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Lord Bach
Main Page: Lord Bach (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bach's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a particular pleasure for me to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, whom I admire hugely and with whose speech I agree 100%. She has seen everything in her very distinguished career, and the Government should take considerable notice of what she had to say about Part 4 of the Bill.
We can see from reading the debates in the other place that this is not particularly a politically controversial Bill, unlike many we have seen recently and, alas, may see again before very long. However, there are important arguments, very well put by the many experts in this House, that, as far as victims are concerned, while improving the position—the Bill does that—this may yet turn out to be a wasted opportunity.
I speak as the only Member of either House—so far, and perhaps not for long—who has served as an elected police and crime commissioner. I have therefore consulted opinion, to some extent at least, regarding the role of the police and crime commissioners, their offices and their responsibilities under the Bill. They are clearly being asked to do more than before. If the House will indulge me, I will briefly explain how they feel about the Bill at this stage. I tend to share their view.
Their general view is to welcome the proposals as they affect police and crime commissioners, but of course there is concern about effective implementation—the real question being: are there the facilities of leverage and resourcing that are needed for them to fulfil their roles? In particular, there is a view that the local criminal justice boards should be on a statutory footing. These are local fora where police and crime commissioners will seek assurances from criminal justice partners around code compliance—one of the responsibilities they are given—and shared accountability. The Home Office review on police and crime commissioners recommended that these local criminal justice boards should be statutory. That is not in the Bill. Have the Government changed their mind about that, or might we see this in the other criminal justice legislation that we will hear of in the months ahead?
Secondly, police and crime commissioners would generally welcome further levers to encourage code compliance, which is a duty imposed on them and others. Will they be given the power to demand and set expectations locally for other agencies? There is a welcome focus on good data and robust metrics, including feedback from victims, of course, and there are two new senior data analysts for each office of a police and crime commissioner. They are welcome too, but why the silence about long-term funding for those rather important posts?
Equally, as to the resourcing of the vital and welcome duty to collaborate, there are many similar duties in recent legislation that have gone through this House. In practice—that is the important point—these place a significant resourcing challenge to the parties involved, which, it is felt, are not always appreciated by the Government. Will the Minister please look at that issue again?
Finally, and more generally, where gaps in local services are found, there is no provision in the Bill for funding services. Will the Government step up to meet unmet victims’ needs?
Those, in short, are the views of police and crime commissioners. I cannot speak for them all, but I hope the Minister will take note of those views.
As for the code itself, I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, on what she had to say about the need to strengthen the code and tighten it up in regard to victims who have English as a second language. It is an important point, and I hope we do that at a later stage of the Bill.
The Minister will not be surprised to hear me ask about legal aid for Part 2 of the Bill. I would like more clarity as to where legal aid will come in and whether it will be means tested. If victims of an appalling incident want—as they may well—to instruct their own lawyers in the circumstances, what will the legal aid position be? Is that yet clear?
Finally, I want to express the widely shared view concerning the Bill’s proposals for the future of the Parole Board. Of course, the change of heart in giving the Lord Chancellor the option to direct the Parole Board and then to refer the case to the Upper Tribunal is to be welcomed, but some questions arise and I would like to put them quickly.
First, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, asked, why was the Upper Tribunal chosen? Secondly, on the point that the Lord Chancellor will send some cases where he thinks the Parole Board has got it wrong up to the Upper Tribunal, but not others, why must he not send them all up to whatever the judicial body is? How will he pick and choose? A less generous Lord Chancellor than we have at the moment may well take a completely different view and not send anything up to the Upper Tribunal, which will of course make the effect of this alteration negligible.
Thirdly—I have some experience of how busy Cabinet Ministers are, from having been a junior Minister in the Ministry of Justice, albeit a very long time ago—will the Lord Chancellor himself decide these issues by reading the papers? Will it be a junior Minister or a senior civil servant, on behalf of the Executive, who will make the decision that will affect the lives of individual prisoners?
In principle, the Executive should have no—or a minimal—part in the area of sentencing and the disposal of individual criminals. That actually breaches the rule of law in a fundamental way. The strength of the Parole Board, as the noble Baroness said, has been its independence, but that independence is being compromised by the proposals in the Bill. Allowing the Executive any greater role needs to be scrutinised with great care and permitted only when the necessity is proven. In my view, that case is not proven here.
Lord Bach
Main Page: Lord Bach (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bach's debates with the Leader of the House
(10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, although this amendment has been put down rather late, I hope that once the Committee has heard about it, it will realise that it has some potential importance in this debate. I want to thank publicly the Public Bill Office of this House, which is superb in the way in which it deals with each of us in turn so ably. For it to be able, on Friday afternoon with an hour to go before closing, to deal so satisfactorily with the issue that I now raise is a real compliment to it, and I do not think you would see that in every part of the public or private services.
My Lords, I do not think I could have put it better than the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. It is a good idea, but there are lots of complexities. I am sure that noble Lords agree that, in many ways, joining the dots and handling data is one of the most critical challenges any Government face—whether it is between departments or within the NHS, within the justice system, within or across police forces, et cetera. We still have 43 different police forces with computers that do not even necessarily talk to each other.
I thank the noble Lord for his amendment, which would introduce a consistent victim identifier for the collecting and sharing of code compliance information. This is extremely important so that we can better understand and meet victims’ needs. As I understand it, there is a Ministry of Justice pilot called the Better Outcomes through Linked Data—or BOLD—programme, which is already exploring how to link victims’ data to improve our understanding of their experiences. It is right that we should have a much better knowledge of the victim’s journey through the system and, in particular—to pick up a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made—better understand why people drop out of the system at a certain stage. Although I do not have a more precise date, I gather that the results of that pilot will be available in 2024.
Whether it is something that is either sufficiently developed or should be in the Bill as a matter of principle is perhaps another question. At this stage at least, the Government are not persuaded that it that should be in the Bill, but they are persuaded that it is something we should continue to work on to understand the complexities and arrive at practical solutions.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this fairly short yet important debate. I thank the Minister for answering the question so positively. Whether or not it is for this Bill is a matter for discussion between now and Report, but it seems that while there are, of course, considerable issues around this in practice, the idea that the victim should be treated in the same way, being known about and followed, as it were, in this area seems an important principle, and would raise the position of the victim—as the Bill says it intends to do. I hope we will come back to this issue. It is worthy of discussion and has had a good outing today in Committee. I do not think it will go away—if we do not take advantage of digital advances in this area, as in every other, we are not doing our duty. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I am going to speak to my Amendment 65. I am delighted that the noble Baroness who has just spoken supports it. It was supported also by the noble Lord, Lord Wasserman, who cannot be in his place today. I remind the Committee that I was a police and crime commissioner for five years and had some responsibility for victims’ services at the time. This amendment springs from a view of the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, and I am very grateful for its help.
Noble Lords will have seen that the duty in relation to victim support services to collaborate and the strategic guidance under Clauses 12, 13 and 14 refers to police areas in England alone. The purpose of the amendment is to try to persuade the Government that the duty to collaborate should apply to elected policing bodies across England and Wales while, of course, respecting Welsh devolved powers.
The Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, which of course represents all police and crime commissioners across England and Wales, is enthusiastic and welcomes the Bill—I should say that to start with. However, it thinks that there is a problem in that, as the clause is drafted now, it could make a real difference to the effectiveness of Welsh police and crime commissioners, and more particularly to how they are perceived in both Wales and England. I want to make it clear that I am advised that the four Welsh police and crime commissioners who would be most directly affected by the amendment are all strongly in favour of it. I emphasise to the Committee that they are not all from one political party; politics does not come into this particular issue.
All noble Lords will of course appreciate that policing in Wales is a reserved power of the UK Government, so that these four Welsh police and crime commissioners operate under the same rules and regulations as their colleagues in England. Nevertheless, of course, they operate entirely within the boundaries of the principality. Therefore, to be effective they have to take fully into account the ways in which health, local government, highways, housing and their local public services are organised and delivered in Wales, notwithstanding the fact that they themselves are not under the control of the Welsh Government.
The four Welsh police and crime commissioners have expressed concerns about the Bill, hence this amendment. Their concerns are that while the Bill imposes on their English colleagues a duty to collaborate in the exercise of victim support services, it does not impose the same duty on them. The Welsh police and crime commissioners believe that this could make a significant difference to their effectiveness in this field and, more significantly, lead to a perception that they are less committed to dealing with such issues as violence against women and girls than are their English colleagues—and nothing could be further from the truth.
Equally, and this is perhaps a significant point, although Welsh police and crime commissioners engage enthusiastically at present with the partnerships set out in the Welsh legislature, they are under no statutory obligation to do so. There are impending elections, and these could change collaborative approaches without such a duty as this amendment seeks to safeguard continued partnership engagement.
It is for this reason that the amendment has been drafted. It recognises the special circumstances under which the four Welsh PCCs operate, but at the same time makes it clear that Welsh police and crime commissioners are no less determined to support victims of crime than are their English colleagues, and no less determined to collaborate with other agencies in Wales to achieve this object.
Neither I nor, with great respect to him, the noble Lord, Lord Russell, are experts in the details of the Government of Wales Act 2006, or the legislation, regulations and administrative arrangements that flow from it. If the Government, in further discussion with the Welsh Government, have concerns with the drafting of the amendment and suggestions for improving it, we would be very happy to welcome them. We are concerned here with the principle of the amendment: to ensure that the obligation that the Bill imposes on police and crime commissioners in England to collaborate in the exercise of their functions to support the victims of crime is extended to the four police and crime commissioners in Wales, whose powers are in every other way identical to those of their English colleagues. On that basis, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I want to pick up the last point of the noble Lord, Lord Bach. The duty to collaborate is extremely important, and both his amendment and that of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, are certainly worthy of consideration. The lighthouse model that has been referred to is extremely impressive. I have also seen, in times past, really effective local working, particularly through services for child victims. However, it would be good if this were strengthened to ensure that part of the victim’s journey, regardless of their age, was helped.
It is a convention in this House that, if we are not quite sure where to go next, we ask for reports. However, we have tabled a lot of amendments about a lot of detail because we are concerned about the practice, and this is one instance where reports actually become vital. They are vital not just to hold the Government to account in Parliament but to ensure that the Government are forced to reflect on how the systems are working, because if this continues for yet another decade, we will be going through another Bill in 10 years’ time saying the same things. A report might help focus the mind when the systems are not working.
I support the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, in her comments about the provision of DA support and the real crisis times that victims face, with their lives in complete upheaval. I agree particularly with her points about economic coercive control, which is really worrying and something I have heard more and more about. I have been working with one victim for about 15 years; it took her 10 years to clear the debts that she was left with as a result of the coercive control of her partner, who completely disappeared. She is on the minimum wage, and it has been very difficult and has affected her life for that long.
I signed Amendments 54 and 81, which the noble Lord, Lord Russell, outlined in his speech, on including stalking in the list of relevant victim support services and placing a duty on the Secretary of State to assess a number of advocates, including stalking advocates. I go back to the issue we discussed in the last group: how important it is to have a victim journey number.
In the case where my colleagues and I were victims, our first barrier was finding one crime number. The man who stalked me pleaded guilty to 67 crimes and asked for another 100-and-something to be taken into account. Not all of the crimes happened to me; some of them happened to council colleagues and supporters of my party, and some happened to people who were, unfortunately, parked on the driveways of supporters of my party. Each time we rang the police, we were given a different number. As the PPC, I started a spreadsheet, and when it got to 30 I went back to the police and said, “This is impossible”. We did not know who it was—we had suspicions—but we knew that it was a very particular campaign.
At that point, about six months in or perhaps slightly more than that, we had the one funny incident of a two and a half year-experience, where, every week in the Watford Observer, there was a letter being very unpleasant about me and occasionally about my council colleagues. The letters got more vitriolic, but each was signed by somebody else. I went with a colleague to see the editor of the newspaper, and he said, “Politics is a tough old game, and you just have to accept that, if people want to write in and tell me that you are poor on this topic and not a very nice woman given what you do with your children, I will print it”. I asked him if I could read out the surnames of the people who had written in over the last few weeks: they were Freeman, Hardy, Willis, Debenham and Freebody. At that point, he realised he was being had, but we had been watching the letters go in for four months at that stage. The objective was to destroy my campaign—that is what the judge said when the man was sentenced. But that was the only funny part.
The other thing about stalkers is that, when they do not achieve what they want, their behaviour becomes more drastic; the Suzy Lamplugh Trust will tell you that this is well-known. The man then started printing completely fictitious letters about one of my council colleagues who lived just round the corner from me and literally scattering them along the road in his car. At that point, we thought we knew who he was, but we could not get the police to take it seriously. The letter said that my council colleague—who was married to his one and only wife—had deserted his previous wife and was not paying her maintenance and that his daughter was distressed; funnily enough, my colleague was up for election that year. That was a step up, and then it went a step further up during the 2005 general election, when all the poster boards were pulled down. My husband, who happened to be our poster board supremo, kept creating higher and higher stakes for the poster boards—we really made it into an artform. When one got to three times the normal height, the man scratched the car on the driveway of the house. Thereafter, it moved on to petty crime, but it was not stalking because it was petty crime against other individuals. That is why we need one crime number for this sort of thing, but also recognition that, although there is a core victim, there are other victims because of the nature of stalking.
What really freaked them out was when he started to put knives through the tyres of cars on driveways at night and spray epithets on the homes of councillors. My husband had installed 10 closed circuit cameras on the most likely places by then. The police provided one on our house, and our house was never targeted—I cannot imagine why. We were able to use that evidence, along with a picture of him where you could see that he was wearing a watch on his right arm which matched the one seen during the spray-painting. At that point—this was the worst day—the police said that a forensic psychiatrist had come in as they were worried about the behaviour, and it was clear that he was going to go for people with the knife next, and it was a 10-inch knife.
At that point, we were well over two years in. That is why, 15 years on from his sentencing, when the noble Lord, Lord Russell, spoke about knives the other day, my blood ran cold. I was remembering when the police came to our house and upped security. Stalking can be very dangerous. I was lucky; we got it taken seriously and he pleaded guilty when caught, but there are other cases.
Lord Bach
Main Page: Lord Bach (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bach's debates with the Leader of the House
(9 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, briefly, I support the amendments moved and spoken to in this group by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I spoke on this matter at Second Reading and agreed with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said in his speech then.
The Committee may know that, along with others, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, I have put my name to later amendments that question the changes proposed by the Government to the Parole Board. In my view, those changes attack pretty fundamentally the independence of that board and allow the Secretary of State to interfere in these matters to an extent that affects the separation of powers. As a rule, I argue that it is never a good idea, however tempting for Governments, for the Executive to interfere with matters that should be the role of the judiciary. Taken as a whole, these changes are unnecessary and overcomplex, and will prove to be extremely costly.
Today, we are discussing the amendments so well put by the noble and learned Lord, who speaks with such huge authority; I am pleased to support them. They argue that the Upper Tribunal is entirely the wrong body to hear these cases. The Government would be well advised, with respect, to listen to him, and to remind themselves of the powerful speech made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, at Second Reading. It is not often that this House is privileged to have the support of the last two Lord Chief Justices on a matter that they are profoundly expert in. I ask the Minister, who is always very reasonable, to think very carefully about how powerful the case that has been made this afternoon is.
Of course, I strongly agree with the amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on the necessity of a report from the Secretary of State on the implementation of these proposals, which I consider to be pretty disturbing on the whole. I ask the Minister, when he replies, to consider carefully where these amendments are coming from.
My Lords, I will speak with the leave of the Committee and with many apologies; I was delayed in a committee. Amendment 143A is a probing amendment to seek to understand whether the Secretary of State will issue guidance on these matters, and if so, what that guidance will include. The Prison Reform Trust is particularly concerned about this, being aware that an overturned release decision would be likely to undermine public confidence in the parole system and so on. I am sure that the Minister will want all the actors in the sector to understand how these arrangements are intended to work and how they can be scrutinised.
Lord Bach
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(8 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I speak having taken some advice from the Clerks—I am grateful to them. The first two items in this group are notices of my intention to oppose Clauses 53 and 54. We debated the amendments in both clauses in our previous Committee sitting on 12 March and the Minister, whom I have spoken to this afternoon before coming to Committee, gave certain undertakings following that debate about discussing further the issues raised with his fellow Minister, who sits by his side, and with the Ministry of Justice. In all the circumstances, I will not press the stand part notices in my name on either Clause 53 or Clause 54. That is why I have got to my feet at this stage.
My Lords, I put my name to this clause stand part notice, which was originally in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He, alas, cannot be here this afternoon as he is on parliamentary business abroad, and he has asked me to open this short debate. I do not think that the Committee will be that surprised to hear me say that what I am about to say owes much to the noble Lord.
Clauses 55 and 56 prohibit a prisoner serving a whole-life tariff from entering into a marriage or civil partnership with another person, without the written permission of the Secretary of State, to be granted only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances. At Second Reading, on 18 December, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, referred to
“a recent case in which surviving families of the victim of a most serious murder were openly mocked by the convicted offender, who trumpeted his right to marry, causing distress to many”.—[Official Report, 18/12/23; col. 2056.]
It is my view, and I suspect the view of many on the Committee, that it is deeply unsatisfactory to legislate on the basis of one such incident, however upsetting it was for the victim’s family, as it undoubtedly must have been. That point was made at Second Reading by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. Is this one incident, serious though it was, the only basis for seeking to legislate in this context?
Beyond that, there is a question of principle. However repellent their crimes, whole-life prisoners are allowed to eat, exercise, read books, watch television and send and receive letters, so why are they to be denied the basic right to marry a consenting adult? I say “basic right” because Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights states:
“Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry”.
What the state cannot do, consistent with human rights, is impose restrictions so extreme that they impair the very essence of the right to marry. That is the test stated in the consistent case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which considered how this applies to prisoners, in particular in the case of Frasik v Poland in 2010. The court stated in its judgment that an effective bar on any exercise of a prisoner’s right to marry is a breach of Article 12. The court added:
“Imprisonment deprives a person of his liberty and … of some civil rights and privileges”.
The authorities are, of course, permitted to impose restrictions on civil rights to protect the security of the prison regime, but:
“This does not, however, mean that persons in detention cannot, or can only very exceptionally, exercise their right to marry”.
The court added that the state cannot prevent a prisoner enjoying the right to marry because of the authorities’ views as to what
“might be acceptable to or what might offend public opinion”.
That is the basis, it seems, of Clauses 55 and 56. It is very doubtful whether these clauses are wise in any event. My noble friend Lord Ponsonby made the important point at Second Reading that if we are to lock people up for very lengthy periods, perhaps the whole of their lives, we must surely give them some positive purpose in life: some hope, some encouragement to maintain relationships with the outside world, not just for their own self-respect or mental health but because it will help those who have to manage the prison regime and prevent the inevitable frustrations of long-term prisoners erupting in violence against prison officers or other prisoners.
Clauses 55 and 56 have, in my view, no sensible justification. They are objectionable in principle and they will impede good management of the prison system. They seem to have more to do with populism than with any sensible policy. I submit that if these clauses become law, this is an example of bad legislation that an experienced Parliament such as this should not pass. I invite the Minister, when he replies to this debate, to say that the Government will think again about this issue and, I hope, come to the conclusion that it is not worthy of this important Bill.
My Lords, I have added my name to both stand part notices. The first question I asked myself way back before Second Reading, and I still need to ask myself, is why on earth the Government put these two clauses in the Bill. They do not seem to do anything to make the prison regime any better or to make the work that goes on in supporting people in prison any easier. In fact, they appear to be cruel in a variety of ways.
The Secretary of State being able to approve a marriage or civil partnership only based on exceptional circumstances, even if you felt there was a rationale or a reason, is surely the wrong way around. Surely, the Secretary of State should be able to deny them only if there are exceptional circumstances. This measure will apply regardless of the way in which anybody in future seeks a partnership or marriage.
It worries me, as I am sure it does many others in this Committee, how much placing people in prison for their lives will add to—or detract from—what happens inside the prison. It is going beyond punishment. Whatever anybody feels about what happens in a prison establishment, providing some hope for the future of their lives, understanding how their lives work and making sure they feel a sense of purpose in remaining alive is part of the job of the state, which must retain that ability.
These clauses, once again, chip away at those fundamental human rights, disapplying human rights to a specific cohort of people. The universality of human rights in this circumstance is doubly important because, of course, the state is totally responsible for whatever rights and purposes prisoners have. It has to manage them. It is precisely in custodial institutions such as prisons that human rights protections are most vital, because the individuals are under the control of the state.
It would appear, as in the Illegal Migration Act and the safety of Rwanda Bill, that we are beginning to see a testing period for making controversial changes to our human rights framework. It seems to me and those on these Benches that this particular measure is offensive to that spirit of how the state should manage the lives of people in this circumstance. If there were to be a case for saying that somebody cannot get married or have a civil partnership, that is surely by exception rather than by practice.
It appears to me that these clauses do not really fit into this Bill, because of that sense of things being done in the wrong direction. More than anything else, I seek to understand from the Government why they have put this in place. If it is because of a single case, as we have just heard, to write law on the basis of a single case is surely not the correct way to go about it.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their comments in this short debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for setting out his intention to oppose that Clauses 55 and 56 stand part of the Bill, and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for his comments in support of that.
It is important that the Committee examines the rationale behind these clauses. Clauses 55 and 56 will prohibit prisoners in England and Wales who are subject to a whole-life order from marrying or forming a civil partnership while in prison or another place of detention. The Secretary of State may grant an exemption in truly exceptional circumstances. A whole-life order is the most severe punishment in the criminal law of England and Wales. It is reserved for exceptionally serious offences, such as serial or child murders which involve a substantial degree of premeditation or sexual or sadistic conduct. Unlike other life sentences, offenders subject to a whole-life order can expect never to be released. Their tariff will never expire and they will not be considered for parole at any point.
As the law stands, a prison governor cannot reject a prisoner’s application to marry or form a civil partnership unless the ceremony creates a security risk for the prison. This includes whole-life prisoners. Those subject to whole-life orders can expect never to be released. As they are not working towards life on the outside and the prospect of being able to enjoy married life, any rehabilitative effect of a potential marriage is likely to be significantly reduced. Being married or in a civil partnership does not have any practical impact on an individual’s ability to maintain a relationship with a prisoner. Prisoners are not entitled to conjugal visits and rights to access fertility treatment do not require the prisoner to be married to or in a civil partnership with their partner. Neither do spouses, civil partners or their children have any additional right to visits, telephone calls or video calls. Whole-life prisoners can therefore benefit from supportive relationships while in custody in the same way as other prisoners. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord German, this is not cruel—they can maintain relationships.
While the right is protected under Article 12 of the ECHR, the convention allows states to impose restrictions in a proportionate way for a legitimate purpose. In line with the opinion of the European Court of Human Rights in Draper v the United Kingdom, we consider that a restriction on whole-life prisoners’ right to marry can be justified on the basis of public interest. The public set great store by our response to the most heinous crimes. The current position undermines confidence in our criminal justice system and its ability to deliver justice and protect the public. These clauses allow the Secretary of State to make exemptions on a case-by-case basis in exceptional circumstances. Any discretion available to a Secretary of State would itself be exercised compatibly with ECHR obligations.
We have taken a proportionate approach in applying these measures to only a small cohort of offenders who are already singled out in our domestic framework due to the exceptionally serious nature of their offences. As of December 2023, there were only 67 whole-life prisoners in England and Wales, representing less than 0.1% of the total prison population—less than one in 1,000.
To answer the question from all noble Lords, this is not about a single case. While it was a particular case that brought this issue to the Government’s attention, this is not about any individual; it is a broader point of principle. The justice system must be able to deal appropriately with the worst offenders, to drive up public confidence in the justice system. We consider that these measures are justified on the basis of that public interest. This is not just due to the distress that such an event may cause to the families of victims, whose lives these prisoners have cut short in heinous ways, but, more fundamentally, because of the real risk of damage to public confidence in the criminal justice system if it cannot deal appropriately with the most serious offenders. The Government are resolved that this is an appropriate measure. I therefore propose that Clauses 55 and 56 stand part of the Bill.
I thank the Minister for his response, and the noble Lord, Lord German, for his support in this matter.
I have two points for the Minister, if I may. Is it really considered proportionate as an answer to Article 12 to say that these measures would be allowed only in exceptional circumstances? That seems not very proportionate at all. Secondly, I personally do not see the relevance, when we are talking about a matter of principle such as this, of what percentage of prisoners are in this category. It does not matter what percentage are. If it is right, it is right, and if it is wrong, it is wrong. In my view, it is a matter of some principle that this should not be imposed upon people who have done absolutely terrible things and are paying the price for it. This is a step too far and, as I say, not worthy of Parliament. Having said that, I am not going to take this matter any further today.
Lord Bach
Main Page: Lord Bach (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bach's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(7 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 35 would require information on compliance with the victims’ code to be linked to a consistent victim identifier. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby for supporting this amendment. Members may recall the helpful discussion on this issue in Committee. I am grateful to colleagues and to the Minister for their engagement on this topic.
I have been moved to reintroduce this amendment because I remain convinced that, without this change, the Government’s ambition to harness the Bill to put victims at the heart of the justice system and increase accountability may well fail; it is that serious. I thank Natalie Byrom, whose article in the Financial Times in January 2024 kicked off this important debate.
I begin by being extremely clear about what is being proposed. Put simply, this amendment contemplates the creation of a unique identifier allocated to victims at the point at which they first report a crime to the police, to which all subsequent crime numbers and case updates can be linked. Compliance with the measures in the victims’ code must also be recorded against this identifier. Information about the victim’s demographic and protected characteristics can also be added to the victim identifier, provided that the victim consents to provide this. In the absence of the introduction of this identifier, it will continue to be impossible to routinely link information on victims’ code compliance to the demographic characteristics of victims or criminal justice outcomes. This makes it impossible to tell what measures are working and for whom. Information will remain partial, piecemeal and costly to collect.
My Lords, I thank the Minister very much for his response. I also thank noble Lords around the House who have been sympathetic to the amendment that I moved.
Because it is such common sense, this will happen in time. The sooner it happens, the better for victims and the justice system. I am realistic, so I understand that there are complications, as my noble friend Lord Ponsonby said, that will have to be worked through before we get to the stage—which I hope will happen sooner rather than later—where something like this comes into being.
For the moment, I am delighted to hear that the Government understand the problem and are working hard to solve it. There is a real issue as to whether the BOLD development is the answer to the issue that I have tried to raise today. I ask the Government to look very carefully at whether that is a better alternative to the proposal I made today. It seems to me that it would not be sensible to divide the House on the issue, however much I might be tempted to do so, because there is more work to be done. However, I go away with the feeling that the Government are sympathetic to the idea that this whole system should be very much simplified. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Bach
Main Page: Lord Bach (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Bach's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(6 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberIt was Winston Churchill; I am corrected—both great names.
If we have progressed at all from the way prisoners were treated in the past, we should be enabling whole-life prisoners to find some meaning and purpose in a life that is certain to end in prison. This includes providing opportunities for them to have some social interaction and build relationships, even though they can never expect to be released—in fact, especially because they can never expect to be released. This reflects the long-standing legal position. It is trite law now that prisoners enjoy basic human rights, such as respect for their private and family life, their religion, freedom of expression and access to a lawyer etc. Under Article 12, prisoners have the right to marry and form a civil partnership.
My noble friend Lord Pannick has already referred to the case of Frasik. I will quote again that passage from the court’s judgement, because it is so powerful. Imprisonment, the court said, does not mean that those detained
“cannot, or can only very exceptionally, exercise their right to marry”.
Yet is that not exactly what Clauses 55 and 56 say? The ECHR memorandum conveniently sidesteps that by saying that marriage by whole-lifers
“undermines public confidence in the Criminal Justice System”.
We have just heard from my noble friend Lord Pannick on that one; it is, in effect, code for “offends public opinion”. But the Frasik judgment, as my noble friend said, says that the Bill cannot do that—it cannot automatically prevent prisoners forming marital relationships.
It is not all about the law either. Compelling legal points, such as those we have mentioned, often arise from a rotten policy, which is what we have here. The Government’s justification seems to be the case of Levi Bellfield. Awful as that is as an example of the right to marry being abused, it is one case of about 70 whole-lifers in the system. They have all committed terrible crimes, but their whole-life tariffs are the punishment for that. Even Ministers have recognised that we send people to prison as punishment, not for punishment. Automatically denying prisoners, even whole-life prisoners, the right to marry or enter a civil partnership amounts to nothing more than the state imposing additional, entirely gratuitous punishment on this cohort of prisoners for no reason other than to show the public that it is tough on crime.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, expressing his personal views at Second Reading, put it well when he described it as a “petty measure”. The noble Lord, Lord German, who unfortunately cannot be with us tonight, rightly called it cruel. It also punishes prisoners’ partners, who are entirely innocent in all this. It punishes them emotionally, of course, but it may also affect their entitlement to, for example, a widow’s pension on the death of a whole-life prisoner or a spouse’s exemption from inheritance tax. Has any consideration been given to the effects of this policy on partners? I would be most grateful to know the answer to that.
There is a simple solution to the Government’s wholly justified concern about the Levi Bellfield case, which would deal with all the legal and policy objections that have been mentioned. The existing law entitles a prison governor to refuse an application to marry or form a civil partnership only if it would create a security risk to the prison. Why not ditch Clauses 55 and 56 and legislate to widen the basis for refusing such applications to include cases where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the application is not made in good faith but from some improper motive? This could easily be made legally watertight to minimise the possibility of unfounded legal challenges.
In conclusion, and at this late hour, in the dying breaths of the Bill, I urge the Minister to ignore the word “reject”, which is in his briefing notes in capital letters, underlined, in bold type. Why not surprise everybody, not least his officials, by agreeing now to remove Clauses 55 and 56 and adopt the more proportionate, but no less effective, solution that I have just proposed?
My Lords, I do not intend to say much, for the very good reason that I do not have to. The arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, and particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are overwhelming. I do not want to put the Minister, for whom I have huge respect, on the spot, but I have a suspicion that he has more than a bit of sympathy for the arguments that have been put.
The only point I want to make is this: commentators have said that, when the Minister and the Secretary of State came to their positions, there was likely to be a different attitude towards issues of this kind than there was under some predecessors. The evidence is that that is true, and we have seen examples tonight and this afternoon of the Minister no doubt using his influence in persuading the Secretary of State to have sensible views and change the Bill where it needed to be changed.
This is exactly a case of a clause that is both against the European legislation we have adopted and against all common sense; it should be removed. It would be a real shame if this Bill, which contains some really excellent stuff on both prisoners and victims, has at the tail end of it, as the noble Lord said, this rather ridiculous and very anti-British way of dealing with this issue—so I do ask the Minister to please think again.
My Lords, I raised questions about Clause 55 and how it might operate in practice at Second Reading that were really not answered. I make no criticism; the Minister had a lot to deal with. I regret not being able to participate in Committee. But I have devoted quite a lot of my professional life to the formation and validity of marriage, and therefore in the context of this Bill I would like to point out that the question of whether and to what extent certain marriages should be restricted or governed by statute faces two underlying problems.
First, it is generally not necessary for anybody otherwise qualified to marry to have any good or creditable reason to do so. I mention that in the context of my noble friend Lord Carter’s suggestion that possibly in these circumstances prison governors should question the motives and have the ability to do so, and that that may be the way through this problem. I have to say that research suggests that the decision to marry is rarely reached on rational grounds—and indeed the same research revealed that 3% of those surveyed did not know why they were getting married at all.
Secondly, and altogether more seriously, there is the fundamental right to marry, stated in Article 12 of the ECHR. That is a right that long predated that convention in this country. However, it was Article 12 that underpinned the Marriage Act 1983, which allowed for marriages of those detained in prison, for essentially pragmatic reasons. It was legislation that did not attract criticism—indeed, only newspaper headlines such as “Get Me to the Jail on Time”. Article 12 also led to the extension of the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act 1986, which I had a part in, believe it or not, and which set mankind free to marry their mothers-in-law.
The restrictions proposed in this Bill on specific marriages were understandably prompted by the attention-seeking attempts by particular convicted prisoners to marry—something that many people, no doubt including their victims and their victims’ families, will have found grossly offensive. Nevertheless, the underlying points emphasised by all noble Lords who have spoken so far simply cannot be ignored.
If Article 12 rights are to be curtailed and qualified simply by reference to the nature of the sentence being served or by vague concepts of public interest, the Government really should spell out more clearly the justification for the proposed restrictions and should clearly indicate the circumstances likely to satisfy the Secretary of State that they are “exceptional circumstances”. At Second Reading, I suggested that they might include terminal illness, but I can see that it ought probably to go wider than that. Otherwise, we are simply going to be storing up problems and litigation for the future.