Miscarriage of Justice Compensation

Karl Turner Excerpts

Wednesday 19th March 2025 Westminster Hall

[Ben Lake]

The hon. Gentleman has got to the nub of the matter. That is precisely the effect of the change implemented in 2014. It has devastated the number of successful applications for compensation, because if we consider the data for the period between 1999 and 2024, we can see that, prior to the introduction of the new section 133 test, 45.6% of applicants received compensation for their wrongful convictions, but, following its introduction, just 6.6% of cases were successful—a drop of 39 percentage points. This new test has virtually put a stop to compensation payouts for these kinds of miscarriages of justice—an insurmountable hurdle indeed.

Members may wonder about the purpose of restricting eligibility in this way, and I am sure we will hear arguments that it was done to prevent those exonerated on a technicality from receiving compensation, but the cynic in me fears that the restriction was introduced to cut costs. Prior to 2014, the Ministry of Justice made average annual payouts of £5.9 million. Following the change, we have seen the average annual payouts under the scheme drop by 95%, to an average of £297,000. Even successful applicants have seen their individual compensation payments fall, with the average pre-2014 payment totalling just over £267,000, falling to an average of £61,000 after the change.

I am reminded of Cicero’s teachings, over two millennia ago:

“Justice looks for no prize and no price; it is sought for itself”.

He also said, of course:

“The worst kind of injustice is to look for profit from injustice.”

It is for others to consider whether anyone profits from this injustice, but the savings that the 2014 test realises for the Ministry of Justice perhaps offer an answer to that age-old question of, “What price do we put on justice?” Well, I can tell you, Mr Turner: it is around £5.6 million a year on average, compared with the pre-2014 payments.

The current system therefore places an almost impossible burden on the applicant—one whereby they are required to find a new fact that shows beyond reasonable doubt that they did not commit the offence for which they have been acquitted. The perverse situation into

The perverse situation into which the 2014 change forces the wrongly convicted can be summarised as follows: they are required to prove that they are innocent of a crime for which they have already been exonerated. I appreciate that this is an academic point, but it is worth considering whether some high-profile exonerees—the Cardiff Three, the Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six—would receive compensation if they applied under the scheme today.

To the layman, it is difficult to understand how such a situation is compatible with the principles underpinning our justice system, because it undermines the well-understood principle that we are all innocent until proven guilty. I know there might be a challenge to that assertion, but the fact remains that the current rules place the obligation on the defendant to prove that they did not commit a crime to the criminal standard of proof, which is beyond reasonable doubt.

In Mr Buckle’s rejection letter, the Ministry of Justice, as well as reassuring him that his case had been carefully considered, asserted that, despite rejection of his claim for compensation, he is still presumed to be, and remains, innocent of the charges brought against him. If you were ever looking for a definition of Orwellian doublespeak, Mr Turner, that response is a perfect example. It illustrates how the 2014 change, by reversing the burden of proof, undermines the presumption of innocence and forces the Ministry to perform quite impressive but legally illogical linguistic gymnastics.

For if Mr Buckle is in law presumed to be innocent, surely he must be treated as such by the state. A man presumed to be innocent who has spent more than five years in jail should be compensated. If the state wants to treat him as though he were a guilty man and deny him compensation, why should the burden not fall on to the state to prove his guilt? Claims by the Ministry of Justice—

[Karl Turner (in the Chair)]

Order. The sitting is suspended for approximately 65 minutes for multiple Divisions in the House. If we get back earlier than that and all Members are in their place, I will recommence the debate.

--- Later in debate ---

On resuming—

[Karl Turner (in the Chair)]

We will start where we left off. Injury time will be added to the debate, so I expect it to finish at 5.13 pm. I call Mr Ben Lake.

[Ben Lake]

I am grateful for the additional time to conclude the debate.

Prior to the Divisions, I was reiterating the perversity of the situation that the 2014 change has forced the wrongly convicted into. It can be summarised as follows: they are required to prove that they are innocent of a crime of which they have already been exonerated. To the layman, it is difficult to understand how such a situation is compatible with the principles that underpin our criminal justice system, for it undermines the well-understood principle that we are all innocent until proven guilty. I know that this can be challenged in practice, but the fact remains that the current compensation rules place the obligation on the defendant to prove that they did not commit a crime—a crime, of course, of which they have already been acquitted to the criminal standard of proof, which is beyond all reasonable doubt.

Let me return to the case of my constituent Mr Buckle. In its rejection letter, the Ministry of Justice, as well as reassuring him that his case had been carefully considered, asserted that, despite rejecting his claim for compensation, he is still presumed to be and remains innocent of the charges brought against him. If we were ever looking for a definition of Orwellian doublespeak, this response is a perfect example. It illustrates the way in which, by reversing the burden of proof, the 2014 change undermines the presumption of innocence and forces the Ministry to perform quite impressive, but illogical, linguistic gymnastics. For if Mr Buckle is presumed to be innocent in law, he must be treated as such by the state. A man presumed to be innocent, who has spent more than five years in jail, should be compensated; if the state wants to treat him as though he were a guilty man, and deny him that compensation, why should the burden of proving his guilt not fall on the state?

The Ministry’s claims that Mr Buckle is still presumed to be, and remains, innocent of the charges brought against him ring rather hollow when he is also denied a single penny in redress. It is clearly an affront to justice that the eligibility test prevents those who have been wrongly convicted from enjoying the full and unconditional benefits of being presumed innocent.

There is a growing acceptance of the need for action on this matter. Sadly, the list of miscarriages of justice that have perhaps not received as much media attention, but which are just as deserving of compensation, grows ever longer. I could mention cases such as that of Sam Hallam, who was imprisoned for seven years; Victor Nealon, who was imprisoned for 17 years; or Oliver Campbell, who spent 11 years in prison and a total of 34 years fighting to clear his name.

All have suffered unimaginable harm as a consequence of their wrongful convictions and, just like my constituent Mr Buckle, deserve justice. The new UK Government have an opportunity to provide it, and I urge them to address this injustice without delay. I know that the Minister will agree with the principle that the state should compensate those who have wrongly been deprived of their liberty by the state, and I would welcome confirmation from her that this is the Government’s position.

The Law Commission is consulting on reform to the law governing criminal appeals, because it, too, acknowledges that the current state of affairs is completely unfair. The Law Commission’s intervention is to be welcomed, in so far as it acknowledges the unfairness of the current position of the wrongly convicted. In its consultation, the commission suggests that, if the burden is to fall on an accused to prove innocence to obtain compensation, it should be to the civil standard, rather than the criminal standard, as is the position in every other situation in a criminal case where the evidential burden shifts to the defence. That would bring things into line with the normal state of affairs. Will the Minister offer the Government’s position on the Law Commission’s proposal? Would the Government accept such a recommendation? If they are minded to accept, will they ensure that the recommendation is applied retrospectively to those wrongfully convicted since 13 March 2014?

Although I cautiously welcome to the intervention of the Law Commission, and agree that it would make the current situation fairer, it still does not explain why someone presumed innocent has a further obligation or burden to prove it, nor would it address the failings made by the scheme in determining Mr Buckle’s application for compensation, or prevent other claims from being rejected after similar careful consideration.

If the Government maintain that it is necessary for a person presumed innocent to prove it to receive compensation, I do not believe the appropriate authority to make that decision is an official at the Ministry of Justice, someone who, through no fault of their own, will be unfamiliar with the facts of the case and will not have witnessed the evidence given under oath, but who instead must work solely from the papers. Such an individual is not best placed to decide on such applications.

Surely it is the trial jury that is best placed to decide whether the evidence proved Mr Buckle—in this case—to be both not guilty and innocent. I request that the Minister meets us to discuss the handling of Mr Buckle’s specific application and also the merits of amending the law to allow a judge to ask the trial jury, in circumstances where they have acquitted the defendant on all charges, to consider also whether they are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant is innocent of those same charges.

If it is the Government’s intention to ensure that true victims of miscarriages of justice are fairly compensated, asking the trial jury to make the decision must be the fairest way. It is difficult to see any rational argument against it. I ask the Minister to be kind enough to agree to a meeting to discuss how we can ensure that Mr Buckle is granted that opportunity, so that this miscarriage of justice and the ordeal that he and his family have endured is finally brought to an end. Urgency is key, because justice delayed is justice denied.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Karl Turner (in the Chair)]

I remind Members to bob if they wish to catch my eye to be called. I call the Chair of the Justice Committee.