Lord Alton of Liverpool
Main Page: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Alton of Liverpool's debates with the Scotland Office
(8 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 184 and the two clause stand part debates in respect of Clauses 21 and 22 give an important opportunity to explore here exactly what the intention is behind the clauses. It is important that the Minister carefully sets out what he believes are the reasonable grounds for immigration officers to conduct a search for documents in respect of illegal working or leasing premises to disqualified persons obtained in the commission of an offence. Will the Minister set out what he means by a search of the premises? At any point, would that include a search of the person? How would that be conducted?
These are very sensitive matters and I want to be satisfied that proper processes are in place, and that people are treated with respect. We often need to remember that asylum seekers have not always had a good experience of meeting officials of the state in other countries, and we must ensure that actions are taken in a proportionate manner and to the highest professional standards. I have the highest regard for the officers who undertake this work for the Immigration Service; they do a very difficult and challenging job.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made an important point when he talked about the extensive experience and knowledge that police officers have when it comes to conducting searches and preserving evidence to secure convictions. Are we confident that the immigration officer would have this knowledge? The noble Lord makes another important point when he talks about the burden of bureaucracy arising from items taken during a search that are then passed on to police but in the end do not secure any convictions because there is no offence at all.
My Lords, before the Minister replies to the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Lord Paddick, may I add a word in support of their points, particularly the point about proportionality that has just been made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy? Why does the Minister feel we need to add to those powers that immigration officers already have, as set out in chapter 16 of the Home Office Enforcement Instructions and Guidance?
Would he also comment on the extensive powers that immigration officers already have to search without warrant in connection with a criminal offence? What is envisaged here, as I try to understand it, is to give those same officers powers to search premises without a warrant, in circumstances where they do not have any reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence has been committed. Is that the case? Is there no restriction in this clause authorising an immigration officer to act only where it is not practicable to obtain a warrant? If that is so, this is quite an extension of powers, and one that is disproportionate in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has described.
I am obliged to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick, Lord Kennedy and Lord Alton, for their observations on these provisions. I shall begin with Amendment 184, which seeks to insert the phrase “is required to” in place of “should”, and explain why that would not be appropriate. As I observed, Amendment 184 seeks to ensure that an immigration officer’s power to examine a person for the purpose of making a decision to curtail their leave is limited to whether the person’s leave is required to be curtailed. The use of the words “should be”, which appear in Clause 20, reflects the wording already included in paragraph (2) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971, which refers to examination on the basis of whether a person should be given leave or refused it. It naturally follows that the power to examine for the possible purpose of making a curtailment decision is on the same basis. Indeed, it would be rather strange if one test differed from the other in that context.
The effect of the amendment would be to fetter the Secretary of State’s discretion under the Immigration Act 1971 to decide when a person’s leave should be curtailed. The basis on which leave may be curtailed is set out in the Immigration Rules. Some of these are mandatory probations and some are discretionary. An example of a discretionary ground on which leave may be curtailed is when the Secretary of State considers it undesirable to permit a person to remain in the United Kingdom in light of his or her conduct, character or associations. Immigration officers therefore need to be able to question a person to ascertain whether curtailment is or is not appropriate. I can reassure the noble Lord that immigration officers may question only people who have already entered the United Kingdom for immigration enforcement purposes where they already have some information, or reasonable grounds for suspecting, that the person is in breach of immigration law. Therefore it would be wholly inappropriate, having regard among other things to the terms of the Immigration Rules, to put in this amendment in the form of a requirement rather than a discretion.
Clause 21 gives immigration officers a power to search premises for documents that might help in determining whether a civil penalty should be imposed on an employer or landlord. This power may be exercised only where immigration officers are already lawfully on premises. I will come back to this point in the context of the observations from the noble Lord, Lord Alton; it is not a question of dispensing with the requirement for a warrant, but I will address that point directly. A primary role for immigration enforcement activity is the disruption of illegal working and illegal renting. We believe it is fitting for immigration officers to have specific administrative search powers where they are exercising powers for a non-criminal purpose.
Immigration officers already have powers to search for evidence of the offence of employing illegal workers and will do so for the new offence of leasing premises to a disqualified person. However, as I am sure noble Lords will agree, it is often more appropriate to impose a civil penalty than to pursue a criminal prosecution. Immigration officers provide employers and landlords with an opportunity, during a visit to the relevant premises, to supply evidence that they have undertaken right-to-work checks before taking any enforcement action. If an employer or landlord is able to do this, no further action is taken against them.
While I understand that some noble Lords may have concerns regarding the reasonableness of having a power of search in the context of a civil penalty, where immigration officers have established through existing powers that a migrant does not have a right to work or a right to rent, and the employer or landlord is unable to demonstrate that they have made the appropriate checks, it does not seem unreasonable for the immigration officer to be able to search for evidence such as payslips or timesheets, tenancy agreements and letting paperwork. This is especially important in cases where a migrant claims simply to be a guest at residential premises or “assisting”, for example, in a restaurant.
While search powers in the civil penalty context are relatively rare, they should not be disregarded purely on this basis when there is a compelling case for introducing them. By equipping immigration officers with these new powers, the Home Office should be enabled to make better-informed decisions as to whether liability for a civil penalty has arisen and help to ensure that only non-compliant landlords and businesses are faced with civil penalties. To put the matter shortly, it would be rather strange if, having made provision for civil penalty, we should say to immigration officers, “You have the power to search if you intend to pursue a criminal prosecution but you have no power to search if you intend to take the lesser step of imposing only a civil penalty”. For that reason, Clause 21 is considered material to these provisions.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for what he said about the training of immigration officers. But before he goes on to the next point in his argument, does he recall that in 2014, in the case of R v Ntege and Others, his honour Judge Madge stayed the prosecution because of both bad faith and serious misconduct? He held:
“I am satisfied that officers at the heart of this prosecution have deliberately concealed important evidence and lied on oath”.
In addition, in 2010, in Abdillaahi Muuse v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Court of Appeal concluded that the conduct of what was then the Immigration and Nationality Directorate in the unlawful imprisonment of Mr Muuse,
“was not merely unconstitutional but an arbitrary exercise of executive power which was outrageous”.
How can the Minister, in extending the powers that already exist for immigration officers, ensure that there is not a repetition of those sorts of cases?
Clearly, I will not comment on the detail of individual cases in this context. Those findings were made, and clearly they indicate conduct that was wholly unacceptable, and—let us add—quite exceptional, with two cases cited in many years. It is regrettable that those events occurred, but let us remember that they are isolated events. As regards the general powers of immigration officers, they will be provided with training and guidance on the use of their powers and are given enforcement instructions in guidance.
My Lords, during the excellent remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in introducing his amendments and talking about these clauses, he referred to Stephen Shaw’s report and I want to ask the Minister some questions about that. He will know that the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration produced a pretty damning report on immigration detention, which led to the former Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, Stephen Shaw, being asked to investigate the treatment of vulnerable persons in detention. His report was published on Thursday 14 January, so another place had no opportunity to discuss that when it was considering the Bill, but we have a chance now to ask the Minister some questions about it in the context of these clauses.
Has the Minister had a chance to read the report in detail? It criticises the conduct of searches in immigration detention centres and it gives cause for further scrutiny of these provisions. The Minister himself, in his remarks on the previous set of amendments, said that things such as strip-searching would not be permitted, but I was concerned to read a number of accounts in Stephen Shaw’s report that involved male detention staff in searches of women, although not with the removal of clothes, and of women’s rooms in Yarl’s Wood. I am particularly interested in the situation there, as, thanks to the Minister, my noble friend Lord Hylton and I have been able to arrange a visit to Yarl’s Wood on Wednesday morning. I am glad that we will have the opportunity to put some of these questions directly to the staff who run that facility.
Mr Shaw says in his remarks:
“It is of the greatest importance that the proportion of female staff at Yarl’s Wood is increased … In the meantime, Serco should only conduct searches of women and of women’s rooms in the presence of men in the most extreme and pressing circumstances, and there should be monitoring and reporting (to Home Office Detention Operations) of these cases”.
In recommendation 35 of the report, he states:
“I recommend that the service provider at Yarl’s Wood should only conduct searches of women and of women’s rooms in the presence of men in the most extreme and pressing circumstances, and that there should be monitoring and reporting of these cases”.
During that review, Stephen Shaw identified evidence that the Home Office policy of not searching detainees, especially women, in the view of other people, is not always followed. I was struck by some examples that he gave. He said that:
“As far as the practices at Heathrow, Lunar house and Eaton House are concerned, the evidence of this review is that the Home Office’s policy that detainees (especially women) should not be searched in view of other people is not always followed”.
For instance, talking about Heathrow Terminal 3, Mr Shaw says, at paragraph 3.175:
“A female detainee was searched in front of several people”
At paragraph 3.227, talking about Lunar House, he says:
“Detainees were searched in an area where they could be seen by others in the main holding room”.
At Eaton House, at paragraph 3.240, he says:
“A female detainee was searched in the holding room by the Tascor escort who had arrived to take her to Colnbrook. This was in front of a male detainee and a male member of staff”.
Clearly, given the vulnerable position of detainees, particularly women, who are held as immigration detainees, and the lack of compliance by detention custody staff with existing policies on searching detainees, it would be highly inappropriate to extend those powers of search to include searches for the purpose of identifying nationality documents, particularly where they are so broadly defined in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has already described to the Committee. When he comes to reply, I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us how the Government intend to respond to Stephen Shaw’s observations and recommendations.
My Lords, having visited Yarl’s Wood several times in the past, I have noted the deep anxiety of those resident there. Anything like this will be particularly disturbing to them, so that should be kept in mind.
We must always draw attention to concerns about the treatment of these vulnerable individuals, but we must also commend the Government when they take steps to protect such individuals and treat them with respect. I take this opportunity to pay tribute once again to the last coalition Government, which took children and families out of these settings. Many of us were very concerned at the large numbers of families who were detained at Yarl’s Wood, often for many months on end. I remember speaking to a 16 year-old girl who was there with her mother and her six or seven year-old sister for nine months. It is very much to the coalition Government’s credit that they decided to change the system.
Very briefly, I support Amendment 215A because I absolutely agree that this is not a trivial matter. I am not an expert on these issues but a social scientist who knows the importance of language. Some years ago, it was quite common among the media and politicians to talk about bogus asylum seekers. That did immense harm, so I absolutely agree that language which has connotations of criminality when applied to asylum seekers is totally inappropriate and could be very harmful.
My Lords, I intervene briefly to support the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and previously the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have made about the importance of the language we use. When the Minister comes to consider this issue again between now and Report, I wonder whether he will look at the nomenclature that we use here and whether “immigration bail”, with its connotations of criminality, really is the right language for us to use at all. In particular, people seeking asylum are not criminals when one considers that they will include refugees, children, survivors of torture and trafficked people. It is quite wrong to imply that they are necessarily people who are therefore trying to break our laws.
I hope that the Minister will also return specifically to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about our duties under international law, especially Article 31 of the 1951 refugee convention, which expressly protects those who claim asylum from being treated as criminals. The UNHCR and other international guidance recognises that the detention of persons seeking asylum must always be the exception, so let us at least start from the basis that those seeking asylum will be among people who are genuine. They will be trying to escape from the most appalling situations in their own countries and are not criminals. We therefore must have some regard for their well-being and status.
I would like to raise one other brief issue in relation to Schedule 7, which is not covered by these amendments but on which I hope that the Minister will be able to provide some clarification. It appears that the introduction of a restriction on studies as a condition either of temporary admission or bail for those subject to immigration control is a new provision. I would be grateful if the Minister would spell that out. No reason for the restriction is given in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, so I wonder whether we could take this opportunity in Committee to find out what that reason is. Breach of a condition of immigration bail is, as we have just discovered in these exchanges, a criminal offence and therefore has serious consequences. Those lawfully present and in touch with the authorities should not be restricted from undertaking studies. All those subject to immigration control will be on immigration bail, not just persons released from detention. The condition could potentially be applied to children and young people, preventing them accessing further education and even attending their school. I am sure that that is not what the Government had in mind but I hope they will clarify what the consequences of this provision might be.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for giving that clarification. It would be a convenience and a help to the House and to those who have made representations about this if further clarity could be given. If the power is to be used only in circumstances relating to terrorism, that seems a reasonable and justifiable provision.
I am most obliged to the noble Lord and I undertake to write on that point.
The government amendments that arise here are essentially consequential amendments. Amendments 224E to 224K are consequential amendments to legislation to ensure that the provisions in Schedule 7 work as they should, by bringing existing legislation into line with Schedule 7, removing references to provisions which have been or are being repealed by Schedule 7 and, where necessary, inserting references to the relevant provisions in Schedule 7. Amendments 229ZA and 230ZA are consequential amendments to Schedule 8 to the Bill to reflect the amendments and repeals made in Schedule 7.
I am conscious that your Lordships had in mind not only the question of bail but the question of detention. However, as that is going to be addressed in a further group of amendments, I will come to that when we address that further group. I hope your Lordships will support the amendments standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Bates, but I ask that noble Lords withdraw their amendment—I say noble Lords, but I address that to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.