Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Kieran Mullan Excerpts

Thursday 4th December 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Tessa Munt]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 5, Clause 11, page 10, line 4, at end insert “by—

(i) a recognised news publisher, within the meaning of Part 3 of the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 56 of that Act), or

(ii) a person in the course of working for such a publisher.” .—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This amendment clarifies that the journalism exemption from the offence of misleading the public only applies to media entities and those that work for them.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 2, clause 11, page 10, line 35, at end insert—

“(10) A prosecution for an offence under this section shall not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director for Public Prosecutions.”

This amendment requires the Director of Public Prosecutions to consent to the prosecution of anyone for the offence of misleading the public.

[The Chair]

With this, it will be convenient to discuss clause 11 stand part.

[Dr Mullan]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Sir Roger.

As we all know, clause 11 creates the new offence of misleading the public, which is intended, quite rightly, to capture the most serious and culpable instances where public officials knowingly or recklessly provide false or misleading information to the public. The motivations behind the clause are entirely understandable. In the past, we have seen, through scandals and tragedies, how deeply harmful it can be when institutions withhold the truth or put out statements that they know to be false.

However, there is no doubt that, as the Minister herself said earlier, this is a new area of the law. She referred to the fact that politicians often debate what does or does not count as misleading information. Members of the Committee grumbled when I raised this issue at our first sitting, using the live example of what we have been going through in the last couple of weeks, but we have also heard how contentious legislating in this area can be in relation to the media and the role they play. This is a novel area and one that we have to tread carefully in, recognising that we are not able to anticipate fully how this offence will be used, not just by current prosecuting authorities but by different actors under a different regime, or by private citizens. We also know that there have been attempts to prosecute individual politicians for offences of misleading people, so this is very much a live issue. With an offence of this seriousness that is framed in this way, we must ensure that it is applied proportionately, fairly and with great care. That is the purpose of the amendment; it is to ensure that no prosecution under the clause can be brought without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Although clause 11 sets out a structured test for what counts as being “seriously improper”, and the explanatory notes make it clear that the offence is intended to target only the most egregious conduct, the reality is that the clause interfaces with the political environment in a way that few other offences do. “Misleading the public” is a phrase that, regrettably, is used daily in our political discourse. Accusations of “misleading the public”, made fairly or unfairly, are frequently levelled in debates, campaigns and correspondence. Therefore, we need to be absolutely certain that this new criminal offence cannot become a vehicle for politically motivated complaints, vexatious charges, over-zealous private prosecutions, or attempts to use the criminal law to litigate policy disagreements. Requiring the personal consent of the DPP is a well-established constitutional safeguard in precisely this kind of context. It would ensure that decisions to prosecute are taken objectively, independently and at the highest level.

It is not only political actors that we must consider. Senior public officials, regulators, police chiefs, NHS managers or anyone else in a position of public authority might find themselves being accused of misleading the public in complex and fast-moving situations. Often, such situations involve imperfect information, operational pressures or competing obligations. The clause rightly makes it clear that accidental or inadvertent misleading of the public should not be criminalised. However, we must ensure that establishing the threshold for a prosecution remains firmly under the control of the independent prosecuting authority, and not subject to either the ebb and flow of public anger or the risk of tactical litigation.



Some may reasonably argue that the CPS would in practice be involved by discontinuing prosecutions and bringing them under the Director of Public Prosecutions, but that in itself could create a storm for an individual subject to that action. That is why we think a tighter safeguard should be required.

It is not in the amendment, but I would like to ask the Minister about what thought has been given to whether prosecution should be subject to the Attorney General’s permission. Forgive me: I do not know if that is already part of the legislation; I do not think it is, but the Minister will know. For example, when it comes to public order offences—another potentially contentious area—we ask the Attorney General to give permission for prosecution to serve as a safeguard against the inappropriate use of measures.

My final, more general point about clause 11, which we touched on earlier, is about the maximum sentence of two years. What are the Minister’s thoughts on whether there have been any common law versions of a prosecution for this sort of thing in which someone was given a sentence of more than two years? Are the Government sure that this is not unnecessarily constrained compared with the current common law position, which is unlimited? I appreciate that the offences in question are normally more to do with misconduct rather than misleading, but it would still be helpful to get that reassurance.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the shadow Minister for raising this important issue. We agree wholeheartedly with the intention behind the amendment, and I can assure him that the Bill achieves that intent. Schedule 3 makes further provision regarding clause 5 and clause 11 offences. Paragraph 2(2) sets out that,

“Proceedings for an offence under section 11 may be brought only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.”

With that clarification, I hope the shadow Minister will withdraw his amendment. Hopefully, I can answer some of his other queries as we move through the debate.

Clause 11 creates a new offence of misleading the public, which is designed to capture the most serious incidents of misleading the public, such as the behaviour seen after Hillsborough, where officials intentionally spread a false narrative to protect their reputation and caused harm as a result. That, as the shadow Minister rightly states, is punishable by up to two years in prison. We all know the harm that caused and how, three decades on, families are still fighting for justice and accountability for what the spreading of that narrative did. The Independent Office for Police Conduct report on Tuesday was clear: a lie was told; a false narrative was spread to protect reputations and avoid consequences. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that no family ever has to go through what those families went through and continue to go through. I can only imagine how hard that report was to read and the pain that they continue to feel.

The new offence will ensure that when a public official has misled the public, there is accountability. To have committed the offence, an authority or official must have acted with the intention to mislead the public or been reckless as to whether their actions would do so. By reckless, we mean a person acting with the knowledge that there is a risk that they might mislead the public and taking that risk without reasonable justification. It does not include accidental mistakes or inaccuracies. They must have known or ought to have known that their act is seriously improper.

It will be for the judge and the jury to determine whether that test has been met, but clause 11(3)(a) sets out minimum conditions that must be present: that the act—

“involved dishonesty that was significant or repeated…in respect of matters of significant concern to the public”.

That will avoid capturing minor instances of lying or misleading on trivial political or private matters. The act must have caused or have the potential to cause harm. Harm, as we have already discussed, is broadly defined, including economic, physical or psychological harm, including distress. The purpose of this is to avoid capturing inconsequential matters, such a Minister lying about where they went to university or competing in a chess tournament or a local government official overstating their council’s performance. Although these sorts of lies should entail professional consequences, we do not think they meet the bar for criminal sanctions. The individual must also have departed significantly from what would have been expected of them in carrying out their functions. This is to ensure that where it may be necessary to mislead someone as part of a person’s job—for example, as part of an undercover police operation—that is not captured.

This clause as introduced does not apply to devolved matters. We have written to all the devolved Governments to request that the offence be extended in their jurisdiction in line with the other provisions on duty of candour, which apply across the UK. The Northern Ireland Executive, the Welsh Government and the Scottish Government have all confirmed their agreement to extend the offence, and we will be extending the offences accordingly. We hope to bring forward amendments on the territorial extent on Report to ensure full coverage for the United Kingdom.

Subsection (4) also excludes any act done for the purposes of journalism. That is to avoid capturing public service broadcasters and those working for them who would otherwise meet the definition of a public official. That is to ensure that the offence does not impinge on press freedom or existing regimes for media regulation. Although behaviour that meets the threshold for the scope of the offence would clearly be unacceptable, we do not believe that this offence is the appropriate vehicle for determining the veracity of media reporting, as we have already discussed.

Subsection (6) includes a reasonable excuse defence, with specific defences for the exercise of functions by the intelligence services and armed forces on active service. That is necessary to make it clear that when officials can prove that they misled the public to protect national security or this country’s defence operations, they are not subject to criminal sanctions. I stress, however, that this will not prevent the successful prosecution of members of the security services or armed forces who mislead the public for any other purposes, such as personal gain or to protect their reputation.

This is a transformative offence that will ensure that when something goes wrong and public officials lie to the public, there are serious consequences. It will act as a powerful deterrent against the sorts of state cover-ups that we have sadly see all too often.

The hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle asked me about offences which potentially attract two or more years in prison. I will write to him on that and come back on the specifics, as well as on his question about the Attorney General. With that, I commend clause 11 to the Committee.

[Dr Mullan]

I thank the Minister for explaining the clause to us. She has provided the reassurance that we are looking for, and I look forward to receiving further material in writing. I recognise that the Government are attempting to craft an offence that has a high threshold and does not interfere with the wide range of situations that people might seek to apply it to, but I worry that we might end up seeing such questions tested in the courts repeatedly before there is a settled view on what they translate into in reality. I am not sure that it will be as simple as we might think in reality. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3

Offences under Part 2: related provision

[Ian Byrne]

I beg to move amendment 56, in schedule 3, page 44, line 27, after “national,” insert “or”.

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[Dr Mullan]

Despite not relating directly to the Bill, the matter of pensions has come up in Committee a couple of times. We do need to explore that, because there are many situations where people walk off into the sunset. It seems to me that the one lever we still have over people is their pensions. Have the Government considered how such a provision might be used in the future? The Opposition will be looking at it.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will happily raise that issue with the Pensions Minister in our discussions.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby for tabling the amendments. I hope to be able to provide some clarification. Amendments 56 and 57 seek to ensure the same extraterritorial extent applies for the offences of failure to comply with the duty of candour and assistance and the offence of misleading the public.

The intended effect of amendment 56 is already achieved in the Bill as drafted. In schedule 3, paragraph 1(1), the disapplication does not apply if any the criteria of sub-paragraph (1)(a) or (b) are met. It is already an “or” list, not an “and” list. That follows the standard parliamentary drafting convention. To add an unnecessary “or” between sub-sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), when that is already the meaning, would risk putting the position in doubt in other legislation across the statute book and could cause confusion.

Paragraph (1)(2) refers only to the clause 5 offence because the clause 11 offence applies only in England and Wales. A case could not be heard by a court in Scotland or Northern Ireland. However, as I confirmed earlier, we have in principle agreements to extend clause 11 offences to Scotland and Northern Ireland, and we are working with the devolved Governments to draft amendments, which we intend to bring forward on Report, so that the offence is UK-wide.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will speak to each of the clauses in turn. Clause 12 will introduce the first of two new statutory offences to replace the common law offence of misconduct in public office. In its 2020 report, the Law Commission recommended that the common law offence should be abolished and replaced with two new offences that broadly replicate the coverage of the common law offence. In acting on those recommendations, the Government do not intend to change significantly the type of conduct the criminal law will capture. Like the common law offence, the new offences are intended to capture only wrongdoing at the most serious level.

The clause establishes the new offence of seriously improper acts, and is designed to capture the conduct previously caught by the concept of wilful misconduct under the common law offence. The seriously improper acts offence is committed when a person who holds public office uses that office with the intent to obtain a benefit for themselves or another person, or to cause detriment to someone else. They must know or ought to have known that any reasonable person would regard their act as seriously improper.

The offence can capture a wide range of conduct. “Using” an office can include both acts and omissions. “Benefit” and “detriment” mean any benefit or detriment including, but not limited to, financial gain or loss, protection or enhancement of or damage to a person’s reputation, and benefits or detriments of a physical or sexual nature, whether temporary or permanent. When we talk about protection or enhancement of or damage to a person’s reputation, we intend to capture serious situations where someone uses their office in the way that we associate with the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster: the manipulation of evidence in order to protect the reputation of a person, including an organisation, or the spreading of allegations about other people, designed to damage their reputation.

The clause is about not the usual back and forth of everyday politics, but severe abuses of power that undermine the very basis of public service. An act is seriously improper if a reasonable person would consider it so. There is a list of factors that the jury must consider to make that determination, including the extent to which the act involved an intention to mislead or be dishonest by withholding, covering up or misusing information. A defence is available if the person can show that they had a reasonable excuse for their action—for example, a public office holder has to disregard one fraudulent benefits claim to uncover a more serious, larger scale benefits fraud. The offence is indictable and carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. That puts it on par with similar statutory offences, such as bribery and fraud.

The consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions will be required to bring a prosecution under the offence. That is to safeguard against the risk of spurious claims against public officials, including politicians. We have already heard examples of that. It will ensure that only cases that are serious in nature and justify criminalisation are prosecuted. It does not require the personal consent of the director—consent can be delegated—so it should not cause any undue administrative burden.

The clause will ensure that serious misconduct and corrupt behaviour by those in public office will continue to result in criminal sanctions, and that those who abuse positions of public trust are held to account for their actions. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 13 establishes the new offence of breach of duty to prevent death or serious injury. It is designed to capture the conduct previously caught by the concept of wilful neglect of duty under the common law offence. The new offence is committed when a person who holds public office either causes or creates significant risk of causing someone else to suffer critical harm, in breach of a duty to prevent other people from suffering such harm. They must know that they are under such a duty, and their act must fall far below what could reasonably have been expected of them in the circumstances. The offence requires that the person be under a duty to prevent critical harm that arises by virtue of the public office that they hold. That means that the offence can be committed only by public office holders whose roles inherently involve a duty to prevent critical harm—for example, service personnel, firefighters and the police. It does not apply to public office holders whose roles do not put them under a duty to protect the public from critical harm.

The offence is made out only if the public official knows or ought to know that they are subject to that duty. The breach of duty must cause either critical harm or a significant risk of that harm materialising. It will not capture cases where a negligible or insignificant risk of harm is caused. The breach of duty must also have been intentional or reckless. These are both very high criminal thresholds. To act recklessly means to proceed in full awareness of the potential outcome and in circumstances where it is unreasonable to take the risk.

Only the most serious breaches of duty are captured by the offence. The requirement that the act must fall far below the standard that could reasonably be expected of the person in the circumstances ensures that minor or honest mistakes and legitimate but risky operational decisions made in challenging circumstances will not be captured. For example, a law enforcement officer having to decide in the moment whether to take a particular risky operational decision would be caught by the offence only if they intentionally recklessly breach the duty, their act falls far below the standards reasonably expected of them in those circumstances, and they have no reasonable excuse for their actions.

The offence will be triable on indictment only and will carry a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. That is commensurate with other offences where a failure of duty leads to serious or critical consequences, such as gross negligence manslaughter. As with the offence in clause 12, the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions will be required to bring a prosecution under the offence in clause 13. That is to guard against the risk of spurious claims being made against public officials in this position and to ensure that only the most serious cases are prosecuted.

Clause 14 clarifies the territorial application of the new offences in clauses 12 and 13. It makes clear that a public office holder can commit the seriously improper acts or breach of duty offences by their actions either within England and Wales, or in other UK territories such as Scotland or Northern Ireland. The offences in clauses 12 and 13 may also be committed by acts done outside the United Kingdom provided that, at the time of the act, the public office holder is either a UK national or habitually resident in England and Wales. The clause ensures conduct like this could be caught by the new offences.

[Dr Mullan]

I want to make some brief points. I welcome the maximum sentences, which are clearer and in a more natural range, and there is not the uncertainty that I think we still have with the misleading the public offence.

I want to ask the Minister about the role of MPs, however, because she will know that our privilege to speak in the Chamber, including to make allegations of defamation, is unfettered. We can say things that do damage people’s reputations and that cause all sorts of issues, but we are immune from civil procedure. I am not sure how the common law has dealt with equivalent sorts of scenarios, but I can imagine an MP trashing the reputation of a business and that business going under, causing huge harm to an individual who then feels as though they should be able to have a say through this route.

I think we all agree that, although it can be abused, that privilege is really important to the operation of our democracy. Even if not now—the Minister may not have considered this before—it would be helpful to have a written note on the Department’s view about the potential misuse of that privilege to say whatever we want in Parliament, without restriction.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am happy to clarify that for the shadow Minister.

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[Dr Mullan]

This is one area of the Bill where we need some clarity about how exactly it will operate. Before becoming an MP, I worked for a patient advocacy organisation, so I saw at first hand just how challenging inquests can be for patients’ relatives. I spoke to so many families who had to sit and watch while a portrayal of events, which they had no ability to challenge, was given at an inquest. I am sure that many Members have dealt with individuals who have had an experience with a coroner, outside of the big national scandals, that was not as they would want it to be. There is an underlying challenge that coroners are very different from other public bodies, agencies and office holders, because to some extent they can just do their own thing. That makes it very hard to achieve a consistent approach.

I have a number of questions. First, who exactly will decide whether the public authority’s costs are reasonable? The chief coroner was very clear that she felt that coroners were not equipped to do that, and even if they were, it would take time and resources. We all need to understand what the process will be. Importantly, will there be a mechanism for someone to challenge that? If the coroner is not personally engaged with everything that this Government are trying to do with the Bill—as we are sympathetic to—and they do not make any reasonable attempt to control a public body’s costs in line with what we are asking of them, what is the route for challenge?

I have heard concerns from people who work on the frontline of a public body. Sometimes, the reputation of the organisation is defended, but conversely, the reputation of an individual can be at risk in these sorts of situations—I go back to my experience in healthcare. We would not want a perverse scenario where the organisation throws an individual under the bus and makes no particular effort to ensure that their role is adequately explained and defended—accepting that we do not necessarily agree technically that it would be defending, but rather inquisitorial.

Complex family arrangements were raised in the evidence sessions. How exactly does it work if the parents are divorced? The Minister touched on that towards the end of her speech, and mentioned that another family member must not have applied for funding. Again, would there be a limit? Could every single individual family member get help? How would that be determined? The question that politicians always have to come back to is that of funding. Is this new funding that has been allocated to the Ministry of Justice outside of its existing budget, for what we imagine would be a significant increase in legal aid spending? Will the Minister reassure those people who have an interest in other areas of legal aid spending that they will not be reduced as a result of this new area of legal aid spending? I just want to understand where the money has come from.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am grateful for those questions. On who will police the spend, it will not be for the coroner to police it; it will be for the public bodies themselves. They will be under an obligation, because they will also be funding the legal aid for the bereaved families, depending on which public authority or arm of government it comes under. If it is health, for example, that Department will fund the legal aid costs of the bereaved families; if it is the Prison Service, the funding will come from the Ministry of Justice; if it is police, it will be the Home Office, and so on.

[Dr Mullan]

I thank the Minister for clarifying that, but it still leaves the question whether additional money has been allocated to the individual areas of Government spending.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

No, there is no new money for this legislation. Therefore, we hope that the spending that public authorities carry out for inquests will match how much they have to fund for the bereaved families. We hope that this will also be a deterrent against arming up officials when going towards what should be an inquisitorial process.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

The hon. Lady is bang on the money, literally. I cannot tell her how frustrating it has been as a Minister trying to figure out a way forward on this—trying to figure out the cost to the public purse and the taxpayer—when we do not have that data. This will enable us to have the data on exactly how much is being spent by public authorities and Government Departments on legal aid.

This is taxpayers’ money. We heard evidence from the bereaved families that one of the biggest kicks in the teeth for them was that they as taxpayers were funding the legal support for the public authorities that were accused of having a hand in the death of their loved one. That is totally perverse and unacceptable.

[Dr Mullan]

I asked how a coroner would be challenged if they were not adequately policing this. In practice, if a public authority is not doing this in the way that we would want it to, how does the Minister envisage that it will be held to account and costs driven down?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome that point. We have put new powers in the Bill for the coroner to challenge public authorities if they are acting inappropriately. What they bring forward has to be proportionate and reasonable. There are powers on the coroners there. They have to compile a report and complain to the relevant bodies or those individuals with the power to take action against the public authority for not acting in accordance with the guidance set out by the Lord Chancellor or the provisions in the Bill.

[Dr Mullan]

But that is kind of circular, because it takes us back to the coroners. Are the coroners in a position to do that? It is not something they have to do at the minute. As we heard in evidence, judges do that—it is part and parcel of their work—but it is not part of what coroners do. What are we doing in terms of support, information and guidance, and then monitoring that they actually do it?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I have a very close working relationship with the chief coroner, as the hon. Member would probably expect given my role. We work together very closely, and we have had significant conversations about how to work together going forward and about the implementation of the Bill, which will be crucial to its effectiveness. It is important to recognise that coroners, although distinct in their nature, are the judiciary. They are independent and they do have relevant expertise in this regard. I will be working closely with the chief coroner on implementation.

I am not sure whether the hon. Member heard what I said about annual reporting, but any experiences of a public authority failing to abide by the coroner’s instructions will have to be put into the annual report that the chief coroner will provide to the Lord Chancellor—all of this has to be captured—and we will not hesitate to name and shame those who are failing to abide by the duties in the Bill.

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[Ian Byrne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston cannot be here to move the motion because of her father’s illness. She really wanted to be here, and I fully support the new clause, so I am going to speak on her behalf.

New clause 1 proposes a post-legislative assessment, within 12 months of the passing of the Act, of how its provisions on the duty of candour and equality of arms are increasing public confidence in public authorities. Specifically, it would examine whether the internal processes of public authorities are fit for purpose in identifying and investigating failures as they first arise after major incidents. The assessment would also consider the role of the independent public advocate in evaluating how public authorities respond to affected individuals and bereaved families following such incidents.

The report would have to explore whether the powers of the independent public advocate should be extended to facilitate the gathering of information to support inquiries and investigations, to ensure that public authorities and officials act in accordance with the duty of candour. It would also have to examine the case for empowering the independent public advocate to instigate an independent panel, similar to the Hillsborough independent panel, and assess the costs compared with non-statutory and statutory inquiries.

The new clause would ensure that, soon after the Act comes into force, Parliament would receive a clear, evidence-based assessment of whether it is delivering on its aims, and whether the role of the independent public advocate should be strengthened to secure faster truth, greater transparency, and better support for bereaved families after major incidents.

When Hillsborough Law Now launched in 2022, it not only supported the measures in the Bill but called for the establishment of an independent public advocate with powers to set up independent panels like the Hillsborough independent panel. For more than two decades, the legal system failed to deliver truth or justice to the Hillsborough families. In some cases, it even facilitated the propagation of a false narrative, including by officers named in the IOPC report published this week.

It was the Hillsborough independent panel, which was established in 2009 and reported in 2012, that finally set the record straight. I wholeheartedly support that statement. Its process was non-legal, document-based and grounded in transparency rather than adversarial proceedings. In two years it achieved what the legal system had failed to do in 24. One of the key lessons of Hillsborough is that the legal system can fail. The two witnesses, Jenni Hicks and Hilda Hammond, spoke powerfully on behalf of this new clause, and the need to look at how panels in the style of the Hillsborough independent panel can help to achieve justice. I want to put on record that I thought they spoke really eloquently. We cannot claim to have learned the lessons fully unless we provide bereaved families with access to a similar process at an earlier stage.

The Public Advocate Bills introduced by my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston in the Commons in 2016 and by Lord Wills in the Lords in 2014, set out to create an independent public advocate with meaningful powers, including the authority to instigate independent panels akin to the Hillsborough independent panel. The intention was to give bereaved families a route to truth and transparency at an early stage, and to ensure that public authorities could be held to account quickly and that failures in process could be addressed before they became entrenched.

However, the office of the independent public advocate, as currently established under the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, does not yet carry the powers originally envisaged, as the independent public advocate outlined in last Thursday’s evidence session. I think she is open to having more powers to achieve what my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston is looking to set out with the new clause. As it stands, the office of the IPA lacks the statutory authority to gather evidence from those affected, and it cannot initiate independent panels to collate information and assess public authorities’ actions.

I cannot say it strongly enough: the Hillsborough independent panel uncovered what happened at Hillsborough because it had access to the police documents and the reports, so it could see the scale of how some police officers had changed the evidence of those who were at Hillsborough. I include in that my own father, whose report of his experience at Hillsborough was changed beyond all recognition. When he eventually saw what the police had put down for him, it caused him great distress, along with many others. What my right hon. Friend has outlined in the new clause is so important, and without the powers in it the advocate cannot replicate the approach that finally succeeded in the case of Hillsborough, when transparency, document disclosure and independent oversight finally brought truth, in a fraction of the time that the legal system had taken.

The gap in the powers has real consequences today for families who experience disasters or major public incidents. If we are serious about learning the lessons from Hillsborough and other tragedies, which I believe we are, we need to ensure that the independent public advocate has the appropriate authority and resources to act effectively, and that Parliament can scrutinise whether the office is delivering on its intended purpose. New clause 1 would provide for that, and I support it fully. I urge the Minister to consider what my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston laid out in the new clause, and to discuss how we move forward on it.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of some of the sentiment and principle of the new clause, particularly subsection (1)(a) on understanding the impact of the provisions. As discussed, some of this is very novel and we will not always be sure how it pans out. I am not necessarily convinced that “within 12 months” is the right timescale. Thankfully, these things do not happen that often, in the scheme of things, and I am not sure that 12 months is quite enough time to see whether the new system has bedded in, and for there to be examples that we can review. I do not support the timetable, then, but it is important that the Government have a clear strategy for assessing and understanding how everything works in practice.

[Tessa Munt]

I have to disagree a little with the hon. Gentleman. A year is probably a good time in which one can make an initial assessment. We can then recognise what is happening on an annual basis.

With reference to our earlier discussion, might the Minister consider the annual report be the appropriate vehicle to look at what is spent on legal fees, and how that might reduce or increase? It will probably not increase. I believe the IOPC spent £80 million in the span of time for which it considered Hillsborough. If we get the new system right, sums like that £80 million will be reduced to very little, because the IOPC will be able to do its job swiftly and accurately, and to inform the Minister exactly what it has saved out of that £80 million pot, which was ridiculous.