Universities: Statutory Duty of Care

Kerry McCarthy Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[James Naish]

Yes. Undoubtedly one of the universities’ biggest concerns is about how the duty would be implemented and what the implications would be. I am not shying away from the reality that there would be costs for universities, but the question is whether we should put the duty in place. My hon. Friend’s point is about how any such legislation should be implemented, as opposed to whether it is needed in the first place.

It is important to be clear that a statutory duty of care is not about exposing institutions to unreasonable liability. In fact, clearer statutory duties may benefit universities by reducing uncertainty, helping to focus limited resources on the services and support that will make the biggest and most important legal difference, and by providing a shared sector-wide benchmark against which wellbeing and safety interventions can be properly assessed and, when necessary, judged in a court of law.

[Kerry McCarthy (Bristol East) (Lab)]

As a Bristol MP, I very much appreciate the fact that my hon. Friend has taken up the case on behalf of Natasha’s parents. I have had conversations with the University of Bristol about Natasha’s case, and also with the University of the West of England. One issue that comes up is where parents fit in, because students have a right to tell the university that they do not want their parents involved. They are treated as adults in that respect, which can put universities in quite a difficult position if they feel that the parents ought to know what is going on. What thought has my hon. Friend given to that aspect?

[James Naish]

My hon. Friend is right. What I am alluding to is the level of greyness that means that we see people falling through the gaps. Our responsibility in the House is to understand whether those gaps should continue to exist, for valid reasons, or whether a change in the law is required to ensure clarity for universities, parents and students.

I hope that in his response the Minister will address several questions. First, do the Government agree that the current legal position leaves duties unclear until after harm has potentially occurred? Secondly, do the Government accept that reliance on evolving common law places an unreasonable burden on impacted individuals to clarify law through litigation? Thirdly, what assessment has been made of the case for statutory clarity, particularly given the calls from organisations such as the British Medical Association for stronger protections for students?

Finally, if the Government do not believe that a statutory duty is the right approach, how do they propose to deliver the clarity, consistency and accountability that students and universities both currently lack, given the mental health taskforce’s stated aim in December 2025 to

“fill gaps in areas where more consistency is needed”?

Surely there is no better way to ensure the consistent implementation of proactive measures than by ensuring a solid legal basis for that obligation.

This debate goes to the heart of how we balance autonomy with responsibility and independence with protection in one of the most important sectors of our national life. Provision for students has improved, but in reality the consistency of support and legal understanding remain poor, despite words to the contrary. It is down to this House, and this House alone, to determine what more could and should be done. I look forward to colleagues’ contributions and to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Warinder Juss (Wolverhampton West) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Christopher. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (James Naish) for securing this important debate. Currently, there is no general duty on universities to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm to adult students. With much of the University of Wolverhampton in my constituency of Wolverhampton West, I have been working closely with the university’s director of student life and designated safeguarding lead to address this issue.

Campaigners are not asking for strict liability or for universities to take the form of a parent. They are asking for something fair and simple: where a university becomes aware of a foreseeable risk of serious harm to one of their students, it should take reasonable steps to reduce and prevent that risk. That duty of care is applied in workplaces and colleges, and higher education should be no exception.

After I raised this matter in the House last May, I got a response from the Minister for Skills, Baroness Smith of Malvern, who said that a duty of care may arise in certain circumstances, and that such circumstances would be a matter for the courts to decide, based on the facts and context of the case being considered, and would be dependent on the application by the court of accepted common-law principles. I became an MP to be a legislator. As MPs, we cannot absolve ourselves from our duty as legislators by saying that it is for the courts to clarify uncertainties in the law. It is for us not only to clarify the law, but to make it stronger and sensible.

I was a personal injury and clinical negligence solicitor for more than 30 years before I became an MP, and I find it shocking that the common law does not impose a duty of care on universities to exercise reasonable care and skill for the wellbeing, health and safety of their students when they are teaching them or providing education-related services. That also applies to taking reasonable steps to prevent injury, including psychiatric injury, when such a statutory duty exists in prisons, hospitals, primary and secondary schools, and colleges or further education. Duty of care in negligence also exists in other situations: doctor to patient, solicitor to client, manufacturer to consumer, and one road user to another. There are well-established principles of negligence that state that, where a duty of care exists and that duty is breached, resulting in injury and/or financial loss that was reasonably foreseeable, negligence has occurred.

I will bring the tragic case of Abrahart up again. In Natasha’s case, there was reasonable foreseeability of Natasha’s health suffering and her having a psychiatric disorder, but it was held that the university was not negligent because the university did not owe Natasha a relevant duty of care. In October 2017, university staff became aware that Natasha was struggling and was experiencing anxiety and panic attacks in response to oral assessments. In February 2018, a university employee received an email from Natasha, saying:

“I’ve been having suicidal thoughts and to a certain degree attempted it.”

At that time, Natasha had been diagnosed with chronic social anxiety disorder, but the university continued to mark her down on her assessments. The court confirmed that there were other ways of eliciting information from the student rather than having oral assessments. It concluded that, had there been a duty of care in existence, there would have been a breach of that duty, and the university would consequently have been negligent for its actions.

Natasha’s claim succeeded only under the Equality Act 2010 on the grounds of disability discrimination, because the university failed to make reasonable adjustments based on her disability. However, there are other reasons—to do with legal costs and time limits—why, in order to achieve justice, it should be possible to pursue a claim in negligence where a university has been negligent.

[Kerry McCarthy]

It is not adequate for us to have to rely on a determination that someone is suffering from a disability because of mental health issues. In some cases, there will be a history, engagement and a diagnosis of a disorder, but in many others, it could be that the student suddenly feels themselves to be in that situation. There is not always a long pathway to suicide; it could be triggered by a particular event. Does my hon. Friend share my concern that relying on the Equality Act is not adequate in the cases of these students?

[Warinder Juss]

My hon. Friend makes a valid point, and I agree. There will be cases where a student is vulnerable and action needs to be taken, but where that student may not have been diagnosed with a disability. It does not feel fair that in those circumstances the university should not take any steps to deal with the student’s vulnerability.

It cannot be right that there is currently no duty on universities to take reasonable steps to protect the welfare of their students and prevent them from suffering harm when it is reasonably foreseeable that a failure to act will result in harm. Establishing such a statutory duty of care would ensure that the law in this country was brought in line with the position in other common-law countries, like the United States and Australia. More importantly, it will give clarity to judges to ensure that justice is achieved and there is access to justice. Universities will also be given clarity about their responsibilities, so that they can take appropriate action to prevent the loss of young lives in their institutions.

A statutory duty of care for universities would define expectations, embed accountability and promote prevention. It would not burden universities unnecessarily, but would align them with the responsibility already expected in other sectors. This is about fairness, clarity and saving lives, and Parliament must act to close this duty gap. Students and their families deserve better, universities need certainty and the courts need clarity. As parliamentarians, let us make that happen.