Victims and Courts Bill

Lola McEvoy Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 27th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I look forward to meeting the hon. Gentleman and his constituent in due course to discuss the failings in the criminal justice system that led to her experience. No victim should go through what she did, and I stand ready to support her and improve the situation.

Let me turn to the amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mr Reynolds), which I touched on in my opening remarks. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Lauren Edwards), the Opposition Front Bench spokesperson, the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan), and others in this Chamber spoke to that amendment. I know that many Members will have had horrifying casework in which families are stuck trying to differentiate between a language barrier and a different jurisdiction or legal system, all while trying to get answers on what has happened to their loved one. That is unacceptable.

I remain of the view that the victims code is not the right place for these victims to have that framework, because the victims code is based on the justice system in England and Wales. It does not apply, and it is not right. However, I am committed, and I have already met with the Minister in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr Falconer), to discuss the FCDO and the MOJ working together on how best we can support victims, and working with the Victims’ Commissioner and the charity Murdered Abroad on creating the dedicated framework and guidance on what victims in this country can expect.

[Lola McEvoy (Darlington) (Lab)]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way in a crucial part of her speech. In the work that she is doing, I implore her to remember my constituent, whose sister Rita Roberts was brutally murdered in 1992 and not formally identified until 2023. Rita has still not had justice, as she was murdered abroad, and her family are desperate for any support that the Minister can give.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank my hon. Friend for raising that case. It is a horrific case that I know all too well, because the previous Member for Cardiff West, who is now in the other place, raised it previously and sought to support Rita’s family. I will seek to support them in any way I can and will work with the FCDO, because justice delayed is justice denied for anyone, regardless of where they are. I make the commitment to the hon. Member for Maidenhead that we will find the right way forward to support these families, but I do not believe that his amendment is the right one, so I implore him to withdraw it.

I turn to my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy), who is right: these are invisible children and we must do more to protect them. This is not just about identifying them and their parents, who are the perpetrators; it is about supporting those children and better identifying them, and I make that commitment to her. She asked me directly about how we are going to do this. The Minister responsible for sentencing and the Children’s Minister have met to discuss this issue and held a roundtable with organisations to look at the best way of doing this, and I will impress on them my hon. Friend’s desire for them to move quickly and involve her in how best to bring this forward.

I will discuss the amendments on restorative justice tabled by the hon. Member for Wimbledon (Mr Kohler). I encourage all Members of this place to go and see the play “Punch”, which is outstanding—it is probably the best example of restorative justice that anyone can see. Restorative justice is not right for every victim and will not work for everyone; it needs consent from both the victim and the perpetrator. It will not be right for every crime, but in certain crimes it is appropriate and can provide better victim outcomes and lower reoffending rates. The Prisons Minister and the new Secretary of State are passionate believers in that. We are looking closely at this issue as a Department and will continue to work with the hon. Gentleman to see how best we can bring out restorative justice programmes across the Ministry of Justice.

I come to my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Matt Bishop). I think we have already discussed his commitment to these victims and families for justice, and I pay tribute to him. I am committed to working further on the unduly lenient sentencing scheme to ensure that victims have the right to redress and to complain in an appropriate time, and that the victim impact statements are fit for purpose and represent that victim’s voice. For Katie Brett, the Youens family and all those who feel that they have been silenced, I make that commitment today. We also need that clarity in sentencing and transparency on what a sentence actually is, and I wholeheartedly agree with my hon. Friend.

My hon. Friends the Members for Lowestoft and for Calder Valley (Josh Fenton-Glynn) talked about the need for vital support services, and they are right. Without the vital support services that support victims and survivors, we do not have victims and survivors engaged in a criminal justice system. There needs to be a multi-year settlement—my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft mentioned that as well—to ensure that they are sustainable, effective and there to support victims.

Those organisations know that we are currently going through the financial allocations process in the Ministry of Justice. We are due to complete that process very soon, because I know that these vital organisations need certainty as to the sustainability of their future, and I have committed to them that I will provide it soon. I also hear their calls for more support for child victims. Again, that is something I will be looking at as part of the consultation on the victims code later this year, because although we have identified that children can be victims in their own right, there is little to support them, and they deserve support too. I am committed to working with my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft and other hon. Members to get this right.

My hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) and I have spoken many times about the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal injuries compensation scheme. Change in this area cannot be piecemeal; we need proper change if victims are to be supported, if they are to have redress, and if they are to have the recognition that they so vitally need—that something has happened to them, and that they are a victim. As my hon. Friend mentioned, there is discretion in the scheme. There are many reasons for that, but she is right that the scheme does not work. We have heard that time and again, and I am committed to working with her to determine what scheme should be in place to support victims and survivors. I want to hear from them directly, and I am also keen to hear from Quebec—which my hon. Friend mentioned—about how the scheme there operates. If we can learn about best practice internationally, we should do so. But most importantly, we need an effective and sustainable redress scheme for victims of violent crime.

Finally, I wish to pay tribute, as others have done, to my hon. Friends the Members for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball), for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet) and for Lowestoft, and to every single Member in this place who has stood up and discussed the need for change through this Bill. They have spoken from their hearts. They have spoken with bravery and with lived experience about what is needed to support victims and survivors. Never let anyone tell you that having a Labour Government does not make a difference. What is the difference? It is delivering for victims—deeds, not words. That is what we are doing in this Chamber this evening. We are making that difference, delivering for Claire Throssell, Jan Mustafa, Sabina Nessa, Olivia Pratt-Korbel, and the countless other victims who have been failed by the criminal justice system. That is the difference a Labour Government makes. I commend this Bill to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 13 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 14

Restriction of parental responsibility for child conceived as a result of rape

“After section 10D of the Children Act 1989 (review of orders made under section 10C) (inserted by section 3) insert—

“10E Duty to make prohibited steps order following rape

(1) This section applies where the Crown Court—

(a) sentences a person (‘the offender’) for an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape), and

(b) is satisfied that a child (‘the child’) for whom the offender has parental responsibility was conceived as a result of the rape.

(2) The Crown Court must make a prohibited steps order when sentencing the offender.

(3) The order must—

(a) specify that no step of any kind which could be taken by a parent in meeting their parental responsibility for a child may be taken by the offender with respect to the child without the consent of the High Court or the family court, and

(b) be made to have effect until the order is varied or discharged by the High Court or the family court.

(4) But the Crown Court must not make a prohibited steps order under this section if—

(a) making the order is prohibited by section 29(3) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002,

(b) a prohibited steps order is already in force that meets the requirements in subsection (3), or

(c) it appears to the Crown Court that it would not be in the interests of justice to do so.

(5) A prohibited steps order made under this section does not cease to have effect if the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal, but see section 10G.

(6) Sections 1, 7 and 11 do not apply where the Crown Court proceeds under this section.

(7) A prohibited steps order made under this section is to be treated for the purposes of section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (proceedings and decisions) as if it were made by the family court.

(8) The Crown Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings in connection with the enforcement of a prohibited steps order made under this section.

(9) A reference in this Act to an order under this section includes, so far as the context permits, an order varying or discharging it.

10F Duty to apply to court where child may have been conceived as a result of rape

(1) This section applies where—

(a) the Crown Court sentences a person (‘the offender’) for an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape),

(b) the Crown Court is satisfied that there is a child (‘the child’) for whom the offender has parental responsibility,

(c) the Crown Court considers that the child may have been conceived as a result of the rape, and

(d) section 10E does not apply.

(2) The Crown Court must notify the local authority that is the relevant local authority at the time the offender is sentenced (if any) of the matters set out in subsection (1).

(3) The notification under subsection (2) must be given before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the day after the day on which the offender is sentenced.

(4) Before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day after the day on which the Crown Court notifies the local authority under subsection (2), the local authority must make enquiries into whether—

(a) the victim of the rape, or

(b) if the victim is deceased, any person with parental responsibility for the child other than the offender,

consents to an application being made to the court (see section 92(7)) for the court to determine whether to make a section 8 order.

(5) If consent is given, the local authority must make that application as soon as is reasonably practicable and in any event before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the day after the day on which the consent is given.

(6) Subsections (4) and (5) do not apply if the local authority is satisfied that the court would not have jurisdiction to make a section 8 order (see sections 2 and 3 of the Family Law Act 1986).

(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend the periods specified in subsections (3), (4) and (5).

(8) In this section, ‘relevant local authority’ means—

(a) where the child is ordinarily resident within the area of a local authority in England or Wales, that local authority;

(b) where the child does not fall within paragraph (a) but is present within the area of a local authority in England or Wales, that local authority.

10G Review of orders made under section 10E or following an application under section 10F

(1) This section applies where—

(a) either—

(i) a prohibited steps order has been made under section 10E, or

(ii) an order under Part II has been made following an application under section 10F, and

(b) the offender is acquitted of the offence following an appeal.

(2) The local authority that is the relevant local authority at the time the verdict of acquittal is entered (if any) must make an application to the court (see section 92(7)) to review the order.

(3) An application under this section must be made as soon as is reasonably practicable and in any event before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the day after the day on which the verdict of acquittal was entered.

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend the period specified in subsection (3).

(5) In this section, ‘relevant local authority’ means—

(a) where the child with respect to whom the order was made is ordinarily resident within the area of a local authority in England or Wales, that local authority;

(b) where the child with respect to whom the order was made does not fall within paragraph (a) but is present within the area of a local authority in England or Wales, that local authority.””—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause, to be inserted after clause 3, requires the Crown Court to restrict the parental responsibility of a person convicted of rape where a child was conceived as a result. If it is unclear whether the child was so conceived, the local authority must apply to the family court.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 4

Victim personal statements

“(1) The Secretary of State shall, within six months of the passing of this Act, issue revised guidance on the content of victim personal statements.

(2) The revised guidance issued under subsection (1) must stipulate that when making a victim personal statement, a victim shall be able to say anything they wish about the defendant, provided it is not contrary to any statutory limitations on free speech, makes allegations of untried criminal conduct or is disorderly language.

(3) The court must disregard any prejudicial comments made during a victim personal statement.”—(Dr Mullan.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review how to make victim personal statements less restrictive and clarify what can be included.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lola McEvoy Excerpts

Report stage
Friday 20th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Lola McEvoy (Darlington) (Lab)]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater) and celebrate her courage and kindness throughout this whole process.

I agree with many in the House that the status quo is unacceptable—that is why most of us are here—and I urge colleagues who, like me, are in favour of the principle of choice at the end of life to vote today not on the principle, but on how the Bill will work in practice. This is not an opinion poll, and there are very real trade-offs. Without palliative care parity across the UK, this new way to die offers a replacement, not a real choice. I am pleased to have the support of the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Gordon Brown, as well as a huge number of medical professionals, on these arguments.

I was brought up around death, and I am still smiling. I know about good palliative care because my dad would take me to the hospice to meet his patients that he had grown to love. As a child, I remember him getting promoted to a new nurse consultant role. They were experts in their field of nursing and were promoted to fill the gap in expertise in making decisions on crucial palliative care and pain relief. My dad’s positional and relational power to give confidence around decision making and to support less experienced but more senior staff in essential decisions around life and death meant that those decisions could ease a lot of people’s passing. When decisions are delayed, the patient suffers unnecessarily, and we have heard that happen in the stories and many cases of poor palliative care that have shaped this debate today.

In the interests of time, I will skip to my final point. The practical reality of what we see today is that, without radical improvements to palliative care, a joined-up digital system, and clear recorded centralised data on when and how we talk to patients about the treatment they are getting, and about what that means—not just for the length of their life, but for the quality of their life—we will continue to have a postcode lottery. With a finite number of experts in our NHS, this decision to bring in this new way of dying will simply deprioritise addressing the gaps in the provision of good-quality palliative care, which will affect most of us, in favour of offering a new option to the minority of people who will be eligible. That is not in line with my values, and that is why I cannot vote for it.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lola McEvoy Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 29th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)]

Prior to my election to Parliament, as a consultant psychiatrist with a PhD in decision-making capacity, I would have met both criteria to be a medical expert assessor under clause 9(3)(b), so I have a particular perspective as someone who, in different circumstances, might have been called upon to make these assessments.

I strongly believe that we should respect and support the right to bodily autonomy for people with full decision-making capacity, subject to the caveat that it does not cause serious harm to others. I argued for this when I was on the working group of the independent review of the Mental Health Act 1983 and on the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee on the Mental Health Bill, which, among other things, aims to prevent people from coming to harm when suffering from severe mental illness. These reforms were debated in the House of Lords this week, and they demonstrate how Parliament should legislate in complex areas that balance individual autonomy and risk.

In contrast, as a private Member’s Bill, there is limited ability for scrutinising this Bill’s provisions. It has had no independent review, no pre-legislative scrutiny and no impact assessments. Many MPs support the principle of assisted dying yet have concerns about implementation, resource implications and safeguarding. That is why I, along with colleagues on both sides of the House, tabled a reasoned amendment calling for an independent review and consultation before a vote in Parliament, to provide a third way through. I thank the Members who supported the amendment, particularly the hon. Members for Shipley (Anna Dixon) and for Twickenham (Munira Wilson), for their work and their extensive and careful consideration.

Although the general debate on assisted dying may focus largely on the principles, legislation must address the limits to and the safeguards on consent. Should people be able to agree to a medically assisted death? If so, what restrictions, if any, should there be on people who can make this decision—age, capacity, terminal illness, intolerable suffering? And then, what safeguards are there to uphold these limits and to prevent abuse—assessments by two doctors, judicial scrutiny?

Given that the main argument I see in favour of assisted dying is the exercise of personal autonomy, I believe the most substantive issues we need to wrestle with are the limits that we set. Why is this Bill limited to the terminally ill and not those who are suffering without that being terminal? What even comes within the scope of terminal illness? With the refusal of treatment and medication, conditions such as type 1 diabetes and HIV can be designated as terminal, despite being fully treatable.

There are many questions, but in this Bill the most prominent problem is that, in a legal context, if the availability of assisted dying is limited only to those who are terminally ill, it is discriminatory either to those with or without terminal illness. Either their right to autonomy is greater than others’, or the value of their life is worth less.

We must also ask whether autonomy can be exercised where there is no choice. If good palliative care is simply not available, can we really rely on this as a true and free decision? I would argue that we cannot, and that this Bill does not safeguard against coercion through state neglect.

[Lola McEvoy (Darlington) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Dr Spencer]

I usually would, but unfortunately that would impact on other Members who wish to speak. I apologise.

What is fundamental to me, given my interest in capacity, is that we have not considered how much human decision making is driven by altruistic intentions. “I did it for my children” is rightly a primary motivation in many settings, but as a society are we comfortable with a decision to seek a medically assisted death so as not to be a burden on one’s family or to save them money?

This will not impact on capacity. We cannot pretend that capacity assessments will be a shield for these moral concerns. Where is the line, if there is one, between indirect coercion and the natural human responses in a stressed family unit looking after a sick loved one?

I believe that we could introduce legislation on assisted dying that has fully reviewed and addressed these issues, but parliamentarians must deal with what we have in front of us today. Proponents on both sides of the debate frame this vote on Second Reading as a vote on the principle of assisted dying, but in reality it is a vote on implementation as put forward in this Bill.

As a former mental health doctor, I am proud that I was there for the most vulnerable. Today, I think about those without a voice in this debate or in the TV studios. I think about the elderly woman in the care home with mild cognitive impairment, who retains capacity but is nevertheless vulnerable to coercion and undue influence, or the sick mother whose child may lose their job or their relationship due to the burden of caring responsibilities. The Bill would not protect them. It risks placing implicit pressure on people already vulnerable at a time of life when they should receive our unwavering care and support. We should and must vote it down.

[Dame Meg Hillier (Hackney South and Shoreditch) (Lab/Co-op)]

In my brief remarks today, I want to touch on principle, policy and practice. We have to be very clear that we are having a debate not just on the principle, but on the Bill. The principle at stake is that we would cross a Rubicon whereby someone who is terminally ill, according to the definition in the Bill, is assisted by the state to die. That is a fundamental change in the relationship between the state and the citizen, and the patient and their doctor. If we have a scintilla of doubt about allowing the state that power, we should vote against the Bill today.

Like most of us, I came into politics partly to stand up for the vulnerable, and we have heard heartbreaking stories today about those vulnerable at the point of death. We have also heard—and I concur completely with my right hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott)—about those who are vulnerable for other reasons and who could be coerced or persuaded down this route.

I have had the privilege of being around the hospice movement for nearly 50 years, as my father established one of the first national health service hospices in this country. I saw what he did as a doctor in a world where death was not talked about, where surgeons would say, “We’ll whip this bit out and you’ll be fine.” He would be one of the first to have to tell the patient that they were actually going to die. The work that he did, on the back of giants such as Dame Cicely Saunders, is something we should be proud of. We were the first country in the world to recognise palliative care as a separate profession, and some of the tragedies we have heard about today arose from a failure in that system. A failure in palliative care and support is not a reason to continue.

I have personal experience of this. Many hon. Members will remember when my daughter was very ill a few years ago. I had not intended to speak about this today, but she was admitted to hospital as a teenager with acute pancreatitis. The Bill would not have covered her, but I did not know for five days—in fact, many months—whether she would live or die. For those first five days she did not sleep and she did not eat, and she was crying out in pain. I saw what good medicine can do. It palliated that pain and got her to a place where, although she was unable to eat for two and a half months, she was saved and her pain was managed. Our best friends were the pain nurses and the anaesthetists. I have other examples of another family member, but I do not have time to go into them today.

I hope my daughter forgives me for raising her personal situation in the House today—

[Lola McEvoy]

Will my hon. Friend give way? I pay tribute to her for the strength that she is showing. Indeed, I pay tribute to all Members on both sides of the House who are dealing with this very difficult issue. Does she agree that we already have assisted dying in this country? Legislation already allows for choice, proving that people would be able to die at home with carefully administered, practitioner-led pain management. Does she agree that the inconsistency of this application of good pain management at the end of life, causing compassionate legislators to feel that the only option is to vote for the Bill, is a failure of our existing national health system, and does she—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order. Interventions will have to be short in this debate because many Members wish to speak, so perhaps that is enough.