Kelvin Hopkins
Main Page: Kelvin Hopkins (Independent - Luton North)Department Debates - View all Kelvin Hopkins's debates with the HM Treasury
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman has made his point in his own inimitable way, but I do not want to be diverted from the substance of what is before us. There is a substantial proposition on the table, and I think it is important for all Members to understand it. The detail that will eventually emerge from the final taskforce report is important, and it would be useful if the Minister could deal with some of the question marks that hang over some of the detail, to which Members have already alluded.
For example, a series of new fiscal disciplines—as they are called—will be pursued across the European Union but, of course, largely for eurozone countries; yet the adoption of enforcement measures will apparently be subject to the negative qualified majority voting procedure. That presumably means that the United Kingdom will take part in any of those decisions. If that is so, can the Minister say how we will inform our policy position if we are involved in votes on enforcement measures? While we may not have a vetoing power here, our role could be strategically significant.
My hon. Friend is using terms like “largely” and “presumably”. These are not definite enough for me. Please will he be firmer and clearer in what he is saying?
I wish I could be firmer and clearer, but we are dealing with a malleable set of proposals. The bundle of directives keeps changing, moving and morphing from phase to phase, and the directives will clearly go into a different phase when the European Council meets in December, but we can discern the rough direction of travel, and many Members will take a firm view on that.
The Minister talked about the sanctions. Yes, it is the case that they may not apply to the UK because of our opt-out from the euro, but the range of non-binding standards and early warning requirements in the event of significant deviation from the adjustment path apparently would apply to the UK; I should be grateful if the Minister would confirm that that is the case. Even if the UK is to be subject only to such commentaries, public observations or other non-binding standards, the Minister should tell the House how they would work and what the implications for us would be. Clearly, what the taskforce report calls the new reputational and political measures will be phased in progressively, but is it correct to read the proposals as also applying to the UK? In other words, is it not true that we will be subject to reporting requirements, potential formal reporting to the European Council in certain circumstances and enhanced surveillance—whatever “enhanced” may mean—if the situation dictates? Is it not also true that we will be subject to onsite monitoring from a mission of the EC—which I thought was curious, and which certainly might be of interest to some Conservative Members—and possible publication in the public domain of these reports and surveillance? Will the proposed regulations to strengthen the audit powers of Eurostat also apply to the UK, and what are the anticipated compliance costs of those changes for the UK and the Treasury? If we fail to comply with the proposed requirements, is it not the case that sanctions could be applied to the UK?
Those of us in opposition are merely asking questions and scrutinising what is on the table, but we are trying to find out what will be the impact on the UK. Ministers are arguing, “Don’t worry, absolutely nothing changes and there is no impact whatever.” As far as I can see, there are strands and suggestions that there will be an impact, both direct and indirect. In that respect, although we might have different views, there might be a point on which we can agree.
If the eurozone deflation and the shrinkage of European economic markets affect our exports, that matters, because the Treasury has depended on them so greatly. The June Budget and the spending review were predicated on a return to strong economic growth here in the UK, based principally on higher business investment and strong export growth. The Office for Budget Responsibility analysis shows that the cuts imposed because of the Chancellor’s austerity programme and his overly speedy deficit reduction strategy will see private consumption shrink rapidly and Government consumption doing the same.
Cuts in domestic expenditure will hit growth—that much is clear—but the Chancellor has bet the shop on the countervailing growth in trade and business investment. The Treasury states clearly that it needs £100 billion of growth in exports and business investment, yet the last time we saw such a massive rate of growth for exports was in 1974 and we achieved that rate of improvement in business investment only in 2005, but the Chancellor’s sums depend on the UK achieving both those record levels in each of the next three years—a very tall order indeed, equivalent to tripling our exports to the US and seeing our exports to China grow 20 times or to India 40 times.
Clearly, our reliance on the eurozone’s appetite for our exports is central to the Chancellor’s strategy, so there are implications for British fiscal policy here.
I thank my hon. Friend for giving way yet again. He focuses on trade, but it is in trade that we have our worst possible relationship with the rest of the EU. We have a gigantic trade deficit. We buy billions more from them every month than they do from us. The only advantage we have had in the last year or two is that we have depreciated the pound relative to the euro and we have started to see a slight improvement in our trade balance with the EU.
If we see growth dented here in the UK because those ripples flow from the eurozone—changes as a result, perhaps, of the measures we are debating—we could see further implications for spending cuts here in the UK in respect of vital public services and more austerity when perhaps stimulus would be the order of the day. However, there is a balance of risks here and it is clearly important for fiscal discipline to be exercised, but responsibly so. We have argued for a sensitive and measured approach to deficit reduction in this country, rather than the doctrinaire approach of steep and swift cuts favoured by the parties whose Members sit on the Government Benches.
I am glad to note the ironic analysis of the Minister in the explanatory memorandum that was referred to, which he signed last week. He said that he believed
“that the main consideration should be whether a Member State’s debt is on a downward trajectory, rather than the specific pace of annual debt reduction”.
He also said that the numerical pace should remain
“only as an indicative benchmark…that…is not used as a concrete rule by which Member States’ debt reduction plans are judged.”
How right he is—if only he applied such pragmatic sense to our economy and public services in the UK, too.
I shall speak briefly, but it is important for the House to know that there are also Members on the Opposition Benches who will be voting against the Government motion, and on similar grounds to do with the implicit transfer of sovereignty in the Commission’s initiative. I congratulate the Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), on ensuring that the House is fully aware of the concern about such matters and on the fact that we are having this debate, as it is largely down to him.
There is serious confusion about the wording of the documents. The terms “all member states”, “eurozone states” and “non-eurozone states except the UK” are used at different points throughout. It would be simpler if only the term “eurozone states” was used throughout, so that we could be absolutely clear that the provisions apply only to the eurozone states. In the first draft regulation—on the preventive arm of the stability and growth pact, as it is called—reference is made to all member states. In the second draft regulation—on what is known as the excessive deficit procedure—reference is made to all member states, but a little later it refers in two places to the eurozone. The third draft regulation talks about eurozone states. The two further regulations, on macro-economic imbalances, refer to member states—not “all member states”—or, alternatively, to eurozone member states, but right at the end there is a reference to non-eurozone member states except the UK. I want to be clear that the provisions apply to the eurozone, not to the United Kingdom, so that we can know precisely where we stand on sovereignty over our own economy.
I, too, had to read the documents several times before I began to understand what was being proposed, but is not the simple distinction that the information-sharing provisions apply to all EU member states, whereas the sanctions under the stability and growth pact apply only to eurozone members?
The Minister himself said that any information about the economy that was needed could be found by Googling it, and there is also the Library note on economic indicators, which I use regularly. All the information is there—for example, in the Budget statements and so on—and we do not need to provide much more than that. There is masses of public information. We do not need to have it in regulations. It can be provided as a matter of course. We must put down a marker for the European Union saying that we will not go this far, and that we do not want changes that show political creep or gradual encroachment of the European Union into British sovereignty over our own economy, going beyond the treaties.
I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby (Austin Mitchell) about the nonsense of the eurozone and the economic arrangements that it entails. There is a reference to “surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances”, but the trade imbalance that I focused on earlier in the debate is serious. We have a massive trade deficit with the rest of the European Union, particularly Germany, which sustains a massive trade surplus. Will the European Union focus on that imbalance?
In 1944, Keynes said that countries running massive trade surpluses should be required to appreciate their currencies to bring them into line. Will that be suggested to Germany? That cannot happen because Germany is in the eurozone, and all those other countries that cannot compete and cannot inflate at a greater rate are having severe difficulties, which are becoming worse year by year. Will that imbalance be addressed? When it is, I will start to take the European Union a little more seriously on economic matters.
I have probably said enough. I intend to vote against the motion, and I hope that the Government will challenge the European Union to make the wording of its documentation right and acceptable to the United Kingdom.