sentences; this suggests a lack of judicial confidence in them. That must change; it needs to change for the system as a whole, but it certainly needs to change in the context of these three courts.

This is potentially an important and valuable experiment. As well as the resourcing and valuation issues that I have mentioned, it will need judicial continuity, with the same judge dealing with individuals over the period of their sentence. It will also need confidence to be built in the quality of community sentencing, addiction services and other services. The courts need to be better informed about what services are available and how good and reliable they are, as well as how appropriate they are to the kind of offender that they may want to attach to them. It will place considerable requirements on the Probation Service, which is seriously overstretched at the moment throughout the country, and will pose challenges for local authorities, the health service and other providers of services. However, we need to do it and I wish it well. We need an effective alternative to expensive, ineffective prison sentences for some offenders.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate in such a constructive and thoughtful way. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, whose Motion gave rise to it.

First, I will briefly address the concerns raised, notably by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, about the Explanatory Memorandum. I am happy to acknowledge that, in this case, the Explanatory Memorandum was somewhat thin and did not meet the required standard. My officials have, I think, been able to provide answers to the committee’s satisfaction. We are working to ensure that future memoranda do not encounter a similar problem. Internal training is being undertaken and we will shortly have a meeting with the clerk of the relevant committee to understand what its requirements are. I hope that these various measures will deal with the problem, but I apologise for the fact that the committee felt it necessary to draw the House’s attention to this statutory instrument.

Let me explain briefly some of the background to this instrument; I hope also to deal with the points that have been raised. We are piloting three ISCs: two are focused on offenders with substance misuse and one is focused on female offenders. I place particular importance on the female offender court, which is at magistrates’ level in Birmingham. To take one particular point, in the earlier sentencing White Paper of 2020, the Government committed to piloting up to five schemes; we did not commit to five or more, I think. It is partly a question of resource, but the view has been taken that we should try to do three properly now rather than risk spreading resource too thinly; of course, that leaves open the possibility of the programme being expanded later if it is successful, but I hope that this is a solid and important start. I am glad to hear that, in general, noble Lords welcome this step forward.

I mention, I hope relevantly, four particular features of the programme. The first is close judicial monitoring by the same judge. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, my noble friend Lord Jackson and, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Beith, raised the importance of continuity from a judicial point of view; it is crucial. I am sure that the MoJ will take away that point—it was made very forcefully by your Lordships, who collectively represent a wealth of experience in this area—and ensure that it happens. That is indeed a mainstay of the proposal.

The second feature is a particular emphasis on continuity and personal probation supervision so that there is always that particular continuity. As has been explained to me—to my personal satisfaction, I must say—it is in this respect something of a return to the old system of probation, whereby you had one probation officer who looked after you, took you all the way through the court process and was in direct touch with the judge, rather than there being, as I understand has happened to some extent in recent times, a sort of split within the Probation Service between the court team that prepares the reports and the supervisors who are out in the community, with a certain lack of communication in that process. It is very important that there should be the continuity of a single probation officer. Of course, at the same time—this is one of the reasons why the experiment is perhaps not as expansive as it might be—you do need to fully involve local authorities, other support services and so forth. We need to be sure that agencies have, as it were, signed up to and bought into the whole process for it to work.

For the substance misuse course, we have a requirement for regular drug testing so that, if there is a risk of someone falling back into such misuse, it will be picked up early.

Fourthly, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said, there is not exactly a mixture of carrot and stick but the possibility of imposing sanctions on offenders if they are clearly not observing the rules in a way that merits a sanction.

Your Lordships know the sequence of events. There was a sentencing White Paper in 2020, then there was the 2022 Act and now there are the pilots. The ministry did not exactly invite bids but sought to explore which areas of the country would be interested in undertaking this work. I have to say, the response was not exactly overwhelming because, at the time, the courts were preoccupied with the backlog and after-effects of Covid and all those issues. So we do not, from that point of view, start from a particularly propitious situation. None the less, on each site, a local level, multiagency team has worked together, including the judiciary, probation, the police, the police and crime commissioner, the local authority, third-sector organisations and, of course, MoJ officials.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I was explaining the work with local multiagency teams to make sure that we are delivering a model and a system that will work with a ring-fenced probation resource and a judiciary that will engage in intensive supervision and provide the continuity that has been lacking so far. As I say, this resulted from the sentencing White Paper of 2020 and the 2022 Act.

Against that background, I will take up at least some of the main points raised in the debate by noble Lords. As I say, we have sought to concentrate on what is within our ability to deliver, which is why we have gone for three courts instead of five. There may well be further opportunities to expand that in the future.

It is certainly true that there is an international context, to which attention was rightly drawn. Over the years, it has been difficult to pinpoint exactly how successful some of those international experiments were or are. I regret to say that there was not a full follow-up to the Liverpool experiment of some years ago, so we do not have the data, which is why the evaluation process is so important. All noble Lords referred—and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and my noble friend Lord Jackson specifically referred—to the importance of evaluation.

There will be an interim process evaluation report next year—2024—a further evaluation report in 2025 and yet a further impact evaluation in 2027. The reason for the further impact evaluation in 2027 is to allow time to give an assessment of the reoffending rate because we want to be sure—or to have some information on—whether people have managed to stay on the straight and narrow for two or three years. That is why the 2027 date is in the evaluation.

There will be a continual process of assessment as we go along. There are governance boards across the three sites to enable local partners and the MoJ to review progress on an ongoing basis, so evaluation is critical to the success of this experiment. It is fair to add that one of the encouraging features in a parallel context, at least in some areas, is the relative success of the FDACs—family drug and alcohol courts. That parallel example is slowly catching on because, unlike this process, they involve very considerable dedication of resources by local authorities and it is has taken them a little while to buy in to the idea, particularly in some parts of the north of England.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Will the Ministry of Justice be marking its own homework, or will we have some kind of independent basis for the evaluation?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

At the moment, the evaluation is an MoJ evaluation, as far as I know. I am sure that we can build in stakeholders. This is not exactly the MoJ’s homework, because the MoJ is not active in doing this; it is judges, the Probation Service, local authorities and so forth. I am sure that if your Lordships attach importance to some objective, third-party look at what we are doing—I can quite see why—that suggestion should be taken very seriously as we move forward.

European Court of Human Rights

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 5th September 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

While I am on my feet—in view of the political situation, I fully understand why noble Lords want to have a little bit of amusement at my expense—I take this opportunity to thank and congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, who has posed this Question, for his work at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. That Assembly plays a very important role in the convention, and the UK plays a very important part in the Assembly. I particularly commend the noble Lord for his work on sport and human rights and his recent report looking at the protection of underage players against risks of abuse and other matters. I thank the noble Lord for his Question.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Will the Minister confirm that the Government intend to use the Bill introduced in the other House to limit the ability of citizens to use the convention on human rights to safeguard their position against an over-mighty state? Does that not sit very oddly with the victor of the Conservative Party leadership contest quite often asserting her dislike of an over-mighty state? Is this not one of the main protections against it?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

It is a protection and will remain a protection. The rights in the convention will continue to be respected and enforced by the courts of the United Kingdom as before.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 24th February 2022 Lords Chamber

We think that these measures provide the opportunity to improve and enhance the magistracy and its leadership structures, which will now more closely align with the Crown Court. There will still be local training, but, where appropriate, we may have national training as well. But magistrates will be involved in the development of all these areas—

[Lord Beith (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister. Does he think that he ought to consider the impact that would flow from removing local justice areas, when we already find that taking cases to the furthest point within a local justice area—because there is a particularly well-equipped courtroom there, say—means that magistrates are finding that most of the cases they will be asked to sit on are taking place 50 or 60 miles away? It is extremely difficult to recruit magistrates who are prepared to accept that distance, and it does not do much for local justice.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Of course I accept that point as a matter of principle. That is why consultation is really at the heart of this. There has to be a balance. For example, there could be a case where you have a number of very disabled witnesses and a particular courthouse is more accessible for them than another one. There could be cases, as in the pandemic, for example, where some courthouses have been more easily adapted than others. But, as I hope I have made clear, we will make sure that there will be full consultation on this. But we want to build in the legislative flexibility to allow that to take place in cases where it is needed. If I may say—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, the office of the coroner has evolved over 1,000 years since William the Conqueror introduced it. There were too many dead Normans lying about attacked by Saxon villains. The coroner inflicted a fine called murdrum on a community where a dead body was found. The deceased was presumed to be Norman under the presumption of Normanry, unless the community, by the presentment of Englishry, could avoid the fine by showing that the deceased was English, in which case it did not matter.

The problem is that traces of these ancient procedures continue to dog the present and to provide cover to government not to recognise the realities of coroners’ proceedings today. Coroners today will tell you that their duties are confined to determining who the deceased was and how, when and where they came by their death. But it is not as simple as that. The thread that runs through this chapter on coroners in this Bill is the lack of concern for the interests of the bereaved, particularly the involvement of the family. The Commons Justice Committee reported last year, and Section 3 of its report is entitled:

“Putting bereaved people at the heart of the Coroner Service”.


This Bill does not even begin to do that.

The evidence given at an inquest and the decision of the coroner or a coroner’s jury has many consequences. When the family of the deceased arrive at the coroners’ court, they will frequently find that skilled advocates are representing a hospital, the police if there has been a death in custody, the insurers of a potential defendant in a road accident or insurers where there may be defects in a stadium, a block of flats or other structure. The evidence given on oath before the coroner may be crucial in determining an allegation of assault or negligence or, where the suggestion is suicide, whether life insurance will be paid out to the dependants. A finding in a coroners’ court frequently determines whether the dependants of the deceased can settle a claim for compensation quickly and without stress or whether they have to go through the agony of a court case.

I turn to Amendment 40. Currently, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, the coroner can discontinue an inquest only after the results of a post-mortem have been delivered to him unless he suspects a sudden and violent death or a death in the custody of an organ of the state, such as the police. Clause 38 of this Bill now extends his discretion to discontinue by the use of wide words: if the

“cause of death becomes clear”

before inquest. Under this Bill, all the family receive is a statement of reasons. The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that, before the coroner makes his decision to discontinue, he has made all proper inquiries, and ensured that there are no ongoing investigations into the death, such as a hospital inquiry, and crucially that the family have been given the opportunity to make representations and actually consent to the discontinuance.

I think the Explanatory Notes are disingenuous when they suggest that an inquest adds to the distress of the bereaved family. Certainly, there is distress, but a decision to discontinue, taken above their heads and without their participation and consent, may very well cause much greater distress.

I come to Amendment 41. We are all aware of the struggles of many families to obtain an inquest through the courts by way of the discretionary remedy of judicial review. Amendment 41 provides for rules to establish an appeals process for those who disagree with the decision to discontinue. To succeed in the Bill as currently drafted, they would have to establish that the cause of death is not clear. What does that mean? What may seem clear to the coroner may not be clear to the family at all. If Amendment 40 is carried, the need for appeal would be considerably lessened since all interested persons known to the coroner would have been notified of his intention to discontinue prior to the inquest and would have consented to it. Appeals could then be brought only by interested persons who had been overlooked. That is possible but very rare.

I turn to Clause 39 and Amendment 42, where the theme continues. The decision of a coroner to determine that a hearing is unnecessary and may be determined in writing should also involve the consent of the bereaved: put the bereaved at the heart of the coroners service. Proposed new subsection (2)(a), to be inserted by Clause 39(2), requires the coroner to invite representations from known interested parties before he makes his decision, while (2)(b) deals with situations where no representations have been made and (2)(c) deals with situations where there is a disagreement between interested parties. That is what the Bill talks about, but nothing is contained in the clause about the position where all the interested parties oppose the coroner’s notification of his intent to determine the issues in writing on the papers, much less a requirement that they all consent. Amendment 42 would deal with those omissions.

Amendment 43 to Clause 40 again seeks to involve the family in the decision to hold remote inquests. First, they should consent. Secondly, the coroner should be assured that such a hearing is in the interests of justice, in particular that the issues are not too complex and interested persons are able to use to technology involved. Thirdly, the coroner should give his reasons in writing. However, a remote hearing has this disadvantage: the family are not open to the support services that would be available at a live hearing. The Commons Justice Committee recommended at paragraph 66 of its report that

“local volunteers in the Coroners’ Courts Support Service”

use their skills to assist the bereaved and commented that that service is not centrally funded, nor available everywhere.

Amendments 44 and 45 emphasise the public interest in inquests. If held remotely, they should not be held simply by telephone and absent the public. The rules require that inquests be held in public, except for reasons of national security.

Amendment 50, after Clause 42, is an amendment in my name to delete Rule 27 of the 2013 rules, which states:

“No person may address the coroner or the jury as to the facts of who the deceased was and how, when and where the deceased came by his or her death.”


I have been present at a number of inquests and have always found this to be quite extraordinary. Deborah Coles, the director of Inquest, told the Justice Committee about her experience of a culture of “defensiveness” on the part of public bodies:

“Very often, those lawyers are working as a team to try to reduce the scope of the inquest, to try to limit the number of witnesses or argue against questions being left to a jury, if indeed there is one, or argue against a coroner making a prevention of future death report … There is much more concern for reputation management, rather than a meaningful search for the truth.”


In my experience, it is much the same with employers who seek to limit their liabilities. “Well,” you might say, “so much the better if they cannot address the coroner.” However, they often make submissions on facts dressed up as submissions on process. Where both sides are represented, the coroner should be helped by submissions made by both sides to clarify issues of fact and make points about the evidence that has been heard; those points may be crucial to the issue of liability. Whether both sides are represented and there is equality of arms is a matter that we shall come to in the debate on the next group.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with many of the points my noble friend has made. He made a particularly forceful point about addressing the jury at an inquest. It seems an absurdity that the law is in that state; I will come back to the encrusted historical nature of the law on coroners in a second.

I will add to what my noble friend said, although it might seem a slightly conflicting point. It is simply that the circumstances can be very different in so many of these cases. From my experience of inquests and dealing with families going to inquests, I have often come across the circumstances so vividly described by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, of those who do have any equality of arms and are dealing with a major public sector body or a private organisation with great resources. There are other families for whom an inquest is just another liability they do not want at a time of maximum grief. If there are no grounds for holding an inquest or drawing them into that procedure, we do not want to make life more difficult for them at a time of very real grief.

--- Later in debate ---

The problem is that, unless the coroner undertakes a full investigation or an investigation is suspended, those deaths can be registered only if an informant qualified to do so by legislation provides the registrar with information relating to the deceased. The qualified informants are primarily family members. That is the problem. The death can be registered only after the coroner has considered whether a full investigation should be carried out or discontinued, by which time a funeral may already have taken place and family members may no longer be interested. As I said, I am not blaming anybody; it is just human nature: the funeral has taken place so they regard the matter as concluded.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

It is not just human nature; it is the practical difficulty of registering deaths and making appointments in coroners’ offices, because registrars’ and coroners’ offices have very limited not just opening hours but opening days. This has been particularly marked during the pandemic.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I understand that, certainly from my postbag. I should say that coroners work extremely hard, but the pandemic has caused a real problem. I do not want to go back to the online discussion, but we hope that enabling people to do that sort of thing online will help. I certainly take the noble Lord’s point.

To solve this, the amendments in my name will enable a coroner to provide the registrar with the information required for the registration to take place on the basis of that information. I should make it clear that we are not introducing new duties on coroners or removing the duty on qualified informants to provide information. It is intended to be used in those exceptional circumstances where qualified informants are unable or unwilling—often for good reason, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said—to discharge their duties. The effect will therefore be that the death will not go unregistered. We think that about 200 of these cases happen a year. They affect the accuracy of records, but there is also the potential for fraudulent use of the identity of an unregistered deceased person, since the identity has not been closed by the death being registered. It is not quite Day of the Jackal territory, but there is potential for fraud there. We want to close that.

For those reasons, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments and I will move mine when the time comes.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

I will wait to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on Amendment 3, but I must say that I am not persuaded in advance. As I mentioned at Second Reading, it is usual in some other jurisdictions for prospective-only quashing orders to be made only on condition that the benefit of the quashing extends to litigants who have already brought similar claims to that being adjudicated upon. For that specific reason and as a matter of general principle, I would not be in favour of diminishing the flexibility of the courts by removing their power to impose conditions. I like much better the noble Lord’s Amendment 6 and wait with interest to hear what the Minister has to say about it.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, this is an area of complexity and difficulty and I think the difficulties are added to by the content of the Bill as the Government have brought it before us. It was not broken and it was not necessary to fix it in this respect. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has just explained how the previous use of common-law powers has dealt with this matter perfectly satisfactorily.

I share with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the dislike of anything that lessens the clear impact of the threat of judicial review on the public service. I say threat not because I am hostile to members of the public service but because it is a necessary discipline that things must be done within the law and they know that, if they are not, what they are bringing forward could well be nullified in the courts. The severity of judicial review is important to its role as the discipline for the rule of law.

There are, however, cases which do not fit easily into this pattern and which make an element of retrospection attractive. I think of licensing measures of various kinds—measures that render lawful things that would otherwise be unlawful. There are quite a lot of them in the area of game shooting, for example, and one caused quite a stir over the last couple of years: the power to shoot a predator bird if it is likely to enter an area where it would disturb the wildlife in a site of scientific interest which is subject to protection. In a recent example, there was indeed the threat of an action which did not take place in the end but which led Natural England to accept that its regulations were defective.

In those circumstances, you have people who have behaved in good faith and—they thought—lawfully, who, when the court in a judicial review determines that the action is not within the law, are left in a rather difficult position. You may say that nobody is going to prosecute them once it becomes clear that the law had been nullified. The case may already have started. However, in the real world, having been found to have acted unlawfully, even unwittingly, is not a good position to be in and not one that an employee wants to find themselves in. It presents some difficulties which I think Amendment 6, from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, attempts to address in so far as it affects regulations and delegated legislation. I will be interested to hear him set it out more fully and the Minister’s response to it.

That qualification—that we should remember the interests and concerns of people whose actions could unwittingly be rendered unlawful—is only a limited qualification to what, in my view, is the fundamental reason to object to what the Government are proposing, which is that the full rigour of the effects of judicial review should be something that the public service is always aware of.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I find myself in the same position as my noble friend Lord Anderson and I would like to add just a few words to what he said.

One of the points made in the Explanatory Notes—and I am looking at paragraph 21—is that:

“The diverse circumstances of possible cases make it difficult to assume that any one remedy or combination of remedies would be most appropriate in all circumstances.”


My noble friend Lord Pannick invites us to address subsection (1), read together with subsection (4). If one asks oneself what these provisions are driving at, one has to bear in mind that there is a whole range of diverse circumstances, some of which may affect private individuals very much indeed; in which case, one would be very concerned that their remedies were not being cut out. Other cases deal with administration and circumstances where individuals probably are not affected at all, but the good administration or even the security of the country is very much at stake when a quashing order is made.

I hope I can be forgiven for coming back to the case of HM Treasury v Ahmed in 2010, which I was involved in. I mentioned it at Second Reading and when I was addressing this subject at an earlier stage. It is worth dwelling on that case because it is an illustration of a circumstance where the clauses that are under attack by these amendments could be valuable. It was a case where the Treasury had pronounced an order to give effect to our international obligations under the United Nations Act 1946, designed to freeze the assets of suspected terrorists. That was our international obligation and, understandably, the Treasury made the order. But when the case came before the Supreme Court, it was pointed out that there was no parliamentary authority for such an extreme measure. The Supreme Court unanimously decided that the order should be set aside.

I suggested in the course of the hearing and, indeed, at the end of my speech—the leading speech in the main case—that we should suspend the effect of the order to give time for the Government to remedy the situation in order to avoid the terrorists dissipating their assets. The risk was that the banks that were holding the assets under the order that was under attack would release them under demand from the terrorists. Clearly, that would not be desirable.

I was overruled by six to one for a reason which, I think, demonstrates why these provisions are needed. My noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood was in the majority of the six against me so perhaps he can explain more fully what their reasoning was. As I understand it, they were saying that if you quash the order you are declaring what the law always was; in other words, the Treasury order was of no effect at all—that was the effect of the order—and, as I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, said, it would indeed undermine the effect of the quashing order to suspend it because it would be suspecting that there was something wrong with the decision to quash the order.

I could not understand that and I still cannot understand the sense of it. Indeed, one of the broadsheet papers, having spotted what was going on, asked: has the Supreme Court gone mad? I remember that certain people were rather discomfited by that but it was a very strange thing to do because there was no question of the banks releasing the money. But it was just as well to suspend the order so that they would be comforted by the fact that we were not actually making the order until Parliament had come in and produced a proper remedy to sort it out.

There you are. If you look at subsection (4), the “impugned act” was this order and what I wanted to do was to, in effect, allow the impugned act to be maintained—or, as subsection (4) puts it, “upheld”—so that the matter could be corrected. I cannot see anything objectionable to exercising the power in subsection (1)(b) in a circumstance of that kind. I wish we had had that power available to us at the time. It would have made my life a good deal easier in our discussions. It was not there and any idea that the common law could do that had really been exploded by the decision of the majority.

There is a problem and it would arise time and again if people were looking at the majority decision. There are, or could be, cases where for the protection of the public and in the interests of good administration the possibility of suspending the effect of the order so that the impugned act is regarded as valid until the defect can be corrected will be valuable. I suggest, with great respect to my noble friend, that it would be unwise to remove these provisions from the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 13. Two of the greatest joys of practice at the Bar are finding oneself on the same side as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and feeling that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, might possibly be with you. On this amendment, I am experiencing both those joys, because both noble Lords, along with the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, have signed it.

Amendment 13 would remove the proposed new subsections (9) and (10), by which the Government seek to enlist our aid in watering down the remedies judges might grant in the unfettered exercise of their discretion. Such interference is unjustified as a matter of principle. Judges are skilled technicians who know that every case turns on its particular facts. The Clause 1 remedies are specialised tools, the uses of which are best judged not by remote control but by those dealing on the ground with the infinite variety of cases that human ingenuity throws at them.

Two factors should incline us to particular caution. The first factor is that the Government are themselves a party to most judicial review cases. Subsections (9) and (10) look very like an attempt to tilt the playing field against those who seek to hold public authorities to account for their unlawful actions. The judges can and should be trusted to serve the interests of justice without presumptions designed to serve the interest of their promoters.

The second factor is that the remedies in respect of which the presumption applies have always been treated by the courts themselves as suitable for exceptional cases only, not just in this jurisdiction but in other jurisdictions where they are used; in other words, the Government are attempting to reverse a presumption that the judges have themselves developed in the interests of justice.

Even apparently benign fetters on judicial discretion may have unanticipated consequences. So, despite the good intentions behind it, I am a little wary of the words that would be substituted by Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Had this been the law, it would no doubt have been argued that the rights-holders must have their pound of flesh from the innocent copiers of CDs, since to restrict the scope of the quashing order could have denied them an effective remedy. I am not sure that would have been a just result.

The Minister, as the consummate advocate he is, knows that his best chance of defending this presumption is to minimise its significance. Indeed, the first time he mentioned it this evening, he described it as a so-called presumption, although the adjective was later dropped, and his Second Reading speech scarcely acknowledged its existence. He preferred to emphasise that it is

“ultimately up to the judge to decide”

whether to take out the tools provided by Clause 1, that

“this does not limit the flexibility of the court”,

and that subsections (8) and (9) are simply

“there to ensure a consistent but rigorous approach to identify the appropriate remedy in each case.”—[Official Report, 7/2/22; col. 1380.]

Yet subsection (9) is not as benign as that. It creates a rebuttable presumption in favour of the Clause 1 remedies in any case where they would offer adequate redress—a phrase whose meaning, as we discussed at Second Reading, is highly uncertain and obscure.

Yes, a robust interpretation by the highest courts might confine it to very limited circumstances. However, such an interpretation would take time to achieve and, in the meantime, the steer inherent in this proposed new subsection will, I am afraid, be picked up and will retain its power to influence and even intimidate the less experienced judge.

Proposed new subsection (10) makes it worse by singling out for a special weight the factor identified in proposed new subsection (8)(e)—a factor that is itself uncertain and problematic, for reasons we have already heard. Particularly troublesome, going back to Amendment 11, is the weight that would have to be placed on action proposed to be taken by a public authority in respect of which no binding undertaking is, however, offered to the court.

However, my point is wider ranging. The particular weight given to one set of factors is in itself objectionable in principle, as a further limitation of the court’s discretion. I sum it up in this way: if proposed new subsections (9) and (10) constrain the free exercise of judicial discretion, they should be resisted on that ground alone; if they do not constrain it, they are pointless clutter and, for that reason, should be removed from the Bill. The underlying point is that there should be nothing in the Bill to discourage judges from holding the Government accountable, where the interests of justice require, for the past consequences of their unlawful acts. I hope that by the time we have finished with it, that is what we shall have.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, if I were to give my apprentice joiner grandson a tool for his toolbox, I would not say, “In all circumstances, other than quite limited circumstances, this is the tool you must use and ignore the ones you already have”. The Government’s toolbox analogy does not seem to work. I am glad to have the opportunity to raise a question before the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, contributes to the debate—as I hope he will—because perhaps he can throw further light on the clarity of the recommendations of the Independent Review of Administrative Law on the issue we are debating. Paragraph 3.69 considered what would happen if the committee’s recommendation for a non-presumed format for these circumstances were followed and stated that, if Section 31 were amended in this way,

“it would be left up to the courts to develop principles to guide them in determining in what circumstances a suspended quashing order would be awarded, as opposed to awarding either a quashing order with immediate effect or a declaration of nullity.”

It was a very clear recommendation, and the Government should have taken that advice, as they took much other advice from the excellent document produced by the Independent Review of Administrative Law.

I will enter one other point into the debate. It was referred to by the former Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton: the issue of adequate redress. The way the phrase appears in proposed new subsection (9)(b)—

“offer adequate redress in relation to the relevant defect”—

worries me. It may not have been drafted with this intention, but there is a very great danger if “adequate redress” is seen as a matter which concerns only the person pursuing the action. It is perhaps too rash to say “most”, but many judicial review cases, by their very nature, have a far wider effect than simply on the individuals involved in the case. That is, indeed, recognised in the Government’s own formulation of proposed new subsection (8). It refers both to those

“who would benefit from the quashing of the impugned act”

and those who had expectations and

“relied on the impugned act”.

There will be large numbers of people in many judicial review cases who will be affected by the outcome, either because an action they have already taken will be deemed to have been unlawful at the time it was taken or, indeed, because the law on which they have relied to enforce a regulation has now been found not to have been good or effective law at the time. The breadth and implications of judicial review cases—which is why the subject arouses such widespread interest—is potentially threatened if the concentration becomes on “We’ve fixed it for the unfortunate person who appears before us in this case” without having proper regard to the very large number of people who will be affected. Now, courts do have regard to it and that is a feature of many of the cases referred to in the debate. I am suspicious that the Government wording appears to discourage them from doing so.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, indicated, I am happy to join myself with the amendment. Both the Law Society and the Bar Council oppose the inclusion of proposed new subsection (9), as do many others and for very good reasons. It is worth pointing out at the outset that the provision is not based on any recommendation of the Independent Review of Administrative Law headed by my noble friend Lord Faulks. To my mind, this part of new Section 29A is the critical provision because it colours the appropriateness or otherwise of what has gone before: in particular, the powers under the proposed new subsection (1)(a) and (b). It is objectionable, I suggest, for three reasons: it is unnecessary, it is wrong in principle, and it is potentially dangerous in practice.

It is unnecessary because proposed new subsection (8) sets out a comprehensive list of matters to be taken into account by the court, including, most importantly under (f)

“any other matter that appears to the court to be relevant.”

There is simply no need for any other guidance or mandatory direction to the court if the courts are to be left to choose the most appropriate remedy to right the wrong that has been committed. A problem would arise only if what is intended is that in certain circumstances the judge should not be left to choose the most appropriate remedy but one of the other quashing remedies to be found in the proposed new subsection (1).

As I understood the Minister’s answer to a point raised by my noble Lord, Lord Pannick, if the judge feels it would not be appropriate to impose a quashing order, notwithstanding the trigger in proposed new subsection (9) that would

“as a matter of substance, offer adequate redress”,

because the judge felt there would be injustice, that would be good cause. Well, if the judge feels that the appropriate remedy in all the circumstances to remedy the wrong committed by the public body is different from the quashing orders in proposed new subsection (1)(a) and (1)(b), that would be an injustice. So one asks oneself, “What on earth is the point of it all?” since the answer given by the Minister that I have just mentioned indicates that what one is left with is a free-ranging discretion to be applied in an appropriate judicial manner, having regard to all the circumstances to rectify the wrong that has been committed. So I am afraid I am left at a loss to understand exactly what it is that makes the proposed new subsection necessary or logical.

I have also said that proposed new subsection (9) is dangerous and wrong in principle. First, it provides a precedent for interference by the Executive with judicial discretion. In effect, it politicises the exercise of judicial discretion in carrying out the judicial function of selecting the most appropriate remedy to right, so far as possible, the wrong that has been committed.

Secondly—a point I raised at Second Reading—the trigger for the mandatory direction in proposed new subsection (9), that the court must exercise its powers under subsection (1), the new quashing powers, if that would

“as a matter of substance, offer adequate redress”

is bound to be the subject of dispute and appeals. It introduces a hard-edged objective test, quite different from the judge’s discretion, which will enable disappointed litigants an opportunity to litigate and appeal further, and that surely is something we must avoid if possible.

--- Later in debate ---

which is the second. There are two important safeguards, so to characterise the presumption as an attempt by the Executive to control the courts or remove their discretion is misleading. We want to make the decision-making process thorough and consistent and, as I say, to enable a body of jurisprudence to arise, which will be in the interests of justice because it will lead, ultimately, to more legal certainty for both claimants and defendants.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

On the basis of what the Minister has just argued, do I understand the Government’s position to be that unless this presumption is included, insufficient use will be made of these provisions and case law will not develop appropriately? Is that the Government’s position?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The Government’s position is that the presumption will enable the case law to develop more quickly, perhaps, than it might otherwise do, because in each case the court will consider whether these remedies are appropriate. But there will be no case in which the remedy is provided where the court sees a good reason not to do so. In other words, we will not be in the position of Ahmed; that was the opposite. That was where at least some members of the court—in fact, the majority—wanted to do something and could not. We are not—I underline “not”—putting the court in a position where it will say, “We have to do this. We really don’t want to, but we have to”. You simply do not get there under subsections (9) and (10).

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 7th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I think even the Government sometimes concede that judicial review is a vital protection for the citizen against the unlawful abuse of power by the Executive, other public authorities and, in some circumstances, by private sector organisations. It provides a powerful system of scrutiny of the fairness and integrity of the decision-making process, which the Executive ignore at their peril, as someone who has worked in the Civil Service will be aware—the noble Baroness clearly was.

The use of judicial review has increased significantly over the years, but so has the range of government activity which impacts on the citizen and therefore makes it necessary for it to be open to challenge. Most of the Bill, of course, is nothing to do with judicial review. After its first few pages, it is the reincarnated and revamped courts Bill, which fell at the 2017 election—it should have been introduced sooner to avoid that fate—plus a few very limited clauses about coroners which are a missed opportunity to address the inequality of arms which occurs in some very significant inquests to which my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford referred. It is not the full-frontal attack on judicial review that some in the Government hoped for. Instead, I would liken it to guerrilla tactics against judicial review.

We must go back to the publication of the review of administrative law by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to understand what is going on. The noble Lord and his expert committee carried out a thorough study and, based on the evidence, reached conclusions but they were not the conclusions that the Government intended it to reach—at least in part. Following publication of the report, I had a revealing letter from the then Lord Chancellor, Robert Buckland, in which he commended the group’s use of empirical evidence but added:

“However, I feel that the analysis in the report supports consideration of additional policy options to more fully address the issues they identified.”


That is pure Sir Humphrey, straight out of “Yes Minister”. A consultation followed, but my belief is that Robert Buckland’s approach—I not seeking to be critical of him because he had many qualities—became one of rejecting any general attack on judicial review and favouring instead the more selective inclusion of ouster clauses in some future Bills. There is a natural concern that even this unwelcome development might not be enough to satisfy the incoming Lord Chancellor once Sir Robert, as we know, was removed. Mr Raab has form on this issue. That is the context of the judicial review provision.

I have two particular concerns, echoing those of others, about the impact or potential impact of the Bill on the direction of policy on judicial review once the Bill is enacted. The first is the ouster clause tactic to which I referred, and it must be seen alongside the ouster clause in the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill going through the House. The Ministry of Justice gave the game away in the press release which launched this Bill, saying:

“It is expected that the legal text that removes the Cart judgment will serve as a framework that can be replicated in other legislation.”


My Lords, you have been warned.

There is a debate to be had about whether the Cart provisions in the Bill are necessary or will prevent some meritorious challenges to areas of law. I think we must look at them very carefully in Committee. However, I am more seriously concerned at this deliberate creation of a precedent for similar ouster clauses in unspecified future legislation. In what fields? Is it going to become the framework for a standard clause like the commencement clauses, which come on the end of a Bill and which every Bill—or a significant number—is going to have?

My second serious concern is that a reasonable proposal that the court should have an option of suspended quashing orders has been distorted into little short of a direction to the court that prospective or suspended quashing orders should be the norm. In the words of subsection (9) of proposed new Section 29A to be inserted by Clause 1, the court must exercise its power to suspend the effect of its order unless it sees

“good reason not to do so.”

There is always a good reason to quash illegal action by the Executive. It is the basis on which people in the public service know that they need to get things right or risk their action being quashed or nullified.

There are sometimes practical and sensible reasons why the full remedy is best not used—for example, when it would leave other citizens without a valid licence or with their status changed without time to make alternative arrangements. However, the court can assess the balance of those arguments without a massive statutory presumption in favour of weakening the wider discipline to the public service that comes from potential exposure to judicial review.

There are notional but understood boundaries between the role of the courts and the role of the Executive. There are judgments that are for an accountable Executive to make, such as the allocation of resources or the making of treaties. Courts are aware of these boundaries and have articulated them in a range of cases. Sometimes the Executive would disagree and be discomforted, but that is no excuse for them to remove or shift the boundary that protects the citizen’s ability to rely on the court to make sure that the Government obey the rule of law. If we were not already concerned about the maintenance of the rule of law in government, recent events have reinforced that it cannot be taken for granted.