Draft Code of Practice on Reasonable Steps to be taken by a Trade Union (Minimum Service Levels) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJustin Madders
Main Page: Justin Madders (Labour - Ellesmere Port and Bromborough)Department Debates - View all Justin Madders's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(1 year ago)
General CommitteesIt is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Nokes. I draw the Committee’s attention to my membership of the GMB and Unite trade unions.
I thank the Minister for his introduction. However, it will come as no surprise to him that the Opposition will oppose the code of practice. He described it as controversial, which is an understatement. We remain clear in our view that the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act is fundamentally unworkable and places undue limitations on an individual’s freedom of association. These freedoms have been fought for and won over many decades, and they deserve much better than to be chipped away and undermined in the way that we see before us today. Labour has promised to repeal the legislation when we get into government, and we stand by that pledge.
“Reasonable steps” is a pivotal phrase that jumps out at anyone reading the Act. It stands out so much not only because it is vague and is left undefined in the primary legislation, but because the phrase’s definition carries hugely punitive consequences for those who get it wrong. It determines whether a union’s actions could leave it liable to proceedings in tort for sums that would be likely to bankrupt it. It could also see an individual worker’s protections against unfair dismissal removed. Those are not issues that as legislators we can ignore.
How “reasonable steps” is defined is a fundamental part of the legislation. As the Bill progressed through the House, we repeatedly asked for greater clarity as to what it meant. Time and again, we asked what constituted “reasonable steps”. In response, all we got from the Minister was that it would be for a court to decide.
My hon. Friend and I have many things in common, one of which is that we were both trade union lawyers, which Government Members perhaps think are not a good thing. Why are the Government so keen to give so much business to employment lawyers? The code of practice’s use of the phrase that my hon. Friend has just mentioned—“reasonable steps”—is a lawyer’s dream, whether they be on the employer’s side or the workers’ side. In legal libraries across the country, there are fat books of case law to determine what is and is not reasonable in various employment situations. The code is a recipe for further clogging up the courts, and it will cost further money for both trade unions and employers. Does my hon. Friend agree that it is absolutely ridiculous?
Yes. We both have some industrial experience of how this works, so we can see what is going to happen. There has been no regulatory impact assessment for the code of practice. If there had been, it would have produced some eye-watering numbers on what it will mean for legal costs not just for trade union members, but in the end for the taxpayer, because a lot of the disputes will involve public sector employers.
During the passage of the Bill, the Minister’s refrain was that it is for the courts to decide, but even after the code of practice is issued, it will still be up to the courts to decide. There are still so many ambiguities and unanswered questions. The fact that we had to vote on such an important piece of legislation without any clarity about what “reasonable steps” meant shows that this debate is taking place 10 months too late. As elected legislators, we really should have known what this all meant before being asked to vote on a Bill that was passed into law. That is no way to go on, and it is by no means the only example of this Government rushing through legislation without an adequate opportunity for scrutiny.
Let us be honest: we were told at the time that there was an urgent need for this legislation, and that it needed to be rushed through a Committee of the whole House in just one day. That was back in January. We are now in November, so in reality we could have had a proper Bill Committee stage and evidence sessions in which these issues were properly debated and voted on. Will the Minister tell us whether the rush at the start of the year was because the Government did not want scrutiny of the Bill? Or was it because they were making it up as they went along?
The provisions before us are at odds with expectations about what the Act was meant to deliver. The code of practice does not alleviate any of our concerns about the workability of the legislation. Actually, it adds more levels of concern, complexity and ambiguity. It contains provisions that go well beyond what was discussed and included in the Act, and it contains language that is at odds with ministerial comments at the Dispatch Box. Many important elements are left undefined, presumably for the court to pass judgment on at some point—not to mention the inconsistencies in the code’s guidance, which I will come on to. Unreasonable expectations are also being placed on unions to police the behaviour of their members, and there are excessive diktats on the language to be used in communications between a trade union and its members.
The Minister says that measure has been produced as a result of consultation, but we know that most of the employers’ organisations, never mind the trade unions, think that this is a complete mess. The reason why it is still before us today shows us everything about where the Conservative party is coming from with this legislation. The document deliberately defines the phrase “reasonable steps” in a way that is designed to infringe on a trade union’s actions to a degree that is not in line with the Act’s stated policy aim, which is to reduce disruption during strikes. Put simply, we believe that the code seeks to further restrict the right to strike and limit the lawful actions of trade unions during a period of industrial action.
Turning to the first recommended step—the “identification of members”—it is clear that the interpretation that the code offers is unduly burdensome on unions. It imposes tight deadlines and has the effect of creating confusion. That is before we look at whether this can be done in a GDPR-compliant manner. The Minister did not really address the concerns that several hon. Members raised about what happens in a workplace where more than one trade union is recognised by the employer. Of course, that is quite commonplace.
Paragraph 19 is the most important part of this section of the code of practice. It states:
“Unions should begin identifying their members who are subject to the work notice as soon as reasonably practical after receiving a work notice”.
That means that with potentially as little as seven days’ notice, a union would have to comb through a list—most likely just a list of names—and pick out its members who could be involved in a particular industrial dispute. But not only that: due to an employer’s right to vary a work notice up to four days prior to strike action, that work could be in vain. I will return to that issue shortly. To me, this responsibility seems particularly onerous. We should remember that the sectors in which work notices can be introduced have vast workforces and can be national in scope. It is quite possible that an industrial dispute could involve hundreds of thousands of workers across the country and potentially impact hundreds of different workplaces.
For example, the RMT has highlighted that during a multi-train company dispute, similar to the one that has taken place over the past 18 months, a number of employers could send more than 10,000 names, comprising 100 different grades working at 100 different locations. To provide unions with a matter of days to sort through such an expansive list and identify which members could be impacted by the strike is an enormous undertaking. I am sure that if such an obligation was placed on a business, Ministers would be jumping up and down about all the extra red tape, but we know that this Government do not judge trade unions by the same standards.
One could even take the view that this expectation is designed to be completely impossible, especially given that there is no guarantee that employers will provide defining characteristics alongside the names. That means that the union may not be able to differentiate between two people with exactly the same name or a similar surname, for example. The guidance addresses that by stating that unions “may wish” to engage with employers ahead of strike action on how work notices can be designed to avoid that. That will depend on employers’ co-operation, although, as we have heard, they will be subject not to a statutory code of practice, but to non-binding guidance, which gives us no guarantee that they will co-operate at all.
What steps will the Minister take to address that? Will action be taken against employers that fail to engage with unions to help them to differentiate workers? How will the Minister ensure that any union conducting strike action in the short term will receive work notices that allow them to differentiate names on the list? Will they be offered dispensation if they are unable to identify any workers within a very tight deadline?
Paragraph 20 of the code offers guidance on employers’ ability to vary work notices at four days’ notice. It is hard to understand how that provision could not be deliberately designed to cause confusion and undermine trade unions. What will happen if an employer varies a notice over a bank holiday weekend, or even at Easter, when there is a bank holiday either side of the weekend? Are trade unions expected to have people perpetually on call during such periods just in case another notice is issued? The code makes no mention of bank holidays and weekends, so might a union be asked to respond to hundreds of varied work notices at two days’ notice—or even one day’s notice—with no leeway given?
If employers are not compelled to share information, is this dog’s dinner of legislation even remotely workable?
The overwhelming response to the consultation on the measure, and to that on the original Bill, was that the process will be very difficult in practice. That is because it is not about providing minimum service levels, but about trying to stop trade unions from exercising their lawful and democratic right to take industrial action.
The instruction at paragraph 25 of the code of practice that a union should send its compliance notice to its members “by electronic means” is the biggest irony in all this, because the Government have sat on a review on e-balloting for industrial disputes for some five years, yet made no attempt to implement it. Does the Minister finally accept that it might be reasonable to allow trade unions to enter the 21st century, with industrial action communications sent by email? Does he accept that that should include the actual balloting for industrial action? It is inconsistent, to say the least, that the code of practice specifically instructs unions to contact members about industrial action electronically, yet the law specifically prohibits them from balloting their members by email. I know that the Minister has had a lot of practice in e-balloting from his party’s leadership contests, so does he now accept that it should be possible to ballot trade union members on industrial action electronically?
Paragraph 25 further states that
“if the union is aware that any member will be unlikely to access electronic communications before the…strike”
it should send notice by “first class post” instead. What on earth does that mean? Is a union to require a read receipt from every member to form a view of whether they are likely to access their emails? Does the Minister realise that even four days’ notice would be asking rather a lot of Royal Mail, leaving aside bank holidays and weekends, because the latest stats on the delivery of first-class mail show that it is well below its performance targets?
The most problematic aspect of the code is probably paragraph 20, given its provisions on varying work notices. Anyone tasked with ensuring that all the right members are contacted within the incredibly tight timescale of seven days will experience a logistical nightmare, and that would only be exacerbated by the option of amendment only four days out.
Sadly, the provision leaves the door open to employers to deliberately and purposefully issue erroneous work notices in the first instance, only to vary them closer to the relevant date with a view to undermining industrial action. Members should not forget that “four days before” can start at 11.59 pm on the relevant day, effectively leaving three days. While the motivation might not be malevolent—it could be due to negligence—the practical effect of the requirement will be that a union would be expected to contact an employee to encourage them to attend work on the day of a strike, but then say to them a couple of days later, “Actually, you don’t need to attend,” while telling a whole new set of people that they need to attend. It is not hard to see how that could be abused to create an air of confusion on the part of the worker as to whether they are meant to be on strike or at work. When the consequences for making a mistake are so great, it is understandable that a worker would be likely to err on the side of caution and attend the workplace. Of course, all the energy and time expended on deciding who needs to get a notice and who does not could be spent on trying to resolve the dispute.
All those problems are compounded by a contradiction in the code of practice. Paragraph 19 indicates that, under the duty, a union is expected to take reasonable steps to contact members included in a work notice as soon as is “reasonably practical”.
Does my hon. Friend share my confusion about why the onus for communicating with members who have been named in work notices has been placed on unions, rather than on employers, which routinely communicate with their employees as a matter of course? Does he also worry, as I do, that given the difficulties that unions often encounter in contacting members, the measure greatly increases the likelihood of workers being subject to disciplinary action and even dismissal?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right that the code puts the onus on trade unions. How odd is it that we are in a world in which a Government instruct a trade union to tell employees to attend the workplace? I cannot think of anything more bizarre. But the measure is not actually about ensuring that people attend work; it is about undermining collective industrial action. From what we have seen today, it is clear that that is exactly the Government’s intention.
The trade union’s duty to take reasonable steps to contact members as soon as is “reasonably practical”, contained in paragraph 19, is contradicted in step 2 of the code, which provides guidance on how to encourage members to comply with a work notice. In this step, the code states that once a union has identified all its members, it should communicate this to them via a compliance notice. Paragraph 23 states that the union
“should send the compliance notice before the strike action”
but that it would be “reasonable” to send the notice
“once it is clear that the work notice will not be subject to variation by the employer—either because the last day on which the employer can vary the work notice without the union’s agreement has passed or because the employer has notified the union in writing that it will not vary the work notice”.
That is completely inconsistent with what the code of practice states earlier—that the union should contact its members as soon as is “reasonably practical”. They cannot both be right. Given the consequences of getting this wrong for both the trade union and the individual, the code of practice really ought not to contain such a mixed message. Will the Minister therefore confirm whether a union is supposed to wait until the conditions in paragraph 23 are met, or just get on with it as soon as is “reasonably practical”, as paragraph 19 suggests?
Beyond that issue, the code’s recommendations on encouraging members to comply with a work notice are plainly unreasonable, misleading and complex. Step 2 of the code contains stipulations that are drafted in such a way that grounds for legal challenge will inevitably be opened. Paragraph 26 and annex A, in particular, can be seen to do this. Paragraph 26 includes a list of eight features that a compliance notice must state “clearly and conspicuously”, and annex A contains a pro forma template for unions to use, which is recommended for use by unions at paragraph 27. Paragraph 27 states that a union can amend the template but that the compliance notice must retain
“the overall substance and effect of the notice”.
So why go down this road at all? Why go to the trouble of drafting a template letter and then say that unions can vary it? Is that not just inviting trouble?
We know that the slightest transgression in an industrial action ballot can lead some employers to seek injunctions, even though the practical effect of that transgression is nil, so there is a concern that any deviations from the template will invite legal challenge from employers. The TUC believes that deviations
“will almost certainly lead some employers to seek to legally challenge unions”.
Does the Minister agree with that point of view? How does he think that such satellite litigation will aid the resolution of industrial disputes? Can he also explain the rationale for including a pro forma template on top of the guidance contained in paragraph 26?
Unfortunately, that is not the only way in which the code could instigate legal challenge. Plenty of areas in the code appear to allow for challenges if the union makes an error. Paragraph 39, for instance, states:
“communicating with members whom the union knows are identified in a work notice to induce them to strike”
could constitute an act that undermines steps taken to comply with a work notice. Taken literally, that means that for the period of the work notice, the trade union cannot contact any member subject to one at all with any information on the industrial action. Is the Minister saying that on certain occasions, for a certain period, a trade union cannot contact some members to tell them what is happening with the strike? The mere mention that a strike is taking place could be considered an inducement to strike. I am interested to hear what the Minister says about that, because to me it looks like a fundamental attack on democratic freedoms.
If the Minister does not accept that that is the intention behind paragraph 39, does he accept that there could be a real problem in some circumstances—for example, where there is a technological or administrative error in distributing emails on a mailing list that could risk some of the wrong members receiving that email? Trade unions in those circumstances would lose their protection from liability in tort and employees would lose their automatic protection from unfair dismissal. Is that really what is intended with the code of practice, because that is what paragraph 39 seems to suggest?
The stakes are far too high for such an error to constitute a breach of the code, especially given that the names included in the work notice are liable to change, often at short notice. As there is already guidance in the code stating that compliance notices should include statements telling those on work notices to ignore calls to take part in strikes, paragraphs 38 to 40 seem excessively punitive and unnecessary. The only conclusion that one can draw from such a communication—a blackout around strikes—is that this is a deliberate attempt to undermine trade unions and impact the effectiveness of industrial action.
I will return briefly to the annex and paragraph 26; this is an example of the state trying to dictate the contents of a union’s communications with its members. First, according to the stipulation in paragraph 26(f), unions are expected to encourage workers to undertake the work set out in the work notices. We think it is inappropriate for a union to encourage a worker to comply with a work notice, as it could undermine the collective endeavour of industrial action. Yes, a union must advise a worker of the possible consequences of failing to comply with a work notice, but it is not the role of the state to instruct a union to do that in an enthusiastic way, as is implied in the code of practice.
What does “encourage” even mean? Is it like a football supporter encouraging their team from the terraces and cheering the team on? Is it sending text messages to a mobile phone with affirming messages such as “Please go to work today. I know you’ve got this”? It seems a very odd thing to request that a trade union encourage its members to go to work, given that presumably on every other day, the employee does not require such encouragement to turn up and do their job.
Is there not another concern that trade unions have flagged up? Trade union representatives will be identified in the work notices, so the trade union representative will be the one who is picked to, effectively, bust their own industrial action.
Yes, I will get on to that—there is a bit more, I am afraid, Ms Nokes, because there is an awful lot to talk about. The measure fundamentally pits trade unionists against their core beliefs and principles. That does not seem to register with Government Members, but it really is doing that.
The requirement to encourage members to turn up for work is an odd thing to request, given the failure to explain the legal issues with the necessary accuracy in paragraph 26, which states that unions are advised to tell members that they should receive from the employer
“a statement that the member is an identified worker…and must comply with the…notice given to the union.”
But there is no obligation under the Act for an employer to communicate with workers named by the work notice. Employers need do so only if they want to keep open the option for dismissing them for not attending work. If not, they can let the trade union do all the work.
The code also states that the compliance notice should contain a comment stating that two notices should be received from the employer and that if the member receives both, they
“must carry out the work during the strike or could be subject to disciplinary proceedings which could include dismissal”.
However, the Act gives neither the employer nor the Government the power to compel people to attend work. What it actually does is state that a worker who has been notified by the employer that they are named in the work notice may be dismissed and denied the automatic right to protection from unfair dismissal for taking part in the strike. The code does not highlight that a worker who was dismissed might still be able to bring an unfair dismissal complaint under the general law.
The code and template letter are therefore misleading. But why do they have any reference to dismissal at all? The template requires the union to warn a member that
“you could also be dismissed as a result”
of not following the work notice. However, that is not what the Minister told us would happen. When he was at the Dispatch Box on Monday 22 May 2023, he said:
“The reality is that nobody will be sacked as a result of the legislation.”—[Official Report, 22 May 2023; Vol. 733, c. 103.]
If that still stands, why does the code of practice require unions to warn people of something that is not going to happen? Why would the Minister ask unions to write to their members about something that he said at the Dispatch Box would not happen? I invite him to withdraw his comments or, ideally, withdraw the whole draft code.
The compliance notice template in annex A states:
“The work required of you should be work which you normally do or work which you are capable of doing and is within your contract of employment.”
Can the Minister tell us whether the notice remains effective if it requires someone to undertake a role with which they are not familiar? After all, many contracts of employment have a catch-all clause requiring employees to undertake whatever duties their employer sees fit. At the very least, there ought to be some guidance on what the employee should do if they face such a request. That point also raises the question of what happens if a non-union member is included in a work notice, but the employer fails to contact them. Would they be subject to disciplinary procedures as well? Both those examples show how far the code is from providing certainty; it just adds more complexity and confusion.
The code of practice’s guidance on picketing is an element that came as a surprise, as there was no mention of it at all in the Act. It is covered by different legislation and a different code of practice. There was next to no discussion of picketing when the Bill passed through Parliament, so its inclusion in the code of practice is another example of the way in which this Government have sidestepped scrutiny at every opportunity. I see no legitimate reason for its inclusion; it seems that it is an attempt to expand the scope of the legislation via the back door. That is at complete odds with the purpose of a code of practice that is supposed to put flesh on the bones of how an Act works, not to expand its reach.
Step 3 of the code is simply titled “Picketing”. It sets standards on the union to instruct picket supervisors. Paragraph 33 states that
“the union should…use reasonable endeavours to ensure that picketers avoid, so far as reasonably practicable, trying to persuade members who are identified on the work notice not to cross the picket line at times when they are required by the work notice to work.”
The irony of a code of practice explaining what is meant by the term “reasonable steps” by using the phrase “reasonable endeavours” is certainly not lost on me. It is not exactly a great leap forward, is it? Using “reasonable endeavours” not to do something is a novel concept: it is usually a concept applicable where there are positive obligations on someone to act. I struggle to see how that translates into a negative obligation.
Certainly, nothing that I have heard today explains what that means in practice. But that is the point, isn’t it? This and many other areas in the code of practice leave important questions open to interpretation by the courts. It will take a case making its way to court, and probably several levels of appeal, before it becomes clear what “reasonable endeavours” a union must actually take to prevent members persuading those on a work notice not to cross a picket line. The weight of the punishments that the union and its workforce could be forced to pay will doubtless mean that unions will be cautious about how this works in practice.
This is a legal nonsense. It is quite blatantly a tactic from the Government to attack a union’s right to strike by blunting some of its most effective tools. However, it is a tactic that will add to court backlogs, as we have heard, and will cost the taxpayer, unions and businesses large sums of money when all these issues end up being litigated. Ultimately, it will do absolutely nothing to improve industrial relations in this country.
I will return to the crux of the extract from which I quoted: that picketers should not try to persuade workers listed in a work notice to join them on strike. It is clearly drafted to completely undermine the role of a picket, to the extent that it will be unworkable and difficult to enforce. How is a picket supervisor supposed to know who is on a work notice, especially if the notice runs to hundreds or even thousands of people? Are they expected to know them by appearance? Unless they are told otherwise, picketers are therefore going to have no idea who is bound by the work notice and who is not.
It is completely unclear how the picket supervisors, who are expected to execute this duty and enforce this measure, will be able to do so in practice. The aim of the picket is to encourage compliance with the strike, but the picket supervisor is expected to undertake duties well beyond ensuring that a worker named in a work notice simply is not hindered in going into work. It is another fundamental attack on the role of trade unions. Does the Minister understand that he is asking trade unions to turn on their core beliefs and jettison the very essence of what they stand for?
It is also unclear whether the Government have considered the case of Ezelin v. France, as the TUC’s submissions recommend. In that case, the European Court of Human Rights found that requiring a lawyer to disassociate himself from a demonstration infringed his rights under article 11 of the European convention on human rights? A response on that issue from the Minister, either in his closing speech or in writing after today’s proceedings, would be appreciated.
Other hon. Members wish to speak, so I will draw to a conclusion. We are being asked to vote on a code of practice that goes far beyond the legislation that it is meant to explain. It places potentially insurmountable burdens on unions, leaves important legal questions unanswered, requires unions to be the mouthpiece of the state and expects unions to enforce a draconian piece of legislation that goes against the very essence of their values. To top it all off, there is the threat, should unions not follow the guidance to the letter, of having to pay out exorbitant costs through proceedings in tort and of leaving all their striking workers vulnerable to being sacked.
It is clear what the code of practice seeks to achieve. As we said of the Act throughout its passage, it is an attack on trade unions and their members, and it undermines the fundamental right to strike. We cannot vote for it. No one who believes in freedom of association can vote for it in good conscience. The Government need to go back to the drawing board and redraft the code of practice—or, better still, get rid of the Act altogether.