Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Ashcombe Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th June 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Ashcombe]

69B: Clause 16, page 18, line 33, leave out “5” and insert “3”

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, unfortunately, I was unable to speak at Second Reading—like the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, as he mentioned on Monday—but I am delighted to be back in time to speak in Committee. I declare my interest as an employee of Marsh, an FCA-regulated firm.

The amendment in my name in this group, Amendments 69B and 73A, propose that our financial regulators move from a five-year to a three-year strategic planning cycle. At its heart, this is a straightforward proposition: regulators must keep pace with the world they regulate. In financial services, the rate of change has accelerated to such an extent that a five-year strategy can quickly become outdated. When the FCA and the PRA last set their strategies, few could have anticipated the speed and scale of the developments that followed. The volatility seen in digital assets, the rapid emergence of artificial intelligence in financial decision-making, the growing importance of cyber resilience to financial stability and the impact of geopolitical tensions on global markets have all evolved far more quickly than expected. Yet regulators remain bound by frameworks conceived for a very different environment.

A three-year cycle offers a more realistic and proportionate approach. It is not an arbitrary shift. It better reflects the pace of change in financial services, aligns more closely with the Treasury’s spending review cycle and mirrors the planning horizons adopted by many firms. It also corresponds more closely to the time it takes for innovation to move from novelty to something requiring clear regulatory oversight. Some may argue that a five-year cycle provides greater stability, but stability should not be confused with rigidity. A strategy that is clearly out of date does not offer certainty; it risks losing credibility. True stability lies in a framework that is regularly reviewed and refreshed, so that it remains relevant and dependable. Nor would a shorter cycle create unnecessary disruption. It would not require regulators to constantly change direction; rather, it would ensure that their strategies are revisited at appropriate intervals and updated where necessary. That strikes the right balance between continuity and responsiveness.

There is a practical consideration. Industry participants have consistently highlighted that five-year strategies can be overtaken by events well before their conclusion, making it harder for firms to plan with confidence. In reality, regulators have already had to adapt to unforeseen shocks—whether economic, geopolitical or technological —outside the normal review cycle. For that reason, this is not a radical proposal but a pragmatic one.

It is important that financial regulation does not rely on a planning horizon that no longer reflects the realities of the market. The FCA and the PRA are strong institutions, but even the most capable regulators cannot be expected to operate effectively within five-year strategies in a period of such rapid change. A three-year cycle is a measured reform. It would help to ensure that regulation remains responsive, credible and accountable, while fully respecting the independence of our regulators.

These are probing amendments. As such, can the Minister say why the Government chose to fix five-year periods for strategy reviews? I believe that is too long, so I look forward to hearing his thoughts on that. I also support the amendments in the names of my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 70, 71, 73, 74 and 76 in my name. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for adding his name to Amendments 70, 73 and 76.

At first sight, Clause 16 looks like a bit of “motherhood and apple pie” legislation. After all, what is not to like about five-year strategies, which are what most businesses do in the UK and internationally? A closer look at Clause 16, however, reveals a bit of a mess. The position we have at the moment is that the PRA is required to determine a strategy, and it does this by way of annual business plans. There is no requirement in statute for the FCA to do anything but it has routinely issued annual plans; last year, it issued a five-year strategy as well. So this is clearly a slightly messy area, and the Government are right to try to tidy it up.

I fear, however, that the solution in Clause 16 will make things worse. First, the requirement for a strategy seems to be a static one, requiring a five-year strategy to be set and then replaced when the five years have nearly run out. The subsections of new Sections 1JZA and 2E, to be inserted by Clause 16, envisage that the strategies can be revised or replaced, but it is unclear what the trigger for that is other than when the Treasury issues new recommendations in a remit letter. In the business world, strategies are kept under review and are often revisited annually—certainly more often than every five years. I believe that Clause 16 needs a positive requirement for the regulators to keep their strategies under review, if only to confirm their continuing validity. My noble friend Lord Ashcombe’s Amendments 64A and 73A would partly get round the problem by shortening the period, but they still envisage a static strategy; it would be three years and then, at two years and nine months, you would do another one, which is not a satisfactory approach to drawing up strategies.

The Explanatory Notes explain that these strategies are expected to be

“high level and focus on the FCA’s and PRA’s top priorities”.

That is fine, but it is not very useful for the regulated firms that want to know how the regulators’ actions will affect them in practice. If these five-year plans are anything like the FCA’s five-year strategy—all 20 pages of it are full of drawings, photographs and big letters—firms will be very disappointed. The FCA’s four priorities of being a smarter regulator, fighting financial crimes, supporting growth and helping consumers are so high level that they mean nothing to regulated firms.

At the moment, both regulators annually set out the detail of what they plan to do for the following year. Can the Minister say whether this will continue once the Bill becomes law? There will be no requirement in law for either the FCA or the PRA as a consequence of the Bill, and, given the lightweight content of the FCA’s five-year plan and the Government’s intentions for only high-level strategies, it would be a serious error if the regulators were not required to publish their detailed annual plans as well.

These are deficiencies in Clause 16 but they are not covered by specific amendments, mainly because, when I drew up my amendments, I was working on the naive premise that asking for a five-year strategy was a sound, if unexciting, proposition. As I have explained, I now see that as flawed in many ways. For this reason, I fully support the Clause 16 stand part notice in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles; I am sorry that I did not have time to add my name to it.

On the amendments that I have tabled, I will start with Amendment 70, which requires the FCA’s strategic priorities to include its secondary competitiveness and growth objective. The equivalent provision for the PRA in new Section 2E, inserted by Clause 16, says that the strategic priorities of the PRA include secondary objectives, whereas the drafting of new Clause 1JZA for the FCA does not extend to the secondary objectives. The Minister has helpfully written to me today to say that the Government sort of accept that but that they will work up their own amendment. I thank him for that and I look forward to seeing the text of that ahead of Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

They are obviously related.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, what an interesting debate this turned out to be. There are a number of flaws, which have been extremely well demonstrated by all noble Lords on this side of the Room. I thank the Minister for his answer to my question. I am also extremely grateful to my noble friend Lady Noakes for improving my amendment significantly by talking about annual plans, which is quite correct. However, it is imperative that we continue to have parliamentary oversight of the regulators. From the discussion we have had this afternoon, there is no doubt that this clause still has a number of legs in it, and the horse race will continue for some time. I am sure we look forward to coming back to this on Report but, with that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 69B withdrawn.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Ashcombe Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 29th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as an employee of Marsh, the insurance broker regulated by the FCA. A number of amendments in this group discuss the downgrading of the “have regard to” requirement for proportionality, which would be a backward step. At a time of intense global competition, the Bill should strengthen proportionality, not weaken it. These amendments do that by replacing Clause 17’s downgrading provisions with a clearer, more robust and more meaningful principle, based on the distinction between wholesale and retail markets.

There remains a clear need for a better balance between these two sectors. Evidence supports this. A survey of chief risk officers conducted by the City of London Corporation identified simplification of regulation as the single most important step that regulators could take to foster growth and innovation. Similarly, a recent Prudential Regulation Authority survey showed that fewer than 60% of respondents believe that its current approach to proportionality makes the UK a more attractive place to do business, with most of the remainder expressing neutrality. That is hardly a vote of confidence.

In practice, the current one-size-fits-all approach is flawed. London’s world-leading wholesale insurance market is increasingly subject to rules designed for retail consumers. These regimes impose additional compliance burdens and costs, yet offer little meaningful benefit to sophisticated corporate clients, who require flexibility to negotiate bespoke arrangements tailored to their risks. This is what I have spent my working career doing, and I have never dealt with retail consumers, other than being an insurance buyer myself. There is a massive difference between the companies I advise and seek insurance for and the consumers such as me. Indeed, their premiums are often significantly larger than what I am trying to insure. The two entities should not be regulated by a one-size-fits-all regime.

The Financial Services Regulation Committee has highlighted this issue, noting that failure to distinguish between wholesale and retail drives bureaucracy and costs. Evidence from the London Market Group revealed that one UK broker, for example, employs far more compliance staff domestically—almost four times more—than in the EU on a proportional basis. Stronger proportionality would not weaken consumer protection; it would enhance it, allowing regulators to focus on where risks are greatest. In short, we should seize this opportunity not to weaken proportionality but to make it work properly for growth, innovation and the effective protection of consumers.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I very much support the two amendments of my noble friend Lady Bowles. There is often an assumption that those of us who feel that regulation plays an important role have no instinct or desire to see proportionality in place, which could not be more untrue. My history is as a commercial banker, back in the days when we used to participate intensively in writing the loan documents and creating the covenants associated with our lending, whether to small companies or to some of the largest on the globe. Frankly, covenants that were off the shelf were completely inappropriate for providing the protection we needed in many cases. They were just useless exercises in paperwork for the companies involved. We used to reshape the loan agreements on that basis and, frankly, it worked exceedingly well.

When I look at the amendments, I am glad that proportionality is being recovered from the scrapheap that would result from Clause 17. That is important, and the way that my noble friend Lady Bowles, framed it is particularly significant. Both for the PRA and the SRA, the focus is proportionate to the benefits expected to result from the imposition of the burden or restriction, recognising the difference in size, nature and objectives. I agree with her that this really needs to be considered through the lens of genuinely sustainable—as in durable as well as environmental—growth. That is a very important addition to the discussion.

I am disturbed by Amendment 81. I am not disturbed by most of it, but when I read

“proportionate to that level of risk and whether the burden or restriction enhances UK international competitiveness”,

I begin to get somewhat queasy, because the lowest common denominator is not where we should be headed. We need to genuinely assess risk—the cost of dealing with and understanding it—in a very direct way. I have always thought that a distortion was introduced by the competitiveness objective, and I am afraid that it is reflected in Amendment 81, in my reading at least.

I hope that the Minister understands that proportionality is not something for five-year strategies. It is central to the work, culture and behaviour of a regulator; as such, it clearly belongs in principles that sit on the face of the Bill.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Ashcombe Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st July 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, what a pleasure it is to follow my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. I agree with everything she said, with all the principles she set out and with the amendments in this group.

I shall speak to Amendment 106 and the other amendments in my name. We are asking a lot of our financial regulators and it is only right that we offer help in the Bill. When we come to the Minister’s response —I do not want in any sense to pre-empt him—there may be comments around the amendments being overly prescriptive. I suggest that these amendments do not ask for prescription but, in fact, deliver clarity and, in a sense, are variously helpful to our financial services regulators.

My amendments seek to offer that help but also, as my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe said, to assist in driving that high-performance culture. Our regulators are well-regarded around the world. That is about high performance, but high performance in its turn is about continuous development and improvement. I think that this Bill can assist in that purpose.

In essence, this is all about the “E”s in this group: efficiency, effectiveness and economic activity. It is often said that delay defeats equity. In this instance, delay defeats economic activity and economic growth. It frustrates small, medium and larger businesses in what they are trying to do right across the United Kingdom economies. I believe that this suite of amendments offers clarity to the regulator and that, through that clarity, the regulator can give the right direction and the right support to all our businesses to do what they do best, which is to create economic activity and drive and deliver economic growth. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as an employee of Marsh, an FCA-regulated entity. These amendments in the names of my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe, Lord Altrincham and Lord Holmes concern Clause 21, which I very much welcome in principle. The improvements to regulators’ approval timelines are a positive step, as are the powers within the clause that enable the Government to amend those timeframes over time. In effect, the Bill already recognises the need for a mechanism to drive improvement. However, the evidence suggests that we can and should go further. The fact that regulators have consistently met their existing targets—targets that have remained largely unchanged for some 25 years—indicates that there is clear scope for more ambitious deadlines.

These amendments are therefore designed to embed a culture of continuous improvement, as referred to by my noble friend Lord Holmes. They would ensure that any future changes to the timeframe set out in Clause 21 could move in only one direction, towards faster decision-making. Moreover, where regulators have consistently met revised targets over a period of two years, the Treasury would be required to reduce those timelines further. In doing so, we would place a statutory obligation on the system to evolve and improve. This matters greatly for the competitiveness of the United Kingdom, particularly for the insurance market in which I work. The speed at which regulators handle authorisations, variations of permission and approvals for senior managers has a direct impact on the ease of doing business. These processes define many firms’ day-to-day interactions with regulation and shape broader perceptions of our market. Firms today have choices about where to deploy capital, where to grow and where to locate talent. A regulatory system that is clear, predictable and timely is a key part of that decision-making calculus.

The UK must offer a compelling proposition. There are many other places to go. Evidence from the London Market Group reinforces this point. A recent survey of firms regulated by the FCA and the PRA shows that both institutions are respected with strong overall scores, yet concerns remain. More than half of firms believe that aspects of the FCA’s approach negatively affect the attractiveness of the London market, and nearly nine in 10 highlight slow approvals for senior managers as having a strong detrimental impact on their operations. Improving timelines is not about reducing standards; it is about ensuring that our system supports growth, innovation and competitiveness. These amendments help to achieve just that.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, I should like to speak briefly and, in so doing, declare my interest as an adviser to and shareholder in Banco Santander. I very much support these amendments. I think that we would all agree that we want our regulations and the entire process to be simple and robust, as that is the bedrock of a competitive global financial centre. I do not think that anyone here is arguing for a weakening to the extent that it would undermine confidence in the market, which is absolutely critical.

To support what has just been said, I draw your Lordships’ attention to a study that TheCityUK brought out a few years ago—I think in 2023. It highlighted in its survey concerns among those in the City about the speed of regulatory requirements. If I am reading it right, of those who responded to the survey and were undergoing FCA regulatory approvals, 92% were experiencing delay. If you look at the views on the opaqueness of the systems, which indeed adds to uncertainty and undermines investor confidence, an enormous percentage—almost 100%—saw the system as opaque or somewhat opaque. If one then looks further on in this study at the perceived overall impact that the efficiency of the regulators’ authorisation processes had on the attractiveness of the UK as a place to establish and do business, in terms of the FCA, if my maths serves me right, almost 90% saw it as detrimental or somewhat detrimental to the UK’s attractiveness.

I am sure that the FCA and others are doing their best to solve this issue, but these amendments would do a lot to add pressure to that process and would strengthen the resolve within the system to address what is a clear need if we are to build on the competitiveness of London as a financial centre.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I understand that the regulator does not have the power to increase deadlines without our consent.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

The wording in the Bill is “changing”, so it can go up or down, but we are asking for it to be reduced. That is significantly different.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes an important point, but the regulator does not have that power. Only the Treasury can grant that power to increase the timelines.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

Then the Treasury can do it, but it should be down and not up.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I think this requires some further detail. It is an affirmative power that the Treasury has to regulate, but I will write to the noble Lord in full to make sure that he understands that we are taking this issue seriously.

I turn to Amendment 151 and thank the noble Lord, Lord Howard, for raising this. I know that it reflects a long-standing frustration that credible firms, particularly those led by individuals already known to the regulator, may still face lengthy authorisation processes that can delay market entry and inhibit innovation and growth. However, while the previous approval and track record of senior individuals is clearly relevant to the regulator’s assessment, authorising a firm is not simply a matter of approving the people who run it. The regulators must assess the firm as a whole, including its business model, governance, systems and controls, and whether it is capable of operating safely and in the interests of its customers.

The Government recognise the importance of timely and effective authorisation processes, especially for new firms. This is why the Government are shortening the deadlines for new firm authorisation applications through this Bill. It is also why the Government are taking steps to establish a provisional licences regime, to reduce the barriers that firms face when seeking FCA authorisation and to help them get up and running faster. The challenges that firms face when seeking authorisation are real, and I am happy to discuss that further with the FCA, but imposing a statutory requirement on the Treasury to undertake such a review is disproportionate and not the right way to address them. As I committed to the noble Lord in our meeting prior to today, I will talk to the FCA about this and how it will ensure that this process is sped up.

I fully recognise the concerns that noble Lords have raised about delays, responsiveness and the need for an approvals regime that supports growth and competitiveness. The Government are actively addressing these through the shortening of a range of statutory deadlines in the Bill, in a way that is targeted, proportionate and will ensure competitiveness without compromising the rightly high regulatory standards that firms must meet to operate in the UK. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 105.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Ashcombe Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 6th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 142A and speaking to the other amendments in this group, which I also support, I am asking for the FCA to be able to develop a dedicated division to undertake its regulatory activities regarding wholesale market participants.

This amendment is all about ensuring that in what is a highly competitive global marketplace the FCA can balance its priorities and resources effectively to benefit the consumer or clients who use them in those markets that the FCA regulates. The FCA’s protection of the individual consumer is rightly prominent, but businesses that are customers of wholesale markets, such as our world-leading London insurance market, require a very different level of protection. Currently, the definition used by the FCA is very unclear and does not distinguish between these two very different sets of needs.

I declare my long-standing interest in financial services Bills over the last 50 years, particularly as a practising solicitor in the City of London and a partner in the firm DAC Beachcroft LLP. I have slowly but surely seen the evolution of regulation, but I am concerned that it is now inhibiting the growth of what is for us one of the great global centres, particularly for insurance. However, the definition of wholesale does not just apply to insurance; it applies to other aspects of financial services as well. The FCA is well aware of the issue. Indeed, it has been raised actively with the FCA over the last few years and there have been commitments to action. However, sad to say, progress is not being made. The FCA appears to be struggling with the definition of a retail consumer and has not found the best way forward.

Once again, we rely on our Select Committee to highlight the issue. The cross-party Financial Services Regulation Committee identified this as an issue, finding in its report last year:

“The FCA does not do enough to distinguish between firms that cater to wholesale and retail markets in its regulation and supervision which … imposes unnecessary burdens and frictions on firms … These issues have fuelled an increase in bureaucracy and imposed significant monetary and resource demands on firms”.


Witnesses to that Select Committee gave key examples. They show that wholesale and retail markets serve fundamentally different customers. Retail regulation is designed to protect individual consumers, whereas wholesale markets are primarily used by professional investors, insurance firms, banks, pension funds and corporate entities. The London insurance market deals almost exclusively with corporate clients, but the regulations take a one-size-fits-all approach, applying consumer-focused rules to firms and activities for which they were never really intended.

We have a situation where pet insurance is essentially regulated in the same manner as marine or aviation insurance. Policies and services delivered in the London market are bespoke to the individual client or individually negotiated and tended, where there is no evidence of this type of market failure. They are not unit-based commoditised products that are offered within the retail market. The FCA’s implementation of what is described as the consumer duty has introduced considerable uncertainty for domestic and international firms operating in the London market. This uncertainty is driven by a lack of clarity on the FCA’s expectations as to how firms should comply with the consumer duty, including which markets and consumers it applies to.

I believe, therefore, that a dedicated wholesale division would help to ensure that regulation is proportionate to the sophistication of market participants. That is why I feel so strongly that this amendment and my noble friend Lord Ashcombe’s amendment should be contained in the Bill. I hope that the Minister will be able to address this issue for the first time as a Minister on a financial services Bill, recognising that, at the moment, we are dealing with two separate markets that are merged under the consumer duty, which is wholly inappropriate. I beg to move.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as an employee of Marsh, which is an FCA-regulated firm. I shall speak to Amendment 142C in my name, which seeks, in essence, to achieve something modest but necessary: equipping the regulator with a clearer and more effective framework within which to operate.

I am—as, I suspect, other noble Lords are—unequivocal in my support for well-judged regulation. It is the foundation of consumer protection, market integrity and London’s standing as an international global financial centre, particularly in insurance, as my noble friend Lord Hunt mentioned. However, the position in which we find ourselves today is one not of insufficient regulation but of fragmentation, with a system that in parts lacks clarity and coherence.

At present, the FCA operates without a clear statutory distinction between retail and wholesale clients. The distinction between wholesale and retail markets is not academic; it is fundamental, particularly in insurance. Retail regulation exists to protect individuals and small businesses. Wholesale markets are, by contrast, the domain of larger and corporate entities. These participants are not passive consumers. They are typically active, informed buyers engaging in complex and often bespoke transactions, as I said on Monday last week. This is very much in line with my noble friend Lord Hunt’s Amendment 142A, to which I have added my name.

This situation leads to a consequence: a degree of inconsistency that is, frankly, difficult to justify. Businesses of broadly similar scale and sophistication can find themselves subject to different regulatory treatments depending on the regime applied or the particular lens through which they are viewed. That uncertainty serves no one well. It imposes a cost on, first, firms, which must devote increasing resource to navigating overlapping and at times contradictory interpretations, and, ultimately, on consumers and smaller businesses, which bear that burden through higher costs and reduced access to services.

There is, however, a straightforward solution. Where my amendment takes that further than my noble friend’s is as follows. A turnover threshold of £6.5 million already exists in statute and is used by the Financial Ombudsman Service to reflect the size of companies. It reflects a determination made by Parliament of the point at which a business can reasonably be expected to possess a degree of financial sophistication and resource, and it could easily be adopted by the FCA.

My amendment does not seek to innovate for innovation’s sake; rather, it seeks to bring coherence by anchoring the distinction between retail and wholesale clients to that already established threshold. In doing so, it would provide the regulator with a clear statutory direction. It would also introduce a necessary discipline: that retail-style protections should not be applied to wholesale clients unless there is a demonstrable and proportionate case for doing so.

This is not about weakening regulation; it is about smart regulation. It is a call for regulation that is properly targeted and grounded in the realities of the market. This matters because we must allow the FCA to focus its efforts where they are most needed, which is on genuine customer protection for individuals—you and me when we are purchasing insurance, for example—rather than dispersing them across forms of compliance that add bureaucracy cost without delivering commensurate benefit.

There is a genuine competitive point here too. Post Brexit, we have the chance to move faster than Europe, but we can do that only if the industry has certainty. Businesses need to know where they stand. They cannot plan investment or hire teams based on regulatory guidance that shifts depending on whom you talk to and when. They need law. My amendment offers a measure of that certainty. It would reduce unnecessary friction and support the FCA in meeting its secondary objectives of growth and competitiveness, and it would do so without in any way diminishing the protection afforded to those who genuinely require it. This is a measured and pragmatic proposal that respects the importance of regulation while seeking to improve its application. I support the other amendments in this group.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Ashcombe Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 8th July 2026 Grand Committee

Without certainty, the UK will continue to lose market share to jurisdictions that provide it and our growth agenda will continue to be hampered by a clearance culture that is no longer fit for purpose. This amendment would provide a practical and proportionate way forward. It would ensure that genuine risk transfer vehicles are treated consistently and predictably and that the UK can finally compete in a market that it should have led. I beg to move.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I remind the House of my interest as an employee of Marsh, an FCA-regulated firm. I wish to speak in support of this amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, but before doing so, I would like to pick up briefly on something I said earlier this week about regulatory clarity. I talked about how firms need clear definitions so that they can plan investment with confidence. That principle matters across the Bill, for not just client definitions, but for how we approach emerging markets and new structures.

Amendment 162 is a good example of that. The amendment addresses tax clarity on insurance-linked securities. These are important instruments. They attract capital into insurance, help firms manage catastrophic risk and have become a serious part of global risk management practice. Since being created in the 1990s, the global market has grown to about £136 billion, making up close to 20% of the insurance/reinsurance industry. According to Swiss Re, one of the world’s leading providers of reinsurance, insurance and other forms of insurance-based risk transfer, 2025 was the busiest year in its history of this market.

The London insurance market is phenomenally well placed to lead here. We are larger than our five closest competitors combined. However, we need to be honest: our ILS regime has been somewhat underwhelming at best. That is not because we lack expertise or capital—we do not—but because the regulatory approach has been disproportionate and the legislation inflexible. Firms simply cannot transact deals here as efficiently as they can in Bermuda or other jurisdictions.

To the Government and the PRA’s credit, they have listened. This Bill moves us in the right direction: it gives the PRA flexibility on fully funded definitions, allows multiple contracts in protected cell companies and there is a consultation pipeline on further simplification. That is good. However, there is one thing that the Bill has not addressed, and, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that is tax clarity. When the ILS regime was created in 2017, there was a broad anti-avoidance clause. That is fair enough, but a decade on, I think that HMRC and the Treasury should be comfortable that these are not tax avoidance structures, but are risk transfer vehicles.

Right now, firms have guidance from HMRC, but it is not legally binding. Therefore, every transaction requires a tax lawyer’s opinion every single time, as the noble Baroness mentioned. That cost, that time, that friction is the difference between doing a deal and doing it somewhere else. This amendment asks for something straightforward: a clear and legally underpinned directive that HMRC will presume that ILS vehicles are not being used to secure a tax advantage. That is not asking for exemption from anti-avoidance rules; it is asking for clarity so that legitimate risk transfer does not get caught up in unnecessary caution. That clarity matters because it removes the last barrier to this market. We have the regulation sorted and we have the expertise; what we really need is tax certainty.

This is about positioning London correctly in a competitive global market. It is about letting the PRA’s sensible reforms work, and it is about giving firms the clarity they need to invest with confidence in the United Kingdom.

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 162 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles—perhaps from the Liberal Democrat risk-transfer derivative desk. This amendment raises what seems to be a sensible and practical point about certainty in the treatment of insurance-linked securities and related risk-transformation arrangements. Insurance-linked securities can play an important role in allowing insurance risk to be transferred into capital markets. Catastrophe bonds and similar structures can help insurers and reinsurers manage exposure to major risks, including natural catastrophes, while providing investors with a different form of capital markets instrument.

The United Kingdom has quite rightly sought to develop itself as a competitive centre for these structures, but for that to happen, firms and investors need clarity, as my noble friend just explained. As I understand it, the amendment would require the Treasury, after consulting HMRC, to publish guidance clarifying the tax treatment of these arrangements. It would also provide that where an arrangement falls within that guidance and complies with the relevant regulatory authorisation and supervision requirements, it should be treated as a bona fide commercial insurance and capital markets transaction, rather than as one entered into for tax avoidance purposes. It does not appear to be an attempt to protect fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure. HMRC would still be able to challenge arrangements where the conditions are not met or where there has been improper conduct, but it would give legitimate market participants greater certainty where they are using properly regulated structures for genuine commercial purposes. That certainty matters: if the UK wants to attract insurance-linked securities business, investors and firms need to understand the tax position in advance. Uncertainty can deter activity, reduce confidence and make other jurisdictions more attractive.

I would therefore welcome clarity from the Minister on this point. Do the Government accept that greater tax certainty would help to support the development of the UK insurance-linked securities market? Are they aware of the concerns that uncertainty about HMRC treatment may be limiting the attractiveness of the UK regime? Will they consider whether further Treasury or HMRC guidance is needed to ensure that properly regulated ILS vehicles are treated consistently as genuine commercial arrangements. This seems to me to be a practical amendment aimed at supporting competitiveness and certainty in a specialist but important part of the financial services market. I look forward to the Minister’s response.